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Abstract 
 
This thesis offers a detailed analysis of the politics of neoliberalism and 
financialization in the context of the UK mortgage market. The analysis 
addresses an often implied but conceptually and empirically neglected feature 
in the otherwise booming social sciences literature on financial markets and 
the global financial crisis: how political struggles shape economic space. It 
does this against the background of the construction of the UK mortgage 
market which, as opposed to its American counterpart, is still under-
researched.   
 
The thesis addresses these shortcomings by engaging the theory of Ernesto 
Laclau and the associated logics approach of the Essex School of Political 
Discourse Theory. It provides a detailed genealogical analysis of the 
transformations in the mortgage market during the three decades leading up 
to the financial crisis emphasising the significance of hegemonic struggles 
and ideology in its constitution.  
Empirically, the thesis investigates the transformation of the mortgage market 
from a ‘sheltered circuit’ dominated by a building society price cartel in the 
1970s to a sphere that is increasingly driven by global financial markets.   
 
It is argued that at the heart of these transformations was the neo-liberalist 
deregulation in the name of the signifier ‘freedom’ which, in the neoliberalist 
age, became almost exclusively equated with ‘free markets’.  
The demutualisations of the 1990s are presented as an outcome of 
neoliberalist deregulation leading to a fundamental shift of power in the 
market. In return for improved access to capital markets and powered by 
ideological discourses, the demutualisation of 10 societies resulted in a 
massive transfer of mortgage assets to the stock market and contributed 
significantly to the financialization of mortgages. The struggles and resistance 
surrounding these events illustrate their contingent nature. However, the 
proposed re-mutualisation of Northern Rock had been squandered amidst a 
re-affirmation of neoliberalist ideology centring on the market as the best 
provider of mortgages.  
 7
 
Table of Contents 
 
Abbreviations ................................................................................................. 10 
 
Table of Figures ............................................................................................. 11 
 
Introduction .................................................................................................... 12 
1. The Story So Far: A View on the Financial Crisis ................................... 12 
1.1 Current Development in the Global Financial Crisis ......................... 12 
1.2. Neoliberalism and Finance-Led Growth ........................................... 14 
1.3. The Financialization of Mortgage Finance ....................................... 16 
3. The Role of Building Societies ............................................................ 17 
2. Why Laclau for an Analysis of the Economy and Finance? .................... 21 
3. Towards a Strategy for Research ........................................................... 23 
4. Methodology, Methods and Empirical Analysis ...................................... 26 
4.1 Methodology ..................................................................................... 26 
4.2 Data Collection and Analysis ............................................................ 28 
 
Chapter One: The Theory of Ernesto Laclau and Political Discourse Theory 
(PDT) ............................................................................................................. 40 
1. Discourse ............................................................................................... 40 
1.1 The Philosophical Roots of Ernesto Laclau’s Theory of Discourse ... 40 
1.2 Discourse as a Relational Complex; Logics of Difference and 
Equivalence ............................................................................................ 42 
1.3 The Non-Unity of Discourse and the Centrality of the Signifier ......... 46 
1.4 Radical Contingency and the (Im)Possibility of Society .................... 49 
1.5 Subjectivity ........................................................................................ 51 
1.6 Antagonism ....................................................................................... 54 
2. Hegemony .............................................................................................. 57 
2.1. Hegemony and Marxism .................................................................. 57 
2.2 Three Models of Hegemony in the Theory of Laclau ........................ 59 
2.3 Hegemony and Anti-Essentialism ..................................................... 63 
2.4 The Primacy of the Political .............................................................. 64 
2.5 Universalism and Particularism ......................................................... 68 
3. Political Discourse Theory and the Logics Approach ............................. 72 
3.1 Four Dimensions of Socio-Political Reality:  The Political-Social Axis
 ................................................................................................................ 73 
3.2 The Ideological – Ethical Axis ........................................................... 75 
3.3 Logics ............................................................................................... 77 
4. Ideological Fantasy ................................................................................ 80 
Conclusion ................................................................................................. 86 
 
Chapter Two: What is Economy? ................................................................... 90 
Introduction ................................................................................................ 90 
1. Representing Economy: The Hegemony of Neoclassical Economics .... 92 
1.1 A World of its Own: Neoclassical Economics’ Theoretical Foundations
 ................................................................................................................ 92 
1.2 A Match Made in Heaven: Neoclassical Economics and Neoliberalism
 ................................................................................................................ 95 
 8
2. Laclau and Mouffe and the Spectre of Economism ................................ 98 
3. Towards a Poststructuralist Political Economy ..................................... 102 
3.1 Markets as Contingent Acts of Creation ......................................... 102 
3.2 Putting the Concept of the Political to Work for the Economy ......... 103 
3.3 Economy and Fantasy .................................................................... 106 
3.4 Relationality and Irrationality in Poststructrualist Political Economy 108 
Conclusion ............................................................................................... 112 
 
Chapter Three: What is Financialization? .................................................... 114 
Introduction .............................................................................................. 114 
1. Structural Shifts of Capital Accumulation: Introducing Financialization 116 
2. Approaching Financialization: Three Perspectives ............................... 118 
2.1. Regulation Theory ......................................................................... 118 
2.2 The British Social Accountants ....................................................... 121 
2.3 Cultural Approaches and the Financialization of Everyday Life ...... 125 
Conclusion ............................................................................................... 128 
 
Chapter Four: Mortgage Market Financialization in the UK and the Financial 
Crisis ............................................................................................................ 130 
Introduction .............................................................................................. 130 
1. Contextualising Mortgage Market Financialization ............................... 133 
1.1 The Global Financial Crisis and the Financialization of Mortgages . 133 
1.2. Transforming the Mortgage Market ................................................ 136 
2. Securitization and the Secondary Mortgage Market ............................. 140 
2.1 The Financialization of Homes and the Creation of a Market for 
Mortgage Backed Securities ................................................................. 140 
2.2. Securitization and Collateralized Debt Obligations ........................ 147 
3. Liquid Homes ....................................................................................... 153 
4. The Politics of Homeownership ............................................................ 159 
Conclusion ............................................................................................... 162 
 
Chapter Five: Neoliberalism on the Rise ...................................................... 165 
Introduction .............................................................................................. 165 
1. The Demise of Embedded Liberalism and the Rise of Neoliberalism ... 169 
1.1 Capitalism Contained: Embedded Liberalism and the Post-War Years
 .............................................................................................................. 169 
1.2 ‘Stagflation’: The Dislocations of Embedded Liberalism ................. 172 
1.3 Antagonism and Chains of Equivalence: Neoliberalism on the Rise
 .............................................................................................................. 175 
1.4 Freedom: What’s in a Name? ......................................................... 176 
2. Transforming the Mortgage Market: Struggles, Deregulation and 
Neoliberalisation in the British Context ..................................................... 179 
2.1 Building Societies: A Brief History ................................................... 179 
2.2 The Evolution of the UK Mortgage Market and the Building Society 
Price Cartel ........................................................................................... 181 
2.3 In the Name of Freedom: Contesting the Cartel ............................. 186 
2.4  A Piece of the Action: The Arrival of the Banks ............................. 189 
2.5 ‘Home Loan Battles’: The Advent of Thatcher and the End of the 
Cartel .................................................................................................... 190 
Conclusion ............................................................................................... 196 
 9
Chapter Six: Big Bang and Demutualisation: The Transformation of the British 
Mortgage Market in the 1980s and 1990s .................................................... 198 
Introduction .............................................................................................. 198 
1. Setting the Scene: The Big Regulatory Shake-Up and its Implications 200 
1.1 The ‘Free Economy and the Strong State’ ...................................... 200 
1.2 Reforming the Square Mile: The ‘Big Bang’ Financial Services Act of 
1986 ...................................................................................................... 203 
1.3 Lenders Unleashed: The Transformation of UK Financial Services 
and the Mortgage Market ...................................................................... 205 
1.4 Towards a ‘Level Playing Field’: The 1986 Building Societies Act .. 214 
2. The Fight to Stay Mutual ...................................................................... 219 
Conclusion ............................................................................................... 225 
 
Chapter Seven: Ideology and Politics in the Financial Crisis ....................... 226 
Introduction .............................................................................................. 226 
1. Ideologies of a Near Past: The Fantasmatic Rise of the ‘Perfect Market’
 ................................................................................................................. 227 
1.1 The Fantasy of the Market .............................................................. 227 
1.2 ‘Beating the Bear’: The Ideology of Boom without Bust .................. 228 
1.3 The Revenge of the Repressed: The Downfall of the Converted and 
the Return of the Mutual ....................................................................... 234 
1.4 A Return to Prudent Capitalism ...................................................... 239 
Conclusion ............................................................................................... 242 
 
Chapter Eight: Concluding Discussion ......................................................... 244 
Introduction .............................................................................................. 244 
1. Main theoretical insights ....................................................................... 245 
2. The Political Construction of the UK Mortgage Market 1979-2011 ....... 248 
 
Overall Conclusion ....................................................................................... 256 
1. Research Questions ............................................................................. 256 
2. Limitations ............................................................................................ 261 
3. Glimpsing the Future ............................................................................ 263 
 
Appendix ...................................................................................................... 267 
List of Interviews ....................................................................................... 267 
 
References .................................................................................................. 270 
 
 10 
Abbreviations 
 
Literature 
E ‘Emancipation(s)’ Laclau (1996) 
LCE ‘Logics of Critical Explanation in Social and Political Theory’ 
Glynos and Howarth (2007) 
HSS ‘Hegemony and Socialist Strategy’ Laclau, E. and Mouffe, C. 
2001 (2nd ed. [1985]) 
NR ‘New Reflections on the Revolution of our Time’ Laclau, E. (1990) 
OP ‘On Populist Reason’ Laclau, E. (2005) 
 
Theoretical Approaches 
PDT Political Discourse Theory (also referred to as Poststructuralist or 
Post-Marxist Theory) 
 
Finance 
ABS Asset Backed Securities 
BSA Building Society Association 
CMBS Commercial Mortgage Backed Security 
CMO Collateralised Mortgage Obligations 
CDO Collateral Debt Obligation 
CDS Credit Default Swap 
FSA Financial Services Authority 
GSE Government Sponsored Enterprise 
IMF International Monetary Fund 
MBS Mortgage Backed Security 
PLC Public Limited Company 
RMBS Residential Mortgage Backed Security 
SPE Special Purpose Entity 
SPV Special Purpose Vehicle 
 
 
 11 
Table of Figures 
 
Figure  Page 
Figure 1: A simplified model of the constitution of a social regime  
Source: Glynos and Howarth (2007) 
68 
Figure 2: The four ontological dimensions of regimes and practices  
Source: Glynos and Howarth (2007) 
68 
Figure 3: A simplified structure of an RMBS transaction 
Source: Criado and van Rixtel (2008) 
143 
Figure 4: A Summary of the main deregulatory measures in the UK 
mortgage market from 1971-1991 
Source: Nellis and Lockhart (1995) 
184 
Figure 5: Chronolgy of the crisis; July 2007-February 2009 
Source: Gamble (2009) 
221 
 
 12 
‘Such crises are, above all, political events; they arise politically, they are 
constructed politically and they are resolved politically’ (Gamble, 2009a, p. 10).  
 
 
‘A Critical Social Science has to be a double headed creature, on the one hand 
directed at ruling ideologies, demystifying their naturalization of the arbitrary, 
revealing the patterns of domination behind consecrated systems of 
classification, while, on the other hand, excavating and elaborating the social 
alternatives embedded in the lived experience and the lived experiments of 
subaltern communities’ (Burawoy, 2008, p. 31).  
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
1. The Story So Far: A View on the Financial Crisis 
 
1.1 Current Development in the Global Financial Crisis 
The financial crisis of 2007-8 and the subsequent recession are now widely 
understood to be the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression and, 
arguably, the first financial crisis of global reach. Its consequences are still 
ongoing and, at the time of writing, in October 2011, its future developments 
and potential repercussions are uncertain and potentially hazardous. Four 
years after credit dried up in global capital markets and three years after the 
collapse of Lehman Brothers and AIG which brought the entire banking sector 
to the verge of collapse, protecting the banks has become, once more, the 
central issue of economic policy in the wake of the European sovereign debt 
crisis given their exposure to troubled member states. 
 
A couple of months earlier, the rating agency Standard and Poor’s (which, 
alongside its peers Moody’s and Fitch Ratings, has been often been accused 
of having its fair share in the crisis because they did not fully understand the 
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complexity of the mortgage finance products they awarded top ratings to)1 has 
downgraded the credit rating of the United States for the first time in its 
history. This occurrence was surrounded by a bizarre political struggle 
involving the boycott of higher taxation (as opposed to drastic spending cuts) 
for the reduction of the national deficit on the side of some republican MPs 
close to the notorious Tea Party Movement. Global stock markets have 
become highly volatile and traditional so-called ‘safe havens’ for investment 
have rapidly diminished amidst these turbulences. Recently, Switzerland 
placed a cap on the exchange rate of its national currency into Euros as a 
result of the devastating consequences its status as one of the few remaining 
safe havens had on its domestic economy. In true neoliberalist fashion, 
severe austerity measures to cut national budget deficits have been 
implemented in most Western countries to combat the costs of the meltdown. 
In the UK this has been adhered to with particular ideological rigour by the 
Tory-led coalition government, even in the light of a looming renewed 
recession (not to mention Greece and other southern European countries 
here). The crisis has moved full circle from a banking crisis into a sovereign 
debt crisis and back to a banking crisis again. It is now played out with 
increasing visibility in the global political arena. Economic protectionism, 
currency wars, the collapse and potential subsequent bail-out of further 
banks, as well as a renewed global ‘credit crunch’ and ‘double-dip recession’ 
and even the termination or break-up of the European Union all are not at all 
unlikely future consequences of these developments. Additionally, national 
austerity measures carry the threat of growing unemployment, reduced public 
services and, as the riots in the UK in August 2011 have indicated only too 
clearly, potential social unrest for years to come.  
 
This thesis aims to make a contribution to how we have come to this stage 
and how the crisis has so far been resolved politically. It does so, under 
particular consideration of a sector of the economy that had been one of the 
most important drivers of growth in the boom years which preceded the 
                                                 
1
 See chapter five of this thesis for more details. For a particularly devastating critique of the 
role of rating agencies in the financial crisis see Lewis (2010).  
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meltdown, as well as the epicentre from which the crisis has erupted: the 
mortgage market.  
 
1.2. Neoliberalism and Finance-Led Growth 
As is argued in this thesis, the crisis can be understood as a symptom of 
neoliberalist expansion and finance-led capital accumulation over the past 
four decades of which mortgages were an important part.  
Neoliberalism has developed as a particular reaction to the perceived failures 
of ‘embedded liberalism’, its preceding economic regime. In the crisis 
environment of the 1970s, embedded liberalism, a regime of mass 
production/consumption, characterised by a high level of state interventionism 
based on Keynesian economics, came increasingly under strain. 
Neoliberalism had already gained pace as the ‘Fordist’ system of capital 
accumulation (see Aglietta, 1979; Gramsci, 1971, pp. 277-318) under 
embedded liberalism reached its limits and the global economy (to varying 
degrees) entered a period of ‘stagflation’, a situation where both inflation and 
unemployment were very high, something that Keynesian economics, the 
dominant doctrine of the times, was deemed unable to explain. Under 
Margaret Thatcher in Britain and Ronald Reagan in the US, the neoliberalist 
project, consisting of a revival and modification of the free market capitalism 
of the 19th century, aimed at reducing inflation and reanimating capitalist 
growth. Neoliberalism was subsenquently embraced by the administrations of 
Bill Clinton and New Labour and, by the turn of the century, had developed 
into the hegemonic discourse of the West (and arguably, with modifications,  
increasingly also the East, see Harvey, 2005). Crucial for the philosophy that 
underpins neoliberalism is a particular understanding of freedom as the 
highest possible achievement of humanity, an achievement that presupposed 
‘free markets’ as its necessary precondition. Private property, its other central 
aspiration, can also only be achieved through the workings of free markets. In 
this sense, free markets are necessary, if not sufficient, for the attainment of 
freedom and the latter hereby becomes essentially defined as a ‘freedom to 
own’ (see e.g. Minford, 1998 and chapter three and five of this thesis). 
Neoliberalist ideology has propelled the privatisation of state-owned or 
collective enterprises and the deregulation of markets, particularly financial 
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markets, on an unprecedented scale, driven by a downright hostility towards 
any form of ‘collectivist’ organisation (see e.g. Hayek, 1962; for an overview of 
various strands of neoliberalist theory see Foucault, 2010). In Britain during 
the 1980s, Thatcher and her backers championed the privatisation of a vast 
range of public utilities, nationalised industries and council homes in order to 
create a ‘property owning democracy’ characterised by private ownership of 
housing and wide shareholding. This implied, in theory at least, that everyone 
should be implicated in the day-to-day reproduction of neoliberalist capitalism. 
These privatisation initiatives were accompanied by the large-scale 
liberalisation of financial services and markets that, combined with 
technological advancements and innovations in financial markets themselves, 
have progressively replaced the Fordist assembly line with what Robert Boyer 
(2000) of the French Regulation School calls a ‘finance-led growth regime’. 
Hereby, capital became increasingly accumulated through financial channels 
rather than through trade and commodity production (Krippner, 2005; Arrighi, 
2009).  
 
While the ascendancy of finance capital is not per se a new phenomenon (see 
e.g. Hilferding, 1981 [1910]; Arrighi, 2009), its dominance in the past had 
been restricted to relatively short time spans at the end of business cycles 
(Marazzi, 2010) and was, arguably, not as economically, politically and 
culturally entrenched as it is now (e.g. see various contributions in Erturk et 
al., 2008 for an assessement of what is ‘new’ in contemporary finance 
capitalism). This new form of financial dominance has, in the past decade, 
increasingly been recognised in the wider social sciences under the label of 
‘financialization’. The rapidly growing body of work that investigates this 
phenomenon is heterogeneous and has developed many strands. In its 
broadest sense, financialization designates fundamental qualitative and 
quantitative changes that have led to a proliferation of ‘financial motives, 
financial markets, financial actors, and financial institutions (Epstein, 2005, p. 
3), hereby enabling all sorts of financial innovation as well as an associated 
explosion of credit-financed consumption. Under neoliberalist hegemony, 
financialization was actively politically backed in order to (among other things) 
revive capitalism and compensate for the decline in industrial production, the 
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continuous erosion of the welfare state and the stagnation of real wages. 
While one of its central claims to ‘intellectual and moral leadership’ (Gramsci, 
1971, p. 5-23) is the ‘democratisation of finance’ i.e. the increased access of 
the wider population to credit and financial claims such as shares (cf. French 
et al., 2009), it has often been pointed out that financialization has 
perpetuated and even significantly deepened social inequalities rather than 
reduced them (e.g. Glyn, 2006; Duménil and Lévy, 2004; 2009).  
 
1.3. The Financialization of Mortgage Finance 
Mortgage loans became by far the main target for financialization. Through a 
financial market innovation called securitization, thousands of claims to 
income streams from mortgage payments can be pooled and packaged into a 
financial instrument and sold to capital market investors such as banks, hedge 
funds and pension funds according to their ‘risk appetite’. Securitization is, 
therefore, concerned with the packaging and sale of (housing) credit2 . This 
process contributed to deteriorating lending standards, an explosion in the 
number and complexity of mortgage products and financial instruments and a 
continuous colonisation of ever increasing parts of the ‘lifeworld’ that could 
provide for such income streams such as the now infamous American 
subprime market or the buy-to-let segment. Hereby, securitization increasingly 
mutated from a funding tool for mortgage lending into an object of speculation 
(Wainwright, 2009). One can therefore speak of a ‘financialization of mortgage 
funding’ that turned mortgage markets, which had previously merely provided 
the funds for house purchase, into profitable drivers of growth in their own 
right (see Aalbers, 2008).  
The above developments had the effect of increasingly connecting 
homeowners and financial markets and redefining housing as an investment 
for a range of welfare and consumption needs in the neoliberal era (see 
Schwartz and Seabrooke, 2009a; 2009b; Smith, 2008). Particularly after 9/11 
and the collapse of the dot.com bubble, capital was increasingly channelled 
into mortgages to revive growth which, in turn, inflated the housing bubble. 
                                                 
2
 Securitization is not confined to mortgages. Essentially anything that can provide a stable 
income stream can be securitized such as car loans, credit card payments, care homes, 
student loans, and infrastructural projects (see Hildyard, 2009; Leyshon and Thrift, 2007 and 
chapter four of this thesis).   
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This process was propelled by a macro-economic climate of low interest 
rates, the sheer insatiable appetite of investors for these mortgage products 
(see Lewis, 2010) and the historical reputation of housing as ‘the safest asset 
class in history’ (Ishikawa, 2009).  
 
The bubble burst in 2007, after a tremendous boom since the early 1990 
(interrupted nonetheless by a number of financial crises such as the tech 
bubble crash in 2001) which was, to a large part powered by securitization 
and other new financial instruments such as derivatives (see Willmott, 2010b; 
Ertürk et al., 2010; 2011). Aptly, the crisis was triggered by mass default rates 
in the American subprime segment. The opacity and complexity of the 
financial products based on these subprime loans stopped banks from lending 
to each other for fear of what sort of ‘toxic’ loans other financial institutions 
held on their balance sheets.  
 
The short-term funding from capital markets, on which banks increasingly 
became dependent in the built-up to the financial crisis, dried up which left 
large numbers of banks in severe difficulties to fund their long-term 
obligations. After the demise of Lehman Brothers in September of 2008, the 
financial system was at such a low level that it bordered on the brink of 
collapse. Governments around the world responded with a plethora of 
monetarist and Keynesian rescue packages to stabilise the economy and bail 
out the troubled banks, hereby creating a dangerous precedent for moral 
hazard, namely the one that most banks are now deemed ‘too big to fail.’ As 
the European debt crisis rages on, a return to ‘normality’ any time soon 
appears an increasingly remote possibility.  
 
3. The Role of Building Societies 
Following the crisis, the UK government nationalised or part-nationalised a 
number of banks such as Northern Rock, Bradford & Bingley and Lloyds 
Banking Group. Northern Rock was sold to Virgin Money in November 2011 
but the rest of these banks remain in public ownership to this date.  
Notably, some of the banks that experienced severe problems during the 
‘crunch’, like Northern Rock, Bradford & Bingley, Alliance & Leicester and the 
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Halifax were former building societies that converted to bank status in the late 
1990s. Building societies are (theoretically) non-profit mutual mortgage 
institutions that are owned by their members i.e. their savers and mortgage 
borrowers. Hence, societies rely in principle on an identity of interest between 
savers and borrowers which other banks (with the exeption of similar models 
such as cooperative banks and credit unions) do not possess. Therefore, 
mutuals are not under pressure to deliver shareholder – one of the central 
features of the logic of financialization.  
 
Building societies have developed out of the friendly societies movement in 
the second part of the 18th century. As ‘creatures of statute’ (Marshall et al., 
2010, p. 8), societies are restricted by law in key areas of their mortgage 
funding and lending in a manner that limits their exposure to risk. They have 
to secure at least 75 per cent of their lending on residential property and 50 
per cent of their business has to come from retail depositors. That means that 
societies are limited as to their ability to borrow from the capital markets to 
fund their mortgage business. (The larger societies fund typically about 30 per 
cent of their business through the capital markets and this figure is even 
significantly less for the smaller ones [Coles, 2008, 27 June].) In other words, 
building societies are ‘safe but boring’, a label they could (briefly) turn into 
their advantage in the wake of the financial crisis after three decades of 
marginalisation.   
 
The societies dominated the mortgage market until the late 1970s in the form 
of an interest rate cartel that regularly controlled more than 70 per cent of the 
market. Under conditions of embedded liberalism, characterised by a cautious 
approach to risk, societies were protected by the state which made mortgage 
lending for other financial institutions such as banks very difficult. This 
changed completely in the wake of the neoliberalist revolution whose market 
liberalisation and privatisation initiatives made the then even more tightly 
regulated societies ill-equipped to deal with new competitive pressures. A 
situation that, so it was hoped, could be corrected by the 1986 Building 
Societies Act (amended by the 1997 Act) that gave the societies additional 
powers and also the opportunity demutualise, i.e. to turn into public limited 
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companies. Ten societies demutualised, Northern Rock, Bradford and Bingley 
as well as Halifax among them, resulting in a massive transfer of mortgage 
assets to the stock exchange and a major structural shift of power in the 
mortgage market which, as a result became increasingly driven by global 
capital flows.  
 
Demutualisation was an attractive option for these societies because (among 
other reasons that are discussed in chapter six of this thesis), as banks, they 
had unrestricted access to capital market borrowing, as well as additional 
commercial advantages. In the wake of their demutualisations, these banks 
grew rapidly through the newly available funds and powered by benign 
macroeconomic conditions. Particularly Northern Rock made aggressive use 
of these new sources of funding with, at the time of its collapse, about 73 per 
cent of its funds coming from the money markets and 50 per cent from 
securitization alone (House of Commons Treasury Select Committee, 2008). 
Northern Rock became one of the first high profile casualties of the crisis 
when it sought emergency funding from the Bank of England on 13 
September 2007 prompting the first (and highly televised) bank run in Britain 
in ca. 140 years.  
 
The other demutualised building societies that had not previously been taken 
over by bigger banks such Bradford & Bingley and Alliance and Leicester also 
perished in the wake of the crisis. Particularly Bradford & Bingley is said to 
have replicated Northern Rocks business models in terms of an excessive 
reliance on the capital markets for funding (see chapter six of this thesis). 
Today, none of these demutualised societies exist anymore while, at the 
same time, the traditional building societies lived through a spectacular (albeit 
arguably short-lived) resurgence where ‘boring’ became the new ‘exciting’ as 
an advert by the Nationwide in 2009 put it. While the sector had to face a 
number of difficulties and suffered a few casualties (notably, the societies that 
were affected the worst were those that strayed too far from their traditional 
core activities, see Michie and Llewelly, 2009), it has proved overall  to be 
relatively resilient (BSA, 2011a). An opportunity for re-mutualisation, however, 
has been wasted as Northern Rock has been sold to Virgin Money in 
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November, 2011 at a loss of £400m to the British taxpayer (The Guardian, 
2011, 18 November). This opportunity would have arguably been not only 
immensely beneficial for the future stability of the mortgage sector as a whole 
(see Oxford Centre for Mutual and Employee-Owned Business Report, 2009, 
September) but also would have constituted a more generalcounter-
hegemonic statement against what can be called, following Bourdieu (2003), 
the neoliberalist ‘tyranny of the [financial] markets’, a commitment that, 
despite the devastating impact of the crisis, has not (yet) gathered sufficient 
political support.  
 
So far so bad … 
 
As the financial crisis is without doubt a ‘crisis of financialization’ (Blackburn, 
2008), it is hard to predict what the future holds for the financialized growth 
model which has become highly entrenched in contemporary capitalism 
(Serfati, 2008). It is equally difficult to say where we currently stand in relation 
to neoliberalist hegemony more generally given that one of its central 
foundations, the advancement of consumer credit in exchange for the 
surrender of political intervention in the economy, appears to be no longer 
sustainable (Harvie and Milburn 2011, 4 August). Thus, whether we are 
currently in a situation at the end of which there will be a fundamental 
transformation of the current historical bloc as Gamble (2009), with due 
caution, is inclined to think, only time will tell. What prevails at the moment, 
however, is arguably a strategy that Gramsci calls ‘transformism’ and Laclau 
and Mouffe term ‘logic of difference’. This strategy refers to the punctual 
absorption of certain demands (e.g. in relation to bonus structures in the 
financial sector for example) in order to preserve the institutional complex as a 
whole and recuperate the hegemony of neoliberalism (see chapter six of this 
thesis for how this strategy forms part of a reactionary response to the 
financial crisis; see section 1.2 of this thesis for a discussion of the concepts 
of logics of difference/equivalence and transformism).  
 
However, what is certainly also the case is that the present situation provides 
a privileged opportunity for a critical investigation of these largely taken-for-
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granted forms of power and for the formulation of alternatives. It is argued 
here that the theory of Ernesto Laclau is highly useful for such an endeavour 
for reasons that are discussed in the following.   
 
 
 
2. Why Laclau for an Analysis of the Economy and Finance? 
 
The theory of Ernesto Laclau is not exactly easy to apply to empirical contexts 
in general given its high degree of abstraction and lack of methodological 
guidelines (see below). The latter problem has been addressed to a 
considerable degree in recent years but an analysis of the economy, let alone 
finance, is still challenging, given Laclau’s almost complete silence on these 
matters (this issue is discussed in section two of chapter two of this thesis). 
Nevertheless, a Laclauian analysis of the economy can be very fruitful if its 
central ontological claims are ‘articulated’ together with other, more ‘middle 
range’ theories (see LCE, particularly chapter six; below in this introduction 
and section two of chapter two of this thesis for the ‘method of articulation’ 
and how a Laclauian framework can be, and has indeed been, combined with 
other theories such as the French Regulation School).  
 
Laclau’s basic ontological premises are: the contingency, discursivity, 
historicity, power and primacy of the political over the social (Laclau, 1990). 
(The social here includes the economic sphere which is not to be treated 
differently in ontological terms.) According to him, every social order is 
politically instituted and, therefore, contingent and fundamentally contestable. 
Contrary to deterministic accounts of the economy ranging from orthodox 
Marxism to the market fundamentalism of neoclassical economics, the theory 
of Laclau can provide a vocabulary for the critical analysis of domination that 
is not rooted in essentialist class relations or ‘the market’ as a quasi-religious 
institution. In the critical camp, the often totalising and suffocating accounts of 
Marxist theoreticians that reduce the economy (and by extension its super-
structural realms of state and civil society) to capitalism, can be countered 
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with a more nuanced account of economic differences and an emphasis on 
how economic space is constructed (and always resisted) through hegemonic 
power struggles. According to this view, the economy is first and foremost 
political economy in the fundamental sense of the word (see: Daly, 1999; 
chapter two of this thesis) and is thus always contingent and essentially 
contestable. This view, therefore, radically embraces Gamble’s claim that 
crises are constructed and resolved politically without delegating the political 
to a subordinate status to society or the economy (see particularly section 2.3 
of chapter one of this thesis for the concept of the primacy of the political).   
 
Drawing on a Gramscian understanding of hegemony (without, however 
succumbing to its underlying class reductionism as will become clear in 
chapter one and two of this thesis), hegemony is at once a theoretical tool for 
the analysis of contemporary society but also a strategy of the Left to counter 
relations of oppression. ‘Radical democracy’, as this strategy is called by 
Laclau and Mouffe (2001), implies the expansion of a discourse of a 
multiplicity of demands on the basis of equality (see chapter one and two of 
this thesis for the concept of radical democracy, particularly section 2.2 of 
chapter one). Such a stragegy can can be of particular use for a critical 
analysis of the economy given that the dominance of neoliberalist capitalism 
tends to obscure and marginalise equally valid non-capitalist alternatives and 
demands for economic re-organisation (such as the demand to re-mutualise 
failed banks for example) (cf. Gibson-Graham, 2005).  
 
For Laclau, and following Gramsci (1971), hegemony always comprises 
cultural, economic and political factors alike and is not confined to one sector 
of society such as the economy. Every economic order can, therefore, be 
analysed on the basis of the often neglected ‘bigger picture’ i.e. how the 
economy is culturally and politically reproduced or contested within a 
particular historical formation. Also, Laclau creatively uses the term discourse 
which, for him, encompasses material as well as symbolic elements alike and 
thus collapses the distinction of the domains of the material and the ideal, as 
well as that of subjects and objects (structure and agency in a more 
conventional sociologist reading). The pervasiveness of claims to the 
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rationality and efficiency of the economy in the discourse of neoliberalism and 
neoclassical economics can hereby be challenged by contrasting them with a 
theoretical framework that emphasises the relationality, non-intentionality and 
the co-constitution of subjects and objects in social and economic relations 
(for an elaboration of these points see chapter two of this thesis).  
 
Supplementing Laclau with the associated ‘logics approach’3 of Glynos and 
Howarth (2007) is useful because the latter provides a more empirically 
oriented account of how social regimes (such as neoliberalism) are instituted, 
contested, maintained or transformed in the context of social, political and 
fantasmatic logics (see section three and four of chapter one of this thesis for 
the ‘logics approach’). Apart from the resulting enhanced empirical 
applicability, this approach also particularly helps to address the alleged 
‘institutional’ (Dreyer Hansen, 2008a) and ‘ethical’ (Critchley, 2004) deficit in 
the work of Laclau and reconciles more overtly Laclau’s poststructuralism and 
post-Marxism with the increasing influence of Lacanian psychoanalysis in his 
later work which Laclau himself, for some reasons, appears to have difficulties 
to fully acknowledge (see Cederström, 2007; Glynos and Stavrakakis, 2004).          
. 
  
3. Towards a Strategy for Research 
 
This thesis has developed alongside the unfolding of the crisis as sketched 
out above in this introduction. I commenced my studies in October 2007, a 
few weeks after the collapse of Northern Rock. Unavoidably, the above 
reading of the crisis is selective and its analysis, even within the field of 
mortgage finance, could have taken many turns.  
 
Given that the application of poststructralist (leave alone Laclauian) theory to 
the economy is still in its very infancy, the research I conducted has been 
driven driven by theoretical concerns as well as by a desire to understand the 
                                                 
3
 There is also an entirely unconnected bourgeoning literature on ‘institutional logics’ in the 
field of new institutional theory. For an overview see Thorton and Ocasio (1999).    
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intricacies of the crisis that were unfolding in front of my eyes. The importance 
of mortgages for the crisis as well as the bull years that preceded it became 
clear relatively quickly resulting in a plethora of literature on the topic from 
numerous theoretical perspectives (even though before the fall of 2007 the 
complex financial products that were being traded at the time, rarely featured 
in the business press leave alone social sciences literature, with a few notable 
exceptions [e.g. Pryke and Freeman, 1994; Leyshon and Thrift, 2007; 
Langley, 2006; Gotham, 2006]).  
 
However, the British mortgage market has hereby often been overlooked in 
favour of the excesses of the American market, particularly its subprime 
segment (Wainwright 2009a; 2009b are recent exceptions). However, the 
mortgage market in the UK is the second most financialized in the world and 
its transformations in the neoliberal era are far more visible than those in the 
US that had already an established market for securitization when Reagan 
came to power (see chapter four of this thesis). In other words, the British 
context provides an excellent investigative terrain of how markets have been 
‘made’ in the era of neoliberalist hegemony.  
 
The failure of the demutualised societies and the simultaneous resurgence of 
the mutual model have provided an almost ideal-typical example of what 
Laclau (1990) refers to as a moment where the contingency of the social and 
its institutionalisation through political struggles becomes visible. For Laclau, 
these struggles always involve power in the sense of the exclusion of other 
equally valid possibilities. Inspired by Michel Foucault’s famous statement that 
history is the history of the present (which corresponds to Laclau’s view), a 
genealogical research strategy gradually emerged that became concerned 
with referring back to ‘the original terrain of violence’ through which the 
present order had been constituted via the exclusion of other, equally valid, 
alternatives.  
 
This PhD, then, aims to make the following contributions to knowledge: firstly, 
it provides a detailed genealogical account of the UK mortgage market which 
has been an under-researched topic. Secondly, it aims to add to existing 
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studies on the financial crisis by providing an account that highlights the 
constitution of economic and social space through political acts of institution 
and associated hegemonic power struggles and, thirdly, it provides an in-
depth ‘case’ as to how the neoliberalist restructuring of the global interacts 
with that of the local or national, a process that has been frequently asserted 
(see particularly Langley, 2008a) but rarely investigated in sufficient detail. 
The thesis therefore aims to bridge a gap between a detailed analysis of 
financial instruments and the financialization of the mortgage market (e.g. 
Morgan, 2010; MacKenzie, 2011; Aalbers, 2008; 2009a; 2009b; Wainwright, 
2009a; 2009b), the broader structures, ideologies and trends of neoliberalist 
expansion (Harvey, 2005; Gamble, 2009a; 2009b) and accounts of power in 
the poststructuralist political economy (Daly, 2004; 2006; DeGoede, 2003; 
2005; 2006; Langley, 2006; 2008a).  
 
The thesis has been guided by the following research questions that have 
evolved over time: 
 
1. How can the theory of Laclau and PDT be fruitfully conceptualised for an 
analysis of the economy and finance? 
 
2. How and why has the UK mortgage market been transformed from a 
protected circuit in the 1970s to a highly financialized and competitive market 
in 2007 where the mutual model had been increasingly antagonised? What 
have been the implications of these transformations for the global financial 
crisis?  
 
3. How have neoliberalist hegemony and financialization been reproduced or 
contested culturally, politically and economically in the context of the UK 
mortgage market? 
 
Empirically I have conducted more than twenty interviews with financial 
experts and collected hundreds of newspaper articles, numerous government 
and trade body reports and other texts such as historical textbooks and 
publications by think tanks for the analysis in the chapters 4-7. The 
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methodology and methods used in the thesis are discussed in the following 
section.  
 
 
4. Methodology, Methods and Empirical Analysis 
 
4.1 Methodology 
 
The theory of Laclau questions the distinction between ontology (what is) and 
epistemology (how do we know what we know) which other theoretical 
traditions take for granted. Meaning is therefore to be used coterminous with 
the being of objects (see chapter one of this thesis) – not because objects do 
essentially not exist as, say, a radical constructionist discourse would assert 
but because every object is constituted by a discourse that mediates its 
meaning. It is thus that Laclau shifts the focus of discourse analysis from the 
epistemological to the ontological level as discourse (including its limits) is the 
most fundamental ontological level that can be experienced (Laclau, 1990). 
Therefore, the ‘method’ of a Laclauian analysis, if such a thing exists at all, is 
couched in its central ontological concepts (Howarth, 2000). Indeed, Laclau 
himself is firmly against any kind of generalisable ‘method’, arguing instead, 
with Paul Feyerabend, ‘against method’ and for an ‘ad hoc contextualised 
analysis’ by the researcher who should decide freely on the respective 
procedures that he/she deems appropriate for the investigation into the 
specific phenomenon in question. He makes this argument in order to avoid 
the ‘positivist fallacy’ in the social sciences which wrongly assumes that there 
is ‘a world out there’ that can be accessed and investigated (via scientific 
methods) independently of subjective involvement and discursive mediation 
(Laclau, 1991). There has been, however, a significant advancement of 
empirical case studies and methodological guidelines mostly in the field of 
Political Discourse Theory (PDT) based at the University of Essex in recent 
years (see section three of chapter one of this thesis) but also by other 
scholars (see e.g. LCE, Howarth, 2000; ESRC Research Methods Review 
Paper, 2009; Phillips and Jorgensen, 2009; Cederström and Spicer, 
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forthcoming; Howarth, Norval and Stavrakakis 2000; Torfing, 1999; Howarth 
and Torfing, 2005; Glasze, 2007).  
 
These accounts stay true to Laclau’s ontological stance and do not advocate 
a ‘one size-fits-all-approach’. A common feature of these methodological 
translations of Laclauian theory is that they mostly advocate qualitative 
research methods (apart from very basic quantitative operations such as the 
counting of signifiers in a text for example) and triangulation in order to 
evaluate the rich meaning of a particular discourse. Most of these accounts 
also stress the ‘context dependency’ of social science research as well as the 
role of the analyst in constructing the objects under investigation. My own 
approach towards a Laclauian analysis of the economy is outlined in the 
above in this introduction as well as, in more detail, in section three of chapter 
two of this thesis. It identifies key concepts of Laclau (and in the case of 
chapter seven, Lacanian psychoanalysis) in order to analyse the 
transformations in the UK mortgage market in line with the overall aim to lay 
bare contingent acts of political institutionalisation and its associated 
constitutive power struggles.  
 
Glynos and Howarth’s (2007) ‘method of articulation’ has been useful as a 
guideline here. According to this ‘method’, different theoretical frameworks 
and empirical materials are articulated together in accordance with the central 
ontological claims of Laclauian theory and with the aim to account for a 
specific problem under investigation. What social science is concerned with, 
according to them and following Foucault in this instance, are the 
problematisations of problems of a society, or in what way problems 
themselves become problematised (LCE, chapter six; Howarth, 2005). In the 
case of this thesis, a range of different empirical sources and theories based 
on the central concepts of Laclau and PDT are articulated together in order to 
investigate how the problem of the financial crisis became problematised in 
the mainstream discourse. The thesis argues that these problematisations 
have been mostly concerned with greed and inflated bonuses and the ‘repair’ 
or ‘fixing’ of an otherwise healthy economy. In doing so, these narratives have 
narrowed the scope for political intervention and the articulation of alternative 
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projects. A crucial task of the researcher is to actively intervene in this 
process by naming the logics and counter-logics that constitute a given social 
space (see section 4.2 of this chapter for more details on the role of the 
analyst; see section 3-4 of chapter one of this thesis for an in-depth 
discussion of logics).  
 
 
In this thesis, the process of the naming of (counter-) logics takes the form of 
juxtaposing the logic of financialization with the logic of mutuality against a 
background of neoliberalist hegemony and ideology that has created a terrain 
for antagonisms and struggles. A genealogy has hereby emerged as a 
particularly useful strategy as it combines a critical historical analysis with a 
creative imagining of alternatives possibilities: 
 
‘… Genealogies act as histories of that present in that they unsettle and 
undermine the presumptions and orthodoxies of our time. They show how what 
we often think of as natural or rational is, in fact, historically contingent and 
more or less random. The genealogist highlights the accidental nature of what 
currently exists, and, moreover, by doing so, draws attention to possibilities that 
are excluded by our particular present. The genealogist encourages us to think 
beyond our world, to imagine new possibilities to search for new freedom and 
new identities’ (Bevir, 1999, p. 356). 
 
The empirical data that I have collected and analysed in the course of 
my research was carried out in the spirit of this discussion and with the 
aim to build rich corpus of empirical material that is able to reflect the 
perspectives of different stakeholders involved in the construction of the 
mortgage market and provides the means of a critical analysis of this 
complex process.  
 
 
 
4.2 Data Collection and Analysis 
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The selection and analysis of the data that is used in the thesis has been the 
result of, firstly, the theoretical perspective deployed and, secondly, the result 
of the empirical object and problematisations under investigation which is the 
construction of the mortgage market in the UK in the light of the financial 
crisis. 
 
As stated above, Laclau himself is rather sceptical (if not downright hostile) to 
what is commonly understood as research methodology and methods on the 
grounds of regarding prescriptive procedures for the collection and evaluation 
of empirical material as being part of the ‘positivist fallacy’.  
 
This ‘deficit’, if one wants to use this term, has now been ‘rectified’ to some 
degree by PDT. However, as also indicated above, the latter does not contain 
a prescriptive and rigid set of rules and procedures for carrying out empirical 
research since PDT also acknowledge the potential problems inherent in the 
application of formal-theoretical concepts to concrete contexts. Rather, PDT  
comprises a number of guidelines – the ‘method of articulation’ - that allows 
for a range of different concrete research strategies dependeding on the 
context and the needs in line with its main theoretical claims. Thus, ‘method’ 
is understood here to be linked to the ontological categories of discourse 
theory. In this sense, PDT shares a resemblance with other discourse 
theoretical and related approaches that gather a rich range of possible 
qualitative data to broadly investigate the way that ‘versions of society’ 
(including the economy, of course) are produced (see Bryman, 2008)4.  
 
Most discourse theoretical perspectives, and PDT is not an exeption here, 
value the a variety of different sources for analysis containing documents, 
speeches, media reports, interviews and so forth. As such, discourse analysis 
draws on features of both documentary analysis and conversation analysis, 
although with a focus on what the content and structure of the discourse 
conveys. This mixing of different qualitative procedures for data selection and 
analysis serves as a form of ‘trianguation’ in which a social phenomenon is 
                                                 
4
 See in this context the discussion on performativity in section three of chapter three of this 
thesis with respect to how the economy is produced in texts, reports, speech etc.   
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investigated from a variety of different vantage points.1 Strictly speaking, a 
triangulation consists of mixing qualitative and quantitative methods within a 
research design to enhance the criterion of validity (the extent to wich a 
concept or measurement adaequately corresponds to the ‘real world’)5 but it is 
used here in a broader sense to designate the combination of different 
qualitative sources and approaches in order to account for different 
stakeholders involved in the discourse and, thus, to make the research more 
representative (see Miller et al., 2004). Similarly, Cederström and Spicer 
(forthcoming) advocate a triangulation strategy to account for the complexity 
in meaning and emotion in discourses. As Howarth (2000, p. 140) puts it: 
 
‘The various qualitative methods used by discourse analysts to generate and collect 
empirical material share an important set of famility resemblances with historical, 
ethnographic and anthropological research. Discourse analysts thus gather primary 
information from a range of possible sources, which include surveys of newspapers, 
official reports, ‘unofficial’ reports such as pamphlets, organizational minutes and 
agendas, personal biographies and media representations such as television 
documentaries and film...by investigating the structural features of the contexts that 
limit but do not determine, social and political possibilities. In all these respects, 
discourse analysts have to be sensitive to the theoretical postulates governing their 
research practices (original emphasis).’  
 
I have followed this approach throughout my research by selecting a wide 
range of qualitative data for analysis guided by my theoretical framework and 
the empirical problematisations under investigation (Howarth, 2005). Hereby, 
it became important, firstly, to select empirical material that is diverse and 
heterogeneous to account for the complexity of the construction of the UK 
mortgage market over time and, secondly, to adaequately represent the two 
‘stakeholding’ logics that are the focus of the thesis: financialization and 
mutuality. A particular focus of the research has been to give ‘a voice’ to the 
logic of mutuality in line with the overall emancipatory aim of my theoretical 
approach, i.e. the aim of making power-relations visible and accounting for 
                                                 
5
 This, as will become clear in section 1.1 of chapter one of this thesis, cannot apply to a 
Laclauian analysis, as there the world cannot be accessed without the intermediation of a 
discourse.  
 31 
possibilities of social change (Phillips and Jorgensen, 2006). The research 
data collection was informed by both the need for ‘information gathering’ (see 
Kvale and Brinkmann, 2009) and the aim to critically examine conflicting 
narratives.  
 
Access constraints during the financial crisis and the gradual emergence of 
the historical/genealogical component of the study also contributed to the 
broadening of the data that had initially started with interviews. The collection 
and evaluation of this data set is discussed in the following pages. 
 
I have conducted 20 interviews with financial experts (see appendix for the list 
of interviews), varying from twenty minutes to about 90 minutes in length. I 
have transcribed half of them (I was not able to record the other half of the 
interviews due mostly to requests made by the interviewees, in this case 
extensive notes were taken). The interviewees were either personal contacts 
or approached because of their function such as, for example, the Director 
General of the BSA (whose title I have given with his consent). Hereby, a 
snowballing approach was adopted that led to additional interviews (see 
Schnell et al. 2000).  
 
 Due to the highly volatile situation of the economy at the time, a rather loose 
conservational style was adopted during the interviews to ensure that the 
atmosphere was as comfortable as possible for the interviewee and to 
minimise the potential impact of emotionally unsettling questions as well as to 
reduce as much as possible the asymmetrical relationship between an 
interviewer and an interviewee (Bryman, 2008, part three). All participants 
were informed that they could leave the interview at any time or choose to 
leave questions unanswered if they wished to do so. The proposal for these 
interviews was signed and approved by the ethics committee of Cardiff 
Business School of Cardiff University prior to conducting the interviews 
themselves.  
 
In addition to the interviews, I have placed a particular focus on the analysis of 
newspaper articles. This was due to the fact that most of my interviewees, 
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with some exeptions, did often not remember the precise historical 
circumstances in relation to some of my questions. (Also, in case of the 
psychoanalytically informed ‘fantasmatic logic’ that is examined in chapter 
seven of this thesis, I have particularly relied on accounts in the yellow press 
as ideology often reveals itself in those ‘semi-official’ sources according to 
Glynos and Howarth, 2007, pp. 145-151.) During the course of my research, I 
have collected over 300 newspaper articles in total, hereby ensuring that the 
articles are from a wide variety of newspaper sources.  
 
For this purpose, I am grateful to have been able to research older newspaper 
articles at the newspaper archive of the British Museum, then in Collindale, 
London. For the same reason, and to obtain additional material such as 
historical reports in building society publications and older mortgage market 
publications, I am also grateful to have been given access to research the 
library of the Building Society Association in Aldwych, London on several 
occasions.  
 
This empirical material has been further supplemented by other archival data 
such as particularly government reports and publications by trade bodies and 
think tanks. Hereby, I have again ensured to select the data consistently from 
a number of different sources covering a broad political spectrum. I have 
gathered around fourty of these reports during the course of the PhD. Where 
needed, I have further added other archival data such as historical textbooks 
on some occasions and an election manifesto to provide additional depth to 
the study and substantiate crucial arguments. 
 
All the data collected during the course of my research served the building of 
an ‘archive’ (Howarth, 2005, pp. 337 ff.) to account for a rich and multifaceted 
analyses of the construction of the UK mortgage market since the late 1970s. 
The method of ‘corpus construction’, rather than a more mainstream formal 
sampling process, has hereby proved out to be more appropriate for the 
purpose of my research. The construction of a ‘corpus’ means the 
construction of a collection of text. This procedure consists of a stepwise 
process of data gathering which involves the selection of data, analysis, and 
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then a renewed selection until a ‘saturation point’ is met (Bauer and Aarts, 
2000).  
 
For Bauer and Aarts (2000), using a grounded theory approach, this 
saturation point is met when a theory can be constructed inductively out of the 
data. In my thesis, however, this saturation point was met when the additional 
data could no longer add anything significant to the analysis of the logics and 
problematisations under investigation. While, undeniably, a certain 
arbitrariness needs to be factored into this approach (not out of convenience 
but due to the nature of this research strategy), the selection of the data and 
construction of the ‘archive’ or ‘corpus’ in my research can nevertheless be 
justified on the grounds of the diversification of my data collection, the public 
accountability of my sources, and the consistency in my selection strategy 
(Howarth, 2005, p. 337).  
 
One thing, however, needs to be added here which concerns the role of the 
researcher or analyst. As indicated above, it is acknowledged in PDT that the 
researcher is already politically engaged by carrying out his/her research. By 
naming logics and counter-logics, it is unavoidable that the researcher actively 
participates in the construction of the object that he/she analyses (Glynos and 
Howarth, 2007).  
 
A value-neutral ‘scientificism’ à la Max Weber is therefore not possible, nor is 
it desirable. However, the researcher’s choices are not completely arbitrary, 
as Glynos and Howarth, (2007, p. 196) point out: 
 
‘..In naming dominant social logics and counter-logics, we engage in a 
task of rhetorical redescription that foregrounds the contingent and 
political character of social practices. It does not follow, of course, that 
objectivity is substituted by a kind of subjectivism in which the analyst’s 
individual preferences become foundational. It only follows that the 
political analyst is already engaged in a hegemonic struggle, deploying 
political logics of rhetorical redescription in the very process of 
characterising and explaining discursive practices. This is what is at 
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stake in indentifying and emphasizing one social logi rather than 
another. This is to say, it involves the linking together of certain 
discursive features in equivalential chains, thereby making them part of 
one rather than another logic (original emphasis).’ 
 
 
The researcher, therefore, constructs a particular relation among certain 
elements in the course of his/her research in the process of naming, the 
outcome of which Glynos and Howarth call ‘rhetorical redescription’ (see in 
this context particularly the extensive discussion on discourse and chains of 
equivalences in chapter one of this thesis). In doing so, the researcher takes 
sides or discovers previously ignored struggle, in short the analyst’s research 
is political because it becomes him/herself involved in such a struggle. 
However, he/she does not, and indeed cannot if the research is to be properly 
conducted, arbitrarily ‘invent’ the object under investigation on the basis of 
personal preferences. 
 
My own role in carrying out this research has therefore been no less political 
in nature. I have actively sought to challenge the hegemonic discourse of 
neoliberalism and financialization by foregrounding a counter-logic that has 
been marginalised. Therefore, I have engaged in a process of ‘rhetorical 
redescription’ as Glynos and Howarth call it and, hence, my own role cannot 
be divorced from the results of this study. But, on the other hand, those logics 
also transcend my particular process of naming them and, while a different 
researcher would have made different connections and would have 
constructed different logics and thus reached different conclusions, the 
underlying struggles that consititute social and economic space are 
nevertheless ‘real’ (see also section one of chapter one of this thesis for the 
theoretical underpinnings of this view).   
 
Returning to the dataset, I will clarify the evaluation of my empirical material in 
the following. The approach that I have adhered to here treats its various data 
sources as text (Howarth, 2005). This does not mean that it is merely 
concerned with speech and writing but that, at a more abstract level, all data 
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that is collected forms part of a ‘meaning-given totality’ that is a text6 (see also 
section one of chapter one in this context). At a more concrete level of 
analysis, one can distinguish between linguistic and non-linguistic as well as 
reactive (interviews) and non-reactive (documents) data for specific purposes.  
 
I have used my interview transcripts and extensive interview notes as a 
starting point for my research with a particular focus on the ‘contextualised 
self-interpretations’ of the interviewees (see Glynos and Howarth, 2007). 
Since a logics approach to empirical research always proceeds through 
contextualised self-interpretations but, ultimately, moves beyond them7, these 
accounts were then successively supplemented with the archival data listed 
above where needed.   
 
My interview data as well as most of my other empirical sources were coded 
in order to highlight and identify specific concepts or dimensions in the 
theoretical framework of Laclau and PDT (cf. Cederström and Spicer, 
forthcoming; Phillips and Jorgensen, 2006). The coding was an ongoing 
process that became more diverse and refined over time. Hereby, I used 
different colours to highlight different coding themes. However, this was not 
carried out with the aim of generating a large quantifiable dataset for quasi-
statistical operations but with the aim of making certain dimensions of 
Laclau’s theory fruitful for economic analysis. The coding process was 
therefore analytical rather than descriptive or inductive8 (cf. Schwandt, 1997, 
p. 16). Hence the guidelines for the categorization and coding of empirical 
data were directly derived from the theoretical framework of Laclau and PDT 
(see also Howarth, 2000). This strategy is broadly analogous to a vast amount 
of research in the social sciences in which researchers identify categories in 
existing theories and apply them deductively to the data (Lindlof and Taylor, 
2002). However, my study has not been a case of mechanical testing but, 
                                                 
6
 In this sense, one can indeed say with Derrida that ‘there is nothing outside the text’ (ibid, p. 
336). 
7
 A PDT analysis moves beyond contextualised self-interpretations because the interpretation 
of actors is important but not suffiencient to tackle the more ontological questions that this 
approach is concerned with.  
8
 A more stadardised early approach of using computer assisted data analysis proved out to 
be too rigid for my exploratoy approach.  
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rather, has involved a constant circular ‘dialogue’ between data and theory 
which aimed to avoid the mechanical application of theoretical concepts in 
favour of unexpected discovery and theory development. The method of 
coding that I have used is therefore, arguably, more aptly described by the 
notion of ‘circling the text’ where writing itself becomes an ongoing process of 
data collections which, in turn, yields new and unexpected results (St. Pierre, 
2002).  
 
I began the process of coding with two categories: ‘struggle’ and ‘affect’. By 
the end of my analysis, I had identified around 20 distinct categories in 
relation to central concepts of Laclau and PDT and, to a lesser extent, also 
Antonio Gramsci. The most important ones and thus the ones most widely 
used in the thesis are fantasmatic logics and dimensions, the political, power-
struggles, antagonism, empty signifier, dislocation, discourse, relation, 
bricolage, subjectivity, hegemony, common sense, war of position and civil 
society. These categories subsequently became the analytical backbone of 
my analysis chapters 4-7.  
 
The research process outlined above has resulted in the following structure of 
the thesis.  
  
Chapter One is the first of three ‘theory chapters’. It gives and in-depth 
account of the theory of Laclau and PDT supplemented, where appropriate, 
by two of their major influences: Antonio Gramsci’s theory of hegemony and 
aspects of Lacanian psychoanalysis. Particular emphasis is placed on a 
thorough account on the most important concepts of the literature and 
examples are given that relate to the empirical part of this thesis in order to 
illustrate the theoretical framework. 
 
Chapter Two gives an overview over the challenges and opportunities of a 
poststructuralist view on the political economy according to Laclau and 
Political Discourse Theory (PDT). In drawing on literature in the field of 
poststructuralist political economy and Laclauian theory, the particular 
contribution that this approach can make to economic analysis is discussed 
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and contrasted with the doctrine of neoclassical economics (the ‘scientific’ 
enabler of neoliberalist hegemony) to which it is fundamentally opposed as 
will be shown.  
 
Chapter Three gives a theoretical overview over the concepts of neoliberalism 
and financialization and their interrelated nature. The chapter then procedes 
to investigate three of the most important theoretical approaches to 
financialization – the Regulation School, British Social Accountants and 
cultural approaches/financialization of everyday life9.  
These approaches will be then be articulated together with the theory of 
Laclau and PDT in the later chapters in order to account for the 
financialization of the mortgage market from a range of perspectives and 
informed by Laclau’s fundamental ontological insights. 
 
Chapter Four is the first of four ‘empirical chapters’. It characterises the 
financialization of the UK mortgage market prior to the ‘crunch’. The chapter 
investigates the ‘social logic’ of mortgage market financialization – how the 
latter ‘ticks’. It hereby draws on on the Laclau’s notion of discourses as 
relational complexes and Gramsci’s insight that hegemonies always comprise 
of cultural, political and economic factors alike. The chapter hereby situates 
the financialization of the UK mortgage market within the broader relational 
bloc of neoliberalist hegemony.   
 
 
Chapter Five is concerned with the ‘conditions of possibility’ of the 
financialization of the British mortgage market which, in turn, sowed the seeds 
of the marginalisation of the mutual model. The chapter investigates the 
transformation of the UK mortgage market in the late 1970s and early 1980s 
in the context of the rise of neoliberalism. The chapter particularly focuses on 
the ‘instituting dimension’ of neoliberalism and the associated struggles that 
shaped the market.  
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 The last approach is not a coherent theory but designates a range of approaches to 
contemporary finance that emphasise culture and everyday life.  
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Theoretically, the chapter makes particular use of Laclau’s concepts of the 
primacy of the political and its associated notion of power, the political logic of 
equivalence and the concept of empty signifiers. Hereby, the processes and 
struggles that led to the abandonment of the building society price cartel are 
investigated in detail.  
 
Chapter Six analyses how the institution of the neolibealist ‘particular’ became 
increasingly associated with the ‘universal’ in the course of the 1980s. The 
chapter investigates the rise of a new ‘market logic’ that progressively 
marginalised and eroded the mutual model of mortgage lending and funding 
in the context of the massive liberalisation of financial services in the 1980s 
under Thatcher. Also, the chapter deploys Laclau’s concept of antagonism 
and Gramsci’s concept of war of position to investigate the struggles that 
surrounded the demutualisation frenzy of the late 1990s resulting in an 
enormous transfer of mortgage assets to the stock market which, in turn, 
significantly contributed to the large scale financialization of mortgages.  
 
Chapter Seven mobilises the Lacanian inspired category of fantasmatic logic 
to analyse the persistence of the ideology of ‘no more bust just boom’ that 
preceded the global financial crisis. It then discusses how this fantasy became 
modified in order to revive the neoliberalist project in the wake of the financial 
crisis. In doing so, chapter shows how this fantasy underpins a restorative 
logic of difference that aims at the preservance of existing relations of power.   
 
Chapter Eight provides a concluding discussion and synthesis of the main 
theoretical and empirical findings of the thesis and places them within broader 
theoretical and empirical debates on the financial crisis and economic 
analysis more generally.  
 
Chapter Nine is the conclusion. It summarises how the research questions 
outlined on page 26 have been addressed throughout this thesis. Also, the 
chapter investigates the implications and limitations of the thesis and 
discusses potential paths for future research.  
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Some of the empirical material that appears in the chapters one, six and 
seven of this thesis is also used in the following joint publications that I have 
been involved in:  
Klimecki and Willmott (2009); Klimecki and Willmott, (2010) and Glynos, 
Klimecki and Willmott (2011). While these publications undoubtedly have 
influenced my perception of these chapters, their wording and final 
conceptualisation are my own.   
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‘It is only when the open, unsutured character of the social is fully accepted, 
when the essentialism of the totality and of the elements is rejected, 
“hegemony” can come to constitute a fundamental tool for political analysis of 
the left. These conditions arise originally in the field of what we have termed 
the ‘democratic revolution’ but they are only maximized in all their 
deconstructive effects in the project for a radical democracy, or, in other words, 
in a form of politics which is founded not upon dogmatic postulation of any 
‘essence of the social’ but, on the contrary, on affirmation of the contingency 
and ambiguity of every “essence” and of the constitutive character of social 
division and antagonism’ (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001, p. 192-3).  
 
 
Chapter One: The Theory of Ernesto Laclau and 
Political Discourse Theory (PDT) 
 
 
1. Discourse 
 
1.1 The Philosophical Roots of Ernesto Laclau’s Theory of Discourse 
The theoretical concept of discourse, as well as its limits, initially laid out in 
Hegemony and Socialist Strategy in 1985 with Chantal Mouffe, is centrepiece 
to Laclau’s theoretical framework. For Laclau, discourse is the primary 
ontological terrain for the constitution of the social. His highly innovative 
conceptualisation, or even ‘creative misapplication’ (Howarth, 2004, p. 265) of 
the category of discourse is rooted in what he calls ‘the transcendental turn in 
modern philosophy’ where ‘facts’ are no longer the primary object of analysis 
‘but their conditions of possibility’ (Laclau, 2007, p. 431). 
 
According to Laclau, during the course of the twentieth century this turn 
culminates in the development of three main philosophical currents namely 
analytical philosophy, phenomenology and the poststructuralist critique of 
structural linguistics. As Laclau remarks, the works of the later Ludwig 
Wittgenstein,  Martin Heidegger, as well as Roland Barthes, Jacques Derrida 
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and Jacques Lacan respectively, in one form or the other, all arrived at some 
version of discourse theory in the sense that they increasingly put into 
question a direct and unmediated access to the world ‘as it really is’: ‘In the 
three cases, there is an initial illusion of immediacy, of a direct access to the 
things as they are in themselves ... Now, at some point this initial illusion of 
immediacy dissolves in the three currents ... This means that discursive 
mediations cease to be merely derivative and become constitutive’ (Laclau, 
2005b, p. 1).  
 
This conclusion has a number of far reaching consequences for the theorising 
of discourse following Laclau. The category of discourse is radically 
broadened – beyond the traditional understanding of discourse as merely 
designating speech and writing – to encompassing all aspects of social reality. 
Society and politics, as Laclau stresses, can be conceptualised as signifying 
systems that function analogous to the tropological movements of language 
(Laclau, 1998). 
 
This entails, for Laclau (and Mouffe) that, firstly, what is generally referred to 
as ‘objectivity’ is a discursive construct and can no longer be thought of as 
being accessible without discursive intermediation. Hence, all objects within 
this discourse are ‘meaningful’ to the extent that they are constituted within 
systems of socially constructed rules. Laclau and Mouffe (2001; 1990) do not 
deny that objects have a form of extra-discursive presence but argue that 
outside of a discourse those objects merely have ‘existence’, not ‘being’. The 
‘being’ of objects does therefore vary depending which particular discourse 
constructs their meaning. As they point out, a stone exists outside of social 
relations but whether it functions as a projectile or an object of aesthetic 
contemplation can only be determined within a particular discursive totality. 
Without discursive representation, a stone would not be a ‘stone’ as there 
would be no means with which to distinguish it from other objects (Laclau and 
Mouffe, 1990, pp. 97 ff). To give another example, a forest standing in the 
path of a proposed motorway might represent an obstacle to the 
implementation of a new road system, an object of special interest for 
scientists and naturalists, or a symbol of a country’s threatened heritage. Its 
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‘being’ is therefore determined by various particular ‘system of differences’ 
that can be called discourses and include the production of ‘subject positions’ 
with which subjects can identify (Howarth, 2000, p. 102; for the concept of 
subjectivity see section 1.4 of this chapter).  
 
Further, Laclau and Mouffe demonstrate that the linguistic and extra-linguistic 
realm can no longer be treated as being distinct. Drawing on an example 
inspired by Wittgenstein, they argue that building a wall with another 
bricklayer involves linguistic as well as non-linguistics components: the asking 
for the bricks and the adding of the latter to the wall are part of the same 
meaning-giving totality which is neither purely linguistic nor non-linguistic. 
Both components are internal parts of a discursive configuration. A discursive 
structure is therefore understood to be material and cannot be subsumed 
under the idealist pole of an idealism/realism dichotomy. Laclau (2002) states 
in a discussion with Roy Bhaskar that the term discourse could essentially be 
replaced by that of practice. However in order to stress the importance of 
language within a signifying system and to provoke a certain engagement with 
the concept, he has chosen to retain the term discourse.  
 
1.2 Discourse as a Relational Complex; Logics of Difference and Equivalence 
The concept of discourse, which has risen to prominence in the social 
sciences as part of the so-called ‘linguistic turn’, has developed a plethora of 
strands in its respective sub-disciplines. How the category of discourse is 
conceived of and applied, thus, very much depends on the theory that is being 
used (for an overview of the concept as used in the broader social sciences 
and with particular reference to the theory of Laclau and Mouffe see Howarth 
[2000]). 
 
Laclau is following Ferdinand de Saussure’s notion that language is nothing 
but a series of differences. Therefore, discourse is, for him, an ensemble of 
differential positions. These differences are relational in the sense that they 
cannot exist independently of other differences. To understand the term 
‘father’ for instance, one has to understand the term ‘son’ and ‘mother’ etc. 
‘Father’, like ‘stone’ in the earlier example, can therefore not be isolated from 
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a relational complex that is a discourse (Laclau, 2007, p. 432). The relational 
nature of every identity has always been a particular emphasis throughout 
Laclau’s work. In fact, a discourse, as he (2005a, p. 68) puts it, is ‘any 
complex of elements in which relations play the constitutive role. This means, 
that elements do not pre-exist the relational complex but are constituted 
through it. Thus “relation” and “objectivity” are synonymous.’  
Contrary to functionalist conceptualisations of society, however, ‘relation’ is 
here not subordinated to ‘function’ and thus cannot be approached in 
teleological terms as a relation does not precede its constitutive elements. 
 
According to de Saussure, signifying practices operate as paradigmatic or 
syntagmatic relations. Language is a system of relations within which its 
differential units are either substituted or combined respectively. The totality of 
a linguistic system, then, is the totality of its syntagmatic and paradigmatic 
relations (de Saussure, 2006). These relations, in the terminology of Laclau 
and Mouffe, refer to the working of the two logics of difference and 
equivalence (2001, pp. 127 ff). These logics are signifying logics in the sense 
that they function akin to de Saussure’s paradigmatic and syntagmatic 
relations of language but in Laclau and Mouffe’s political sociology they are 
also the primary mechanism of the organisation of political and social space. 
Depending on the context, one logics succeeds to dominate over the other. 
Laclau himself has, throughout his work, given more conceptual and empirical 
focus to the logic of equivalence (Griggs and Howarth, 2009). However, the 
two logics, require each other and are both always present in any given 
discourse (albeit to varying degrees). A totality can only exist within the 
tension created by the mutual subversion and contamination of these two 
logics (Laclau, 2005a pp. 69-70). The degree to which one dominates over 
the other is important in a certain empirical environment as it points to the 
measure of populism or institutionalism present in a discursive formation (see 
below in this section). 
 
The logic of equivalence is associated with the paradigmatic pole of language 
while the logic of difference is linked to the syntagmatic pole of language, 
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involving the simplification and the complexification of political space 
respectively: 
 
We, thus, see that the logic of equivalence is a logic of the simplification of 
political space, while the logic of difference is a logic of its expansion and 
increasing complexity. Taking a comparative example from linguistics, we could 
say that the logic of difference tends to expand the syntagmatic pole of 
language; the number of positions that can enter into a relation of combination 
and hence of continuity with one another; while the logic of equivalence 
expands the paradigmatic pole – that is, the elements that can be substituted 
for one another – thereby reducing the number of positions which can possibly 
be combined’ (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001, p. 130). 
 
 
Political relations can thus be broadly analysed on the basis of a two-
dimensional matrix (Glynos and Howarth, 2007, p. 144). The logic of 
equivalence, which in its most accentuated form is the populist discourse 
(Laclau, 2005a), describes a dimension where different elements enter into a 
relationship of substitution. These elements are substitutionable or 
‘equivalential’ not in terms of an underlying positive commonality or substance 
but only by the common negation of something they are not: a common 
enemy, threat or adversary (for the important concept of social antagonism 
see section 1.6 of this chapter). Subjects who are interpellated10 attempt but 
never fully succeed to cancel out their underlying differences in the face of a 
more universal oppressor (Howarth, 2000, p. 107)11. To give a classic 
example, a national liberation struggle against an oppressive regime will 
typically cancel out particular differences of race, gender, locality or class in 
order to posit a more universal reference point for the identification of the 
                                                 
10
 The concept of interpellation refers to the process by which pre-ideological subjects are 
literally ‘called upon’ by an ideology into ‘subject positions’ (Althusser, 1971). This structural 
view on subjectivity diametrically opposes the idea of an autonomous originating subject as to 
be found, among other traditions, in classical and neoclassical economics (see chapter two of 
this thesis). While influenced by Althusser (see particularly Laclau, 1977 and also Laclau and 
Mouffe, 2001), Laclau emphasises from NR onwards that subjects are only partially 
constituted by structures (see section four in this chapter).   
11
 It must be kept in mind that the formation of chains of equivalences and chains of 
differences is situated at the ontological level. This means that ontically (at the factual and 
historical level of existence) the elements may (or may not) share something in common. 
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oppressed vis-a-vis the oppressor (Glynos and Howarth, 2007, p. 144). In 
Laclau’s social theory of signification, logics of equivalence are associated 
with the rhetorical trope of ‘metonymy’ which is often tied to the emergence of 
a new hegemonic order (see section two of this chapter for the concept of 
hegemony). Here, certain demands12 get taken up by (are displaced to) a 
variety of different sectors of the social in order construct the social into two 
opposing camps:  
 
‘...we could say that hegemony is basically metonymical: its effects always 
emerge from a surplus of meaning which results from an operation of 
displacement (For example, a trade union or a religious organisation may take 
on organisational functions in a community, which go beyond the traditional 
practices ascribed to them, and which are combated and resisted by opposing 
forces’ (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001, p. 141)13. 
 
The logic of difference, then, is a more institutionalist form of discursive 
structuring which is linked to the combinatory pole of signification. This means 
that within a setting where the logic of difference dominates demands are 
dealt with separately in order to preserve the existing institutional 
configuration and relations of power. The logic of difference can therefore be 
linked to administration as opposed to contestation. According to Torfing 
(1999, p.111; see also Glynos and Howarth, 2007, p. 122), the expansion of 
chains of difference, in the form of co-optation for instance, can be linked to 
Antonio Gramsci’s concept of ‘transformism’ (Gramsci, 1971, pp. 55-9; 106-
14; 129-33; see also section 2.1 of this chapter) which refers to a type of 
hegemony that is the favoured strategy of the ruling formation in times of 
economic and/or social crisis. This strategy aims at ‘disuniting the masses’ in 
the sense of counteracting and marginalizing antagonistic opposition14. A 
                                                 
12
 In Laclau’s political sociology demands, not groups are the basic unit of analysis (see also 
section 3.1 of this chapter for Glynos and Howarth’s elaboration on the concepts of political 
and hegemonic demands.  
13
 Hegemony is also sometimes associated with the trope of ‘metaphor’ (Laclau, 1998). In 
Laclau’s later work, the rhetorical figure of synecdoche, a part representing the whole, 
becomes central for the functioning of hegemony (Laclau, 2005a, p. 72; see section 1.5 of this 
thesis).  
14
 To be precise, Gramsci’s transformism refers to the favoured strategy of the bourgeoisie in 
times of crisis whereas his other version of hegemony, expansionism, is a populist-type 
hegemony favoured by the proletariat (see: Torfing 1999, pp. 111-12). While this is a very 
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political example that has been given in relation to the strategic deployment of 
the logics of difference is the discourse of ‘separate development’ at the time 
of South African Apartheid. Said discourse enforced a system of rule that 
treated various ethnic and racial groups differently, for example in terms of 
awarding certain privileges to the demands of particular ethnicities but not 
others. Following the ancient doctrine of ‘divide and rule’, this discourse 
attempted (but ultimately failed) to break down and marginalise a more 
populist form of opposition which cancelled out the differences between these 
particularities in order to construct the Apartheid regime as a common, more 
universal, enemy (Norval, 1996). A more economic example which also 
appears in this thesis would be way that the current financial crisis is resolved. 
Here, certain concessions are made in relation to bonuses, the capital 
adequacy ratio of banks and the future ‘ring-fencing’ of retail deposits etc by 
legislators in order to prevent a series of equivalential demands from arising 
which would otherwise challenge the institutional complex at a more 
fundamental level (see chapter seven of this thesis for detailed account).  
 
Therefore, a social configuration at any given moment can be, at least in 
theory, situated along an axis ranging from an extreme form of 
institutionalized bureaucracy that aims to absorb and channel all demands 
into the existing social order to a discourse that is almost exclusively defined 
by the notion of ‘us versus them’ with the aim to overthrow a regime that is 
deemed to be oppressive (e.g. the Arab Spring movements in their initial 
stages). 
 
1.3 The Non-Unity of Discourse and the Centrality of the Signifier 
According to Saussure, the linguistic unit of the sign can be split, if only for 
conceptual reasons, into a signifier and a signified, a word and its associated 
concept. The relationship between a signifier and a signified, however, is 
arbitrary and outcome of cultural processes. Thus, there cannot be any a 
                                                                                                                                            
useful concept and deployed in chapter seven of this thesis, Gramsci assumes that 
hegemonic projects are always structured around the essentialist core of a universal class, 
such as the proletariat or the bourgeoisie (cf. also section 2.1 of this chapter). Following 
Laclau, this dual typification of hegemony is of course abandoned in this thesis. 
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priori rules on how differential units within language are combined or 
substituted.  
Transferred to the stage of social relations, it follows that the latter, as 
signifying processes, also lacks any ordering principle that can be posited a 
priori. Contrary to Saussure, however, Laclau and Mouffe abandon a strict 
isomorphic relation between signifier and signified which means that a 
signifier corresponds to only one concept. As they argue, following scholars 
such as Barthes and Lacan, the order of the signifier takes primacy over the 
signified. Indeed, Laclau (2005a, p. 22) emphasises (in a different but related 
context) that two phenomena are central to contemporary theorising: the 
unfixity between the relation of the signifier and the signified, and the process 
of overdetermination by which a particular signifier acts as a point of 
condensation for a variety of meanings. Whereas both dimensions are always 
present, the latter phenomenon illuminates particularly the concept of ‘floating 
signifiers’, contingent elements that adopt variety of meanings depending on 
the discursive field to which they are attached (the tree standing in the path of 
a proposed motorway for instance; or the signifier ‘economy’ which acquires a 
different meaning whether it is attached to, say, a neoliberalist, Keynesian or 
Marxist discourse).  
The the presence of empty signifiers, or master signifiers in Lacanian terms, 
which are signifiers without a signified, or names without corresponding, 
objects. These names, for example, ‘freedom’, democracy, ‘equality’ are 
tendentially empty, meaning that they do not possess a fixed content, indeed 
their content is always (temporarily and partially) ‘taken up’ (Miller, 2005) by a 
particular group or ideology. Such a signifier, as Slavoj Žižek (1989) asserts, 
only ‘retroactively’ brings into being what it names. Or, to put it in the words of 
Laclau, the ‘name’ becomes ‘the ground of the thing’ (Laclau, 2006, p. 106). 
(See in this context particularly section 2.5 of this chapter for a discussion of 
the concept of empty signifiers).  
 
The unity of a discourse, as Laclau and Mouffe (2001, pp. 105-6) assert, is 
therefore not one that can be derived from an underlying essence, such as 
the logical coherence of the components of the said discourse, a 
transcendental subject that gives meaning to it or an object such as ‘the 
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market’ (see chapter three and seven of this thesis for how ‘the market’ 
servies as crucial ideological reference point in neolibealism). Nor can it be 
the determination of the superstructure by its economic base, but, drawing on 
a concept by Michel Foucault, systemacy here is understood to be a 
‘regularity in dispersion’, within which the complex rules of dispersion itself 
become the governing principle of the unity of a discourse15. A discourse is, 
therefore, conceived of as ‘unification’ without any form of a fixed apriori 
presence. 
 
However, despite there being no essence to social processes, Laclau and 
Mouffe (2001, p. 105) do not completely abandon the notion of ‘necessity’ in 
favour of a purely constructionist or ‘anarchical’ conceptualization of society 
hence the ‘necessity’ of empty signifiers (see above and 2.5 in this chapter). 
This necessity stems from the relational dimension of a discourse whose 
fragile totality is produced by articulatory practice16:  
 
‘We will call articulation any practice establishing a relation among elements 
such that their identity is modified as a result of the articulatory practice. The 
structured totality resulting from the articulatory practice, we will call discourse. 
The differential positions, insofar as they appear articulated within a discourse, 
we will call moments. By contrast, we will call elements any difference that is 
not discursively articulated.’  
 
The non-necessary character of the elements is transformed into a necessary 
one within a particular discourse, as ‘elements’ are articulated as ‘moments’ of 
its totality. Everything inside a discourse, then, becomes necessary in the 
                                                 
15
 Laclau and Mouffe (2001) have also criticised Foucault’s approach on the grounds of an 
alleged and unwarranted separation of the discursive and non-discursive realm. In fact, the 
direct influence of Foucault has become rather distant in the later work of Laclau: ‘the work of 
Foucault has had only a very limited influence on my own approach, and I feel towards it only 
a very qualified sympathy’ (Laclau 2000, p. 285). It is also worth mentioning here that Laclau’s 
creative engagement with other scholars such as Foucault, Marx, Althusser etc has, perhaps 
unavoidably due to its conceptual rigour, often also attracted considerable criticism. (Most 
notably, the fierce and sometimes ad hominem attacks put forward by some orthodox 
Marxists, see particularly Geras, 1987 and the reply by Laclau and Mouffe, 1990. For a 
critique of Laclau’s appropriation of the concept of ‘regularity in dispersion’ see Grossberg, 
1996, p. 95). 
16
 A concept that is deployed in HSS particularly in opposition to the teleology of 
Hegelian/Marxist dialectics. More generally, it opposed a rationalistic and functionalistic 
conceptualisation of the social. See also the concept of bricolage in chapter two of this thesis.  
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sense that changes of the totality, or of its moments, necessarily impact upon 
the relational configuration as a whole. To return to the above example, a 
change in the status of the term ‘father’ (such as a changed expectations of its 
domestic duties) necessarily has bearing upon the relational configuration of a 
discourse on the family and, thus, also affects  the term ‘mother’, ‘son’ etc. 
Equally, the economy, contrary to the methodological individualism that is 
prevalent in mainstream economics, must also be understood as a discursive 
relational sphere where objects, subjects, language etc cannot be thought of 
in isolation but are linked together into a complex whole that ultimately is a 
historical bloc (see chapter two of this thesis; for the concept of ‘historical 
bloc’ see below). For example, the widespread emergence of securitization for 
the funding of mortgages (and other ‘debt receivables’ such as credit card or 
student loans) has had widespread relational effects not just for the re-
organisation of the economy but also for politics, culture and the wider social 
sphere, including the interpellation of subjects in the sphere of everyday life 
(see chapter four of this thesis for how securitization is embedded in the 
culture, economy and politics of neoliberalism).   
 
1.4 Radical Contingency and the (Im)Possibility of Society  
Necessity, however, is always subverted and deformed by its underlying 
contingency and thus meaning can be stabilized only temporarily and partially. 
The transition from elements to moments is therefore never complete and 
discourses are the precarious product of the continuous mutual subversion of 
necessity and contingency. This mutual subversion is required for social 
processes, as the assumption of a pure contingency would not ‘do the trick’ 
since it would basically leave the notion of necessity unchanged. In the final 
instance nothing can be referred back to a founding totality but social agents 
never act in the final instance because every identity is discursively mediated 
as discussed at the beginning of this chapter.  
Analogous to Saussure’s notion of signification the social, thus, ultimately 
purely consists of a series of differences or a ‘negative essence’. Signification 
does happen, as we have seen, otherwise there would be no meaning and no 
discourse. Meaning, however, remains an incomplete process. Negativity, on 
the one hand, becomes constitutive of social processes but, due to this very 
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fact, every society must ultimately fail to fully constitute itself since it always 
remains exposed and vulnerable to the disruptive impact of the former. Within 
this framework every identity becomes ‘partially constituted’ as well as 
partially threatened’ (Laclau, 1990, p. 27). One can therefore say that society 
only takes place through constant failure (see: Stäheli, 2000) and the ‘diverse 
“social orders”’ are always ‘precarious and ultimately failed attempts to 
domesticate the field of differences’ (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001, p. 95-6). This 
privileging of tension and disruption at the heart of every social process, which 
Laclau captures by the name ‘the (im)possibility of society’, stands in a 
tradition of thought that emphasises ‘radical contingency’ as an ontological 
ground. As Glynos and Howarth (2007, p. 110) note: 
 
‘Radical contingency opposes empirical contingency’s sense of possibility with 
a sense of impossibility: the constitutive failure of any objectivity to attain a full 
identity. Other formulations of radical contingency as an ontological premise 
include ‘lack in the Other’ (Lacan) ‘structural undecidability’ (Derrida) and so 
on, all of which question the idea of a fully constituted essence of a practice, 
regime or object, in the name of an irreducible negativity that cannot be 
reabsorbed.’  
 
To put this in more practical terms, every social formation is therefore scarred 
by an inherent ‘flaw’ or ‘crack’17 which may (or may not)18 reveal itself in 
moments which Laclau calls dislocations, such as the major crisis of a 
historical bloc (Glynos and Howarth, 2007, p. 105). As, according to Laclau, 
every social identity is ‘always already dislocated’ (Laclau, 1990, p. 39 ff), 
Howarth (2004, p. 268), proposes therefore to distinguish between an 
ontological (dislocation 1) and historical (dislocation 2) dimension of this 
category. While dislocation 1 captures more of the general contradictory and 
distorted condition of being, dislocation 2 designates a historical ‘“event of 
Being” in which the contingency of this world is disclosed, and other options 
                                                 
17
 The indebtness to the Lacanian category of the Real becomes apparent here. Lacanian 
psychoanalysis in general has become more overtly influential in Laclau’s later work albeit it 
remains debatable how far Laclau is willing to commit himself to certain psychoanalytical 
categories (see Glynos and Stavrakakis, 2004; Cederström, 2007). 
18
 As one of the major achievements of Laclauian theory is a radical break with structural 
determinism, there can be no certainty as to when, and if at all, such a dislocatory event will 
occur (see Daly, 2006; see also chapter seven of this thesis)  
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and choices become possible’19. For example, Daly (2006), with foresight, has 
labelled foreign sovereign debt the dislocation [dislocation1] of contemporary 
capitalism20 given its general absurd and bizarre proportions which have no 
future possibility of ever being fully met (Greece, of course, is a very fitting 
example here). The current sovereign debt crisis, then, can be seen as its 
corresponding historical event which, at least to some degree, has opened up 
the ‘terrain for hegemonic struggles about how to heal the rift in the social 
order’ (Torfing, 2004, p. 16).  
 
Throughout this thesis, these different forms of dislocation are used to point a) 
to the inherent contradictions within social formations such as the 
contradictions within the financialization (dislocation 1 – see chapter four of 
this thesis) and b) to emphasis crises resulting from these dislocations as a 
(potential) contingent starting point for new hegemonic identifications 
(dislocation 2 – see particularly chapter five and seven of this thesis).  
 
This view therefore emphasises, as opposed to, say, positivist conceptions of 
society, the contradictions and tensions at the heart of every social practice 
and crises as the contingent starting point of political practices. Hegemonic 
projects (see below) can never fully achieve a utopian state of a ‘reconciled 
totality’ or ‘end of history’ (even though the promise to such an ideological 
state of being is often at the very heart of a hegemonic project – see section 
four of this chapter) but are always subject to dislocations and a constitutive 
lack at its core. Hereby, dislocations are not restricted to structural conditions 
alone but extend to the category of the subject as well.   
 
1.5 Subjectivity 
According to Laclau, subjects are also part of a discourse and partially 
determined by it. As Laclau and Mouffe (1990 p. 101) put it: 
 
                                                 
19
 In his hitherto latest major work OPR, Laclau has introduced yet another more multi-layered 
form of ontological negativity which he calls heterogeneity.   
20
 The category of dislocation is, of course, a  broader category and is thus not restricted to 
the inherent contradictions of capitalism.  
 52 
‘…it is the discourse which constitutes the subject position of the social agent, 
and not, therefore the social agent which is the origin – the same system of 
rules that make the spherical object into a football, makes me a player.’ 
 
The social agency of subjects comes into the equation, however, in the form 
of acts of identification that are the response to the grievances experienced as 
a result of dislocations. Laclau and Mouffe originally conceive of subjects only 
in the sense of ‘subject positions’ in HSS and, thus, essentially reduce 
subjects to ‘mere bearers of structures’ to use Althusser’s well known 
expression. Slavoj Žižek’s (1990) influential critique of subjectivity inspires 
Laclau to extend his concept of dislocation to structures as well as subjects 
and, hereby, to fundamentally rethink the dialectic of structure and agency 
adopting a stance between the two extremes of structural determinism and 
extreme voluntarism. As a result, this stance is able to problematise the dual 
character of structure and agency prevalent in mainstream sociology but also 
other critical traditions such as critical realism (see Willmott, 2005). As Laclau 
(1990, p. 210-11) points out: 
 
‘The question of who or what transforms social relations is not pertinent. It’s not 
a question of ‘someone’ or something’ producing an effect of transformation or 
articulation, as if its identity was somehow previous to this effect. Rather, the 
production of the effect is part of the construction of the identity of the agent 
producing it. It is because the lack is constitutive that the production of an effect 
constitutes the identity of the agent generating it.’ 
 
In NR, Laclau emphasises that subjects are partially freed to identify with 
different discourses under conditions of dislocation. ‘Far from being a moment 
of the structure’, he points out (1990, p. 41), ‘the subject is the result of the 
impossibility of constituting the structure as such’ (see also 1.4 of this 
chapter). Since, following Žižek’s Lacanian approach, the subject is also 
marked by an inherent lack, the latter is practically ‘forced’ or ‘interpellated’ to 
constantly identify anew. Since structures as well as subjects are ‘always 
already dislocated’, identification is a continuous process and identities are 
therefore in a constant flux. As a crisis can never be absolute in the sense of 
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a complete dissolution of structures – even in extreme situations, however, 
the freedom to identify can also never be entirely complete. It therefore makes 
sense to distinguish between identity and identification (or between subject 
positions and political subjectivity – Laclau and Zac [1994]) when referring to 
the location of subjects within the structure of a discourse and acts of 
identification (or political acts) as a reaction to dislocatory situations, 
respectively (see Glynos and Howarth, 2007, pp. 127 ff): 
 
 ‘The incorporation of the individual into the symbolic order occurs through acts 
of identifications. The individual is not simply an identity within the structure but 
is transformed by it into a subject, and this requires acts of identification’ 
(Laclau, 1990, p. 211).  
 
Identity, then, can be located at the level of the social (involving the more or 
less sedimented content of a discursive formation – see section 2.2 of this 
chapter) whereas identification is situated at the level of the political involving 
public contestation and hegemonic struggles over meaning. As Howarth 
(2000, p. 109) summarises:  
 
‘This “decentering” [dislocation] of the structure through social processes such 
as the extension of capitalist relations to new spheres of social life [but not 
confined to it] shatters already existing identities and interests and literally 
induces an identity crisis for the subject. It is this “failure” of the structure to 
confer identity on social agents that “compels” the subject to act. In this sense 
the subject is not simply determined by the structure; nor, however, does it 
constitute the structure. The subject is forced to take decisions – or identify with 
certain political projects and the structures need to be recreated. It is in the 
process of this identification that political subjectivities are created and formed. 
Once formed and stabilized, they become those subject positions that turn 
individuals into social actors with certain characteristics.’ 
 
Further, the notion of identification also possesses a deeply fantasmatic 
dimension (discussed in in more detail in section four of this chapter). The 
dislocation (or ‘lack’, in Lacanian terms) at the centre of the subject also leads 
to attempts on its part to find a culprit for this failure and blame it on an 
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external ‘enemy’. This process points to the presence of antagonistic relations 
and struggles as the foundation of social and political space.  
 
1.6 Antagonism 
The concept of antagonism and antagonistic struggles is central to Laclauian 
theory highlighting his theoretical indebtness to Marx for whom antagonistic 
class struggles are the defining characteristics of every historical social 
configuration, summarised in the famous quote by Marx and Engels (1999, p. 
13) that ‘the history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class 
struggles’.  
 
Contrary to a Marxian understanding of antagonism, however, for Laclau, 
antagonisms are contingent constructions which are not grounded within a 
pre-determined location of the economic structure. On the contrary, the very 
existence of antagonisms indicates that the absence of historical laws and 
privileged universal agents (Howarth, 2000, p. 105) as antagonisms are a 
direct response to the dislocation that permeates both structures and 
subjects. In this sense, what is discussed throughout this chapter with 
reference to the concept of radical contingency as a constitutive ground, or 
the (im)possibility of society, is inherently connected to, and revealed in, the 
discursive presence of social antagonisms. The latter are, therefore, the name 
for the limits of a discourse or social formation as such: 
 
‘Antagonism, far from being an objective relation, is a relation wherein the limits 
of every objectivity are shown… antagonism, as a witness of the impossibility 
of a final suture, is the “experience” of the limit of the social’ (Laclau and 
Mouffe, 2001, p. 125). 
 
By introducing the category of dislocation, Laclau acknowledges in his later 
work that, while every discursive order is always already dislocated, not every 
dislocation needs to be antagonistically constructed. Antagonisms are 
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therefore a discursive and historical response to conditions of dislocation 
(Laclau, 2004, pp. 318-319).21  
 
As will become clear in section two of this chapter, antagonistic struggles are 
a requirement of hegemonic political relations which always rely on 
exclusionary practices that involve an element of suppression and force and 
therefore power (Torfing, 1999; see also below in this section). Every 
hegemonic discourse requires the exclusion or foreclosure of other 
possibilities as a constitutive operation and they involve the exercise of power 
(see section 2 of this chapter). As is pointed out in the discussion of chains of 
equivalences above, what lies beyond this exclusionary frontier – the identity 
that is antagonized – is not something which is rejected on positive grounds 
but because of its status as a common threat or enemy which must be 
conceived of in purely negative terms (see section 1.2 of this chapter). This is 
captured by Laclau’s notion of ‘constitutive outside’,22 a discursive exterior 
which ‘blocks the identity of the inside (and is, nonetheless, the prerequisite 
for its constitution at the same time)’ (Laclau, 1990, p. 17). This operation 
affects both sides of the antagonistic relation (Laclau 2004, p. 125), hereby 
creating a situation of ‘us versus them’ where the enemy or adversary is held 
responsible for the blockage or failure of an identity while the common 
opposition to this enemy is what constitutes this identity in the first place. 
Therefore, considerable time and effort is usually invested into discrediting the 
enemy (Willmott, 2010b) who nevertheless remains a mere construction of, 
and an outlet for, one’s own failure. As Žižek (1990, p. 251-2) puts it:   
 
‘It is not the external enemy who is preventing me from achieving identity with 
myself, but every identity is already in itself blocked, marked by an 
impossibility, and the external enemy is simply the small piece, the rest of 
reality upon which we “project” and “externalise” this intrinsic, immanent 
impossibility.’ 
                                                 
21
 While antagonisms tend to be more or less synonymous with limits as such in HSS, 
Laclau’s later reworking of the notion of limit as dislocation leads him to conceptualise 
antagonisms as a particular historical reaction to these dislocations (Laclau, 2004, pp. 318-
329).   
22
 For a different interpretation of the concept of constitutive outside see Stäheli (2004). 
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It is thus that ideological narratives often present ‘obstacles’ that, once 
removed, guarantee a certain ‘fullness-to-come’. Upon actual removal of 
these obstacles or enemies, the subject encounters its own failure (and not a 
reconciliation with his/her ‘true self’) and is therefore compelled to identify with 
a different hegemonic project which offer a solution to the dislocation that 
permeates both structures and subjects (Laclau, 1990; Žižek, 1990; see also 
section four of this chapter for the related concept of fantasmatic logics). 
 
In concrete situations social antagonisms show themselves through the 
production of unstable political frontiers. These invoke stereotypical depictions 
of friends and enemies, involving a negation of identity in the double sense of 
a negation of alternative meaning and of subjects who identify with these 
excluded options. Their presence is revealed in a number of different political 
constellation that can take the form of open confrontation (e.g. Gramsci’s war 
of position – see section 2.1 of this thesis) to the successful exclusion or 
marginalisation of a ‘common enemy’. Likewise, the antagonised force at the 
other side of the political frontier can react by ‘fighting back’, accepting its fate, 
resorting to denial, and so forth (see Torfing, 2004; p. 14; Torfing 1999, p. 
120-31).   
 
In this thesis the concept of social antagonism is used, firstly, to illustrate how 
neoliberalism emerged and initially constituted itself as a purely antagonistic 
reaction to the perceived failures of the preceding regime of embedded 
liberalism (see chapter five of this thesis). Secondly, the concept is deployed 
to illuminate the nature of the antagonistic struggles surrounding 
demutualisation frenzy of the 1990s as a constitutive terrain for the 
marginalisation of the mutual model and the rise of financialization as the 
hegemonic force in the British mortgage market.  
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2. Hegemony 
 
2.1. Hegemony and Marxism 
The concept of hegemony is what Laclau is perhaps best known for. It is this 
concept that, besides the concept of antagonism, most clearly anchors his 
theoretical framework within the (post) Marxist tradition. As Critchley and 
Marchart (2004) point out, Laclau’s deconstructive reading of Marxism 
throughout his work does not lead to a complete abandonment of the former 
but to the strengthening of one of its traits – the Gramscian heritage. The 
Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci is the central figure for a contemporary 
understanding of the concept of hegemony.  
 
Conventionally, the term hegemony is understood in political theory to refer to 
the dominance of a specific country over others such as that of Britain in the 
19th Century and the US and the Soviet Union in the post-World War II era 
(The Voter, 2011). In a Marxist context, the term first arose in the writings of 
Georgi Plekhanov and other Russian Marxist such as Lenin, to designate the 
necessity of the working class to forge political alliances with different 
heterogeneous groups rather than undertake mere economic struggles to 
overthrow the Tsarist regime (Anderson, 1976). Gramsci, then, developed 
Lenin’s strategic use of the term into a theoretical concept (hegemony as an 
emancipatory strategy, however, remains important for Gramsci as well as 
Laclau within their respective theoretical frameworks).  
 
For Gramsci, hegemony is a type of political relation as well as a substantive 
achievement23 (Norval, 2004, p. 156). Gramsci emphasises the importance of 
the superstructure in Marxist theory in relation to the economic base. For him, 
hegemony characterises the process by which a group transcends its 
particular ‘economic corporatist’ interests and aspires leadership over 
                                                 
23
 One can also draw a distinction between the terms ‘hegemony’ and ‘hegemonic’ in this 
context. According to Torfing (1999, p. 293, footnotes chapter 2), hegemonic practices refer to 
the intention to dis- and re-articulate social elements in and through antagonistic struggles 
(this is, of course, already involves a Laclauian notion of hegemony). It is a different matter, 
however, whether these practices succeed in the construction of hegemony. 
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subordinate groups within society. Hegemony is exercised not exclusively by 
the use of coercive power in the Weberian sense of a ‘power over’ something 
or someone (Weber, 1980, p. 28). On the contrary, for Gramsci, gaining the 
ideological consent of the governed is its defining characteristic which implies 
‘intellectual and moral leadership’ (Gramsci, 1971, pp. 182; 269)24. Hereby, 
education plays a central role in the diffusion of hegemonic ‘common sense’ 
(Gramsci, 1971, pp. 24-33), where ‘organic intellectuals’, non-traditional 
intellectuals who function as the intellectual architects of a hegemonic project, 
have the role of ‘organisers of masses of men’ (Gramsci, 1971, p. 12). 
 
 
A hegemonic project consists of an intricate, contradictory, and contingent 
alliance of forces within the spheres of the state, the economy and civil 
society (the latter referring to institutions such as the church, trade unions, 
schools, the family, the media etc. The dominant configuration of those 
heterogeneous forces in a given period of time is called a ‘historical bloc’ 
(Gramsci, 1971, p. 366). Gramsci tends to identify civil society as the primary 
ground to convey hegemony (Gramsci, 1971 p.12).  
 
Williams (1960 p. 587) characterizes the hegemony of Gramsci as  
 
‘... a socio-political situation, ... an order in which a certain way of life is 
dominant, in which one concept of reality is diffused throughout society in all its 
institutional and private manifestations informing with its spirit all taste, morality, 
customs, religious and political principles, all social relations, particularly in 
their intellectual and moral connotation.’ 
 
Gramsci affirms the centrality of struggle as a defining feature of Marxist 
theory. However, struggles are predominantly located at the level of the 
superstructure in the form of the attempt to persuade social agents of different 
ideological groupings which he calls a ‘war of positions’, as opposed to the 
                                                 
24
 Gramsci tends to identify hegemony with consent and the state with coercive power 
(Howarth 2004). This distinction is collapsed in a Laclauian reading of hegemony. Therefore, 
according to Laclau, hegemony can imply consent as well as coercive power.  
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‘frontal attack’ of direct political confrontation (Gramsci, 1971, pp. 238-9). ‘The 
concept of “war of position”’, Levy and Egan (2003, p. 807) argue, 
 
‘employed a military metaphor to suggest how groups challenging hegemonic 
coalitions from below might avoid a futile frontal assault against entrenched 
adversaries; rather, the war of position constitutes a longer term strategy, 
coordinated across multiple bases of power, to gain influence in the cultural 
institutions of civil society, develop organisational capacity, and to win new 
allies. As in a game of chess, power lies not just in the playing pieces, but in 
the configuration of forces, and each set of moves and counter-moves presents 
fresh possibilities to prise open the seams of a historical bloc.’ 
 
Resistance is, therefore, always present within this framework because a 
historical bloc is never stable but, due to the contradictory and contingent 
nature of the alliance of forces, always fragile and threatened by competing 
hegemonic projects. A crisis of the hegemony of a historical bloc which 
Gramsci calls ‘organic crisis’, is therefore accompanied by the dissolution of 
its precarious unity which, in turn, creates the possibility for counter-
hegemonic forces to seize power (Gramsci, 1971, pp. 210 ff). For Gramsci, as 
for Laclau, a crisis is thus the contingent possible starting point of a new 
hegemonic order.   
 
2.2 Three Models of Hegemony in the Theory of Laclau 
As Howarth (2004) notes, the theoretical reception of the concept of 
hegemony by Laclau can be broadly divided into three ideal-typical stages 
within his work. These reflect his respective engagement with different 
theoretical problematisation and schools of thought as well as concrete 
political issues. Each of these stages also contains a radicalisation of the 
concept of contingency at the end of which the achievement of any form of 
final suture25 becomes impossible.  
                                                 
25
 The concept of suture is elaborated on by Laclau and Mouffe in the notes on chapter two of 
HSS (2001, p. 88, footnote 1) which, given its rare insight into the earlier reception of Lacan 
by Laclau, is worth quoting in full here:  
‘The concept of suture which we will be using frequently, is taken from psychoanalysis. Its 
explicit formulation is attributed to Jacques-Alain Miller (“Suture elements of the logic of the 
signifier”, Screen, Winter 1977/78, vol. 18, no4, pp. 24-34), although it implicity [sic] operates 
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The first model in Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory (1977) draws on, 
and expands, the ideas of Louis Althusser and Gramsci to rework Marxist 
categories with regard to the advancement of the ‘more traditional demands of 
the socialist working class’ (Howarth, 2004, p. 272, footnote 3). The centrality 
of a class core for the constitution of hegemonic projects in not yet fully 
deserted within this model. 
 
The second model stems from a deconstructive reading of the concept of 
hegemony in the Marxist tradition in HSS disclosing the last remnants of 
essentialism in the works of Gramsci and Althusser by predominantly 
deploying poststructuralist theories of signification and discourse such as 
those of Derrida Foucault and Lacan (see: above). HSS aims to advance the 
project of radical democracy on the basis of a theory of hegemony that is no 
longer rooted in any form of economic determination. The outcome, as said 
before, is not a complete rebuttal of the Marxism tradition, but a radicalisation 
of the anti-economistic position of Gramsci with the aim to ‘reactivate’ Marxist 
categories in a completely non-essentialist way as Laclau and Mouffe (2001, 
                                                                                                                                            
in the whole of Lacanian theory. It is used to designate the production of the subject on the 
basis of the chain of its discourse; that is, of the non-correspondence between the subject 
and the Other-the symbolic-which prevents the closure of the latter as a full presence. 
(Hence, the constitution of the unconscious as edge operating the junction/division between 
the subject and the Other.) “Suture names the relation of the subject to the chain of its 
discourse; we shall see that it figures there as the element which is lacking, in the form of a 
stand-in. For while there lacking, it is not purely and simply absent. Suture, by extension-the 
general relation of lack to the structure of which it is an element, inasmuch as it implies the 
position of a taking-the place of’(Miller, pp. 25-6). This moment of lack is, however, only one 
aspect. In a second aspect, suture implies a filling in. As Stephen Heath points out, “suture 
names not just a structure of lack but also an availability of the subject, a certain closure...It is 
not surprising..., therefore, that Lacan’s own use of the term ‘suture’...gives it sense of a 
‘pseudo-identification’, defines it as ‘function of the imaginary and the symbolic’...The stake is 
clear: the ‘I’ is a division but joins all the same, the stand-in is the lack in the structure, but 
nevertheless simultaneously, the possibility of a coherence, of the filling in” (S. Heath, “Notes 
on Suture”, Screen, pp. 55-6). It is this double movement that we will attempt to stress in our 
extension of the concept of suture to the field of politics. Hegemonic practices are suturing 
insofar as their field of operation is determined by the openness of the social, by the ultimately 
unfixed character of every signifier. This original lack is precisely what the hegemonic 
practices try to fill in. A totally sutured society would be one where this filling-in would have 
reached its ultimate consequences and would have therefore, managed to identify itself with 
the transparency of a closed symbolic order. Such a closure of the social is, as we will see, 
impossible.’    
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p. ix) assert in the second edition of the book.26 The impossibility of ultimately 
fixing meaning is a central claim to a Laclauian conceptualisation of 
hegemony. Indeed, the open-texturedness of the field of discursivity is the 
condition of possibility, and constitutive ground, for hegemonic struggles to 
occur in the first place. The aim of any hegemonic project is, then, to stabilise 
and expand a system of meaning around the articulation of nodal points. In 
this model, hegemonic articulations require the existence of antagonisms and 
the instability of the frontier dividing them and, thus, the presence of floating 
signifiers that can be attached to either side of the hegemonic frontier 
(Howarth, 2004, p. 259).  
 
HSS also becomes a ‘manifesto’ for a re-positing of the strategy of the left. 
Politically influenced by the occurrence of the so-called ‘new social 
movements’ from the mid-1960s onwards, which were not easily conceivable 
within a traditional Marxist framework, hegemony is seen as a possible 
collective strategy for a variety of different and heterogeneous demands27 
(e.g.: feminist, anti-racist, the gay movement, environmentalist etc). It is 
treated as a means to transform the particular identities of certain demands 
into a more collective opposition against subordination and inequality by 
entering into equivalential relations with other struggles on the basis of the 
diffusion of the egalitarian democratic imaginary.  
 
The logic of equivalence itself, cancelling out differences, becomes the 
condition of possibility for a democratic articulation of a variety of different 
heterogeneous struggles.  ‘Hence’, as Laclau and Mouffe (2001, p. 167) put it, 
‘the project for a radical and plural democracy, in a primary sense, is nothing 
other than the struggle for a maximum autonomisation of spheres on the basis 
of the generalization of the equivalential-egalitarian logic.’ A democratic 
hegemonic project can only succeed by aiming not only to establish links 
                                                 
26
 Laclau and Mouffe, in their only other collaborative work Postmarxism Without Apologies 
(1990 [1987]), point out that their theoretical endeavour should be understood as being Post-
Marxist as well as Post-Marxist. 
27
 For Laclau’s political sociology the basic unit of social analysis is a demand, and not a 
group (Laclau, 2005). Demands can be defined as ‘a type of action whose objective is the 
transformation of a social relation which constructs a subject in a relationship of 
subordination’ (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001, p. 153). 
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between subordinated groups and expanding the democratic principle of 
equality into ever increasing sectors of the social alone, but, it must equally 
construct a more ‘positive’ version of the social in the sense that it must 
provide for a certain concrete account how the social, as democratically 
organised, might look like. This space, the space of the universal which is 
discussed below, is an empty one whose identity cannot be determined a 
priori. As any given factual positivity of this universality is, thus, contingent 
and ultimately impossible in the sense shown above, a truly radical 
democracy must always take into account its own contingency and 
precariousness. Not the inversion of a particular form of oppression should 
therefore be the aim of a radical democratic project as this would ultimately 
lead to another form of oppression. Rather, the very forms of oppression and 
closure should be inverted as such (Laclau, 1990, pp. 159-174). This relates 
to what Glynos and Howarth (2007) call the ethical dimension of a practice or 
regime - as opposed to its ideological dimension - a dimension which is 
foregrounded if subjects actively affirm the radical contingency of socio-
political relations (see section 2.3 of this chapter). In the words of Laclau and 
Mouffe (2001, p. 190), then, this means that: ‘this moment of tension, of 
openness, which gives the social its essentially incomplete and precarious 
character, is what every project for radical democracy should set out to 
institutionalize’.28 According to Gibson-Graham (2006) the concept of radical 
democracy is particularly useful as a strategy to highlight the heterogeneity of 
economic relations and oppose the hegemonic status of capitalism that falsely 
claims sole representation of the entire economic sphere. (This monolithic and 
universalist representation of capitalism hereby obsures other models of 
economic organisation such as mutuals, see also chapter two of this thesis).  
 
The third model of hegemony, increasingly influenced by psychoanalysis, 
commences with the response to Žižek’s critique of subjectivity in New 
Reflections on the Revolution of Our Times (Žižek, 1990) by introducing the 
category of dislocation to both social structures and agents (see section one 
of this thesis). Later Emancipation(s) (1996) continues this endeavour with the 
                                                 
28
 According to Wenman (2003, it is particularly Chantal Mouffe who should, more so than 
Laclau himself, be credited with the concept of radical democracy.  
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conceptualisation of empty signifiers, modelled on the Lacanian master 
signifier, as a prerequisite for the signification of the absent fullness of a 
hegemonic formation. The complex interaction between a particularism and its 
incarnation of a universality qua empty signifier, an incarnation that is 
ultimately contingent and remains tainted by its very particularity, becomes, 
from E onwards, central to Laclau’s concept of hegemony (see section 2.5 of 
this chapter) .  
 
Populism, then, as opposed to how this term is conventionally understood, 
designates a discursive articulation that aims to divide the social space into 
two opposing camps. It is conceptualised as a dimension of hegemony that is, 
to some degree, always present but particularly pronounced when the social 
space is equivalentially reconstructed in times of organic crises (Laclau, 
2005a). 
 
2.3 Hegemony and Anti-Essentialism 
This thesis is primarily concerned with engaging insights of the second and 
third model. It hereby follows Howarth (2004) in emphasizing the continuities 
rather than discontinuities between these two theoretical stages. Arguably one 
of the most important achievements of HSS, and also of Laclau’s work more 
generally, is the deconstruction of the determination of the superstructure by 
the economic base in Marxist theory. This move results in a ‘de-
essentialisation’ of the economy and a fundamental reworking of Marxist 
categories such as antagonism and hegemony (see also above in this 
chapter). Following Gramsci, hegemony is understood to be politically 
constructed as well as historically contingent and inherently unstable. 
Contrary to Gramsci, however, the notion of fundamental classes as ultimately 
privileged historical agents around which hegemonic projects are constituted 
is completely abandoned. Thus, for Laclau, the universalisation of particular 
interests, or demands, as well shall see, is not tied to an essential class core 
like the proletariat or the bourgeoisie and, therefore, not ultimately rooted in 
the economy. In fact ‘politico-hegemonic articulations retroactively create the 
interests they claim to represent’ (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001 p. xi). Similarly, 
and contrary to the position taken by Althusser and others (originally 
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formulated by Friedrich Engels), a social formation, therefore, cannot be 
determined ‘in the last instance’ by the economy as this would eventually 
amount to a simple determination and not the overdetermination that 
Althusser himself postulates.29 Hence, space of the economy is structured like 
any other space of society within which the workings of hegemony and 
antagonistic struggles are constitutive and not derivative. The unity of a 
hegemonic discourse amounts to a unification of different struggles through 
articulatory practice that cannot be determined a priori.  
 
2.4 The Primacy of the Political 
The contingent acts of institutionalisation that create the space for 
antagonistic hegemonic struggles are, for Laclau, associated with the logic of 
‘the political’ which for him takes primacy over ‘the social’. Following (and 
supplementing) Derrida’s deconstruction, the concept of the political, as 
understood here, designates a ‘decision taken in an undecidable terrain’. It 
thus refers to the discursive (re)articulation of dislocations and is linked to the 
contingency and freedom of a collective decision that is not rooted in existing 
social structures but transcends them (see Stäheli, 2003, p.1). In Laclau’s 
own words the political denotes a collective act:  
 
‘...where the undecidable nature of the alternatives and their nature of the 
alternatives and their resolution through power relations becomes fully visible...’ 
(Laclau 1990, p. 35).  
                                                 
29
 The concept of overdetermination was originally developed in a scientific way by Sigmund 
Freud referring, among other things, to the concept that dreams are ‘overdetermined’ in the 
sense that they result from a variety of multilayered factors in the psyche of the dreamer 
which condense into a single image. No single factor can be isolated that accounts for the 
image in a ‘causal’ way (Freud, 1999). In its Althusserian reception, overdetermination 
accounts for the constitution of a level of the superstructure with a certain autonomy and 
dinstinct effects of its own. It means the ‘fusion’ of a multiciplicity of contradictions of a social 
formation ‘determining but also determined in one and the same movement, and determined 
by the various levels and instances of the social formation it animates’ (Althusser, 1967, p.4). 
In re-assessing Althusser’s argument Laclau and Mouffe (2001, p. 98) state that the ‘concept 
of overdetermination is constituted in the field of the symbolic, and has no meaning 
whatsoever outside it. Consequently, the most profound potential meaning of Althusser’s 
statement that everything existing in the social is overdetermined, is the assertion that the 
social constitutes itself as a symbolic order. The symbolic –i.e., overdetermined-character of 
social relations therefore implies that they lack an ultimate literality which would reduce them 
to necessary moments of an immanent law.’ See also Gibson-Graham (1996) for an 
elaboration of the concept of overdermination specifically for the sphere of economy (cf. also 
chapter two of this thesis).   
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This means that the political, conceptualised as a contingent act of 
institutionalisation, is constitutive upon the social and, by extension, the 
economy as part of the wider social sphere. Unlike orthodox Marxism, the 
political is therefore not confined to a derivative level of the superstructure nor 
is it, as in neoliberalism, a passive guarantor of free markets which is only 
invoked in times of crisis (as the lender of last resort, for example).  
 
As becomes clear in the above quote, the operation of the political logic 
always involves the exercise of power. Not unlike a Foucauldian notion of 
power, the latter is, for Laclau, also enabling and restraining at the same time. 
The operation of power involves the repression or marginalization of 
alternatives (alternative decisions, conducts or beliefs that were once 
attempted but then discarded or marginalised, as well as the subjects who 
identify with them – cf. section 1.6 of this chapter for the concept of social 
antagonism and the notion of a constitutive outside). This process, as 
discussed earlier, is constitutive upon the very identity that carries out the 
repression: 
 
‘It is in this sense that we assert that all objectivity necessarily presupposes the 
repression of that which is excluded by its establishment ... Our thesis is that 
the constitution of a social identity is an act of power and that identity as such is 
power’ (Laclau 1990, p. 31).  
 
Dyrberg (2004) points out that it is useful to distinguish between two different 
analytical levels of the political in Laclau’s work of which neither is confined to 
state politics. The first level refers to the notion of the political as elaborated 
above – the contingent act of institution of a hegemonic order that is a 
response to dislocation. The second one refers to ‘politics’ in a more narrow 
sense which designates the concrete ordering of a historical bloc - the 
particular content that defines a given historical conjuncture. The political, 
according to Dyrberg (ibid), is a strictly ontological intervention which is 
distinct from ontical and historical manifestations of political regimes and 
practices. This dimension is particularly to be found in Laclau’s third model of 
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hegemony which is the elevation of a particularity into the status of an 
(incomplete) universality (see 2.5 of this thesis below). This implies the 
repression of equally valid alternatives – other ‘historic options that were 
discarded’ (Laclau, 1990, p. 34). The political as a concept is, thus, a mere 
function of hegemony without a pre-specified content or form. It basically 
emphasises the institutionalised (and hence contingent) character of every 
social order as such: 
 
‘The moment of original institution of the social is the point at which its 
contingency is revealed, since that institution, as we have seen is only possible 
through the repression that were equally open (ibid, original emphasis).   
 
The notion of the political as devoid of any concrete content or form is 
important. Claims that Laclau simply inverses the relationship of the economy 
and political and, thus, essentialises the latter instead of the former (see 
Dreyer Hansen, 2008b) can therefore be refuted (even though there is 
arguably a certain ‘bias’ in Laclau’s work towards political processes that 
needs to be addressed if one is to analyse the economy, or indeed any other 
social sphere; see chapter two of this thesis). Politics, then, is concerned with 
the ‘actual hegemonic relationship’ – the specific particularity that becomes 
the ‘stand- in’ for the absent fullness of society (Dyrberg, 2004, p. 244). For 
example, the way that neoliberalism articulates the relationship between state, 
economy, and society and the degree of populism and institutionalism (chains 
of equivalence vs. chains of difference) present at a given point in time is a 
matter of politics.  
  
Glynos and Howarth (2007) introduce another useful analytical distinction of 
the category of the political referring to ‘political dimensions’, ‘political logics’ 
and ‘political moments’ respectively. For them, the political dimension is tied 
to the public contestation of a practice or regime where subjects challenge 
existing norms and social relations (LCE, p. 112-3; see also the discussion in 
section 3.1 of this chapter). Political logics refer to the political ordering of a 
regime or practice (logics of difference vs. logics of equivalence) irrespective 
of the presence of contestation (see section 3.3 of this chapter). Finally a 
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political moment denotes a heightened awareness of contingency that may 
result in public contestation (see also Chang and Glynos, 2011).   
 
According to Laclau (1990, p. 33-5), the concept of the political, then, can be 
juxtaposed with the concept of the social with which it enters into an unstable 
relationship of mutual contamination or, a continuous relationship of 
‘sedimentation’ and ‘reactivation’. 
 
In the course of the routinisation of practices that once were politically 
institutionalised, the contingent origins of every hegemonic formation become 
largely forgotten and are mistaken for genuine ontological ‘objectivity’. Laclau 
(ibid), drawing on Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology here, distinguishes 
between ‘sedimentation’ - the forgetting of the ‘original acts of violence’ of the 
power relations that led to the institution of the social involving the repression 
of alternatives – and ‘reactivation’- a moment, most apparent in times of crisis, 
where ‘through the emergence of new antagonisms’ the underlying 
contingency of the social becomes visible. Social relations are therefore linked 
to sedimentation whereas their political institution is linked to moments of 
reactivation. As any form of political decision involves power, what is regarded 
as ‘objectivity’, the being of objected, is nothing but sedimenented power 
relations whose ‘traces have been erased’ (Laclau, 1990, p. 60). However, the 
line that separates the social and the political is constantly displaced as 
neither can fully constitute itself. The social, consisting of sedimented 
practices of iteration, is continually subverted by acts of political re-
composition whereas the political institution of the social takes place against 
the background of a range of sedimented practices. It is thus that LCE speaks 
of a political dimension (see section 3.1 of this chapter), referring to the public 
contestation of sedimented practices that is, to some degree, always present.  
 
The institutionalisation of a new hegemonic project, then, proceeds from a 
crisis or dislocation where the social is politically reconstituted and subjects 
are partially ‘freed’ to identify anew (see, for example, chapter five of this 
thesis). The ‘sedimented forms of objectivity that make up the social’, 
however, can, even in times of crisis, never be fully abandoned because 
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every reactivation ‘takes place in a determinate situation: that is one in which 
there is always a relative structuration’ (Laclau, 1990, p. 43).  
 
2.5 Universalism and Particularism 
As pointed out earlier, Laclau’s third model of hegemony is concerned with 
the (complex and unstable) process by which a particularity assumes the 
status of the universal. This process is associated with the rhetorical trope of 
the synecdoche – a part representing the whole (see Laclau, 2005a, p. 72). 
This trope signifies the process by which a ‘particular social force assumes 
the representation of a totality30 that is radically incommensurable with it. 
Incommensurability means here that the social can never be sutured 
completely (see: footnote 19 in this chapter for the concept of suture) and 
remains precarious. ‘Such a form of “hegemonic universality”’ is, according to 
Laclau and Mouffe, (2001, p. x), ‘the only one that a political community can 
reach.’ Similar to the effects of the fragile arrangement of forces that is a 
hegemonic bloc in a Gramscian sense (see section 2.1 of this chapter), 
resistance, thus, practically ‘lurks’ at every corner of the hegemonic formation 
(Spicer and Böhm, 2007, p. 1671).  
 
Unlike some forms of postmodernism which do away with any notion of 
universality, resulting merely in a form of value pluralism where no hegemonic 
articulation is possible31, the concept of universality is indispensable for 
Laclau. However, his conceptualisation of universality differs significantly from 
classical philosophy, or indeed Marxism, in the sense that universality does 
not have any content of its own – it is empty – and it can therefore appear in 
various ontical guises depending on the particular discourse in question. 
Hence, the universal requires the incarnation of a certain particular content or 
demand (e.g. freedom, order, equality etc). Like Derrida’s spectre, as Laclau 
                                                 
30
 The concept of a particularity assuming the status of universality is, for Laclau, identical to 
the operation of the Lacanian object petit a (Laclau, 2003; 2005a; see also section four of this 
chapter).  
31
 The relation of the particular and the universal is theoretically discussed in Emancipation(s) 
(1996) on the basis of ongoing debates on multiculturalism in the political science. For Laclau, 
advocates of a pure multiculturalism who do not account for any form of shared universal 
reference eliminate all politics which, for him, could only result in a form of segregationism or 
‘self-apardheid’ (Laclau, 1990p. 32).  
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(1996, p. 72; Derrida, 1996) points out, universality ‘can exist only through its 
parasitic attachment to some particular body’. Through a process of struggle, 
a particularity ‘overflows’ its own particular content and takes of up the 
(impossible) task of representing the community as a whole which involves an 
equivalential operation: ‘a certain particular, by making its own particularity the 
signifying body of a universal representing, comes to occupy – within the 
system of differences as a whole - a hegemonic role’ (Laclau, 1996, p. 102).  
 
This operation is linked to what Laclau refers to as the production of empty 
signifiers (Laclau, 1996, p. 36-46). The latter are ‘pure names’, signifiers 
without a signified (Laclau, 1996, p. 36). These signifiers are ‘empty’ because 
they are names that do not have a content of their own but, in their function as 
nodal points (privileged reference points), act as a ‘stand-in’ for the ‘absent 
fullness’ of the discursive formation by articulating alongside it a chain of 
equivalence that points to a constitutive outside (Laclau, 1996, pp. 36-46; see 
also the various discussion in section one of this thesis). 
 
Empty signifiers, therefore, literally construct the ‘ground’ of a discourse (see 
Daly, 2006 and section 1.3 of this chapter). They are the ‘necessary means of 
representation for the (impossible) discourse to appear coherent’ (Cederström 
and Spicer, forthcoming). The common opposition to something external, 
represented by a certain signifier, is thus the central unifying principle of a 
discourse (Laclau, 1996; Laclau, 2006). To give an example that is used in 
this thesis, the name ‘freedom’ for instance, occupies the role of an empty 
signifier in neoliberalism. The latter has been constitutive upon articulating a 
heterogeneous set of practices and ideas as freedom into an equivalential 
chain. What freedom means in neoliberalism, e.g. unrestrained competition, 
private property, and so forth, is not derived from what freedom ‘really is’ but 
how it became defined against the preceding regime of embedded liberalism 
and Keynesian welfarism.32 Given the magnitude of economic and social 
transformations this idea of freedom has contributed to advance (for example, 
                                                 
32
 It becomes apparent here that empty signifiers acquire their presence in historical 
circumstances and are, therefore, only partially empty, as they, to some degree, adopt the 
historical content of the particular social force that hegenomises it (see section 2.2 of this 
chapter).   
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the deregulation of markets, the privatization of public facilities, anti-collectivist 
policies against unions and so forth), this signifier has literally ‘brought into 
being’ what it names (see also section three of chapter two of this thesis for 
the concept of ‘performativity’).33 
 
More generally, then, signifiers like ‘order’ or ‘freedom’, can be primarily 
grasped as an antagonism of what they are not – a state of perceived 
‘disorder’, ‘non-freedom’ - and, thus, they are empty in the sense that they do 
not, qua essence, automatically refer to a certain concept. Empty signifiers 
are, however, only tendentially empty34  since they are ‘filled’ with the content 
of a particular social force. Thus, in order to structure a hegemonic discourse 
in a certain way they borrow, to some extent, the content of the particularity 
that occupies its place. The universal, therefore, always remains 
‘contaminated by particularity’ (Laclau, 2000 p. 51). This dialectical process 
takes place at the ontological and ontical level and is precisely what structures 
the horizon of a given hegemonic formation:  
 
‘The particular has transformed its very partiality in the name of a transcendent 
universality. That is why its ontological function can never be reduced to its 
ontic content. But because this ontological function can be present only when it 
is attached to an ontic content, the latter becomes the horizon of all there is – 
the point at which the ontic and the ontological fuse onto a contingent but 
indivisible unity’ (Laclau, 2005a, p.226). 
 
To return to the above example, ‘freedom’ in neoliberalism is therefore of a 
particular colouring (see above and chapter five of this thesis). It acts as a 
horizon that delimits the historical bloc as a whole in terms of governing its 
inclusionary and exclusionary practices.  
 
The relationship between the universal and the particular which incarnates it 
is always a ‘failed encounter’ as both are never fully congruent and, at some 
point – the moment of dislocation – the insufficiency of the particularity to 
                                                 
33
 Cf. in this context also Laclau and Mouffe’s discussion of neoliberalism in HSS (pp. 171 ff).  
34
 As Laclau argues, the longer the expansion of the equivalential chain, the emptier the 
signifier (Laclau, 2005a).   
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carry out the ‘filling function’ is revealed and the particular cannot fulfil its 
universal function any more (see Torfing, 1999, p. 182). 
 
The theoretical concepts discussed so far are in the following supplemented 
by the associated approach of Political Discourse Theory which, among other 
influences, draws on, and extends, the ontological premises and central 
categories of Laclau’s approach.  
 
 
3. Political Discourse Theory and the Logics Approach 
 
Political Discourse Theory (PDT)35 has developed out of the writings and 
initiatives of Laclau at the University of Essex where he founded the Ideology 
and Discourse Analysis Programme that later led to the creation of the World 
Network in Ideology and Discourse Analysis36 and the Centre for Theoretical 
Studies in the Humanities and Social Sciences37 to establish his particular 
brand of poststructuralist/post- Marxist discourse theory. Anchored in, but not 
confined to, the work and theoretical heritage of Laclau and Mouffe, PDT has 
produced a significant body of theoretical and empirical research that is 
sometimes also referred to as the ‘Essex School of Political Theory’ since the 
approach originated at the University of Essex and some of its main 
proponents, often former students of Laclau, are still based there. Standing in 
this tradition, the ‘logics approach’ developed by Glynos and Howarth in their 
important work LCE advances further methodological aspects of PDT and 
develops a distinct explanatory framework for the analysis of social and 
political processes based on the concept of political, social and fantasmatic 
logics.   
 
Crucially, besides elaborating a distinct poststructuralist/post-Marxist 
methodology, the logics approach develops a more ‘institutionalist’ account of 
central Laclauian categories (and that of related scholars some of whom have 
been mentioned earlier).38  
 
Based on the central ontological claims discussed earlier such as radical 
contingency, the structural incompleteness of the social, and its subjects as 
well as the primacy of the political (see above in section two of this thesis), the 
                                                 
35
 PDT is sometimes also called ‘Poststructuralist Discourse Theory’ or Post-Marxist 
Discourse Theory (cf. Glynos and Howarth, 2008; Howarth, 2010) 
36
 See,  http://www.essex.ac.uk/idaworld/ 
37
 See, http://www.essex.ac.uk/centres/Theostud/staff.asp 
38Those scholars include: Jacques Lacan, Karl Marx, Antonio Gramsci, Louis Althusser, 
Ferdinand de Saussure, Roland Barthes, Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, Ludwig 
Wittgenstein, Michel Foucault, Jaques Derrida and Slavoj Žižek.  
Glynos and Howarth’s logics approach remains firmly rooted in Laclauian theory but also 
further develops some of the contributions of these scholars in relation to its central 
ontological claims, most notably the contribution of Lacan (see section four of this chapter). 
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logics framework provides a critical grammar for an analysis of how social 
regimes and practices are instituted, contested, maintained, or transformed.   
 
3.1 Four Dimensions of Socio-Political Reality:  The Political-Social Axis 
According to Glynos and Howarth (LCE, chapter four) there are four 
ontological dimensions, or conditions of (im)possibility, of socio-political reality 
– the social, political ideological and ethical dimension. All dimensions are 
always present within a socio-political regime or practice, albeit to varying 
degrees. A regime can therefore conceptually be understood according to the 
degree that these respective dimensions are either foregrounded or 
backgrounded. Socio-political practices as mundane as mortgaging one’s 
home (see chapter four of this thesis) are embedded in broader institutional 
arrangements here referred to as regimes.39 The latter are relational social 
systems, ‘discourses’ in the terminology of Laclau, which structure an 
ensemble of social (i.e. sedimented) practices. Those practices, however 
taken for granted in our daily lives, always arise, and are contested or 
defended, politically (i.e. hegemonically). Hereby, the dialectical relationship 
between the political and social as shown above applies as both dimensions 
are integral part of every practice or regime.40 The institution of regimes, as 
discursive formations, always involves the exercise of power in the 
exclusionary sense discussed earlier. Therefore, certain regimes can, for 
instance, contain explicit exclusions such as the division between insiders and 
outsiders (the prevalence of the logic of equivalence) or mechanisms where 
the excluded are pushed to the margins of the formation (i.e. the mutual 
model in this thesis). This process reflects how regimes are always defined, to 
some degree, in antagonistic contrast to other regimes which, in turn, colours 
the regime’s own practice (LCE, p. 106). But this also means, as discussed 
throughout this chapter, that every regime, like every discourse, is marked by 
                                                 
39
 Other appropriate names would be ‘order’, system, or ‘discursive formation’, for example. 
What accounts for a ‘regime’ depends on the precise circumstances and contexts and, thus, 
in turn, under the specific problem under investigation. Hereby, the analyst plays an active 
part in the ‘characterization of a context as a particular regime’ (LCE, 125-6, original 
emphasis). Therefore, a regime does not necessarily needs be located, say, at the level of the 
nation state or at the supra-national level.    
40
 In LCE the terms ‘political or social aspects of a practice or regime’, ‘political or social 
practices’ or the ‘foregrounding of the political or social dimension’ are often used 
interchangeably to denote an emphasis on one dimension or the other. 
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an outside that partially constitutes it but also destabilises and subverts it at 
the same time.  
 
The foregrounding of the political dimension of a regime is linked to public 
contestation and involves the articulation or absorption of political demands. 
Demands are political as understood here if they publically contest ‘the norms 
of a particular practice or system of practices in the name of a principle or 
ideal’ (LCE, p. 115).41 Those demands are radical if they contest a 
fundamental norm of a practice or regime (ibid, p. 115; p. 230, original 
emphasis). Political demands can potentially be transformed into hegemonic 
demands which challenge aspects of a practice or regime by successfully 
generalising its relevance to other institutions and practices (ibid, p. 115-16, 
original emphasis). Thus, demands can be more or less hegemonic 
depending on them succeeding in having more or less universal appeal. 
Political practices, namely the foregrounding of the political dimension, can 
therefore challenge particular isolated aspects of that regime or fundamentally 
transform the latter and institute a new hegemonic order (such as in the case 
of the neoliberalist counter-revolution under Thatcher, for instance, that is 
discussed in chapter five of this thesis). 
 
Political practices arise from grievances experienced and articulated in 
situations of dislocation such as organic crises where previously sedimented 
institutional practices are suddenly disrupted and questioned (see also section 
2.3 of this thesis). As pointed out earlier, this can result in the articulation of 
demands that potentially seek to challenge and/or transform a regime in the 
name of a principle or ideal (the empty signifier) which involves the 
construction of political frontiers that divide the social into two antagonistic 
camps (logics of equivalence). But as the categories of dislocation and the 
political are tied to contingency and freedom, the outcome of how a 
dislocatory experience is politically (and socially) resolved is never 
predetermined, neither in form nor in content. Political practices can therefore 
                                                 
41
 The political character of demands or struggles emphasises that the latter are not confined 
to demands within parties or the state but aim at the ‘transformation of a relationship of 
subordination’ more generally (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001, p. 153) 
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also involve efforts by the dominant hegemonic force to disrupt the 
construction of such frontiers and deal with demands separately (for example 
by making certain singular concessions or dealing with particular groups 
differently) in order not to threaten the hegemonic formation and existing 
power relations as a whole (see above, particularly section 1.2 of this chapter 
for a discussion of Laclau and Mouffe’s logics of difference and Gramsci’s 
concept of transformism). Thus, the political outcome of an organic crisis can 
also be the preservation of the existing power bloc albeit usually in a modified 
form (see chapter seven of this thesis). 
 
In contrast, the foregrounding of the social dimension implies the iterative 
reproduction of sedimented practices or institutions. These allow for a certain 
predictability and characterisation of the regime or practice in question. These 
are the aspects of a regime for which contestation does not arise or is actively 
prevented from arising in order to keep contestation at bay and preserve the 
institutional complex. This can be achieved, for example, through pre-emptive 
attempts to muffle grievances or guide their way through existing institutional 
channels. An example here would be the Carnival festivities in some parts of 
Germany which, for centuries, have provided a semi-official outlet for the 
public to mock the political elite during one week of the year. 
 
On can therefore say that, to the extent that the instituting dimension of a 
practice or regime is made visible, either through public contestation or the 
absorption or resolution of the latter, the political dimension is foregrounded. 
If, on the contrary, contestation does not arise or is pre-emptively prevented 
from arising, the social dimension is foregrounded (LCE, p. 111).  
 
3.2 The Ideological – Ethical Axis 
The second ontological axis of socio-political reality is concerned with what 
can be called the ideological and the ethical dimension of a practice or 
regime. The foregrounding of the ideological dimension denotes attempts on 
the side of the subject to cover over the radical contingency that particularly 
reveals itself in moments of dislocation. Ideological aspects of a practice or 
regime therefore lead to an active misrecognition of the undecidability of every 
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socio-political reality or, to put it in Lacanian terms, an (ultimately failed) 
attempt to limit the presence of the real, in order to attribute a certain 
consistency or rationality to the world. LCE follows Althusser in insisting that 
ideological acts of identification are always present in every social order and, 
thus, ideology is a fundamental ontological category (LCE, p. 118). (The 
concept of ideological fantasy will be dealt with in more detail in section four of 
this chapter). 
 
This, however, is not the whole story as there is the possibility of responding 
ethically to radical contingency and dislocatory experiences. This implies their 
active affirmation and a sense to ‘keep things open’ and to be aware of the 
presence of other alternatives. The ethical dimension, which in Lacanian 
terms can be called ‘an ethics of the real’ (cf. Zupančič, 2000), is not 
concerned with ethics in a straightforwardly normative way but with the 
manner that subjects respond to the constitutive lack at the heart of all reality 
in the sense of not attempting to conceal or disguise it which, in the theory of 
Laclau and Mouffe, is connected to the concept of radical democracy (see 
section 2.2 in this chapter).  
 
The social and political dimension of a practice can find expression alongside 
the ideological- ethical axis. Political practices can be more or less ideological, 
for instance, depending on the amount of concealment in relation to their own 
contingency. This is best illustrated perhaps, by Thatcher’s infamous ‘there is 
no alternative’-doctrine (see also chapter five of this thesis). Equally, to the 
extent that subjects are attentive to the radical contingency in political or 
social practices, one can speak of the foregrounding of the ethical dimension 
or, in the terminology of Lacalu and Mouffe, the presence of a ‘radically 
democratic ethos’ (LCE, p. 123).   
 
The political and social structuring of regimes and practices are illustrated in 
figures 1 and 2; source: Glynos and Howarth (2007)  
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Figure 1 
A simplified model of the constitution of a social regime  
 
 
Figure 2  
The four ontological dimensions of regimes and practices 
 
These four dimensions of socio-political reality are linked to the operation of 
three types of different logics that form the basis of the next section – social, 
political and fantasmatic. These provide a basic explanatory and critical 
grammar for the functioning and interaction of the various aspects that 
characterise regimes or practices.  
 
3.3 Logics 
The concept of logics is inspired by Laclau who initially refers to social logics 
as the ‘grammar’ or ‘cluster of rules’ that structure and organise a particular 
discourse (Laclau, 2000, p. 76). In his later work, he distinguishes between 
‘social logics’ and ‘political logics’ which are connected to ‘rule following’ and 
the ‘institutionalization of the social respectively’ (Laclau, 2005, p. 117). Using 
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these remarks as a starting point, Glynos and Howarth develop a distinct 
approach where logics become a central category of social and political 
analysis that explains what makes social practices and regimes both possible 
and vulnerable at the same time (LCE, pp. 133-164). 
 
There are three types of logics within their framework - social, political and 
fantasmatic. Taken together, they characterise the mechanisms that structure, 
institutionalise, reproduce, defend, or challenge a regime or practice within a 
general theory of hegemony. For them, the ‘logics of a practice comprises the 
rules or grammar of the practice as well as the conditions which make the 
practice both possible and vulnerable’ (LCE, p. 136). 
 
Logics are not ‘laws’ in the sense that one can subsume the phenomena 
under investigation under universal laws or ‘causal mechanisms’ such as, for 
example Marx’ tendency of the profit rate to fall. Nor are they confined to 
particular contextualised interpretations as in the hermeneutic tradition, for 
example. How particular actors interpret their roles and contexts is important 
but equally important is that logics, like the dimensions that were outlined in 
the last section are ontological and, thus, logics possess a ‘quasi-
transcendental’ quality which, as Glynos and Howarth put it, ‘moves between 
empirical phenomena, consisting of self-interpretations and practices, and our 
underlying ontological premises’ (LCE, p. 164). The latter are, as noted 
earlier, essentially compatible with those of Laclau.  
 
The three different logics can be associated with the foregrounding and 
backgrounding of the four different ontological dimensions. Social logics assist 
with characterising what a practice or regime is; its sedimented content. 
Political logics show how it is contested and defended. Those two logics are 
tied to the foregrounding/backgrounding of the social and political dimension 
respectively. Finally, fantasmatic logics generate reasons for why practices 
are maintained or transformed and are associated with the ideological or 
ethical dimension. All logics mutually implicate each other and are necessary 
components of a critical account of a problematised phenomenon (LCE, p. 
103 ff; original emphasis).  
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Social logics furnish the vocabulary to characterise a regime or practice as an 
ensemble of sedimented rules that govern a discourse. The logic of 
financialization, for example, consists of a number of different rules, or ‘sub-
logics’ such as leverage, risk, credit, commodification, increased accumulation 
of capital through financial channels and so forth. Taken together, they 
account for an assemblage that can be called the logic of financialization (see 
chapter four and six of this thesis).  
 
Crucially, social logics are at the most ‘ontical’ of the three logics in the sense 
that they are inseparable from the historical context in which they operate 
(see also chapter four of this thesis) but, qua rule, they cannot be fully 
reduced to this context either. All the ontological categories elaborated upon 
above equally apply to social logics (discursivity, the presence of 
antagonisms, the general theory of hegemony etc). Thus, the concept of 
social logics allows for a certain cross-contextual investigation as well. As 
Laclau and Mouffe observe (2001, p. 142 quoted in LCE, p. 140), ‘social 
logics … acquire their meanings in precise conjunctural and relational 
contexts where they will be always be limited by other, frequently 
contradictory – logics.’  
In sum, social logics account for the ‘patterning’ of a regime or practice which 
characterises how it ‘ticks’ and how it interacts with other, often antagonistic, 
logics (e.g. the antagonistic relationship between mutuality and 
financialization that is investigated in this thesis).  
 
Political logics refer to the logic of equivalences and differences that are 
discussed in section 1.2 of this chapter. They are concerned with how a social 
space is constructed at any given moment in time and are tied to the 
foregrounding of the political dimensions of a regime or practice or its active 
suppression. To briefly summarise, while logics of equivalence construct 
political frontiers in order to oppose a common enemy or threat, logics of 
difference aim to absorb potential contestation into the existing social order in 
a transformist way. Therefore, they account for the political struggles that 
institute, contest, or defend social regimes and practices. Hereby, political 
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logics account for the dynamics of social change by highlighting how the logic 
of difference prevails over the logic of equivalence and vice versa (LCE, pp. 
141-45; original emphasis).   
 
Neoliberalism, for example, emerged under Thatcher as an antagonistic 
reaction to the perceived failures of Keynesian. It drew support from many 
sectors of society by uniting a variety of heterogeneous demands. Hereby, the 
logic of equivalence clearly dominated the logic of difference. In contrast, the 
period preceding the financial crisis where neoliberalism and financialized 
growth were largely officially established (particularly during the ‘roaring 
noughties’), was characterised by the prevalence of the logic of difference. 
During this time their political origins were largely sedimented and 
contestation (e.g. anti-globalisation movements, environmentalist protests etc) 
was largely dealt with through existing institutional channels.      
 
Political logics can be combined with fantasmatic logics (see below) in the 
sense that the latter can provide the force and speed for change, but also 
support the resilience of an existing regime or practice. As the concept of 
fantasmatic logics ties in with an established tradition in political theory that 
explores processes of ideological fantasy, it is investigated in this broader 
context and in some depth in the next section. 
 
 
4. Ideological Fantasy      
 
In PDT, the concept of fantasmatic logics is deployed to develop a version of 
ideology critique that combines poststructuralist and psychoanalytic thinking 
and draws on an established critical tradition which links ideology and the 
critique thereof to the operation of fantasy (e.g. Žižek, 1989, 1997; Glynos, 
2001; 2008; Glynos and Stavrakakis, 2008; Stavrakakis 1999; Daly 1999, 
2004). Here, the Lacanian category of fantasy points to the affective 
dimension of a hegemonic (ideological) regime or practice by stressing the 
role of subjectivity, desire, and enjoyment (jouissance). A fantasmatic logic, 
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therefore, draws attention to why subjects identify with certain contingent 
hegemonic discourses and not others - the reason why subjects are ‘gripped’ 
by a particular regime or practice (Glynos, 2001). While an ideological fantasy 
can appear in many historical guises, the latter is predominantly an 
ontological category which is tied to the foregrounding of the ideological 
dimension of a regime or practice as discussed above. Fantasy, therefore, 
refers not so much to the concrete, normative content of a specific regime or 
practice but to the more formal ‘mode of the subject’s enactment with these 
norms’. Fantasy, thus, can be understood as ‘a way of mediating the subject’s 
relation to the norms and ideals that govern a social or political practice 
(Glynos and Stavrakakis, 2008, p. 10).  
 
The ideological component of fantasy involves an obfuscation of the ultimate 
impossibility of every social order. Ideology is understood not to reside in 
‘false consciousness’ in the sense of a misrecognition of the true essence of 
society - such as the misrecognition of economic classes as structuring 
principle of social relations in orthodox Marxism - ‘but precisely the opposite, 
the non-recognition of the precarious character of any positivity, of the 
impossiblility of any ultimate suture’ (Laclau, 1990, p. 92).42 On the contrary, it 
is fantasy that gives consistency to a discursive formation and partially covers 
over the lack in the structure and well as the subject.  
 
Fantasy is, therefore, not a dream-like construction to escape reality43 but it 
involves a narrative that supports and structures the reality of our social 
relations as such by trying to offer an escape from the traumatic experience 
that is the ‘real’. In Lacanian psychoanalysis the ‘real’ and ‘reality’ are 
conceptually to be distinguished. The real, an increasingly important concept 
in the later work of Lacan, which Žižek (1989) describes as a ‘traumatic real 
kernel’, refers to a pre-discursive leftover that resists all attempts of 
symbolisation. It can surface only as a disruption of the symbolic and 
                                                 
42
 Laclau himself seems to be more at ease with the conventional term ideology as he, 
despite increasingly affirming the influence of Lacan in his later work, does not explicitly use 
the terms fantasy or enjoyment.   
43
 That is precisely why ‘ideology at its purest’ is to be found in the seemingly neutral 
reference to mere ‘utility’ such as national differences in toilets (Žižek, 1997)  
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imaginary order. Reality, on the contrary, is a symbolic and imaginary 
construction aimed at domesticating the disruptive effects of the real which is 
nevertheless bound to fail (here, the parallels to Laclau’s (im)possibility of 
society become apparent). The category of the real points to the lack in the 
big Other (the symbolic order of discourse) as well as the lack in the subject 
(see also section one of this chapter). This refers in essence a lack of what 
Lacan calls jouissance, a pre-symbolic enjoyment that is sacrificed upon the 
entry into the big Other in the formative stages of a subject’s identity (Lacan’s 
famous mirror stages). Fantasy, then, is the attempt to eliminate the lack in 
the Other by promising to recapture the lost enjoyment which, however, must 
remain impossible since the subject cannot return to a time before language 
and ‘the symbolic law’. 
 
It is the identification with a master signifier in the big Other (the realm of 
discourse and language) that stimulates desire (It is the identification with the 
signifier ‘freedom’ in neo-liberalism, for instance, that retroactively constitutes 
its desiring subjects). Desire, however, is the desire of the big Other which, 
like the subject, is also structured around a central lack. Fantasy literally 
teaches the subject how to desire while simultaneously concealing the desire 
of the big Other.  
As Žižek remarks (1989, p. 118; original emphasis): ‘Fantasy appears then as 
“Che Vuoi?” to the unbearable enigma of the desire of the Other, of the lack in 
the Other; but it is at the same time fantasy itself which, so to speak, provides 
the co-ordinates of our desire – which constructs the frame enabling us to 
desire something. The usual definition of fantasy (“an imagined scenario 
representing the realization of desire”) is therefore somewhat misleading, or at 
least ambiguous: in the fantasy-scene the desire is not fulfilled, “satisfied” but 
constituted (given its objects, and so on) – through fantasy we learn “how to 
desire.”’ 
 
Fantasy structures the subject’s belief about the recapture of the sacrificed 
enjoyment in staging a relationship between the subject-as-lack and an 
impossible object; the Lacanian object petit a. The object remains impossible 
as it constitutes the subject as desiring. Thus, desire must remain ‘dis-
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satisfied’ as the subject of desire can never encounter its truly desirous object 
(Glynos, 2001, p.201).  According to Žižek (1997, p. 13), the object petit a 
paradoxically always emerges as already being lost. Fantasmatic 
narrativisation, then, aims at resolving this deadlock by artificially positing the 
object petit a as first given and then lost which, in turn, sets in motion the 
endless but impossible search for the sacrificed jouissance represented by 
the ‘lost’ object. The object petit a can, for example, emerge in the form of 
utopian political projects that are embedded in imaginary promises of a future 
state which will not be hindered by the loss of jouissance. Glynos and 
Stavrakakis (2008, p. 261) describe, for example, the imagined return to a 
utopian era of ‘prudent capitalism’ devoid of any form of impure 
‘contamination’ such greed and corruption (see chapter seven of this thesis).   
While a certain amount of jouissance of the body, as it is called by Lacan, can 
actually be obtained in the political context through the staging of national 
celebratory rituals for example, this form of jouissance remains partial and 
momentary.44 In an often quoted passage Lacan points out that ‘“That’s not it” 
is the very cry by which the jouissance obtained is distinguished from the 
jouissance expected’ (Lacan, 1998, p. 111). Thus, these utopian political 
projects cannot deliver on their promise of providing for an absolute fullness 
and, therefore, merely reproduce desire and this very utopian promise of 
fullness inscribed in fantasy. That is why fantasy possesses a certain 
masochistic quality and often is experienced as suffering. This also explains 
why subjects frequently submit themselves to conditions of subordination (see 
the initial quote in chapter eight of this thesis).  
 
Fantasy, as understood here, is thus the ‘glue’ (Glynos, 2001) that holds the 
ideology of a hegemonic formation together by simultaneously constituting its 
subjects as desiring and promising the desire’s (impossible) satisfaction. 
However, since coming too close to the realization of one’s desire is an 
encounter with the real which is experienced as traumatic, fantasy relies on 
the re-/ staging of a scenario that keeps the subject at a critical distance vis-a-
vis the fantasmatic object. As Daly (1999, p. 221-2) remarks: ‘The supreme 
                                                 
44
 This is sometimes also called jouissance2 which is staged in fantasy and accounts for a 
‘false’ and ‘domesticated’ real (Stavrakakis, 1999, p. 49) 
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“promise” of ideology is that it will realize a fully reconciled social order and 
deliver us absolutely from the Real’ ... In this regard, all ideology is structured 
in terms of eluding a direct (and unbearable) encounter with the Real through 
a certain re-staging in which such an encounter is made to appear resolvable.’  
 
This re-staging often involves the form of the construction of an ‘other’ that 
denies access to, or has stolen, the lost/impossible enjoyment (cf. also 
section 1.6 for the concept of social antagonism). Hence, a fantasmatic logic 
often takes the form of a promise of a ‘fullness-to-come’ once an obstacle is 
removed or a certain villain, responsible for the theft of the primordial 
jouissance, is identified/punished. Indeed, according to LCE, every utopian 
fantasy seems to produce the need for a scapegoat to supplement its beatific 
dimension of a reconciled fullness with its horrific side of violence upon which 
this vision is founded45 (Stavrakakis, 1999; see also Willmott, 2010b). 
Scapegoating provides the possibility of enjoyment because it offers the false 
promise of snatching away the jouissance from the imaginary thief who is 
believed to have stolen it. In the context of the financial crisis of 2007-9, 
scapegoating a few CEO’s such as RBS’s Fred Goodwin and Northern Rock’s 
Adam Applegarth precisely provided the form of jouissance pointed out here. 
Moreover it even constitutes, or at least reaffirms, the very status of the larger 
public as subordinates, as the perceived victory of having pressured a few 
CEO’s of banks to hand back their annual bonus, for example, leaves the 
systemic nature of the system of existing power relations largely intact (see 
chapter seven of this thesis).   
 
More generally, then, Žižek (1997, p. 29) summarises these processes as 
follows: 
 
 ‘It is therefore crucial to bear in mind the radical ambiguity of fantasy within an 
ideological space: fantasy works both ways, it simultaneously closes the actual 
span of choices (fantasy renders and sustains the structure of the forced 
choice, it tells us how we are to choose if we are to maintain the freedom of 
                                                 
45
 A prototypical scapegoat in the work of Slavoj Žižek is the figure of the Jew. The concrete 
embodiment of such a scapegoat varies but always refers to a similar mechanism. 
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choice-that is, it bridges the gap between the formal symbolic frame of choices 
and social reality by preventing the choice which, although formally allowed, 
would, if in fact made, ruin the system) and maintains the false opening, the 
idea that the excluded choice might have happened, and does not actually take 
place only on account of contingent circumstances.’ 
 
The ‘offer to be rejected’ which would in fact ruin the system in the above 
example is, in fact, foreclosed by the fleeting enjoyment derived from 
scapegoating a few ‘greedy bankers’ as this pushes more systemic reforms of 
the financial system to the margins of public debate. Such an ideological 
move, however, can seldom be acknowledged in official public discourse. 
Ideological fantasy, therefore, often relies on the censorship of its own 
ideological foundations (see Žižek, 1997). It is thus that the very foundations 
of social fantasy, such as the scapegoat that aims to steal our enjoyment, 
often reveals itself in semi-official sources such as the yellow press (Glynos 
and Howarth, 2007; Glynos, 2008). 
 
A fantasmatic logic, therefore, aims to capture these practice that regulate the 
subject’s economy of enjoyment in order to conceal contingency. Fantasmatic 
logics can either foreground the social dimension of a practice at the 
expenses of its political dimension thus contributing to the sedimentation of 
social relations, or, on the other hand, give support to political change 
processes. Hence, as briefly indicated above, fantasy can either make a 
practice more resistant to change or account for the speed and impact of its 
institutionalisation. As Glynos and Howarth (2007, p. 147) point out:  
 
‘If the function of fantasy in social practices is implicitly to reinforce the natural 
character of their elements or to actively prevent the emergence of the political 
dimension, then we could say that he function of fantasy in political practices is 
to give them direction and energy, what we earlier referred to as their vector 
(...) In addition, during the institution of a new social practice or regime, there 
are invariably political practices that actively seek to naturalize a newly 
emerging social structure or regime by backgrounding its political dimension 
through decision, institutionalization and other means. This entails 
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marginalizing whatever contestatory aspects remain from the struggle to 
institute the new social structure.’  
 
Ideological fantasies are, therefore, the link that binds subjects (for example, 
the everyday subjects of saving and borrowing discussed in chapter four of 
this thesis) to certain regimes or practices via the promise of covering over the 
radical contingency at the heart of every experience. Contrarily, a response to 
contingency that foregrounds what LCE calls the ‘ethical’ dimension 
designates a continuous effort to resist the totalising attempts of a particular 
fantasy in the sense of keeping the possibility of other alternatives open. In 
the theory of Laclau and Mouffe, this means to construct a hegemony where 
equality itself becomes the governing principle for the expansion of the chain 
of equivalence. While antagonism can never be done without, ‘common 
enemies’ can hereby be transformed into ‘common adversaries’ whose views, 
while they are opposed, can be seen as equally valid (Mouffe, 1993).   
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter gives an overview of the theory of Ernesto Laclau, including 
some of his Gramscian and Lacanian influences, and PDT. It places an 
emphasis on covering a broad range of central theoretical concepts due to 
their interrelatedness and a general consideration of making the approach as 
accessible as possible without having to compromise too much of its 
complexity and depth. On certain occasions, the historical evolution of some 
of these concepts throughout the body of work of Laclau is investigated so as 
to better locate them within, or distinguish them from, other theoretical 
traditions such as linguistics, poststructuralism, psychoanalysis and, most 
importantly, its Marxist heritage. The theoretical discussions are 
supplemented with empirical examples which predominantly relate to the 
findings of this thesis.  
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Section one of this chapter is particularly concerned with elaborating Laclau’s 
particular version of discourse theory which emphasises the relationality and 
the materiality of discourse and conceptualises social and political processes 
as signifying practices. The section discusses the general importance of 
ontology in relation to the radical contingency of every social formation 
against the background of which Laclau’s central theoretical categories and 
problematisations are elaborated. Particularly, the concepts of chains of 
equivalence/difference, dislocation, antagonism and subjectivity are 
investigated under consideration of their theoretical interrelatedness, their 
conceptual development, and also their empirical applicability.  
 
The second section examines in depth the centrepiece of Laclau’s theory 
which is the concept of hegemony. Its first part discusses the theoretical 
reception of hegemony by Antonio Gramsci who is most closely associated 
with the concept and has been immensely influential on Laclau. Gramsci’s 
approach to hegemony is, on occasions, used in this thesis in its own right, 
most notably with respect to the category of ‘war of position’ in chapter five, 
albeit in the non-essentialist way advocated by Laclau. The section further 
discusses the theoretical trajectory of the concept of hegemony in the work of 
Laclau with respect to his engagement with different schools of thought and 
his continuous effort to deconstruct all kinds of essentialism particularly the 
‘economism’46 of the Marxist tradition. In this sense, the further discussions of 
this section illuminate a range of theoretical categories such as the political, 
power, empty signifiers and Laclau’s reformulation of the relationship between 
the particular and the universal which point to the contingency and political 
construction of every hegemonic order. Additionally, section two outlines 
Laclau and Mouffe’s notion of radical democracy as a contemporary strategy 
of the lefts, a strategy, as it is argued in this thesis, that can (and should) be 
extended to the economy.47 
 
                                                 
46
 See also chapter two of this thesis for further discussions on the deconstruction of 
economism in poststructuralist political economy.   
47
 See particularly also Gibson-Graham (2006) who first called for the extension of the 
concept of radical democracy to the economic sphere.  
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Section three complements Laclau’s often very abstract insights with a 
version of PDT – the logics approach by Jason Glynos and David Howarth. 
This framework allows for a more empirically oriented and ‘institutionalist’ 
reading of Laclau’s theory and that of related scholars. By conceptualising 
four basic ontological features of social regimes and practices, connected to 
the operation of three types of associated logics, social, political, and 
fantasmatic, Laclau’s central ontological claims and theoretical categories can 
arguably be more effectively mobilised for the concrete analysis of social 
formation. One of Glynos and Howarth’s central aims – the furnishing of a 
critical theoretical account of how regimes and practices are instituted, 
contested, maintained or transformed forms the basis of the genealogy 
chapters in this thesis.  Their notion of fantasmatic logics, then, is discussed 
in the broader context of contemporary psychoanalytically inflected studies of 
political ideologies such as those of Slavoj Žižek in section four of this 
chapter. The main purpose of this section is to provide an account for the 
operation of ideological fantasy as an instrument of obfuscating contingency 
and the subjugation of subjects to ideological regimes and conditions of 
domination. This section principally aims to show how, through mechanisms 
such as the projection and diffusion of horrific and beatific fantasmatic 
narratives, scapegoating and transgression, regimes and practices resist 
transformation via the category of the subject. The insights generated in this 
section are particularly deployed for purposes of investigating the resilience of 
neoliberalism and financialization in the light of the financial crisis in chapter 
seven of this thesis.  
 
The next chapter is concerned with mobilising the theoretical edifice of Laclau 
and PDT for an analysis of the economy - an undertaking that, as said before, 
has been largely neglected so far. Supplemented by previous research on 
poststructuralism and economy, a poststructuralist political economy 
according to Laclau is juxtaposed with the paradigm of neoclassical 
economics that has been instrumental in legitimising neoliberalist hegemony. 
It is argued that, despite various difficulties, a Laclauian poststructuralist 
political economy challenges the fundamental axioms and scientific guise of 
contemporary mainstream economics. This challenging of the established 
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orthodoxy in economics, carries the promise of contributing to exposing the 
hegemony of neoliberalism and financialization, underpinned and normalised 
by such claims as to ‘scientificy’, as contingent and politically constructed.  
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‘We have moved from the metaphysical realm to the metaphorical: that is to 
say, we have moved away from the idea that economic “truth” is discovered 
and towards the idea that it is made’ (Daly, 1991, p. 93).  
 
‘Today we must renew the tradition that emerged in the nineteenth century in 
the scientific field, which refuses to leave the world to the blind forces of 
economics and seeks to extend to the entire social world the values of the 
scientific universe …’ (Bourdieu, 2003, p. 12). 
 
 
Chapter Two: What is Economy? 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The identity or ‘nature’ of the economy is subject to a wide variety of 
(competing) discourses, or ‘economic representations’, within academia and 
everyday life (Ruccio, 2008). The economic representation that became 
hegemonic during the second half of the 20th century, relegating almost all 
other representations of the economy to the margins of public discourse, is 
the neoclassical economic paradigm which is based on the assumptions of 
efficient markets, statistical modelling, economic forecasting and the figure of 
the homo economicus. Its claim to ‘scientificity’ has underpinned and 
legitimated the rise of neoliberalism and contributed to the depoliticisation of 
financial markets and practices by constructing markets as spheres beyond 
public contestation and political intervention (see DeGoede, 2003; Froud et 
al., 2010). In the universe of neoclassical economics, the economy, from 
which power and politics are entirely absent, is exclusively populated by 
rational actors whose individualistic and socially atomistic ‘economic choices’ 
ultimately contribute to the greater good. Hereby, ‘the market mechanism’ 
becomes the ultimate judge of economic activity as it punishes ‘inefficiency’ 
and favours choices that lead to economic prosperity and wealth. Even in the 
arbitrage theory of financial economics that presupposes the existence of 
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market anomalies (which are opportunities for hedging and speculation, see 
MacKenzie, 2005 in footnote 51 of this chapter), those inefficiencies are only 
temporary since, on a fundamental level, markets tend towards a general 
equilibrium (Fama, 1970). Indeed, one response to the financial crisis appears 
to be ‘more of the same’ as financial economics becomes more closely 
aligned with (neo-classical) macroeconomics in order to provide the former 
with more ‘scientific legitimacy’.48In the broader context of neoliberalist 
hegemony, the ‘free market’, then, becomes the necessary condition of 
possibility for freedom and (a property owning) democracy (Fukuyama, 1992; 
see particularly also chapters three and five of this thesis for the concept of 
freedom in relation to neoliberalism). 
 
This chapter attempts to mobilise a poststructuralist political economy 
framework based on the central insights of Ernesto Laclau and PDT as well 
as other sympathetic approaches in order to emphasise the primacy of the 
political and the contingency of every economic formation. In this sense, the 
chapter challenges the market fundamentalism of contemporary economics 
as well as the ‘economism’ of other approaches such as orthodox Marxism. 
The first section outlines the central theoretical claims of neoclassical 
economics and discusses its political alliance with neoliberalist hegemony. 
While HSS was first published in 1985 and has been very influential for the 
deconstruction of economic essentialism in Marxism, the application of Laclau 
and Mouffe’s theoretical framework to the economy (as well as the 
development of a poststructuralist political economy more broadly) is a 
relatively recent phenomenon. This delay has in part been due by the almost 
complete theoretical silence on the part of Laclau and Mouffe on the sphere of 
the economy. Section two investigates some of the difficulties of using Laclau 
for economic analysis and stresses the need for supplementary middle-range 
theorising (see also Glynos and Howarth, 2007). Lastly, section three 
identifies key concepts of a poststructuralist political economy based on PDT 
and Laclau, and asks how these concepts can be fruitfully deployed for 
concrete empirical analysis.   
                                                 
48
 This information has been given to me by one of my interviewee who has extensive 
knowledge in the field (interview 6). 
 92 
 
 
1. Representing Economy: The Hegemony of Neoclassical 
Economics 
 
1.1 A World of its Own: Neoclassical Economics’ Theoretical Foundations  
Neoclassical economics is a meta-theoretical framework which consists of a 
revival and development of the so-called classical economics by David 
Ricardo, Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill and others.49 Together with (Neo-) 
Keynesian economics, it forms the so-called ‘neoclassic synthesis’ that 
dominates the field of contemporary economics (Clark, 1998). According to 
Krugman (2009), however, the latter half of the 20th century is characterised 
by a retreat from the original Keynesianism in economics (even within 
mainstream New Keynesianism) which had been the ‘representation’ of the 
economy that had been dominant in the post-Great Depression era (see 
chapter six of this thesis) towards the strengthening of the neoclassical 
paradigm which emphasises the efficiency of markets, the rationality of 
market participants and a limited role of state intervention (the latter 
predominantly assigned to [independent] central banks). John Maynard 
Keynes himself stressed the importance of trust and confidence in relation to 
the functioning of the economy by alluding to his famous ‘animal spirits’ 
(Keynes, 1936; see also: Akerlof and Shiller, 2009). He thus factored a certain 
irrationality and uncertainty into his economic analysis. The New Keynesians, 
however, with a few exceptions, mostly accept the notion that investors and 
consumers act rationally and markets usually ‘get it right’, albeit subscribing to 
a far more extensive role of the state.50 Keynes’s idea of financial markets as 
                                                 
49
 Some commentators would also call Karl Marx a classical economist because of his 
theoretical indebtedness to Adam Smith and Ricardo (see e.g. Weintraub, 2002). However, 
as Daly (2004, p. 7) points out, Marx has highlighted that social relations and power 
imbalances are constitutive of the economic sphere (see particularly Marx, 1976), as opposed 
to the (tendential) economic idealism of  Adam Smith’s ‘Invisible Hand’, for example, that 
precisely seeks to eradicate those relations from the economy.  
50
 Fullbrook (2005) remarks that this representation of Keynes accounts for a ‘vulgar 
distortion’ of his original ideas akin to a ‘Henry Miller novel without sex and profanity’ (p. 4):  
‘Led by Paul Samuelson in the US and John Hicks in the UK, they [mathematical 
economists] set about mathematizing Keyne’s theory. Or, more accurately, a part of his 
theory. They left out all those bits that were inconsistent with the neoclassical axioms 
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a ‘casino’ therefore became replaced by the ‘efficient market hypothesis’, an 
ideological belief in the ‘market mechanism’, which refers to the assumption 
that all markets are ultimately efficient and tend towards equilibrium. 
Consequently, deviations are arbitrary and, thus, prices on traded assets 
always reflect all available information (see: Fama, 1970).51 In that sense, the 
famous phrase coined by Milton Friedman (and attributed to Richard Nixon) 
that ‘we’re all Keynesians now’ must indeed read ‘we’re all neoclassicals now, 
even the Keynesians’ (Weintraub, 2002).       
 
According to the neoclassic paradigm, economics should be conceived of as 
a science that resembles the natural sciences more closely than other social 
sciences or the humanities (a claim that, on occasions, has led to accusations 
of ‘physics envy’). ‘Positive economics’, as Friedman, a central architect of the 
neoclassic revolution and important organic intellectual of neoliberalism, 
(1966, p. 4), puts it: 
 
‘… is, in principle independent of any particular ethical position or normative 
judgement … Its task is to provide a system of generalizations that can be used 
to make correct predictions about the consequences of any change in 
circumstances. Its performance is to be judged by the precisions, scope, and 
conformity with experience of the predictions it yields. In short, positive 
economics is, or can be, an objective science in precisely the same sense as 
any of the physical sciences.’ 
 
This notion of economics echoes its decoupling from the social sciences and 
humanities from the end of the 19th century onwards (Svetlova, 2008, p. 9).52   
                                                                                                                                            
… This bowdlerised version of Keynes, called “Keynesianism”, soon became standard 
fare in undergraduate courses. Even graduate students were discouraged from reading 
the primary text. With this co-optation of Keynes’ reputation and with the real Keynes 
out of the way and Veblen and all the other free spirits forgotten, the road was now 
clear to establish a neoclassical tyranny’ (ibid). 
51
 There are, however, theoretical variations on the efficient market paradigm. For example, in 
neoclassical finance theory, these arbitrary deviations from ‘real’ prices are arbitrage 
opportunities for the savvy trader which makes finance theory, in contrast to neo-classic 
economics, rather more a theory of ‘sharks’ than a theory of the traditional homo economicus 
(Ross, quoted in MacKenzie, 2005). 
52
 The economic paradigm that is hegemonic in the wider social sciences, by contrast, and 
which directly opposes the formalism of neoclassical economics, is the ‘substantialism’ 
developed by Karl Polanyi and later the New Economic Sociology of scholars such as Mark 
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As a freestanding academic discipline, economics makes it its business to 
advance standardised criteria for an objective assessment of economic life 
which serve to measure, describe, explain and predict ‘real’ economic activity. 
In order to do so, it devises methodological tools that aim at, paraphrasing 
Laclau’s statement in section 1.1 of chapter one of this thesis, ‘an unmediated 
access to the economy “as it really is”’. In doing so, the neoclassic paradigm, 
firmly grounded within a positivist conceptualisation of science and based on 
what is known as ‘methodological individualism’, has a number of far-reaching 
consequences for the dominant representation of economic reality.   
 
Where the social sciences explicitly deal with the question of structure and 
agency, economics presupposes a certain form of agency – the homo 
economicus or ‘rational man’ – whose actions and motivations are 
constructed to be beyond the scope of inquiry of economics as a science. 
Coupled with the scarcity principle – economic resources are understood to 
be scarce and all economic actions are geared toward the reduction of 
scarcity – economics presupposes a rational choice under said conditions of 
scarcity as a field of inquiry. The choice of the economic agent is seen to be 
dependent on preferences (for example certain needs ranked according to 
urgency), the actual scarcity of resources (for example budgets, costs and 
prices) and on the presence of alternatives. Every preference is attributed with 
a certain utility on the basis of which preferences can be ranked. The 
economic agent is then understood to choose one (and only one) among the 
number of available alternatives, namely the one that aims at maximal utility 
under the given circumstances.  
 
                                                                                                                                            
Granovetter. For substantialists, markets are a specifically modern form of economic 
organisation that have been established via the increasing ‘disembeddedness’ of the 
economy from the social institutions they were once embedded in, such as the family or the 
community: ‘Instead of the economic system being embedded in social relations, these 
relationships were now embedded in the economic system’ (Polanyi quoted in Stäheli (2008a, 
p. 295). While Polanyi’s notion of the economy as the outcome of an ‘instituted process’ 
(Polanyi, 1954) is followed here, the dichotomy between society and economy is 
problematised (see below). For an overview over the formalism/substantialism debate see 
Wilk (1996, p. 1-26) and Stäheli (2008a).  
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The central methodological principle of economics (and economics is perhaps 
best understood as a set of methodological assumptions) is the 
aforementioned methodological individualism. The latter argues that every 
collective phenomenon can be solely deduced from the actions of individuals. 
These actions, however, are understood to be socially atomistic. This means 
that the relational and social context between individuals is considered to be 
irrelevant for economic analysis: the homo economicus chooses between 
alternatives, makes decisions according to rational principles and operates, 
conceptually isolated from other economic agents, within a social vacuum 
which is the marketplace. 
 
The dominance and persistence of methodological individualism in economics 
can be traced back historically to the importance of Liberalism in philosophy 
and political economy in England in the 18th century. Based on the  
utilitarianism philosophy of John Stuart Mill and Jeremy Bentham among 
others, liberalism contains the notion that, firstly, the morality of actions can 
exclusively be judged according to the principle of utility and that, secondly, 
subjects can be conceptualised as free and autonomous. The Marginalist 
School and the Austrian School, such as William Stanley Jevons, Carl Menger 
and also Joseph Schumpeter have later elaborated and legitimised the 
concept of methodological individualism with particular respect to the 
discipline of economics (Svetlova, 2008, pp. 9-11). 
 
1.2 A Match Made in Heaven: Neoclassical Economics and Neoliberalism 
The ascendancy and success of neoclassical economics has been, to a large 
part, the result of a mutually beneficial symbiosis with the neoliberalist project 
(see chapter three for the concept of neoliberalism). Keynesian macro-
economics, dominant from the post-war years until the 1970s, was 
increasingly seen to be unable to revive capitalist growth during a period of 
crisis because it favoured a ‘mixed system’ rather than a ‘purely capitalist’ one 
(Bresser-Perreira, 2010, p. 15). Additionally, the ‘historical-deductive method’ 
used by Keynes was regarded to be incompatible with the exclusively 
mathematical and ‘formalist’ stance adopted by neo-classical economics 
which supposedly made economics ‘truly scientific’. This representation of 
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economics as a ‘pure science’ was, alongside the collapse of Iron Curtain in 
1989, central for the institutionalisation and legitimisation of neoliberalism 
(ibid). Since neoliberalism emerged chiefly as a response to the perceived 
failures of Keynesian macroeconomics which were deemed to be incapable of 
explaining both a period of stalled economic growth and high inflation at the 
same time (see chapter five of this thesis for the rise of neoliberalism), 
neoclassical economics became integral part of the neoliberalist hegemony 
and played an important role in its legitimisation.  
 
To secure the continuation and success of neoliberalism, the USA, as the new 
post-world war superpower, actively groomed an exclusive elite of 
neoclassical academics as well as business and military leaders. They were 
trained in academic strongholds of neoclassical economics such as Chicago, 
which promoted and diffused neoliberal ideology, underpinned by neoclassical 
‘scientificity’, throughout the world. Due to its very high level of formalism, 
however, the world, as Fullbrook (2005, p. 5) points out, had to be shaped 
according neoclassical principles and not vice versa:  
 
‘Given that it [neoclassical economics] was impossible to escape its autism 
without de-formalizing and thereby losing its treasured illusion that economists 
are kissing-cousins of physicists, why not demand that the real world change 
so as to conform to the imaginary world of neoclassical economics. This is how 
neoliberalism came and continues to be’. 
 
If not entirely succeeding in accurately depicting economic reality or shaping 
the latter according to its own image, neoclassical economics has certainly 
succeeded in projecting an ideological fantasy of the economy. This 
ideological fantasy is centred on ‘the market’ and the ‘rational man’ which has 
interpellated subjects across the social spectrum in various ways. The 
economy – equated entirely with the market place - has hereby emerged as a 
sphere that can be fully controlled and mastered which, in turn, has helped to 
suppress political contestation and participation. The dislocations in the wake 
of the crisis – the Lacanian traumatic encounter with the real – has arguably 
so far only led to a re-affirmation of a particular version of this fantasy via the 
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identification of scapegoats and individual mistakes (see particularly chapter 
seven of this thesis).  
 
The theoretical assumptions underpinning a poststructuralist/PDT reading of 
the economy, then, directly challenge the central claims of neoclassical 
economics as will be shown. It is argued here that a poststructuralist take on 
the political economy provides the conceptual tools for a deconstruction of the 
economic essentialism inherent in neo-classical, orthodox Marxist and other 
representations of the economy. Poststructuralist political economy can 
therefore be understood as a statement against ‘economism’ - i.e. economic 
reductionism - and ‘de-politicisation’ (see DeGoede, 2003; 2004; 2005; 2006).  
 
In this sense, a Marxist political economy within which the political moment is 
subordinated to, and determined by, economic structures (if only in the last 
instance, according to some interpretations), must, of course, also be rejected 
(see Laclau and Mouffe, 2001 and the discussions in chapter one of this 
thesis). The primacy of the political and the associated contingency of every 
social formation moves, therefore, to the forefront of every economic analysis. 
Also, the economy can no longer be regarded as being exclusively populated 
by rational and, with regard to their economic decision-making, socially 
isolated agents as the latter are partially constituted by discursive structures. 
One thus also has to take into account the relational structures, affects and 
acts of identification that govern economic agents and practices.  
 
In the following, I will firstly point to the challenges of using the work of Laclau 
and Mouffe for an analysis of the economy in section 2.3 of this chapter. I will 
then elaborate how a poststructuralist economy with reference to Laclau and 
Mouffe and PDT can be conceptualised.  
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2. Laclau and Mouffe and the Spectre of Economism  
 
The theoretical development of a poststructuralist take on the political 
economy is a relatively recent phenomenon whose advent, ironically, was 
considerably delayed by the distinct accomplishments of Hegemony and 
Socialist Strategy in 1985. As Stäheli (2008a; 2008b) points out, the initial 
reluctance of the poststructuralist tradition to accommodate an analysis of the 
economy (let alone finance) can be read as being part of the very success 
story of poststructuralism itself. He argues that the economy became almost a 
quarantined space of scholarly investigation after the effective deconstruction 
of what Laclau and Mouffe in the influential HSS (p. 75) call the ‘last redoubt 
of essentialism’ of the Marxist tradition; which itself is the economy. While the 
deconstruction of economic determinism in HSS laid bare the primacy of the 
political (see chapter one of this thesis), this came at the cost of leaving the 
economy theoretically untouched, arguably for fear of accidentally resorting to 
a form of economism once again. This reluctance, however, initially resulted 
in a range of unintended consequences: 
 
‘Because the economy was classified as a site of substantialism, essentialism 
and causal determinism, it had not become the subject of a discourse analysis 
or deconstructive reading of its own for a long time. This development is fatal 
for a number of reasons. Firstly, the analysis of the economic remains 
committed to precisely those ‘essentialist’ perspectives that are so heavily 
criticized; secondly, in a number of poststructuralist analyses this results in a 
“politicistic“ asymetry which reduces the economic to the political; [and] thirdly, 
the premature rejection or even demonisation of the economic frequently 
overlooks the immanent heterogeneity of economic practices and discourses’ 
(Stäheli, 2008a, p. 298; own translation). 
 
It is therefore not entirely surprising that the first major work to develop a 
distinct poststructuralist political economy framework specifically accused 
Hegemony and Socialist Strategy of conserving the economy and capitalism 
as a fixed and homogeneous space via means of theoretical silence: J.K. 
Gibson-Graham’s The End of Capitalism (as we knew it), published in 1996, is 
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chiefly concerned with ‘the immanent heterogeneity of economic practices 
and discourses’.53 
 
The very fear of the ‘spectre of economism’54 might also help to explain the 
almost complete absence of concrete economic analysis in the work of Laclau 
(and Mouffe). While Laclau can certainly be accused of theoretical silence on 
the sphere of the economy bar a few comments scattered throughout his 
work,55 his intentions with regard to how the latter should be theoretically 
conceived are always clear. In fact, in a recent interview (Glynos and 
Stavrakakis 2010, p. 232), Laclau points out that perhaps the most important 
lesson of the financial crisis – caused by the ‘politics of deregulation which 
was at the core of the neoliberalist project’ – is that ‘… the idea of the 
economy as a unified space, dominated by its own endogenous logic, has 
experienced an ultimate collapse, which is now more visible than ever before.’ 
 
As Torfing (1999, p. 38) confirms, the all-pervading dimension of the political 
in Laclauian theory is incompatible with essentialist conceptions of the 
economy (see also section 2. 4 of this thesis). According to this view, then, a 
mode of production, for instance, cannot function as the structural foundation 
of society (such as in Marxism), since it is always a historical and contingent 
product (Laclau, 2006a, p. 110). 
 
However, Laclau’s pre-occupation with the political as well as the ontological, 
rather than the ontical, poses additional problems that need to be addressed. 
Ontologically speaking, the economy is, like every other sphere of society, the 
result of a historically specific hegemonic bloc. Any concrete economic order 
(e.g. Fordism, finance-led accumulation etc)56 is to be situated predominantly 
                                                 
53
 A position, however, that was considerably revised in their later work A Postcapitalist 
Politics (2006). 
54
 Gibson-Graham (1996, p. 29; footnote 10) point out that this spectre can never be 
completely banned, nor would this be desirable, as ‘anti-essentialism is a motive rather than 
an achievement and even as a motive it cannot exist as a universal value or unmitigated 
good…’ Therefore, ‘essentialising anti-essentialism’ is a poor substitute for the original 
essentialism that one is trying combat in the first place.   
55
 Most notably, a brief historical analysis of contemporary capitalism via the adaptation of 
Scott Lasch’s and John Urry’s notion of ‘disorganised capitalism’ in NR (pp. 41-60).  
56
 See chapter three of this thesis for more details.  
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at the ontical level and does, therefore, not warrant too much specific 
treatment in the Laclauian theoretical universe. Hence, the latter’s 
‘operationalization’ for concrete economic is difficult and must, arguably, 
assume a more experimental and provisional character at this stage (cf. also 
Gibson-Graham, 1996).  PDT has recently started to engage more thoroughly 
with issues of political economy57 (see e.g. Griggs and Howarth, 2009; 
Howarth, 2010), mirroring its greater commitment to ontical and 
methodological concerns, but there is still much work to be done. What 
appears to be a promising way forward is to conceptualise the economy itself 
as a hegemonic arena where competing struggles are fought out, an idea 
already present but not developed in HSS (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001, p. 77; 
Howarth, 2010).  In this sense, and following LCE (p. 136), different ‘market 
logics’ (or, more broadly, logics of the economy) such as mutuality and 
financialization, can be identified. These logics frequently compete and limit 
one another, each trying (but ultimately failing) to represent the economy in its 
totality. To recapitulate, logics are politically institutionalised and none takes 
ontological primacy over the others.  
 
Here, following Scherrer (1995), Laclau’s theoretical insight is best used as a 
meta-framework on the basis of which more concrete middle-range theorising 
and empirical investigations can take place (see  Betramsen et al, 1991; 
Scherrer, 1995; Griggs and Howarth, 2009; Howarth, 2010, Glynos and 
Howarth, 2007). Thus, for the purpose of this thesis, different theories of 
financialization are therefore analysed in chapter three which are then put to 
use for an analysis of the British mortgage markets based on the general 
insights of Laclau and PDT.  
 
What needs to be discussed in this section as a final point is the relationship 
of the political and the economic. According to Stäheli (2008a, p. 298), a 
Laclauian take on the economy carries the danger of a ‘politicistic inversal’ of 
economism which amounts to the equally undesirable ‘reduction of the 
                                                 
57
 There have also been earlier, highly theoretical, attempts to combine Laclau with more 
economically oriented theories particularly Regulation Theory (see Bertramsen et al, 1991; 
Scherrer, 1995).  
 101
economic to the political’. In addition, Daly (2006, p. 178) points out that post-
Marxism and poststructuralism have tended to ignore the mutual 
contamination of the economic and the political. Also, the way the former has 
influenced the latter in a given conjuncture, as well as the way the political 
itself becomes economised has hitherto been overlooked.  
 
However, a point of clarification is in order at this point in relation to the 
concept of the political, as discussed in section 2.4 of chapter one of this 
thesis. It is argued here that misunderstandings can be avoided by clearly 
conceptually distinguishing between the political and politics. The political is 
an ontological and instituting dimension of the social and has no content of its 
own. It can, thus, qua its very nature, not be contaminated by the economic 
whose content is primarily located at the ontical level. However, the present 
neoliberalist conjuncture can indeed be characterised as one where politics 
become economised in the sense that in neoliberalism, the economy 
determines the important political parameters. Politics are, therefore, viewed 
through the lens of the market in the neoliberal universe (Foucault, 2010). It is 
against this background that the more recent attempts of Slavoj Žižek to re-
introduce class at the level of the ontological ‘infrastructure’ must be refuted.58    
 
Thus, as much as Laclau and Mouffe have succeeded in ‘de-economizing the 
political’, the challenge still largely remains to ‘re-politicize the economy’ (see 
Gibson-Graham, 2006, pp. 54-57; 212). This thesis aims to contribute to this 
endeavour. Hereby, the small but growing literature on poststructuralism and 
political economy can offer further insights. Even though the existing literature 
is still in its infancy and far from homogeneous, a number of keystones can be 
identified that can serve as guidelines for empirical and theoretical analysis. 
These are discussed in the next sections.   
 
 
                                                 
58
 A heated exchange, not least  concerning the ontological status of capitalism and economic 
class relations lies at the heart of Laclau’s theoretical parting with Slavoj Žižek (see Laclau, 
2005a, pp. 232-9; 261-2; 267-8; Laclau, 2006; Žižek, 2006a; 2006b; Butler et al., 2000).  
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3. Towards a Poststructuralist Political Economy 
 
3.1 Markets as Contingent Acts of Creation 
A poststructuralist economy, as understood here, must be fully discursive in 
the Laclauian sense of the term – the reasons for this are given in chapter one 
of this thesis. The internal composition and components of economies and 
markets can therefore not be pre-given and static but must be conceived of as 
relational, historical and in constant flux. Hence, every economic order is 
always essentially prone to political contestation and transformation.  
 
The very ‘material structures’ of markets such as prices, costs, capital credit, 
profit, assets, financial instruments etc. are, according to a poststructuralist 
understanding, discursively constituted and enacted on a daily basis. In this 
sense (economic) discourses can be considered ‘performative’ in the way that 
a discourse essentially ‘brings about what it names’ (DeGoede, 2005, p. 7; 
DeGoede, 2003). Performativity, as used here, is therefore not confined to the 
performativity of economics (see e.g. Callon, 1998; MacKenzie, 2004; 2006; 
MacKenzie and Millo, 2003; MacKenzie Muniesa and Siu, 2007; also see 
chapter three of this thesis).59 Rather, it designates that discourses mediate 
and constitute reality at the same time. Hence, economic space is not the 
outcome of a ‘transcendental rationality’, as both orthodox Marxism and 
neoclassical economics assert, but resides in daily practices of reporting, 
accounting, calculating, buying, selling, speaking, advertising and so forth and 
is constantly made and re-made in a ‘struggle over meaning’. The reality of 
the marketplace, therefore, cannot be separated from how it is interpreted and 
represented, and these representations are always connected to the 
dimension of the political and the exercise of power (see particularly section 
1.4 of chapter one of this thesis). Hereby, resistance is central to how the 
economic sphere is shaped and represented, and strategies of dissent can 
help to upset the sedimented practices of established hegemonic order (see 
Langley, 2008a; also consider in this context the introduction of free ATM 
machines by the Nationwide against the initial reluctance of banks, for 
                                                 
59
 Indeed, Froud et al. (2010) argue that the assumption of the performativity of economics 
implies a rationalistic view that does not adequately describe the non-rational character of 
economic and financial practices.      
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example, or the resistance to demutualisation as discussed in chapter six of 
this thesis).60 
 
Hence, the economy is, as Karl Polanyi (1954) puts it, ‘an instituted process’, 
and, as such, a contingent (and continuous) construction that emerges 
historically. Therefore it does not follow a pre-inscribed historical teleology 
such as the one in Marx’s historical stagism for instance.  
 
Consider in this context, for example, the instructive case of the strawberry 
auction market in Fontaines-en-Sologne in France (Garcia-Papet, 2007). In 
this account, the reader witnesses how a ‘perfect market’, with dynamics of 
competition that outwardly resemble the neoclassical ideal type, is literally 
constructed from scratch. This ‘micro-example’ hereby illuminates the origins 
and mechanics of market on a more general level. Notably, despite its well-
functioning economic rules of competition, the way this market is assembled 
and maintained is entirely social and political (as opposed to purely economic) 
in nature. Its ‘governing rules and grammar’, as Glynos and Howarth would 
call it (see below), have to be constantly reinforced. The organising principle 
of a ‘perfect market’ which this case exemplifies is therefore not the working of 
an ‘invisible hand’, a ‘general equilibrium’, or a ‘market mechanism’ etc but a 
social and political construction.   
 
3.2 Putting the Concept of the Political to Work for the Economy 
Laclau’s concept of the political as discussed in section 2.4 of chapter one 
(and elaborated by Glynos and Howarth in section three of this thesis) can be 
of much help to illuminated the creative acts of institution within which markets 
are created.61 What Daly (2006) calls a ‘radical political economy’ (and what is 
here called poststructuralist political economy) involves therefore an 
acknowledgement of the ontological category of the political as a founding 
principle and a focus on struggles and power-relations as a constitutive 
terrain. This notion requires the discursivity of the economy because only a 
                                                 
60
 The presence of resistance is, of course, most apparent in times of crisis and ‘reactivation’ 
(Laclau 1990, p. 34; see also section 2.4 of chapter one of this thesis).  
61
 For a detailed example see chapter five and chapter six of this thesis 
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discursive, and therefore contingent (as opposed to transcendental), economy 
can be essentially prone to subversion and re-composition and, thus, be 
decidedly political in nature for reasons discussed in the last chapter. 
Therefore, a poststructuralist political economy does not aim to represent its 
‘true’ nature (how the economy ‘really is’). On the contrary, it takes its own 
impossibility as a starting point and acknowledges that the economic sphere 
is essentially a political and social construct.  
 
To reiterate, power is not ultimately grounded in class relations but involves a 
set of exclusionary processes and antagonistic struggles which are 
constitutive and at the same time represent the limit of all (economic) 
objectivity. A hegemonic discourse stabilises itself through the exclusion or 
marginalisation of other possibilities (e.g. the marginalisation of the mutual 
logic in the UK mortgage market since the 1970s). Through practices of 
sedimentation and normalisation a discourse aims to legitimise its particular 
content as universal. Yet this stabilisation and universalisation, despite the 
best efforts of a discourse to eliminate its contingent foundations, can only be 
partial and temporary, given its underlying dislocation and (im)possibililty (see 
chapter one of this thesis). Thus, every economic representation is essentially 
vulnerable to subversion, contestation and potential transformation not least 
because of the destabilising effects of what it has excluded and from the 
perspective of which the present hegemony can be challenged. The excluded 
(Laclau and Zac, 1994 p. 34) ‘manages to emerge even if through a remote 
derivative: this is the moment of dislocation’ (see also Peterson, 2006; 
Torfing, 1999, and chapter five of this thesis). What ‘haunts’ economic 
discourses are therefore the residues of their own contingency, heterogeneity 
and power, particularly in times of perceived crises when subjects are ‘called 
upon’ to identify anew with a different discourse (Gibson-Graham, 1996, 
chapter 10; DeGoede, 2005, p. 124; see also more generally Derrida, 2006). 
 
‘Reactivating’ what is foreclosed or marginalised in an economic discourse, 
therefore, becomes a core component of economic analysis from a 
poststructuralist point of view. Crucial for this is an acknowledgement of 
economic diversity that takes into account the plurality and heterogeneity of 
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economic practices (see Gibson-Graham, 1996, 2006), or to put it in 
Laclauian terms, a notion of the economy as a social field ‘criss-crossed with 
antagonisms’ (HSS, p. 153). As Gibson-Graham (1996, 2006) note, the 
economy is often reduced to capitalism (particularly in Marxist accounts) 
which obscures the presence of a myriad of economic practices that are not 
capitalist (i.e. not concerned with the appropriation of surplus value) such as 
unpaid work, cooperatives, mutuals etc. As Willmott (2005, p. 770) points out, 
analysing Laclau and Mouffe’s notion of the economy: 
 
‘For Laclau and Mouffe … “the space of the economy is structured as a political 
space” … This means that “interests” are socially organized and identified 
rather than conceived as “external force” that is given by the occupation of 
positions. Through a fundamentally political process of identification, people 
are understood to attribute interests to themselves and others. There is, then, 
no “external force” requiring certain people … to maximize profit or to suffer if 
they fail to fulfil this requirement.’ 
 
Gibson-Graham (2006), then, while not denying that capitalist values 
dominate the economic sphere, point to the emancipatory potential of 
alternative kinds of economic organisation and argue for the extension of the 
concept of radical democracy to the economy. (See also Glynos 2008 for a 
psychoanalytical interpretation of their notion of ‘community economy’. Here, 
Glynos argues that such alternative forms of are potentially associated with a 
different (and less ideological) form of jouissance; see section 2.2 of chapter 
one of this thesis for the concept of radical democracy.) 
 
Neoliberalism, for example, has not achieved its hegemonic status through an 
intrinsic quality that makes superior to other forms of economic organisation 
but rather, it has become dominant through the exercise of power involving 
the de-legitimization or collapse of alternatives and concrete historical 
struggles the ‘reactivation’ of which can serve as a stepping stone to 
challenge and contest neoliberal hegemony.62   
                                                 
62
 The process of demutualisation is a concrete example here with the re-mutualisation of 
failed banks being a potential first step of a counter-hegemonic strategy (see chapters six and 
seven of this thesis). 
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A general analytical strategy for a poststructuralist analysis of the political 
economy emerges, then, that, according to DeGoede (2006, p. 5-6), is 
concerned with,   
 
‘how certain meanings are fixed at the expenses of others, how certain 
representations dominate alternatives, how the limits of political discourses are 
constituted, go to the heart of poststructuralist politics’. 
 
The concept of ideological fantasy, as discussed in section four of the 
previous chapter, is a useful tool to supplement these insights with an 
appreciation of a ‘libidinal political economy’ which accounts for how an 
economy coordinates desire and why subjects are mobilised with reference to 
certain signifiers and not others.  
 
3.3 Economy and Fantasy 
As pointed out earlier, subjects and discourse always engage in ideological 
strategies to cover over their dislocations which, as discussed in section four 
of the previous chapter, is driven and maintained by acts of fantasmatic 
identification. In the neoliberalist symbolic universe, for example, such 
attempts often include reference to the fantasmatic object of ‘free markets’ 
which is essentially considered to be a form ‘universal cure’ for the human 
condition as such (see for example the opening quote by Friedrich von Hayek 
in chapter five of this thesis). It has been observed in this context that markets 
often assume a deity-like status in neoliberalism (DeGoede, 2005; see also 
chapter seven of this thesis).63 Hence, an immediate reaction to the financial 
crisis was the proposal to create new markets as remedies to the dislocations 
the latter had created in the first place (Knorr-Cetina, 2009). 
 
In the neoliberalist imaginary – underpinned and legitimised by neoclassical 
economics – markets are represented as the guarantors of individual freedom 
                                                 
63
 From this point of view, it is not surprising that a range of investigations into the economy 
from Max Weber (2001) seminal work to Giorgio Agamben’s (2011) most recent output are 
concerned with a connection between religion and economy.  
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and justice in the sense that markets are  seen to be the most efficient way to 
allocate resources and, hence, are considered to be effectively beneficial for 
all (see Peterson, 2006). The particular version of this narrative which 
immediately preceded the financial crisis even claimed that, due to new 
financial instruments and other developments, markets had been made even 
more efficient. This fantasmatic narrative essentially announced the end of all 
boom and bust cycles, thereby tacitly implying the continuous and virtually 
indefinite rise of asset prices such as housing (see part one of chapter seven 
of this thesis for a detailed discussion of this ideological fantasy). What cannot 
be acknowledged in this discourse are its own internal dislocations: the way 
that neoliberalism itself is grounded in, and constituted by, power (Daly, 
2006). (Žižek (1997) calls this the ‘obscene foundation’ of a discourse and 
Laclau (1990) ‘the terrain of the original violence’ that becomes sedimented 
and naturalised over time (see also chapter one of this thesis for a detailed 
discussion of the concept of the political).  
 
It thus becomes clear from the above observations that the economy must 
also be understood as deeply infused with ideological fantasy. A 
poststructuralist political economy, as pointed out earlier, is therefore also 
always a ‘libidinal political economy’ in the sense that it contains an 
appreciation of the unconscious dynamics that constitute desiring economic 
subjects in relation to the objects, norms and contents of a practice or regime 
(cf. Gammon and Palan, 2006). This appreciation of the libidinal dynamics of 
the economy involves a focus on subjectivity, fantasy and enjoyment that 
explains why subjects are ‘gripped’ by a discourse and how they are hereby 
involved in its (contradictory) reproduction. These modes of engagement often 
involve beatific and horrific components and acts of transgression on the side 
of the subject that perpetuate the status quo (see section four of chapter one 
and chapter seven of this thesis). As Howarth (2010, p. 12) notes, the 
economy is always fuelled by myths and collective imaginaries (e.g. the 
‘fantasy of the law of the market’) which are integral to the various practices 
the economy seeks to institutionalise or reproduce. 
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To return to an above example, neoliberalism based on the perceived 
‘scientificity’ of neoclassical economics and the ideological belief in the market 
as ultimate remedy arguable contains what Žižek calls an ‘ideological move 
par excellence: the notion that reality needs to appear to be ‘found, not 
produced’ (1992, p. 32; cf. in this context the above mentioned quote by 
Milton Friedman in section 1.1 of this chapter).  
 
The beatific utopian promise of Neoliberalism, then, containing the right to 
private property, justice and freedom through the market (with ‘consumer 
choice’ being a central manifestation of this freedom) can be contrasted with 
one of its horrific dimensions: the looting of shops for designer goods by 
underprivileged youths during the riots in the UK in August 2011. The 
individualised scapegoating and quick prosecution of those who ‘unbelievably 
turned against their own communities’ is hereby portrayed as a betrayal of 
(neo)liberal democratic values by certain politicians and in the press, rather 
than being the outcome of systemic dislocations that neoliberalism itself has 
generated, of its own ‘obscene’ foundations so to speak. The riots themselves 
appear hereby more like an act of transgression which has been (so far) 
essentially in line with, and serves to reproduce, rather than transform, the 
neoliberal universe. In this universe, as DeCock et al. (2011, p. 11) point out, 
‘the fantasy of the law of the market’ becomes the ‘“impassable horizon of our 
time” in its purest form’ (see also chapter seven of this thesis). (The emerging 
Occupy Wall Street movement might (or might not) have a more 
transformational or ‘ethical’ impact in the future.)  
 
An additional feature of  poststructuralist political economy is that it contests  
the apparently ‘rational’ and ‘scientific’ hegemonic axioms of ‘methodological 
individualism’ and ‘homo economicus’ by emphasising the relational  
(discursive) nature of every identity and the co-production of subjects and 
objects (see section one of chapter one of this thesis).  
 
3.4 Relationality and Irrationality in Poststructrualist Political Economy 
As discussed in chapter one of this thesis, the concept of discourse can be 
used interchangeably with that of relation. Emphasising the relational 
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dimension of economic practices – a relation that (partially) constitutes 
subjects and objects alike – stands in direct opposition to the social atomism 
and perceived rationality of the homo economicus which is to be found in the 
discourse of neoclassical economics (and also the neoliberalist project more 
broadly). The concept of discourse as relation, then, has a number of far-
reaching consequences for the conceptualisation of a poststructuralist political 
economy.  
 
Firstly, economic subjects cannot be thought of as autonomous entities and 
rational individuals or agents, as subjects are always partly located within a 
discursive structure. An economic order, therefore, always comprises a 
complex configuration of ‘words, people and things’ DeCock et al (2010, p. 
181).64  
 
Secondly, this totality cannot be rational (be it in the form of the rational 
market or the pre-given interests of a fundamental economic class) because 
this relational totality cannot be subordinated to function (see section 1.1 of 
chapter one of this thesis for more details on the concept of discourse). 
Rationality is always the rationality of a particular historical discourse and, 
hence, a contingent rationality. And, thirdly, economic practices cannot be 
reduced to ‘the economic’ per se (as if was a sphere somehow divorced from 
the rest of society) but must be situated within a historical bloc which always 
comprises economic, cultural and political factors alike.  
 
The methodological individualism of neoliberalist economics which implies 
that economic subjects act in social and cultural isolation and independently 
from the materiality of their surroundings, must, therefore, be abandoned. 
Economic subjects and practices should rather, like social practices more 
generally, be situated within the terrain of logics which frequently enter into 
antagonistic relationships with other logics that render them both vulnerable 
and possible at the same time. The concept of a ‘market logic’ in LCE (p. 
                                                 
64
 Actor Network Theory (ANT) also stresses this dimension of relation. For a general 
introduction see Latour (2005); for markets see Callon, 1998; for an overview of various 
relational approaches to the economy see Svetlova, 2008, pp. 71 ff.  
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136), is a useful indicator how processes and practices such as 
financialization or mutuality can be (idealtypically) conceptualised: 
 
‘In abstract terms, we can say that a particular market comprises a particular 
set of subject positions … (borrowers and lenders, investors and issuers of 
securities etc) objects … (e.g. financial products, mortgages etc) and a system 
of relations and meanings connecting subjects and objects as well as certain 
institutional parameter (such as a well-functioning legal system)’.65 
 
What is crucial here is that a market logic is not confined to ‘the market’ in a 
narrow sense but is ‘non-topographical’. Such logics always transcend the 
boundaries between ‘state, economy and society’ and must therefore be 
analysed within the broader parameters of a given hegemony (a task that is 
carried out in relation to financialization in chapter four of this thesis). 
Following a Laclauian interpretation of Gramsci, Bertramsen et al. (1991, p. 
18) point out, that the lines that demarcate the separation of state, economy 
and society are essentially indistinct. Every social configuration is, thus, to be 
conceived of as an ‘open-ended relational totality in which non-unified 
institutional orders of state, economy and society are articulated’. They 
continue by clarifying that: 
 
‘First, when arguing that the social configuration is a relational totality of 
ununified institutional order, we intend to show that the lines of demarcation 
between state, economy and society are blurred. Second, the relational totality 
is defined as open-ended because it is constantly subverted by a constitutive 
outside which prevents its closure. Third, asserting that the institutional orders 
of state, economy and society are articulated emphasizes that their 
interrelations cannot be conceived in terms of causal determination’ (ibid, 
original emphasis). 
 
The concept of methodological individualism, therefore, can arguably be more 
fruitfully replaced by that of ‘methodological’ or, in our case, ‘ontological’ 
‘relationism’ (cf. Svetlova, 2008, pp. 138 ff), as part of a more general strategy 
                                                 
65
 See in this context for example Langley (2006) for an account of how financial meaning, 
practices, objects and subjects are co-produced by a relational discourse in relation to 
securitization. 
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to refute an ‘atomism’ in the social sciences that conceives of the world as 
consisting of discrete events, facts and causes (LCE, p. 104). The economy, 
as well as the social more generally, is therefore overdetermined66 by a 
variety of factors and forces and not reducible to isolated events, mechanisms 
or motives (cf. Gibson-Graham, 1996). According to this view, then, an 
analysis of the economy and its crises does not imply to look for their ‘causes’ 
but rather consists of a critical investigation into their meaning and dislocatory 
effects.   
 
An economic agent of subject is therefore more akin to what the structuralist 
anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss has called a ‘bricoleur’ (a concept that has 
on a number of occasions been used to describe financial practices – see e.g.  
Engelen et al. (2010; 2011; Hildyard, 2009; chapter four of this thesis – and 
which is compatible with Laclau’s notion of discourse). The bricoleur, 
according to Lévi-Strauss (1966, p. 17),   
 
‘is adept at performing a large number of diverse tasks; but unlike the engineer, 
he does not subordinate each of them to the availability of raw materials and 
tools conceived and procured for the purpose of the project. His universe of 
instruments is closed and the rules of his game are always to make to do with 
‘whatever is at hand’, that is to say with a set of tools and materials which is 
always finite and is also heterogeneous because what it contains bears no 
relation to the current project, or indeed to any particular project, but is the 
contingent result of all the occasions there have been to renew or enrich the 
stock or to maintain it with the remains of previous constructions or 
destructions.’ 
 
Rationality, then, is always context-dependent as the bricoleur, in working with 
‘what is at hand’, acts within a particular discourse or horizon which provides 
‘a set of tools and materials which is always finite and is also heterogeneous’ 
(ibid; see also Engelen et. al. 2010; 2011 and chapter four of this thesis for 
the application of the concept of bricolage to financial instruments). Rationality 
is always limited to a particular discourse as the latter confers meaning onto 
                                                 
66
 For the concept of overdetermination see footnote 23 of chapter one of this thesis 
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subjects and objects. Subjects choose the discourses they identify with but, 
according to approach advocated here, this choice is political and ideological 
rather than a ‘formally rational’ (in a Weberian sense) and fully transparent act 
of individual preferences as neoclassical economics claims.  
 
An analysis and critique of the political economy through a poststructuralist 
lens is therefore concerned with its political acts of institution, exclusionary 
mechanisms of power and relationality as well as the ideological fantasies 
through which they are reproduced. As Howarth (2010, p. 10) summarises  
this position: 
 
‘Regimes of accumulation are themselves the sites of political struggle at both 
the molecular and molar levels. Both their political instigation, which always 
involves power and exclusion, as well as the precise linkages that are 
established between the different components of a specific economic logic, are 
the product of hegemonic struggles that connect contingent entities in only 
partially complete systems. Accumulation regimes are thus heterogeneous 
systems of rules, practices, and strategies that are constantly vulnerable to 
dislocations and crises.’ 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter outlines a poststructuralist political economy according to Laclau 
and PDT. It aims to challenge the neoclassical representation of the economy 
as a political terrain populated by rational agents where social relations are 
absent and the economy is reduced to the marketplace (but also the 
economism of orthodox Marxism). Instead, a poststructuralist political 
economy as understood here, emphasises the primacy of the political, power, 
the workings of ideological fantasy, the relationality of the economic sphere 
and the irrationality of economic actors. It furnishes a vocabulary for economic 
analysis that is ‘critical’ and ‘emancipatory’, in the sense of emphasising the 
contingent institutionalisation of every sedimented economic order and the 
existence of alternative forms of organisation. The chapter particularly 
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highlights the heterogeneity of the economic sphere where different (and often 
antagonistic) hegemonic forces (or logics) compete for hegemonic status. 
Hereby, a general research strategy emerges that aims at the ‘reactivation’ of 
foreclosed possibilities as potential counter-hegemonic possibilities.  
 
The first section of the chapter investigates the philosophical underpinnings of 
neoclassical economics and its political symbiosis with the neoliberalist 
project. Section two discusses a number of difficulties for the deployment of 
Laclauian theory for an analysis of the economy. It concludes that such an 
analysis is most fruitfully deployed by mobilising other, more middle-range, 
theories which are then articulated alongside the central ontological insights of 
Laclau and PDT. The third section, then, aims to identify such theoretical 
keystones supplemented by other sympathetic approaches.  
 
The next chapter is concerned with a discussion of a number of such ‘middle-
range’ theories of financialization and neoliberalisation. Firstly, the following 
chapter outlines the key components of the neoliberalist hegemonic regime. It 
then elaborates the three most important approaches towards financialization 
and clarifies the relationship between neoliberalism and financialization. 
These theories are then used for the empirical analysis in the chapters five to 
seven of this thesis alongside the central theoretical premises discussed in 
the chapters 1-2.  
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‘Increasingly freed from the regulatory constraints and barriers that hitherto had 
confined its field of action, financial activity could flourish as never before, 
eventually everywhere. A wave of innovations occurred in financial services to 
produce … new kinds of financial markets based upon securitization, 
derivatives, and all manner of futures trading. Neo-liberalization has meant, in 
short, the financialization of everything’ (Harvey, 2005, p. 33). 
 
‘”… the next act of the financial drama may well start on Wall Street”’ (Boyer, 
2000 p. 142).  
  
 
Chapter Three: What is Financialization? 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This thesis conceives of financialzation as a market logic of neoliberalist 
hegemony67 (cf. Harvey, 2005; Gamble, 2009a; Kotz, 2008)68. Neoliberalism 
consists of a revival and modification of the free market ideology and politics 
of the 19th century,69 underpinned and legitimated by neoclassical economics 
(see chapter two of this thesis). In the neoliberalist universe, individual 
freedom and private property rights are seen to be the highest attainable 
goals of humanity. Free markets are necessary, if not altogether sufficient, for 
their protection (see Harvey, 2005). Neoliberalism became dominant in the 
wake of the perceived failures of Keynesian state interventionism during the 
stagflation crisis of the 1970s. At the forefront of this this attack by 
                                                 
67
 As such, it is, of course, not exclusively confined to the terrain of the market but, in line with 
the theoretical approach advocated here, always comprises economic, cultural as well as 
political elements (see chapter one and two of this thesis and below).  
68
 For a different view, see Montgomerie and Williams (2009) 
69
 Neoliberalism can be further traced back to the emergence of liberalism in the 17th and 18th 
Centuries where the combined power of the clergy and aristocracy over the economy and 
politics was increasingly contested. Liberalism has also spawned many different strands. For 
example, the political liberalism known in the US is precisely the opposite of the market 
liberalism of neoliberalist ideology, as it is associated with the political left which favours 
market interventionism.  
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neoliberalist hegemony was the doctrine of monetarism,70 also know as the 
‘supply side economics’, associated with Milton Freedman and Alan Walters. 
Behind this attack, however, was a broader critique of state interventionism 
and any form of collectivist organisation. (It is therefore not surprising that the 
building society model has been significantly marginalised under conditions of 
neoliberalist hegemony ((Gamble, 2001).) Central to the project of 
neoliberalism has been a particular understanding of freedom that has 
exercised a strong ideological allure. Freedom, as understood here, 
presupposed ‘free markets’ as its necessary condition of possibility. Contrary 
to the laissez-faire capitalism of the 19th century, the state is not entirely 
absent, but has to reinforce this order on a continuous basis. The market,71 
hereby becomes the organising principle of the integral state, and not vice 
versa. By the 1990s, neoliberalism had become formally sanctioned by the 
so-called Washington Consensus.72 
 
The deregulation of markets, particularly financial markets, in the name of 
neoliberalism, has implied a major restructuring of the economy of most major 
capitalist states (including China)73 which has led to the prioritisation of 
finance capital over productive capital and the emergence of a finance-based 
system of growth. What in the following is discussed as financialization has its 
origins, therefore, in neoliberalist deregulation and ideology (see Kotz, 2008). 
Neoliberalism (albeit perhaps crumbling) has become ‘common sense’ and 
informs a range sedimented practices of everyday life (Harvey, 2005; see also 
chapter four of this thesis). It has provided, to use the Gramscian expression, 
‘moral leadership’ partly on the basis of offering certain solutions to problems 
of financial exclusion (Thrift and Tickell cited in French et al., 2008).  
                                                 
70
 It is highly questionable, however, as to whether there has ever been ‘pure’ monetarism 
(Johnson, 1991; Crouch, 2009. Nevertheless, deviations from the monetarist rulebook have 
been very difficult to acknowledge openly (Kaletsky, 2010; Crouch, 2009).  
71
 The ‘efficient market paradigm’ of neoclassical economics, thus, implies a certain 
‘vulgarisation’ of original neoliberalist theory such as that of Hayek.  
72
 Washington Consensus is a term first used by the economist John Williamson to designate 
specific free market policy prescriptions for developing countries to be promoted by the 
following institutions based in Washington D.C. (which had been established under the 
Bretton Woods order): The International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the US 
Treasury Department (Williamson, 1999). The term later became synonymous with neo-
liberalist policies more generally.  
73
 Neoliberalism has been a global phenomenon with only a few exceptions among major 
countries, but its national characteristics vary (Steger and Roy, 2010; Harvey, 2005).  
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The following chapter provides an overview over the concept of 
financialization in the context of the structural economic changes that have 
occurred in the neoliberalist era. The chapter begins with a general 
introduction to the concept before it then discusses three of the most 
important theoretical approaches to financialization – the French Regulation 
School, the British Social Accountants, as well as cultural approaches to 
finance and the financialization of everyday life. Neoliberalism and 
financialization, in the context of the UK mortgage market, are further 
investigated empirically in the analysis chapters 4-7.  
 
 
1. Structural Shifts of Capital Accumulation: Introducing 
Financialization 
 
Financialization is a relatively new concept in the social sciences which has 
not yet received as much theoretical and empirical prominence as the related 
and overlapping concepts such as globalisation and neoliberalism. Particularly 
in the light of the ongoing financial crisis, however, its explanatory potential for 
contemporary capitalist development is increasingly being recognised across 
the social sciences. This has resulted in a variety of different usages and 
theoretical approaches.   
 
In very broad terms, the concept of financialization is used to describe 
fundamental shifts in the relations of power between society, the economy 
and financial markets (Heires and Noelke, 2009). The financial crisis of 2007- 
must, therefore, be understood in the light of broader shifts which comprise a 
wide variety of heterogeneous developments. These shifts, understood here 
to be the outcome of neoliberal deregulation, have fundamentally affected the 
strategies of financial and non-financial actors in the contemporary economy. 
As Krippner (2004, p. 174) puts it in the perhaps most well-known definition of 
the concept: 
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‘I define financialization as a pattern of accumulation in which profit making 
occurs increasingly through financial channels rather than through trade and 
commodity production’ 
 
While this definition captures the quantitative expansion of financialization, the 
latter arguably also consists of a qualitative change in the motives and 
interests of market participants towards prioritising financial means of 
generating profits and the rise of financial motives and people (Epstein, 2001).  
Within its relatively young history, the concept of financialization has been 
used to account for a range of diverse phenomena ranging from the rise of the 
shareholder value ideology (see below) to contemporary practices of branding 
(Willmott, 2010a). Stockhammer (2009, p. 2) summarises a range of these 
phenomena as follows: 
 
‘The notion of financialization covers a wide range of phenomena: the 
deregulation of the financial sector and the proliferation of new financial 
instruments, the liberalization of international capital flows and increasing 
instability on foreign exchange markets, a shift to market-based financial 
systems, the emergence of institutional investors as major players on financial 
markets and the boom (and bust) on asset markets, shareholder value 
orientation and changes in corporate governance (of non-financial business), 
increased access to credit by previously ‘underbanked’ groups or changes in 
the level of (real) interest rates. Financialization has also been used to highlight 
changes of psychological and ideological structures’.74 
 
The underlying thread in all these accounts can be summarized as a shift 
away from traditional forms of mediation (the funding of productive investment 
through savings) towards trading shares, bonds and derivatives in secondary 
markets. This leads to prioritizing a finance-led strategy of capital 
accumulation as opposed to pursuing growth or market share (Montgomerie, 
2006).  
 
                                                 
74
 For a general overview over the concept of fiancialization see: Ertürk et al. (2008a); 
Krippner (2005) and French et al. (2008).   
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The next section follows French et al. (2008) in discussing the above 
transformation with reference to three of the most important75 approaches 
towards financialization: The French Regulation School, The British Social 
Accountants, cultural perspectives on finance and the fiancialization of daily 
life.  
 
2. Approaching Financialization: Three Perspectives 
 
2.1. Regulation Theory 
Broadly speaking, the French Regulation School develops theoretical 
accounts of what they call different economic growth models. These growth 
models, such as the Fordist model of accumulation, operate by (more or less) 
stabilising a certain process of capital accumulation within a given historical 
conjuncture over a longer period of time. Two theoretical concepts are crucial 
for Regulation School theorist: these are ‘accumulation regime’ and ‘mode of 
regulation’. The accumulation regime designates a productive system that 
follows a certain economic growth path linked to specific technological 
trajectory. The mode of regulation consists of an institutional framework which 
stabilises and gives coherence to capital accumulation (Grahl and Teague, 
2000). These institutional forms and social relations that define a regime of 
capitalist accumulation are, however, seen to be ultimately contradictory and 
unstable (the Marxist heritage becomes apparent here).76 Any accumulation 
regime has therefore only a limited lifespan.  
 
‘Fordism’77 is seen as the last fully-fletched capitalist regime where the Fordist 
mode of regulation stabilised the capital accumulation process over a longer 
period of time in the advanced capitalist economies during the post-war years. 
For Regulationists, Fordism essentially refers to an economic growth model 
within which the Fordist assembly line under Taylorist principles is central to 
                                                 
75
 There are, of course, other interesting approaches towards financialization. See for 
example Marazzi (2010) and Fumagalli & Mezzadra (2010) for a post-autonomist 
assessment.  
76
 Indeed, Lipietz (1987) refers to the Regulation School as the ‘Rebel Sons of Althusser’.  
77
 It must be noted here, that the term Fordism was first used in a systematic fashion by 
Gramsci (1971, pp. 277-318).  
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capital accumulation. Key for economic expansion under Fordism was the 
growth of wages. Thus, wage compromise (organised labour) was embedded 
within an assembly of institutions between governments, trade unions and the 
management of companies which mediated a system of mass production and 
mass consumption. A negotiated institutional framework of nationally 
administered credit, the welfare state, macro-economic ‘Keynesian’ demand 
management and control over financial markets (referred to as the regime of 
‘embedded liberalism’ in chapter five of this thesis) was therefore based on a 
shared objective to deliver economic growth and make capital accumulation 
stable and predictable for market participants (Lipietz, 1987).    
 
The crisis of Fordism and the rise of neo-liberalism, during the late 1960s and 
1970s (Aglietta, 1979; see also chapter five of this thesis) prompted the 
Regulation School theorists to search for its successor. During the past 20 
years, it thus contributed a research programme in the search for a post-
Fordist regime characterised by both economic as well as social cohesion 
over a longer period of time (Grahl and Teague, 2000).78 A number of different 
potential successors to Fordism such as ‘Toyotism’ or ‘Knowledge Based 
Economy’ were identified at specific points in time but have failed to produce 
coherent regimes (Boyer, 2000). During the last decade, the increasing 
dominance of finance and its implication for new macro-economic trends has 
become a strong focus of some of the Regulation School theorists (Aglietta, 
1998, 2000; Aglietta and Breton, 2001, Aglietta and Reberioux, 2005). For 
these Regulationists, financial markets are at the heart of changing 
institutional formations that potentially point towards the stabilisation of a new 
growth regime termed ‘Finance-Led Growth Regime’ (Boyer, 2000) which is 
built around a ‘market based financial system’ (Aglietta and Reberioux, 2001). 
However, accounts of this new growth regime are, as of yet, best understood 
as ‘ideal type’ theorisations, rather than describing a fully coherent and stable 
regime of accumulation.  
 
                                                 
78
 However, Jessop (1990) points out that the Regulation School is wrongly solely equated 
with a research agenda centred on Fordism/Postfordism. This article also contains an 
excellent overview over the classical position of the various strands of the Regulation School. 
For another useful overview, see Boyer (1990). 
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Regulationists argue that the liberalisation of finance in the neo-liberal period 
has affected the role of the state in the economy, the role of central bank‘s 
economic policy, labour markets as well as firm governance and household 
savings patterns. According to them, this has resulted in changed institutional 
configurations with profound macro-economic effects. In his seminal article ‘Is 
a Finance-led Growth Regime a Viable Alternative to Fordism’, Boyer (2000) 
sketches out the key institutional parameters for a growth regime within which 
‘the financial system would now occupy the central place previously held by 
wage compromise’ (ibid, p.18). Rather than wages being the central driver of 
economic expansion, as it was under the Fordist regime, financial market 
investments are now increasingly generating new channels of accumulation, 
even under conditions of falling wages. Boyer argues that finance affects all 
institutional forms. The emerging configuration that facilitates finance-led 
accumulation includes the rise of shareholder value maximization as central 
strategy for the firm, signalling a shift of competition from product markets to 
financial markets. This shift increases investment of household savings in 
equity markets via pension funds or direct equity holdings, a flexible labour 
market, a favourable system of taxation and a change of central bank policy 
towards prioritising the regulation of financial bubbles rather than product 
market inflation.  
 
Similarly, Aglietta and colleagues (Aglietta and Breton, 2001; Aglietta and 
Reberioux, 2005) view the growing dominance of financial markets under 
conditions of financial deregulation and technological advances since the 
1970s as a shift from a bank-based financial system (the Rhenish model) 
towards a marked-based financial system (the Anglo-Saxon model) that is 
developing new forms of institutions which can lead into a new growth regime. 
Within this institutional framework, firm, household and state behaviour are 
increasingly driven by the imperatives of financial markets, which, at its most 
crucial level, include a central reassessment of risk and its distribution 
throughout the entire economic system. Thus, from a Regulation School 
perspective, the current financial crisis has not been particularly hard to 
predict. As Aglietta and Breton (2001, p. 434) already put it at the beginning of 
the noughties: 
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‘Growing financial liberalization has profoundly changed the connections 
between finance and the rest of the economy and, as a consequence, the 
economy is vulnerable to nineteenth-century-like investment booms and busts. 
Critical to the emerging pattern of business cycles is asset price inflation, rather 
than inflation in the goods markets. Likewise, downturns can now result from 
the deterioration of confidence in the equity market, rather than being 
necessarily triggered by a recessive shift in monetary policy. In these new 
dynamics, the interaction between speculative bubbles in asset markets, rapid 
credit growth, over-investment and financial imbalances becomes all-
important.’ 
 
However the financial crisis has changed (and is still currently changing) the 
institutional configurations and parameters for capital accumulation (for 
example, the continuing unavailability of credit).  Therefore, according to 
Aglietta (2008), the possibility exists that, for the first time in modern history, 
world growth becomes shifted to the East. A future regime of accumulation 
might therefore be driven by countries such as China and India. 
 
2.2 The British Social Accountants 
The British Social accountants, mainly based at the University of Manchester, 
on the other hand, are not concerned with identifying a more or less stable 
and coherent successor to the Fordist accumulation regime. Rather, they 
account for a dynamic model of the role of financialization and its limitations 
that takes place against the background of conjunctural changes and the 
‘continuous reinvention’ of market players such as banks (Froud et al., 2000; 
Froud et al., 2002; Froud et al. 2006; Ertürk et al., 2008a; Williams, 2000; 
Engelen et al., 2010; 2011). For them, the question concerning financialization 
is what distinguished the present phase of finance from previous ones, such 
as the early 20th century phase of finance-capitalism defined by the figure of 
the rentier, the Keynesian ‘coupon clipper’, who, at the time, was largely 
depicted as a social parasite. As Ertürk et al. (2008b) point out, this notion 
stands in stark contrast of the connotations attached to its contemporary 
equivalent, the figure of the shareholder.  
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The earlier work of the British social accountants focuses on the emergence 
of shareholder value maximization as corporate strategy. Herby shareholder 
value as corporate governance is problematised as a ‘policy issue’ (Williams, 
2000, p. 6) rather than an intrinsically economic feature. The rise of 
shareholder value is seen to be symptomatic of a broader shift within 
contemporary capitalism which points to the importance of capital markets for 
forms of competition within the economy. This shift relates to capital labour 
and product markets alike. According to Williams (ibid), financialization 
restructures the hierarchies and re-directs the objectives of the firm, as 
additional competition now increasingly takes place within capital markets and 
every stock market listed company must now meet the same standards of 
financial performance.  
 
Shareholder value seeks to maximise profit by aligning the interest of 
managers with that of the owners of the company. As corporate governance, 
shareholder value, then, becomes the primary objective of management; 
above growth, market share, the employees of a company and even 
consumers (ibid). Hereby the concept of shareholder value allows for a 
multiplication of services and discourses79 surrounding the measuring and 
enhancing of shareholder return. Financial consultants are, thus, able to sell a 
variety of different and competing metrics to measure the shareholder value 
generated by companies, in playing heavily on the ‘quasi-religious element of 
shareholder fundamentalism’ (Froud et al. 2000, p. 85). Shareholder value 
does not necessarily become realised through enhanced performance and a 
generic increase in dividends, but typically through stock price appreciation 
based on secondary shares trading (this, of course, presupposes a favourable 
economic climate).  
 
More generally, it is worth noting that the concept of shareholder value 
remains slippery and vague – a buzzword (or ‘signifier’ in our terminology) –
that encompasses a variety of different and potentially contradictory 
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 The term discourse is here, of course, not used in a Laclauian sense.  
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meanings. Moreover, its meaning has also mutated over time. Ertürk et al. 
(2008a) point out that, at the beginning of the 1990s, shareholders 
emphasised a stream of value creation from corporate strategy. At the end of 
the 2000s, however, institutional investors and capital market players were 
operating under the concept of ‘value crystallization’ where value is delivered 
by the appreciation of shares resulting from the next immediate strategic 
move (Ertürk et al., 2008a, p. 2-3), making corporate strategy even more 
short-term.   
 
According to Froud et al. (2002) and Ertürk et al. (2008a), shareholder value 
for corporate governance spearheaded a shift from a productionist type of 
capitalism towards what the British Social Accountants term the ‘coupon pool 
capitalism’. Under productionist capitalism, the capital markets remain non-
dynamic intermediaries between household savings and productionist 
companies, or between companies and those firms who hold a stake in it such 
as banks. Under the most basic type of productionist system, corporations 
issue coupons (contractual financial obligations such as shares and bonds) in 
order to raise funds. Funds invested in the company for productive purposes 
are then distributed back through the coupon pool in the forms of dividends 
and interests. Thus, a productionist system, differing in its motives and 
dynamics from the coupon pool system, always exists alongside the latter. 
However, their contemporary interaction within which productionism plays an 
increasingly subordinated role contributes to tensions and instabilities within 
the economy (see Froud et al., 2002). Coupon pool capitalism, then, 
fundamentally alters the intermediatory role of capital markets. It has 
developed out of the boom years of the 1950s and 1960s where the growth of 
pensions was increasingly invested in company shares by stockbrokers and 
where homeownership (and thus the potential of homes to become financial 
assets) increased significantly (Ertürk et al., 2008a). Under coupon pool 
capitalism, ‘the financial markets are no longer simple intermediaries between 
household savers and investing firms but act dynamically to shape the 
behaviour of both firms and household’ (Froud et al., 2002). The secondary 
market issues coupons which, from the 1990s onwards, increasingly also 
included financial derivatives and securitized assets. These became more and 
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more important as a regulator of firm and household behaviour (see also 
particularly chapter four of this thesis for secondary mortgage markets). 
Households became increasingly forced to channel their retirement savings 
(and also their borrowing debt, see Langley (2008a)) into the stock market. 
Conversely, firms now have to react to the imperatives of capital market which 
increasingly drive household behaviour. Hereby, the composition of the 
coupon pool becomes dependent on a variety of different capital flows that 
are no longer connected to any form of productive investment.  
 
‘Financial motives and measures of success are increasingly privileged as 
firms struggle to meet targets. The coupon pool becomes an active source of 
imperatives and constraints which structure what every firm and household 
should do. The management of non-complying and underperforming firms is 
removed by the operation of a “market in corporate control” whose arbiters are 
the fund managers who invest in household savings’ (Froud et al., 2002, p. 86). 
 
This reshaping of household behaviour has, according to the British Social 
Accountants, also triggered new inequalities with only less than half of the 
households in the USA and the UK being able to save enough to provide for 
old age. Furthermore, economic sectors (including housing and mortgages), 
have limits for growth, or, as seen in the American subprime market, cannot 
grow at such an exorbitant speed without resulting in severely deteriorating 
standards. Therefore, the expansion of coupon pool capitalism resembles a 
giant Ponzi Scheme where capital gains do not rely on an ‘activity base’ any 
more but on the appreciation of shares (or financial assets more generally) 
(Froud et al., 2002). The coupon pool should consequently be seen in a 
dynamic conjunctural context whose latest phase, dominated by the 
expansion of the secondary mortgage market via securitization and an 
explosion in derivatives trading (see also chapter four of this thesis), has 
come to an end. However, this does not necessarily mean an end to the 
dominance of capital markets, but merely the start of a new phase within the 
‘continuous innovation of banks and stock market’ (Ertürk et al., 2008a, p. 10). 
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While there are a variety of differences between the Regulation School and 
the British Social Accountants, mainly in terms of the desirability or feasibility 
of a market system that is purely finance-led, there are also points of 
convergence. As Montgomerie (2006) notes, at this level of abstraction, what 
financialization means for these two views on financialization is a matter of 
theoretical precepts. These perspectives are not incompatible but differ in 
respect as to how financialization is conceptually grasped and which aspects 
of its logic are emphasised. Both schools identify financialization as the 
driving force of contemporary capitalist expansion with a particular focus on 
the changing role of households within the economy, as well as the effects of 
shareholder value maximization on macro-economic governance. Both 
emphasise that financialization intensifies capitalist contradictions and 
inequalities. Thus, as Aglietta (2000, p. 146-7) points out:  
 
‘Both approaches have a common background. They deny that finance is 
neutral and that shareholders’ claims on a firm’s value generating process are 
the direct outcome of a “natural order” of property rights. On the contrary, they 
contend that capital markets strongly shape corporate behaviour with definite 
real effects’.  
 
A third and rapidly growing strand of research asserts that financialization is, 
at least in substantial part, rooted and reproduced in the cultural realms of 
everyday life and/or subject to various processes of performativity.80   
 
2.3 Cultural Approaches and the Financialization of Everyday Life 
Drawing inspiration from the so-called ‘cultural turn’ in the social sciences in 
the 1990s, a cultural economy approach acknowledges the importance of 
discourses and rhetorics in constituting finance and the economy.  
 
For example, a number of scholars have looked at the way that economics is 
in itself a driver of economic ‘facts’ and, hence, is performative upon the very 
economic and financial processes it seeks to describe (e.g. Callon, 1998; 
                                                 
80
 For an overview of some of the cultural research on finance, see DuGay and Pryke (2007). 
For a more general introduction to a cultural economy approach see Amin and Thrift (2004) 
and DuGay and Pryke (2002). 
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MacKenzie, 2004; 2006; MacKenzie and Millo, 2003). Thus, the growing 
legitimization of certain financial models, for instance, such as the Black-
Scholes option pricing model, can be seen to directly constitute option prices 
themselves (McKenzie and Millo, 2003). Michel Callon (1998, p. 30) stresses 
that economics brings about what it claims to merely observe. He asserts that 
‘the economy is embedded not in society but in economics’. However, this is 
never a clear-cut process as economics can also have counter-perfomative 
tendencies (MacKenzie, 2006).81 By broadening the concept of performativity 
for economic and financial analysis, others have tried to identify additional 
discourses that ‘perform’ the economy such as discourses of marketing or 
accounting for example (Davis, 2006).  
 
These examples illustrate how, contrary to the rational market ideal of neo-
classic economics, the economy is mediated and constituted by cultural 
factors such as discourses (see also chapter two of this thesis, particularly 
section 3.1 for the concept of performativity). Zaloom (2006), for example, 
shows the impact of cultural resources such as architecture on financial 
trading and Knorr Cetina and Preda (2005) highlight the interwoven nature of 
technology and human agency in financial markets. To use another influential 
example, Nigel Thrift (2001), using the case of the New Economy, illustrates 
how the financialization of the latter was constituted by a variety of discourses 
which were propelled by what he calls the ‘cultural circuit of capital’. This 
circuit consists of a number of different stakeholders that defined the identity 
of the New Economy in predominantly financial terms. These stakeholders are 
the business school, the media, the specialist financial press, management 
consultants and managers. They disseminated a particular type of knowledge 
about the economy to business elites which, in turn, created a framework of 
rules for the functioning of the New Economy. This allowed for many of the 
key innovations of the New Economy to be predominantly financially 
orientated, such as a growth of IPO’s and venture funds for technology 
                                                 
81
 This conceptualisation of performativity is not entirely without its problems because it 
attributes, via the notion of the performativity of economics, a certain mathematical rationality 
to economic behaviour (see also Engelen et al., 2010). This thesis, therefore, follows a more 
ontological understanding of performativity which is compatible with Laclau’s notion of 
discourse (see the discussion in section 3.1 of chapter two of this thesis).  
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companies for example. Thrift argues that finance, rather than internet 
technology per se, became the central ‘passion’ of the New Economy 
because its ‘formatting discourses’, disseminated by the cultural circuit of 
capital, were framed predominantly around the financial interest generated by 
the cultural circuit of capital.  
 
It must be noted here that cultural approaches to finance and financialization 
often accentuate the cultural at the expenses of the political. There are, 
however, hybrid forms that argue for a ‘cultural political economy’. These 
approaches combine an analysis of cultural processes with more traditional 
political economy issues, such as power and inequality (see Langley, 2004; 
Best, 2009), which is also the strategy favoured in this thesis.  
 
In more general terms, then, a cultural perspective on finance consists of a 
variety of different approaches which focus on how cultural resources and 
practices confer meaning upon the economy and how the latter is brought into 
being by so-called ‘agencements’, assemblages of actors, technology, 
discourses and other resources that constitute and make up the economic 
and financial space (Pryke and DuGay, 2007). Zaloom (2006, p. 177) 
illustrates this agenda, using the example of a study of financial traders in 
Chicago: 
 
‘Shifting the market from its location in the bodies and voices of traders to the 
quiet blinking of a trading screen creates a new order of formal rationality 
based on digital representations. Yet traders inevitably develop profit taking 
strategies that bring the social and the cultural materials back into the 
rationalized market, producing a cultured structure that organizes everyday life 
and labour in the futures market.’ 
 
Further, it is argued that the economy and finance (including their forms of 
subjectivity) are also increasingly constituted in the cultural sphere of 
everyday life. This approach is known as ‘the financialization of daily life’ 
(Langley, 2004; 2006; 2008a; Martin, 2002). The work of Langley, for 
example, focuses on how the interaction between global financial flows and 
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saving and borrowing patterns of everyday life have mutually transformed 
each other within the neoliberal era. For him, the power of the global financial 
architecture rests on the restructuring of the general savings and borrowing 
patterns of the population that are increasingly connected to the financial 
markets. For example, mortgage borrowing, while remaining local in nature, 
becomes part of, and dependent on, the movements of global capital flows as 
mortgages become more and more funded through the financial markets via 
financial instruments such as mortgage backed securities and collateralized 
mortgage obligations (Langley, 2006; 2008; see also chapter four of this 
thesis for an in-depth analysis of securitization).  
 
This process progressively affected more and more areas at the intersection 
of economy and civil society, such as credit card debts, student loans, music 
royalties etc (see also chapter four of this thesis). Central to this process is 
the re-definition of financial agency and subjectivity under the expansion of 
neoliberalist capitalism. This re-definition, according to Langley (2008a; see 
also Knights, 1997), leads to the emergence of ‘everyday financial (or 
leveraged) investors’ whose fate increasingly becomes tied to the stock 
market and whose houses become leveraged objects of speculation (Langley, 
2008a). Subjects become enticed by the promises of finance to ‘think like 
capitalists’ (Martin 2002, p. 9-10). For Martin (ibid, p. 3) there is therefore a 
current ‘invitation to live by finance, where finance presents itself ... as a 
means for the acquisition of the self ... as a proposal for how to get ahead’. 
(See chapter four of this thesis for more details on everyday financial subjects 
and the financialization of everyday life in the context of the mortgage 
market.)  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter discusses the concept of financialzation against the broader 
background of the neoliberalist restructuring of the economy over the last four 
decades. It firstly introduces the concept and then discusses three of its most 
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important theoretical approaches. While these three perspectives of 
financialization differ significantly, they are not mutually exclusive and can 
complement each other in crucial areas. As such, they emphasise different 
(and sometimes contradictory) developments within the same historical bloc 
of neoliberalism. Following Aalbers (2008), the financialization of the 
mortgage market includes elements of all three approaches. Those are: firstly 
the institutional restructuring of the market as highlighted by the Regulation 
School, secondly securitization and secondary market trading as well as 
shareholder value maximisation emphasised by the  ‘coupon pool approach’ 
of the British Social Accountants,  and, thirdly, the emergence of new forms of 
subjectivity and cultural developments in finance as theorised by the cultural 
approaches towards financialization. These interconnected processes, 
theorised against the background of Laclau’s theoretical framework and aided 
by the logics approach of Glynos and Howarth (2007), are put to use in the 
chapters five to seven of this thesis. The next c is concerned with the an 
analysis of the financialization of the UK mortgage market prior to the financial 
crisis with reference to the cultural, political and economic factors of 
neoliberalist hegemony that have underpinned it.  
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‘The largest single business in the UK is the letting of property, it accounts for 
7.9 per cent of total GDP or nearly £100 billion annually. Over the last decade 
in particular the nation has been collectively gripped by property fever, from city 
investment funds chasing the latest hot commercial property assets, to lone 
investors hoping to get rich quick by buying up run down terraced houses in the 
North of England. The newspapers devote acres of coverage to the subject and 
the TV schedules are filled to bursting with the latest twist on how to make a 
fortune out of property. Accounts are legion of those who have already made a 
fortune from property, and those who hesitated in the face of ever increasing 
prices, scold themselves for missing “such a sure thing” as the ranks of the 
Sunday Times ‘rich “list” are swelled by the latest property multi-millionaires’ 
(Hamilton, 2005, p. 5). 
 
‘The securitisation of suburbia is … both embodied through the assembly of 
everyday subjectivities and embedded in interactions between financiers and 
calculative technologies in interconnected networks’ (Langley, 2006, p. 297). 
 
 
Chapter Four: Mortgage Market Financialization in the 
UK and the Financial Crisis 
 
 
Introduction  
 
From the mass default of the American subprime mortgages, to borrowers 
who had been sold mortgages they could not afford, to the high profile 
collapse of the former mutual building society and specialist mortgage lender 
Northern Rock that prompted the first, and highly televised, bank run in Britain 
in over 100 years, mortgages were at the heart of the financial crisis. Their 
financialization, i.e. the reengineering of mortgage loans into liquid tradable 
assets, also catapulted them into the driver’s seat of the financialized 
expansion of capitalism that preceded the meltdown. Mortgage market 
financialization turned the formally local or national business of home loans 
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into one of the most, if not the most, profitable capital market. This, in turn, 
with a few blips and exceptions, significantly contributed to a phase of 
unprecedented prosperity over the past 20 years or so. It also contributed to 
the inflation of the housing bubble and an unsustainable construction boom in 
a range in countries as diverse as Spain, Ireland, Dubai and the US. As 
described in the first of the initial quotes, this bubble was embedded in an 
ideological fantasy of ever appreciating house prices and the notion that every 
form of property could be turned into a commercial opportunity essentially 
without risk (see also chapter seven of this thesis). The collapse of this bubble 
is now widely felt both in terms of its effect on homeownership volumes and 
depressed housing markets, as well as in terms of the loss of a motor for 
growth.  
 
Given the material and symbolic importance of mortgages within neoliberalism 
in the form of the centrality of homeownership for a ‘property owning 
democracy’ and the increased importance of housing for consumption and 
welfare needs as well as the aforementioned centrality of housing for 
finacialized growth and the banking sector, one might as well speak of the 
loss of the central motor for neoliberalism more generally.  
 
This chapter therefore situates the financialization of the mortgage market at 
the heart of the historical bloc of neoliberalist hegemony. The chapter is 
concerned with what Glynos and Howarth (2007) call the ‘social logic of a 
practice’ (see chapter one of this thesis) which refers to the sedimented 
‘grammar’ that makes a practice both possible and vulnerable to dislocations. 
While predominantly focusing on the ‘ontical’ dimension of this practice, and 
thus necessarily being to some degree descriptive, the present chapter also 
particularly emphasises the relational and discursive nature of mortgage 
market financialization within neoliberalism. It shows that financialization takes 
place within, and is mediated by, a relational totality that is a hegemonic bloc. 
As the latter, following Gramsci, consists of cultural, political and economic 
components alike, the chapter emphasises how the financialization of 
mortgages is not solely an economic phenomenon but ‘permeates all walks of 
life’ by showing how it is deeply woven into in the collective cultural and 
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ideological fabric of the nation – for example in the form of football terrace 
chants and television programmes.   
 
Section two of this chapter points out that the central technology of 
financialization – securitization – is not per se a rational or efficient financial 
instrument as is often claimed but ‘bricolaged’ and inherently unstable (or 
‘dislocated’ in the vocabulary of Laclau).82 The chapter also emphasises that 
the technology of securitization and the financialziation of mortgages is reliant 
upon the interpellation of new forms of financial subjectivity (see also chapter 
three of this thesis). Hence, securitization and financialization are not the 
outcome of a process of natural market evolution (cf. chapter two of this 
thesis) but politically institutionalized and, therefore, contingent and potentially 
reversible (ibid).  
 
While there has been a plethora of analysis on the US subprime market and 
its ‘excess’, the British mortgage market is considerably under-researched in 
terms of a comprehensive account of the financialization of mortgages and 
the crisis, even though the two systems of mortgage lending and funding differ 
in a number of crucial respects (a notable exception is Wainwright; 2009a; 
2009b). In order to fill this gap, this chapter is concerned with illuminating the 
particularities of British mortgage lending and funding for which the American 
market serves as an important point of comparison.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
82
 As pointed out in section 1.4 of chapter one of this thesis, subjects as well as objects and 
practices are ‘always already dislocated’. Such dislocations can reveal themselves in 
moments of dislocations such as crises but also, more subtly, in distortions, contradicitions 
and metaphors (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001; Cederström and Spicer, forthcoming).  
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1. Contextualising Mortgage Market Financialization 
 
1.1 The Global Financial Crisis and the Financialization of Mortgages 
In spite of the recent developments in neoliberalism, as touched upon in the 
introduction, which increasingly threaten the universalist status of the 
neoliberalist particular, logics of neoliberalism and financialization are still 
deeply ingrained in our everyday practices such as consumer borrowing, 
saving and spending (albeit, it seems, in an progressively deteriorating way). 
It is therefore useful to analyse how precisely these various practices, here 
represented by practices of mortgage lending and funding, have become, and 
continue to be, financialized. This is useful not only in order to make sense of 
the financial crisis and the conjuncture that preceded it, but also to understand 
how the latter is politically and ideologically resolved and in terms of its impact 
upon the post-crisis state of neoliberalist capitalism (some important 
developments that have emerged from the crisis are investigated in chapter 
seven of this thesis).   
 
The financialization of mortgage markets is highly symptomatic of these 
processes. Over the past decades, formerly local circuits of mortgage lending 
and funding have been connected to the capital markets in unprecedented 
ways. This has not only given capital markets more power over mortgage 
lending but also increasingly made the formerly more or less separate 
spheres of financial markets and housing more interdependent (as 
demonstrated by the ‘crunch’ itself). Thus, something as mundane and 
‘everyday’ as mortgages, exemplified in the figure of the now almost infamous 
‘subprime borrower’,83 has become one of the key signifiers of the ‘excesses’ 
of the pre-crisis global hegemonic conjuncture (for the political notion of 
excess see chapter seven of this thesis). 
 
                                                 
83
 A subprime borrower is a borrower with a poor credit history. The ever expanding ‘search 
for yield’ prior to the meltdown made particularly the American subprime market a highly 
lucrative target the expansion of mortgage lending. As is well documented, mass defaults in 
this segment triggered the financial crisis (see also chapter seven of this thesis).  
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According to Aalbers (2009a), the financialization of mortgages facilitated the 
inflation of the housing bubble in a number of countries. Hereby, the housing 
bubble formed an important part of what George Soros (2009) calls the 
‘superbubble’ of the last 25 years. This superbubble, for which the financial 
crisis marked the tipping point, consisted of a long term trend towards credit 
creation and leveraged transactions based on the deregulation and 
globalisation of, as well as innovations in, financial markets (see also section 
three of this chapter and chapter six of this thesis).  
 
‘Debt receivables’, of which mortgages were by far the most important ones, 
became a highly profitable target for financial engineering from the late 1990s 
onwards. The increased relevance of the sphere of housing within financial 
markets created a ‘spillover effect’ to other economic sectors (Sassen 2009) 
as confidence in the markets waned and liquidity84 started to dry up from 
August 2007 onwards. This, subsequently, almost brought the entire financial 
banking system to the brink of collapse.  At the heart of these processes was 
a financial market innovation named securitization which provided the ‘novel 
offering’ that historically tends to precede a speculative mania and 
subsequent financial crash (Kindleberger and Aliber, 2005). Securitization 
allowed for mortgages to be treated as financial assets and be bought and 
sold in the secondary market. The securitization of mortgages means that a 
large number of income streams generated from mortgage repayments such 
as principal and interest are pooled together and sold to capital market 
investors (see section two of this chapter for details on securitization and 
other financial products).  
                                                 
84
 Generally, the term liquidity is used to designate markets with standardised prices 
populated by willing buyers and sellers who are able to exchange assets without causing 
strong fluctuations in prices. Liquid markets are regarded as ‘safe’ and desirable for investors. 
Contrarily, illiquid markets are regarded as dangerous and to be approached with great 
caution. As Langley (2010) points out, the precise meaning of liquidity, however, is subject to 
heated debate ‘and much of its appeal may well arise from its multiple uses and applications’. 
For him, liquidity is essentially a signifier that is to a certain degree performative upon the 
context to which is it applied. Markets named liquid, such as the subprime mortgage market 
prior to the crisis, acquire a dynamic on their own from which withdrawing is not easy for 
market participants. Correspondingly, labelling the same market ‘illiquid’ has significantly 
contributed to the closing of the latter in the wake of the ‘credit crunch’.  
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The following quote by an interviewee illustrates the bascis of how 
securitisaton works in a banker’s terminology (Interview eleven):  
 
‘You have got different ways of doing it but in essence, you select a pool of 
mortgages, you transfer them into a special purpose vehicle … it can be on- or 
offshore … and then you actually ask for people to subscribe funding to create 
the mortgage backed security and those invested by the mortgage backed 
security and that’s how they fund the SPV…’  
 
As financial innovation was spurred to ever increasing heights by the ‘search 
for yield’ in the years up to 2007, these securitized mortgages were ‘packaged 
up’ in financial instruments which, at times, became so complex that few 
people understood them leave alone analysed them properly. As a HM 
Treasury Select Committee Report (2008, p. 38) on the failed UK banks 
reasoned:  
 
‘We note that risk and complexity within the banking sector has increased 
dramatically over the last twenty years. The widespread – but sometimes 
misguided – belief that risk was being dispersed and “managed” led many 
banks to increase the complexity of their operations and their overall risk 
exposure. This was manifestly a false premise. Indeed one of the factors that is 
key to understanding the banking crisis is that some forms of securitisation, far 
from mitigating risk, actually obscured it.’   
 
In the course of the unravelling of the ‘credit crunch’ in 2007, essentially a 
crisis of confidence over the amount of ‘bad debt’ held by other financial 
institutions (Ertürk et al., 2008a)85, the issuing of securitized products by 
lenders deteriorated dramatically and subsequently dried up almost 
completely as market players became suspicious of the extent of these ‘toxic’ 
loans on other institutions’ balance sheets. This, in turn, pushed the rates for 
capital market borrowing such as LIBOR86 to unprecedented heights and 
                                                 
85
 A similar fear is observable in the summer of 2011 which was sparked by a concern over 
the state of the global economy. As of August 2011, a renewed freezing of international debt 
markets is not an unlikely possibility (The Guardian, 2011a, 20 August). 
86
 LIBOR stands for London Interbank Offer Rate and is the rate at which banks borrow funds 
from each other in London. It does not necessarily reflect the movement of the Bank of 
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virtually collapsed interbank lending. The secondary mortgage market has 
only cautiously been re-opened in 2009 in the UK (Patterson and Plehn, 
2009) and its future size and shape remains unclear. Debates on the future of 
mortgages are politically highly sensitive and subject to intense power-
struggles and lobbying involving a range of different actors and institutions 
(CML, 2009; CML, 2010a; 2010b).  
 
Even though the British mortgage market is not primarily associated with the 
‘excesses’ that dominated subprime mortgage lending in the US and 
mortgage assets were mostly sound, the increased level of securitization 
volumes and wholesale market funding87 for mortgage lending left it 
structurally vulnerable to a crisis of confidence. While the deterioration of the 
US mortgage market resulted from the underestimation of credit risk88 of 
subprime borrowers, either through ignorance or deliberate fraudulent 
misconduct89, problems in the UK mortgage market were the outcome of its 
dependence on liquidity in the capital markets (see section two of this thesis).  
 
1.2. Transforming the Mortgage Market 
The financialization of mortgages via new financial instruments was 
embedded in, and a driver of, the transformation of formerly local and 
politically sheltered mortgage circuits into a global market. These 
developments also have been highly symptomatic of the expansion of 
neoliberalist capitalism during the last decades with its tendency towards 
                                                                                                                                            
England base rate (as was particularly pronounced during the financial crisis). LIBOR is the 
major benchmark for short-term capital market interest rates globally. It is used in many 
market transactions including mortgage agreements. It also functions as an indicator for the 
health of capital markets (see bbalibor.com) 
87
 The term wholesale funding is used here in a broad sense to refer to funding through 
capital markets. Some commentators distinguish between wholesale funding and 
securitization (Boléat and Coles, 1987).   
88
 Credit risk is the risk of a lender or investor that a borrower or issuer of a security does not 
repay his/her loan in a timely manner or defaults on his/her debt (see e.g. 
thefreedictionary.com, 2011).    
89
 At the beginning of September 2011, US authorities in the form of the US Federal Housing 
Agency (FHFA) which is overseeing the remains of the failed mortgage companies Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac, is preparing to sue more than a dozen big banks, including Goldman 
Sachs, Bank of America, JP Morgan and Deutsche Bank on the grounds of alleged abusive 
mortgage lending and foreclosure practices to subprime borrowers during the boom years. 
This follows a number of other lawsuits that banks already have had to face on similar 
grounds (The Guardian, 2011, 2 September).   
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capital accumulation through financial patterns and the associated shift from 
‘bank based’ towards ‘market-led’ financing (see chapter three of this thesis).  
 
Hereby, housing became a cornerstone of the neoliberalist agenda to 
privatise, individualise and financialize. This entailed a local and global, as 
well as qualitative and quantitative, restructuring of what Langley (2008a) 
identifies as changes of discreet but overlapping networks of everyday saving 
and borrowing away from networks of thrift towards new networks of 
investment and credit. It is argued throughout this thesis that these 
transformations relied on a number of processes of exclusion and 
marginalisation of which the mutual model is an important example. The 
changes in mortgage lending and funding have been inherently political in 
nature and are embedded in the three broader trends that are discussed in 
chapter three of this thesis. Those are: firstly, the restructuring of institutional 
patterns for capital accumulation (Regulation School), secondly, the rise of 
coupon pool capitalism, particularly the securitization of mortgage portfolios 
and the rise of shareholder value capitalism (British Social Accountants), and 
thirdly, cultural transformations and the ‘hailing’ of new forms of subjectivity 
(cultural economy and the fiancialization of everyday life).  
 
Taken together, these transformations have contributed to the constitution of 
a neoliberal ethico-political configuration that attributes to finance an apparent 
scientific rationality and an increasing authority over economic and social 
relations. An authority, however, that is inherently precarious and frequently 
contested (see DeGoede, 2004; 2005). As finance expanded into ever 
increasing domains of ‘the lifeworld’90 (see Leyshon and Thrift, 2007), new 
forms financial subjectivities became constituted. These were often 
associated with the re-making of mundane practices such as mortgage 
borrowing, which are required to increasingly self-manage financial risk and 
become more and more entangled with, and vulnerable to, the developments 
and imperatives of financial markets (Martin, 2002; Langley, 2008a; Knights, 
                                                 
90
 In the theory of Jürgen Habermas (1984; 1987), the concept of the ‘colonization of the 
lifeworld’ designates the intrusion of the cultural sphere by instrumental rationality and market 
forces. 
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1997). It is argued here that, in the light of the theoretical discussions of 
chapter one and particularly two of this thesis, (mortgage) financialization is 
not a process that is endemic to ‘the market’ but ‘cuts across social 
topographies’ in the sense that it points to the way how economy, state and 
civil society are organised as a relational whole within historical bloc of 
neoliberalism, to use the terminology of Gramsci here. Also, the hegemonic 
status of (mortgage) financialization illuminates how our present (albeit 
perhaps increasingly crumbling and contested) cultural consensus is 
organised around leveraged consumption, financed through financial assets 
such as housing.   
 
This interrelatedness is illustrated by the way that the expansion of 
homeownership (on which mortgage market financialization ultimately relies) 
was facilitated by emotionally charged, and politically laboured, narratives 
constructing homeowners as ‘responsible individuals’ in opposition to renters 
(Smith, 2008; Christie et al., 2008). Politically this was part of an extensive 
welfare trade-off during the Clinton and Bush presidencies in the US as well 
as under New Labour in the UK (Glyn, 2006; Willmott, 2011; Watson, 2009a) 
in line with the continuous re-affirmation of the neoliberalist promise ‘towards 
a further major extension of Britain’s asset holding, property owning 
democracy’ (Gordon Brown, 2005; cited in: Smith, 2008, p. 522). The 
identification of everyday leveraged financial subjects (Langley, 2006; 2007; 
2008a) with this ideological discourse had profound material consequences. 
As Aalbers (2008, p. 151) puts it: 
 
‘The expansion of the mortgage market is not just meant to increase 
homeownership but it is also intended as a means to further the neo-liberal 
agenda of private property, firms and growing profits. In this process, 
homeowners also become more dependent on financial markets. Old 
arrangements of social rights have been replaced and continue to be replaced 
by new arrangements in which social rights and guarantees are transferred 
from the state to financial markets.’ 
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The increasing dependency of homeowners on financial markets constituted 
the sphere of housing, at least in part, as a sphere of finance. Finance, thus, 
became to a considerable extent enacted and performed within the cultural 
realms of everyday life but, complimentarily, the latter also became 
increasingly driven by, and sensitive to, the fluctuations and cycles of capital 
markets. The ‘state of the market’, therefore, impacted in an increasingly 
unmediated way upon the discourses of homeownership and mortgages. 
Metro, for example titles in October 2010 that the ‘homeownership dream is 
“over” for the young’ (Metro, 2010), as down payments (the initial upfront sum 
on the mortgage due) become unaffordable for the majority of first time buyers 
in the wake of crisis.91 A future transformation of homeownership discourse 
seems therefore not an unlikely outcome of the current situation since the 
conditions for mortgage credit availability, particularly for first time buyers, 
have deteriorated significantly.  
 
Economically, the housing boom, which preceded the financial crisis, 
benefited from a benign macro-economic climate within which capital flows 
were increasingly channelled into housing. This development was facilitated 
by the cutting of interest rates of the American Federal Reserve Bank to re-
stimulate economic growth after the bursting of the dot-com bubble and 9/11 
at the beginning of the last decade (Gamble, 2009a; 2009b; Engelen et al., 
2010; 2011). The securitization of mortgages became the primary vehicle for 
the expansion of mortgage lending and the housing boom. In the US, 
securitization was originally a governmental, or quasi-governmental ‘invention’ 
by the so-called ‘government sponsored enterprises’ named Freddie Mac and 
Fannie Mae and Ginnie Mae (GSE’s) (Gotham, 2006).92 The latter became 
modified and mass marketed for private investors in the 1980s by the 
investment bank Solomon Brothers (Lewis, 1989). The government in the UK, 
while not directly intervening in the constitution of the secondary mortgage 
market, nevertheless also supported the expansion of securitization as a 
funding mechanism (see e.g. DETR, 2000).   
                                                 
91
 The typical down payment for first time buyers in July 2011 was 33 per cent of the home 
loan (The Guardian, 2011b, 20 August).  
92
 Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae were placed into federal conservatorship in September 2008, 
a week before the collapse of Lehmann Brothers. 
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Low global interest rates and high volumes of liquidity provided by countries 
such as China and India, who had built up current account surpluses, 
stimulated rising asset prices such as housing which created the bubble. 
Countries such as the US and the UK contributed to this development by 
keeping real short-term interest rates low prompting a ‘hunt for yield’ on the 
side of financial market investors under conditions of increased financial 
market competition (Barell and Davis, 2008). This spurred an explosion of 
financial innovation of all sorts (such as CDOs, credit derivatives, subprime 
lending etc) as well as the expansion of highly leveraged financial market 
transactions and consumer credit.  
 
These processes are inseparable from innovations in financial markets. While 
the conjuncture of financialization and the ‘speculative mania’ (Kindleberger 
and Aliber, 2005) that led up to the bursting of the dot-com bubble in 2000-01 
was driven by a bubble in equities and corporate bonds of internet companies 
(see MacDonald, 2009), the central innovation which inflated the housing 
bubble in the conjuncture prior to the ‘credit crunch’ was financialization. 
Hence, this financial market innovation is discussed in detail in the next 
section.   
 
 
2. Securitization and the Secondary Mortgage Market 
 
2.1 The Financialization of Homes and the Creation of a Market for Mortgage 
Backed Securities 
Securitization was at the heart of the financialization of mortgages and the 
housing bubble because it facilitated the process of connecting local or 
national mortgage lending to global capital markets. ‘Because securitization 
increasingly connects the mortgage market to the stock market’ as Aalbers 
(2009a, p. 402; 2008, p. 154) points out, ‘securitization embodies the 
financialization of the mortgage market’.  Hereby, securitization, in conjunction 
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with certain derivatives, became the defining ‘coupons’93 around which the 
pre-crisis conjuncture94 of financialization was structured. Every loan that 
produces a steady cash flow can be securitized and thus generate a regular 
income for the investors in these securities. For example, residential and 
commercial mortgages, care homes, credit card debt, car loans, corporate 
debt, gas pipeline contracts, infrastructural projects in third world countries, 
music royalties and even the amount of beer drunk in a pub have all been 
securitized in the past (Hildyard, 2009; Leyshon and Thrift,  2007).   
 
Mortgages became, by far, the most important market for securitization and 
thus also became an important driving force of the restructuring of capital 
accumulation towards the financialized growth model that is discussed in 
chapter three of this thesis. Securitization delivered growth both directly 
through rising house prices and indirectly through second or third mortgages 
secured against the home – so-called equity release mortgages – which, in 
turn, boosted private consumption (see section three of this chapter). 
Following Aalbers (2008; 2009a; 2009b), the financialization of housing 
implies that houses, as well as homeowners, become financially exploitable 
(through the risk-based pricing of mortgages and credit scoring).95 The 
condition of possibility for this to happen involved a dual movement of capital 
transfer whereby, firstly, capital became channelled away from the industrial 
circuit to the housing sector to deliver growth which started in the post-war 
years (cf. Bourdieu, 2005) and, secondly, the increasing transfer of capital 
                                                 
93
 See the discussion on ‘coupon pool capitalism’ in chapter three of this thesis. 
94
 Following Engelen et al. (2010; 2011) and Ertürk et al. (2008a), a financial conjuncture is 
used in a rather narrow sense here, designating a period of about six years which are 
typically defined by a particular financial coupon (see also the discussion below in this sub-
section).   
95
 Credit scoring and risk-based pricing are technologies that enable the constitution of 
homeowners as financial subjects and therefore contribute to the financialization of everyday 
life (see chapter three of this thesis). Home loans traded in the secondary market are 
classified by risk profiles, because risk determines their selling price (risk-based pricing). 
Mortgage borrowers are therefore classified according to the risk that they pose to both 
lenders and investors. Hereby, credit scoring uses available information to determine whether 
borrowers are able but also willing to pay back the loan such as occupation, length of 
employment, bank account data etc. (Aalbers, 2008, p. 155 ff). The years preceding the 
meltdown have witnessed a continuous erosion of existing lending criteria in the search for 
higher returns to the point that, as noted earlier, mortgages were sold to subprime borrowers 
in the US in the knowledge that they could not afford to repay the loan (see also section three 
of this chapter for various higher-yielding customised mortgage products based on risk-based 
pricing). 
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from the housing circuit to financial markets for the funding of mortgages. 
Additionally, capital was channelled back through the ‘coupon pool’ in the 
form of dividends to deliver value to shareholders. Listed companies such as 
banks, including demutualised building societies, had therefore considerable 
pressure from shareholders to increase their mortgage portfolios which, in 
turn, could be best achieved through increasing securitization volumes.  
 
The combination of these developments transformed mortgage financing from 
mere facilitators of house purchase to markets in their own right. In turn, they 
became concerned with ‘making money’ for themselves. This, consequently, 
replaced the traditional model of mortgage finance to a significant extent. 
Fees from structuring mortgage backed securities, for instance, became more 
important for banks than the ‘spread’ between the interest paid to retail 
depositors and the interest received from mortgage borrowers in the 
traditional model of mortgage funding (see Willmott, 2011). As mortgages 
became increasingly funded and priced through the markets, the latter 
developed into the main drivers of mortgage lending. Banks and other lenders 
which favoured this model thus became dependent on the liquidity in the 
money markets for the funding of their ongoing mortgage business. This lack 
of liquidity was the main reason for the difficulties of British mortgages lenders 
during the crisis, whose problems did not stem primarily from the quality of 
their home loans or the complexity of their securitization products (as opposed 
to US lenders).  Since a large number of its securitizations was what is called 
‘plain vanilla’ securitizations, most of their underlying loans performed well 
during the ‘crunch’96 and severe losses were specific to particular lenders, 
rather than the market as a whole. However, problems resulted from a 
‘structural vulnerability’ caused by a shift of retail deposit funding to having to 
raise relatively short-term funds from the money markets and a dependency 
on leverage investors (CML, 2010a; 2010b; CML 2009). This dependency on 
capital markets for mortgage funding, however, was a direct consequence of 
the expansion of mortgage securitization. While retail deposit funding was still 
                                                 
96
 ‘Vanilla products’ are relatively ‘straightforward’ securitizations that contain high quality 
mortgages from a relatively homogeneous pool of mortgages. These are often contrasted by 
practitioners with more complex products such as CDOs (HM Treasury Select Committee, 
2009, p. 36; CML, 2009; for CDOs see the next section of this chapter).  
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vital, deposits grew too slow in relation to mortgage debt (reflecting the low 
national savings rate) in order to be sufficient to satisfy mortgage demand.97 
In contrast, securitization exploded in the years between 2000 and 2007. 
Securitizations, backed by residential mortgages (RMBS – see the next 
section of this chapter) and covered bonds98 outstanding in 2007, stood at 
£257 billion amounting to 21 per cent of the mortgage stock (CML, 2010).99 
The financial crisis, therefore, is a ‘crisis of securitization’ more generally 
which is not confined to the opacity and predatory nature of the American sub-
prime market since securitization ‘represents innovation whose outcome 
include frozen markets, failed and bailed banks and blocked credit’ (Engelen 
et al., 2010, p. 34 ). 
 
Given the potential of securitization to boost mortgage lending as well as 
consumer spending and the overall political significance of mortgages and 
housing (see section three of this thesis), it is unsurprising that a market for 
securitization was actively politically supported and institutionalised. This is 
particularly the case in the US with its distinct federal legal-institutional system 
that has favoured securitization as a means of allocating financial flows 
across the different housing circuits of the USA (Gotham, 2006). As 
mentioned above, securitization was practically ‘invented’ by the GSE’s who 
then provided quasi-governmental guarantees which institutionalised, 
standardised and legitimized the secondary market. (While the ‘non-agency’ 
sector, associated with the most ‘toxic’ mortgage loans, grew rapidly prior to 
the ‘crunch’, the GSEs continued to guarantee the majority of mortgages 
issued in the US [IFSL Research, 2010]). This allowed mortgage banks to 
compete with savings institutions and created the largest and most developed 
                                                 
97
 The most extreme example for this lending model of a bank in the UK was Northern Rock. 
By the summer of 2007, only 23 per cent of its liabilities were in the form of retail deposits 
(Shin, 2009, p. 102). 
98
 Covered bonds are mortgage funding instruments which are similar to securitization but 
give investors a dual claim to the pool of mortgages as well as to the issuing lender. They are 
typically kept on the balance sheet of the originating institution. Covered bonds only amount 
to a small fraction of mortgage funding in Britain prior to the crisis (as opposed to especially 
Germany) but, because they are considered to be a safer alternative to securitization, they 
are currently on the rise and backed by government officials and investors (CML, 2009; 
2010).  
99
 The exposure of US lenders on securitization and wholesale funding was, and still is, 
considerably higher than that of its British counterparts but was also better politically 
protected during the financial crisis (ibid).  
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market for mortgage backed securities in the world, where, by the late 1980s, 
almost 70 per cent of new mortgages were securitised (Murphy, 1996). The 
US government was also instrumental in developing its sub-prime mortgage 
market. It did so indirectly through legislatory changes that created the 
condition of possibility for banks to distribute credit to previously redlined 
fractions of the population (such as the Community Reinvestment Act enacted 
by the democratic Carter Administration [CRA]; see Willmott, 2011 and 
Gamble, 2009) and directly by explicitly allowing the GSEs to guarantee 
subprime loans from the mid-1990’s onwards (Ishikawa, 2009). The problem 
therefore was not, as in previous systems of mortgage provision (cf. chapter 
six of this thesis), ‘exclusionary redlining’ but ‘exploitative greenlining’ 
(Newman and Wyly cited in Langley, 2008a, p. 163).  
 
The British securitization market did not result from direct government 
intervention and does not enjoy the same amount of protection by the state.100 
Nevertheless, the market in the UK was the outcome of neoliberalist 
deregulation commenced under the Thatcher administration, especially the 
‘Big Bang’ financial services deregulation of 1986 (see chapter six and seven 
of this thesis for a detailed account). The adaption of securitization to the UK 
context also stemmed from a political process of market institutionalization 
involving struggles and lobbying by a variety of actors and institutions 
including new lenders, investment banks, trade bodies, law firms and city 
advisers and government agencies (see Wainwright, 2009a; 2009b). Britain’s 
sub-prime market, for example, was actively lobbied for and legitimised by 
trade bodies such as the Council of Mortgage Lenders which has resulted in a 
more general acceptance of consumer credit in civil society (Burton et al., 
2004; see also Munro, et al., 2005).101  
 
Despite these inherently political origins, financial economists and 
practitioners tended to regard securitization as the natural outcome of a 
                                                 
100
 For example, securitization has not been granted the same amount of political support as 
in the US in the wake of the financial crisis (such as government guarantees of securitized 
assets, CML, 2010a.  
101
 Subprime lending in the UK, while significantly growing before the crisis, was generally a 
much smaller sector in the UK than in the US and has not played a decisive factor in the 
financial crisis (HM Treasury Report, 2008a; 2008b). 
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process of ‘market evolution’ as well as a means to effectively transfer credit 
risk to ‘sophisticated investors’: ‘Securitization’, as Sir Tom McKillop 
summarises the widely held expectations regarding its benefits,  
 
‘was seen as a stabilising influence in the financial system … This was 
distributing risk. This was making the whole system more stable.’ (HM Treasury 
Select Committee, 2009, p. 32) 
 
While this view is now subject to a number of qualifications after the 
meltdown, securitization is still intensely and successfully lobbied for by the 
mortgage industry on the grounds that it is regarded as an essentially 
unproblematic and indispensable funding tool that, if carried out diligently and 
monitored properly, can be completely isolated from ‘excesses’ such as those 
in American subprime lending (CML, 2009; CML, 2010a; 2010b; see also IMF, 
2009). 
 
Given the sheer size of securitization markets, the worldwide annual value of 
gross securitizations issuance was $3854 billion in 2007 (International 
Financial Services London, 2010). Because of their tremendous importance 
for consumption on which the hegemonic consensus of neoliberalism 
ultimately relies, securitization markets have acquired a status of ‘necessity’ 
within neoliberalist discourse. It has been recognized ‘on both sides of the 
Atlantic’, as Ingram (2009, p. 4-5) notes, that the availability and affordability 
of consumer credit are inextricably linked to the functioning of secondary 
markets for consumer debt. As only securitization guarantees the trading of 
large enough quantities of this debt, the reopening of those markets becomes 
politically imperative. For example, the US Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner 
emphasised in a key note speech on 10 February 2009 on Barack Obama’s 
Financial Strategy Plan that 
 
‘[i]n our financial system, 40 per cent of consumer lending has historically been 
available because people buy loans, put them together and sell them. Because 
this vital source of lending has frozen up, no financial recovery plan will be 
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successful unless it helps restart securitization markets for sound loans made 
to consumers and businesses – large and small’ (quoted in Ingram, 2009, p. 5). 
 
However, despite its tremendous importance for neoliberalist growth that 
becomes apparent in the above quote, securitization is arguably far from 
being a ‘rational technology’, but can be more appropriately described as a 
product of bricolage that has been in constant flux since its emergence. What 
had been designed as a funding tool for mortgage loans had, by 2007, also 
acquired the character of a highly profitable target of speculation including  
the deliberate obfuscation of risk and regulatory arbitrage. Securitization was 
used, for example, to circumvent the capital adequacy ratios for banks set by 
internationally agreed banking rules known as the Basle I and Basle II 
Accords.  Basle I and the more flexible Basle II Accord required banks to hold 
a certain amount of capital reserves against a ‘risk-weighted’ loan. (It is worth 
pointing out that mortgages carried a particularly low risk-weighting in the 
lead-up to the financial crisis.) Banks could circumvent these requirements by 
moving securitized assets ‘off-balance sheet’ and hereby freeing up capital for 
other use (see Hildyard, 2009, 29 ff).  
 
In ‘working with what is at hand’ (see section 3.3 of chapter two of this thesis 
for the definition of bricolage), the creators of these securities did therefore 
respond to the circumstances and challenges (legal, political, macro-
economic etc.) of the particular conjuncture that preceded the ‘crunch’, rather 
than purposefully and rationally designing instruments for effective risk 
transfer. Financial innovation, as Engelen et al. (2010, p. 55) point out, 
 
‘is contingent, resourceful, and context-dependent, because bricolage in each 
new conjuncture reconstructs a world that escapes all rationalistic schemas … 
If we look back at the past conjuncture, the process of innovation could be 
defined holistically as a kind of supply-side bricolage to escape demand 
constraints through devising products … which connect the most mundane 
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transaction [such as mortgage borrowing] to wholesale markets in the 
“capitalisation of everything”’.102  
 
What remains to be seen is how the current financial conjuncture will be 
defined and how financial bricoleurs respond to the new Basle III framework 
that is currently in the making (see Engelen et al., 2011).  
 
Given the extreme importance of securitization for the ‘capitalisation of almost 
everything’ and its impact on the financial crisis, it is discussed in more detail 
in the next sub-section.   
 
2.2. Securitization and Collateralized Debt Obligations  
Securitization is the process by which formerly illiquid assets are transformed 
into tradable securities that can be bought and sold by investors in the 
secondary market.103  Hereby, the repayments on a loan such as a house are 
made into debt securities. Securitization is basically a form of financing 
mechanism (but became increasingly also an object of speculation as 
described above) in which assets are refinanced in the capital markets via the 
issuance of securities. Alongside derivatives which are financial coupons such 
as options, futures or swaps whose value is ‘derived’ from an underlying 
asset, securitization has significantly extended the neoliberalist tendency to 
commodify and contributed to the ‘financialization of almost everything’ (ibid; 
Harvey, 2005, p. 33).104  
 
The general term for the securities backed by pools of assets such as those 
listed above is asset backed securities (ABS). If the securitization is backed 
by mortgages, the most important class of asset backed securities, the 
coupons are called mortgage backed securities (MBS), residential mortgage 
                                                 
102
 The ‘capitalisation of everything’ refers to Leyshon and Thrift’s (2007) article which is also 
separately cited in this chapter.  
103
 Unless specifically stated, the details on securitization and Collateralized Debt Obligations 
(CDO’s) are taken from the following five sources: (Criado and van Raxtel, 2008; Willmott, 
2011a; Wainwright, 2009a; 2009b and Ishikawa, 2009; see also Sumerlin and Katzowitz, 
2007 for an assessment of the opacity and complexity of CDOs that came to light early in the 
crisis). 
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backed securities in the case of residential home loans (RMBS) or 
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) if the mortgages are made to 
corporations. The European RMBS market was driven by the UK making it the 
second most financialized mortgage market in the world with 57 per cent of 
total European securitization issuances coming from the UK in 2006 
(European Mortgage Federation, 2007). Its record RMBS issuances of £139 
billion in the same year was, however, dwarfed, by $10 trillion mortgage 
backed securities outstanding in the US in 2007 (Deutsche Bank, 2008).  
 
The process of securitization involves the pooling of mortgages or other 
assets and the subsequent sale to investors of claims to principal and interest 
backed by these pools. Hereby the investors share the risk associated with 
the securities such as credit risk and prepayment risk.105 In the case of 
RMBS, the claims to the future repayments of residential mortgages are 
structured into standardised and tradable financial instruments. It is by no 
means uncommon that a single mortgage securitization contains hundreds of 
millions of pounds worth of mortgages. Either banks, in cooperation with 
lawyers, carry out this structuring process ‘in house’, or the mortgages are 
transferred from their originating institutions to investment banks for the 
structuring process. Mortgages can be of prime or subprime status or a 
combination of both (a factor that contributed to the ‘spillover effect’ 
mentioned above as large defaults on subprime mortgages ‘contaminated’ the 
sound mortgages together with which they were bundled up. The assets are 
then sold to a specifically created company called Special Purpose Vehicle 
(SPV)106 or Special Purpose Entity (SPE), either in an actual sale or in the 
form of a sale of the credit risk alone via the use of a derivative called credit 
default swaps (CDS).107 The underlying assets remain with the SPV which 
                                                 
105
 Prepayment risk is the risk of the investor that the mortgages are redeemed too early by 
the borrower thereby reducing his/her income in the form of interest payments. 
106
 The SPV typically has charitable trust status and is located offshore. This arrangement has 
considerable tax advantages (Wainwright, 2010).  
107
 CDS have also featured prominently in the financial crisis in relation to the American 
subprime segment. They are basically a form of insurance taken out against the default of 
debt instruments. In order to purchase this insurance one does not need to be in possession 
of the asset against the default of which one is insured (e.g. RMBS, CDOs [see below] 
corporate bonds, sovereign bonds etc). Thus, CDSs can be used to hedge against, or bet on, 
the default on these bonds. Professional insurers, of which AIG, the insurance corporation 
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then issues securities backed by the underlying pool of mortgages (such as 
RMBS or CMBS) to capital market investors which gives them the right to the 
‘receivables’ from the mortgages.  
 
Securitization is linked to the so-called ‘originate-to-distribute’ model which, 
predominantly in the US, replaced the traditional approach of lending 
institutions such as savings and loans associations or building societies of 
originating mortgages and holding them to maturity, the so-called ‘originate-
and-hold’ model.108 Under this new model, the lender transfers the 
securitization ‘off balance sheet’ which frees up capital for other use. The 
payment derived from the sale of principal and interest can then be used to 
leverage further loans and so forth in a virtually endless cycle.109 Since the 
financial crisis, this model has often been criticised for the deterioration of 
lending standards, particularly in the American subprime market, as the 
originating institutions lose the incentives to apply strict criteria for the 
                                                                                                                                            
that was one of the largest insurers of derivatives and which collapsed in September of 2008,  
was the most high profile casualty, extensively insured allegedly bullet-proof mortgage bonds 
that almost exclusively carried AAA ratings (the highest ratings given to the most ‘trustworthy’ 
borrowers). A small number of traders made handsome profits in the wake of the meltdown by 
being the counterparty to these deals and thereby betting on the bonds to default (Lewis, 
2010; Lanchester, 2010; Ishikawa, 2009). In this context it has been observed that  
‘it’s bad enough that these subprime mortgage pools that banks, investment banks, 
insurance companies, hedge funds and others bought were over-rated and ended up 
falling precipitously in value as foreclosures mounted on the underlying mortgages in 
the pools. What’s even worse, however, is that speculators sold and bought trillions of 
dollars of insurance that these pools would, or wouldn’t default. The sellers of this 
insurance (AIG is one example) are getting killed as defaults continue to rise with no 
end in sight’ (Gilani, 2008).  
Recent problems in the Eurozone are also said to be further amplified by traders using CDSs 
to hedge against/speculate on sovereign default (Delatte et al., 2010). See also Morgan 
(2010) for the role of credit default swaps in the financial crisis.  
108
 The ‘originate-to-distribute’ model was not dominant in the British context. As Shin (2009, 
p. 105) points out in his analysis of Northern Rock:  
‘Unlike the U.S. securitization process where the special purpose entities are 
considered separate from the bank that makes the loans (that is, as off-balance-sheet 
vehicles), the accounting rules that Northern Rock operated under meant that the 
special purpose entities were consolidated on Northern Rock’s main balance sheet. In 
this respect, the rapid growth of Northern Rock’s balance sheet reflects the accounting 
regime, along with the flow of new loans originated.’ 
109
 Unsurprisingly, the leverage ratio of banks, the ratio between assets and equity, became 
very high. According to some measures, it stood at over 30:1 for most investment banks 
(Seeking Alpha, 2008, 25 September). 
High leverage is often considered to be one of the main factors that have contributed to the 
meltdown. The typical multiple by which a bank’s equity was leveraged was 50: 1 (Financial 
Times, 2011, 8 September). 
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assessment of credit risk, since the latter is passed on to investors alongside 
the profits. 
 
Securitized mortgage assets were very attractive to a number of different 
types of institutional investors because mortgages are historically considered 
to be the ‘safest asset class in history’, yet more profitable than sovereign or 
corporate bonds (see also below for CDOs). Rising house prices meant that 
even if occasional defaults did occur, the house could be repossessed and re-
sold at a higher price. Risk was considered to be further mitigated because 
the process of securitisation typically involves their structuring into two or 
more different ‘tranches’ each with distinct profiles of ‘risk and return’. 
Different investors can, therefore, purchase the tranches that correspond to 
their ‘risk appetite’. For example, pension funds are likely to purchase less 
risky and lower yielding AAA rated tranches, whereas hedge funds tend to 
invest in riskier B rated tranches with higher returns.110 The securitization of 
assets into different tranches, typically carried out by an investment bank, is 
known as the ‘waterfall structure’ among practitioners.111 The rationale behind 
this structure is that in the case of early redemption of the mortgages (e.g. in 
times of low interest rates) or a ‘credit event’, such as a mass default,112 the 
riskier ‘junior tranches’ (in theory) absorb all the losses whereas the less risky 
‘senior tranches’ are repaid first. 
 
The process of tranching can be taken even further with the aim to enhance 
the overall credit quality of the pool of assets involved and to make them even 
more attractive to investors. CDOs are inextricably linked to the American 
subprime market. These instruments are called Collateralized Debt 
Obligations (CDOs) or, if the CDO is backed by mortgages, Collateralized 
Mortgage Obligations (CMOs). CDOs and CMO that involve the ‘repackaging’ 
or ‘re-securitization’ of lower ranked and more risky so-called ‘subordinate’ or 
‘mezzanine’ tranches of various pools of securitized assets (mortgages) into  
                                                 
110
 See Ishikawa (2009, p. 353-4) for an overview of the ratings used by the different 
agencies.   
111
 See Wainwright (2009; 2010) 
112
 The technique of tranching was initially devised to mitigate prepayment risk as every 
investing institution would roughly know at what time its tranche would be redeemed. Credit 
risk only became a concern much later (MacKenzie, 2011).  
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new securities. Those are then, again, structured into different tranches and 
sold to different investors according to their risk profile. Like the initial 
securitization, this can also take the form of an actual sale of the underlying 
assets of a transfer of the credit risk alone – so-called synthetic CDOs (whose 
issuers were most severely hit in the downturn as they had to compensate for 
the losses incurred on the securities). The ‘trick’ with CDOs/CMOs is that in a 
process often referred to as ‘financial alchemy’ the formerly risky assets are 
turned into a new security whose senior tranche carries an AAA rating. The 
agencies awarded these rating because the correlation between those assets 
in the CDO/CMO is considered to be lower than that in the various original 
securitizations on which it is based. In other words, the risk associated with 
the underlying assets was considered to be ‘diversified away’. Additionally, 
they were handsomely rewarded by the investment banks such as Goldman 
Sachs who structured the CDOs (Criado and van Rixtel, 2008; Wainwright, 
2009a; 2009b, Ishikawa, 2009; Sumerlin and Katzovitz, 2007; for an account 
of the downturn in the American CDO/CMO Market see particularly Willmott, 
2011). CDOs were also a lot more lucrative than corporate or sovereign 
bonds with the same rating. It was common, for example, for AAA-rated 
tranches of CDOs to offer spreads (returns) between 15 and 60 basis points 
(1.5 per cent and 6 per cent respectively) over Libor whereas the spreads of 
sovereign bonds or the relatively few corporate bonds with AAA ratings would 
often be below Libor. CDO trading exploded in the decade leading up to the 
meltdown. In 2006 alone, asset backed CDOs totalling $307.7 billion were 
issued (MacKenzie, 2011). The process of re-securitization could be repeated 
again this time using tranches of CDOs for the repackaging which created so-
called CDO cubes, or even CDO squares in some instances. Also, different 
CDOs sometimes owned tranches of other CDOs and vice versa (a further 
attempt at risk diversification) creating a circular flow of credit money that 
additionally contributed to their complexity and opacity. As in normal 
securitizations, CDOs could be combined with other derivatives such as credit 
default swaps and currency swaps (Criado and van Rixtel, 2008; MacKenzie, 
2011). CDOs were particularly affected by problems in the American subprime 
segment. Mass defaults in this market meant that entire CDOs, including their 
senior tranches and not just the junior tranches or ‘equity cushion’ (which is 
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meant to function as a buffer), became affected. The bizarre and arbitrary 
nature of how these instruments were constructed and rated becomes 
apparent if one considers how they were massively downgraded in the wake 
of the financial crisis, despite their alleged sophistication at diversifying and 
transferring risk. To give one example, it appears that Moody’s downgraded 
one ‘super-senior’ tranche of a CMO given an AAA rating in April 2008 to a 
rating of B2 (considerably below investment grade) in November of the same 
year (MacKenzie cited in Willmott, 2011, p. 252). Sumerlin and Katzovitz 
(2007, p. 13) comment on the state of the CDO market at the point when 
market panic first set in in 2007:  
 
‘Today, there is more than a trillion dollars of CDO exposure sitting in the 
markets. Who exactly owns these securities is a mystery – one hears about 
European banks and Japanese retail investors. But given the size, the answer 
is probably everyone; either directly or indirectly through their ownership of 
financial stocks or pension funds. Institutional investors should have known 
better.’ 
 
CMOs/CDOs did not have the same significance for mortgage funding in the 
UK, but these products were rapidly growing. Also, the international nature of 
secondary mortgage markets meant that international and domestic investors 
who acquired US sub-prime securitizations also purchased UK MBSs for re-
securitization into CMOs which exposed many UK financial institutions to US 
credit risk (Wainwright, 2009a; 2009b; HM Treasury Report 2008a; 2008b). 
Securitization and the financial crisis hereby became truly global phenomena.  
   
These economic developments were part and parcel of a broader shift 
towards what can be called the ‘liquidation of homes’ in the neoliberalist era. 
The following sections investigate its cultural and political implications.  
 
To make the above explained processes of residential mortgage backed 
securities better understandable, Figure 3, below, illustrates a simplified (!) 
structure of an RMBS transaction.  
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Figure 3 
A simplified structure of an RMBS transaction 
Source: Criado and van Rixtel (2008) 
 
 
3. Liquid Homes 
 
The sense that something as illiquid as real estate can be rendered liquid and 
tradable on capital markets is perhaps best captured by the launch of 
Euromoney’s financial magazine Liquid Real Estate in March 2007 
(Christophers, 2010, p.100). Announcing the launch at a time when cracks in 
the housing bubble were already beginning to show (see also section 1.1 of 
chapter seven of this thesis),  Euromoney presented real estate as an asset 
class of ever-increasing profitability and, thus, as a natural target for 
sophisticated money market investors of all sorts and risk profiles 
(Euromoney, 2007, 6 March). (Problems in the US subprime market were 
known at least since the final months of 2006 when the ABX index, the index 
tracking the value of subprime credit default swaps, started to rise as defaults 
and write off’s in this market began to increase significantly (Gamble, 2009a).) 
 
In the neoliberalist era, housing became transformed from a catalyst for 
wealth generated in production (see section three of this chapter for the 
concepts of productionism and Fordism) to an object of wealth creation in its 
own right. Housing, thus, became increasingly connected to, and interwoven 
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with, the materialities, symbolics and fantasies of financial markets in ‘liberal 
residential economies’ such as the UK and the US (Schwartz and Seabrook, 
2009a; 2009b).113 The value of the average home increased from a figure of 
about £3500 to one around £185.000 from 1965 to 2005. Leaving aside 
severe dips in house prices such the housing market recession of the early 
1990s, this amounts to an annual increase of more than 10 per cent (CML 
and CIH, 2005). By 2007, houses in Greater London were nine times the 
average salary (London Councils, 2007). 
 
Deeply structured in the ideology of ‘no more boom and bust’ – a widely 
shared fantasmatic belief that business cycles had eventually been broken for 
good, or at least considerably softened, house price appreciation was more or 
less taken for granted (see chapter seven of this thesis for a more detailed 
analysis of this fantasy). Housing, typically the largest asset in a household 
portfolio, featured prominently within this imaginary. It did so because the 
demand for RMBSs and CDOs traded in secondary markets inflated the 
housing bubble. Also, driven by virtue of the expansion and intensification of 
this process, housing increasingly became an object of financial speculation 
for the leveraged everyday investor. It becomes apparent here that this new 
form of everyday homeowners-as-investor subject position is intrinsically 
linked to the materialities of the new financial instruments discussed in the 
previous section. The financialization of everyday life is therefore an 
illustrative example of how subjects and objects are produced by the same 
discourse, i.e. how new subject positions have developed alongside the 
evolution of the financial instruments discussed in the previous section (cf. the 
second opening quote by Langley; see also chapter one and two of this thesis 
for Laclau’s notion of subjectivity).  
 
                                                 
113
  Housing and mortgage markets differ significantly among countries, for example in terms 
of their homeownership rates, volumes of securitized mortgage portfolios or other mortgage 
funding instruments such as covered bonds, the level of mortgage debt, loan-to-value ratios 
(LTV ratios) and default rates. It has therefore been suggested, analogous to, but not 
necessarily corresponding directly to, the concept of ‘Varieties of Capitalism’ (Hall and 
Soskice, 2001) to speak of ‘Varieties of Residential Capitalism’ (Schwartz and Seabrook, 
2009a; 2009b). 
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The trend of homeowner-cum-investor particularly manifested itself in the 
explosion of the buy-to-let market segment - the purchase of a property to be 
let for money – which, in the UK in 2006 grew by 46 per cent. At the time, this 
market outperformed the entire mortgage market as a whole, representing 
nine per cent of the value of all mortgage balances (The Guardian, 2007, 14 
February). The buy-to-let market, only created in the mid-1990s but arguably 
the strongest motor of mortgage market financialization until the summer of 
2007, is also already deeply inscribed in the cultural fabric of the UK, visible, 
of all things, in the form of a football terrace chant. Lleyshon and French 
(2009, p. 1) report that Manchester City supporters from the early 2000s 
chanted the line ‘We all live in a Robbie Fowler House’ to the tune of The 
Beatles’ ‘Yellow Submarine’ in tribute to Robbie Fowler during his spell at 
Manchester City. They did this when he became known for the possession of 
an extensive property portfolio after the Sunday Times ‘rich list’ had listed him 
as the third richest player in Britain. Fowler had used his significant income 
generated from football to acquire a string of properties with the value of the 
houses making up a considerable part of his net worth. Additionally, those 
houses were occupied by private tenants generating a further income stream 
and making him the most famous (buy-to-let) landlord in the country. 
 
The same notion of ‘leveraging one’s home for profit’ also manifested itself in 
the increase of equity release and innovative mortgage products such as 
over-mortgaging (e.g. the infamous 125 per cent mortgage of Northern Rock), 
offset and current account mortgages, flexible mortgages such as self-
certification  and interest only mortgages. These mortgage products were 
tailored to individual financial and consumption needs with an emphasis on 
mortgages as investment and ‘freedom and choice’ (Langley, 2008a; see also 
Smith, 2006 below). For example, offset and current account mortgages are 
common in the UK. Here, existing savings are set against mortgage debt. 
Thus, the interest payable on the mortgage is reduced by the amount held in 
the savings account (see thisismoney.co.uk, accessed 2010). To give another 
example, interest only mortgages means that mortgagees only pay interest for 
an initial period, the so-called ‘teaser rates’. As Langley (2008a, p. 198) puts 
it:  
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‘Underpinning many of these new mortgage products is the assumption that 
house prices will rise creating equity for the leveraged investor who can “cash 
out this equity” in order to meet future and rising repayments.’ 
 
So-called equity release schemes became particularly significant in this 
respect. Equity release means the leveraging of additional credit to fund 
provision for old age or consumer spending for which the equity in an existing 
house serves as collateral. It comes in the form of equity loans, second or 
third mortgages leveraged against the home, or equity lines of credit, a form 
of revolving credit scheme where mortgagees can borrow up to a fixed sum 
depending on the appraised value of the house as well as the amount 
outstanding on the existing mortgage (Federal Reserve Board, 2010). To 
borrow against housing, traditionally considered to be the ‘safest asset class 
in history’ (Ishikawa, 2009), was thought to be as good as risk free in the pre-
crunch world (as noted earlier, even in the event of a default on repayments, 
rising house prices meant that repossessions could be turned into a profit by 
lenders). Additionally, similar to first mortgages, the default risk of equity 
release mortgages can be passed on to third parties via securitization (see 
below). Thus, equity withdrawal became a profitable investment in the years 
prior to the financial crisis not least because of considerable government 
support, particularly in the US where these schemes have been promoted 
extensively since the 1990s (Forrester, 1994) and consumer expenditure 
became the driving force of GDP growth (Stockhammer, 2004). On this point, 
the European Mortgage Association (2009, p. 1) remarks that: 
 
‘... the present financial crisis ... was driven by the US Federal Reserve policy 
of providing markets with abundant liquidity at lowest rates, coupled with an 
inadequate remuneration of risk and an extensive equity release practice in 
order to boost consumption.’ 
 
 
While this trend was not as pronounced (and not as actively backed by the 
state) in the UK, mortgage equity withdrawal was subsidised by the 
government and became of growing importance to support consumer 
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spending and as part of a welfare trade-off. Equity withdrawal increased every 
quarter from the early 2000s onwards until the financial crisis and stood at 
£14.57 billion in the last quarter of 2006114 or 6.7 per cent of post-tax income 
(Bank of England, 2007).115 The financialization of housing, thus, also became 
the most significant part of the broader trend of the financialization of 
consumption, emphasising the socio-political importance of household 
spending and borrowing for economic reproduction (see: Montgomery, 2006; 
2007; 2009; Langley, 2008a; 2008b). In 2007, the amount of consumer debt in 
the UK exceeded GDP in Britain for the first time (Grant Thornton, 2007, 23 
August). 
 
More generally, then, and following Smith (2008), housing became a 
cornerstone of the ethico-politics of neo-liberalism promoted on the platform of 
‘freedom and choice’ (p. 530). This ‘freedom’ however is of a particular (neo-
liberalist) colouring (as discussed in chapter three and five of this thesis) and 
its meaning for homeownership discourses became increasingly shaped by 
finance. Homeownership, thus, became not so much represented as a way of 
trading high outlays in working life against low cost of living in old age any 
more, but increasingly as an ‘active resource’ (ibid) for a broad range of 
welfare needs and consumption desires. This discourse has created what 
Smith (ibid) calls ‘a hybrid of money and materials’ which fundamentally 
altered the symbolic character as well as the materiality of homes and 
mortgages: 
 
‘The UK model is a financial market model whose rationale is to blur the 
boundary between (fixed) capital and (fluid) money ... This is what gives rise to 
a complex, politically charged, and ethically challenging entanglements 
                                                 
114
 A figure that, however, remains small compared to the $1.1 trillion equity mortgages 
outstanding in the US in 2006 (Heilpern et al., 2009, p. 102). 
115
 The tables have turned completely since the second quarter of 2008. Homeowners use the 
low interest rates (The Bank of England Base Rate remains, and presumably will remain for 
sometime, at 0.5 per cent) to repay existing mortgages. The cumulative net injection of equity 
into housing has reached 24.2 billion since the second quarter of 2008 in October 2010. The 
decreased in house prices and the tightening of credit conditions, as well as a generally more 
cautious attitude to spending, have made mortgage equity withdrawals less attractive (The 
Guardian, 1 October 2010). In fact, to use a particularly striking example, mortgage equity 
withdrawal stood negatively at: - £ 6.2 billion or -2.5 per cent of post-tax income in the second 
quarter of 2010 (Bank of England, 2010). 
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between the materiality of housing, the meaning of home, and the mobilisation 
of money (the flow of cash and credit and credit in market societies)’ (ibid, pp. 
520-1).  
 
The notion of homes as financial assets became deeply embedded within the 
cultural sphere and diffused through what in the previous chapter has called 
‘cultural circuit of capital’116 (Thrift, 2001).  
 
For example, there was a plethora of TV programmes, websites, books and 
newspaper columns that advised on how to best turn one’s home into a 
financial advantage with particular emphasis on the buy-to-let market but also 
in terms of home improvement programmes that emphasised fabric and price 
rather than living space. In TV shows such as Location, Location, Location in 
the UK, owner occupiers are always represented as potential sellers (often 
coupled with a considerable dose of glamour) whose aspirations for individual 
freedom and consumption becomes tied to the materiality of rising house 
prices as, for example, equity release through remortgaging can be used to 
further improve the house in the latest fashion (Langley, 2008, p. 198). The 
cultural notion of homes as assets persists even in the post-crisis world where 
the average first time buyer can no longer afford a home. Consider, for 
instance, in the light of the current budget cuts and subdued housing market, 
this rather bizarre recent example from Location, Location, Location: Here, 
Claire, a student and millionaire (by virtue of legal compensation), searches a 
property in central London (Location, Location, Location, 2010, 15 
September):   
 
‘Claire is looking for a place with good investment potential, three bedrooms 
and an easy 20 minute commute to the University campus. She wants to be on 
the exclusive South Bank, in a place with a bit of buzz about it and easy access 
to shops, restaurants and bars. She has an ideal budget of £1.7 million but can 
go considerably higher for the right investment.’ 
 
                                                 
116
 See also section 2.3 of chapter three for a more detailed discussion of the concept of ‘cultural circuit 
of capital’.  
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These practices economic and cultural practices have taken place against a 
politics of homeowership ideology that is arguably even more pronounced in 
the UK than in the US.   
 
4. The Politics of Homeownership 
 
A prerequisite of the financialization of housing and mortgages is the political 
(and affective) significance of homeownership and the housing market in the 
UK. As a recent post in an internet finance blog puts it:  
 
‘Home Ownership has been an emotive and important political issue in the UK. 
Not for nothing do we have the phrase “An Englishman’s home is his castle’”’ 
(mortgageguideuk, 2010). 
 
The notion that an Englishman’s home is his castle has not always translated 
into a shared political understanding as is the case now. It is only since the 
1979 elections that there is a broader cross-party consensus on promoting 
homeownership with Labour traditionally having prioritized the expansion of 
council estates (see chapter five of this thesis for more historical details; even 
Ed Miliband, for example, recently acknowledged the sale of council houses 
under Thatcher as essentially beneficial).  
 
In the neoliberalist age, homeownership and increasingly also house prices as 
a generator of income have become important political tools to foster consent 
and mobilise support at election times. The volume of securitized home loans 
is considerably higher than any other form of credit provided to households 
such as car loans, student loans, credit cards loans, overdraft facilities etc. 
According to Willmott (2011), therefore, the property market has become 
highly politically sensitive. Thus, when property values rise, people feel richer 
– this is then reflected in the growing popularity of governing politicians. On 
the contrary, when property values fall, such as in the current period that has 
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seen an ‘unwelcome return of widespread negative equity’117 (Parnell, 2009, 
p. 1), politicians are likely to be held responsible. (It is said, for example, that 
John Major, among other reasons, paid the electoral price for the housing 
market crash and recession of the early 1990s when he lost the 1997 election 
to the Blair administration.) 
 
Property, both in the form of homes as well as the form of financial assets is 
also likely to be an object of considerable emotional investment, making 
housing an important part of the so-called ‘libidinal political economy’ (see 
section 3.3 of chapter two and chapter one of this thesis for the 
psychoanlytical approach that is used in this thesis). This can become 
particularly apparent at times of rapid house price inflation where emotions 
such as excitement at the possibility of owning property, desperation to move, 
anxieties and fears about a location or being priced out of the market are 
more visible than at times of relative market stability (Christie  et al, 2005). 
Since emotional investment can drive or hinder social change (Glynos and 
Howarth, 2007), it is unsurprising that housing and politics are inextricably 
linked. However, this is arguably rather an issue of political construction in the 
neoliberalist universe rather than an intrinsic characteristic of homeownership 
as such (cf. Gurney, 2007).  
 
As already noted, the promotion of homeownership has always been a central 
element to Tory policy. When Thatcher came to power in 1979, 
homeownership rates experienced a strong push in line with the neo-liberal 
principles of a ‘property owning democracy’ and the notion of the market as 
the most efficient and fair provider of goods and services. The Conservatives 
introduced the Right-to-Buy initiatives, a policy that strongly featured in their 
election campaign, which gave council tenants the right to buy their property 
at a considerable discount, adding about 2.3 million homes to the private 
market in the UK by the end of 2004. This policy is estimated to have 
increased homeownership rates by 10 per cent until they peaked at 71 per 
cent in 2003 (Williams, 2007; see also chapter five of this thesis for more 
                                                 
117
 Negative equity means that the value of an asset such as a house is less than the 
outstanding balance on the loan secured against this asset. 
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details on Thachter’s privatisation initiatives including the Right-to-Buy). The 
ideological seeds of this policy, according to Houghton (2008, p. 43), had 
already been planted during the post-war years where the political focus 
increasingly became shifted away from housing as a ‘shared common good’ 
with an active stake by the state, towards the promotion of individual 
homeownership at any cost. The neo-liberalist revolution under the Thatcher 
administration, then, took this development to the extreme: 
 
‘The most powerful demonstration of housing policy as a means to deliver 
ideological ends was Margaret Thatcher’s ‘Right to Buy’. More than any other 
policy, it expressed the resurgent New Right’s belief in the liberating power of 
the market and the failure of state planning. In the first great privatization of the 
era, council tenants were able to purchase their homes from the local authority 
with significant discounts, freeing them from what Thatcher saw as the 
deadening grip of municipal landlordism and creating a new cadre of housing 
consumers’ (ibid). 
 
The Right-to-Buy initiative was the first among a number of extensive policies 
to increase homeownership and deregulate the housing market under 
Thatcher (and was continued by John Major). These political measures 
involved the deregulation of the mortgage market (as discussed in chapter 
five and six of this thesis), subsidies for homeowners and the transfer of 
council housing out of the jurisdictions of local authorities to the private market 
which resulted in a substantial weakening of ‘the role of the state as a housing 
provider and asserted homeownership as a necessary condition of economic 
independence and citizenship’ (ibid, p. 44). 
 
After a relatively lukewarm first reception (Williams, 2007) the housing policies 
inherited from the Conservatives were continued by New Labour as becomes 
evident by the quote taken from Gordon Brown in section one of this chapter. 
   
New Labour accepted, and in some cases furthered, the mortgage market 
deregulation commenced under the Conservatives. They invested in council 
housing only on the basis of local councils ceding control and easing planning 
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restrictions to encourage private house building. In line with neo-liberalist 
principles, the notion prevailed that sustainable and affordable homes can, 
and indeed should, be provided by the market (Houghton, 2008).   
 
What was fundamentally different under New Labour was that 
homeownership became centrepiece of a larger welfare trade-off to shift 
welfare provision on to the individual to compensate for the erosion of the 
traditional welfare state. This objective was protected by a ‘rentier friendly’ 
monetary policy of low inflation and interest rates118. 
  
By the 2000s it became a widespread assumption that the government was  
not only responsible for providing affordable accommodation for everyone (as 
the common perception in the 1970s where the government subsidised 
private homeownership for the middle classes and council tenancies for the 
lower classes) but to a) provide private homeownership for everyone and b) 
ensure rising house prices that would generate continuous flows of wealth 
from the property as investment to its owners (Watson, 2009a; see also 
chapter seven for the ideological fantasy preceding the financial crisis which 
included a widely shared belief in the continuous and uninterrupted rise in 
house prices).     
The conditions of possibility for these various intertwined developments from 
the late 1970s onwards are discussed in the next chapter.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter situates the logic of mortgage market financialization within the 
broader relational context of neoliberalist hegemony in the light of the financial 
crisis. The financial innovation that drove capital accumulation and growth in 
the pre-crisis conjuncture – securitization – is hereby discussed with reference 
to the material transformations in mortgage lending and funding, the cultural 
                                                 
118
 House prices were not part of the Consumer Price Index (CPI) at the time which is the 
government’s preferred measure of inflation. 
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redefinition of housing as an investment, the politics of homeownership and 
the emergence of new everyday leveraged investor subjectivities. Section one 
gives a brief overview over these various processes in the lead-up to the 
financial meltdown. Section two, then, investigates the mechanics and 
‘excesses’ of securitization in some detail. Hereby, the chapter points to the 
political origins of securitization and its continuing relevance for growth in the 
neoliberalist age. Securitization is not conceived of as an efficient and rational 
instrument for funding and risk transfer, but as an outcome of a process of 
discursive bricolage.  
 
Section three investigates the increased importance of housing as investment 
and the associated emergence of homeowners as speculators. The section 
discusses a number of the consequences stemming from these developments 
such as the explosion in the number of customised mortgage products (which 
often reveal a decline in lending standards) and the rise of associated 
practices that allow for the leveraging of homes for profit such as the 
emergence of the buy-to-let market and the rise of equity release schemes. 
The chapter also shows how notions associated with the ‘liquidation of homes’ 
are deeply embedded within civil society.   
 
Section three discusses homeownership as an important part of the rise of 
securitization and neoliberalist hegemony more generally. Here, 
homeownership ideology is conceived of as a neoliberalist strategy to foster 
electoral support rather than an intrinsic characteristic of people ‘to own 
property’. The section briefly looks at the politics of homeownership under 
Thatcher before concluding that these politics were, in principle, perpetuated 
or even deepened by New Labour.  
 
The next chapter investigates the political acts of institution that made these 
developments possible. Chapter five examines the rise of neoliberalist 
hegemony and the associated struggles that rang in the beginning of the 
marginalisation of the mutual model that had been dominant in the market 
until the late 1970 and the associated rise of the financialization of homes and 
mortgages.  
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‘We have progressively abandoned that freedom in economic affairs without 
which personal and political freedom has never existed in the past … It is 
necessary in the first instance that the parties in the market should be free to 
sell and buy at any price at which they can find a partner to the transaction, and 
that anybody should be free to sell and buy at any price at which they can find 
a partner to the transaction, and that anybody should be free to produce, sell 
and buy that may be produced or sold at all’ (Hayek, 1962, p. 10; p. 27). 
 
‘Suppose somebody is confronted with a deep anomic situation - what would 
be required would be the introduction of an order, the concrete content of which 
would become quite secondary’ (Laclau and Zac 1994, p. 15). 
 
 
Chapter Five: Neoliberalism on the Rise  
 
 
Introduction   
 
This chapter traces the current financial crisis back to how its preceding major 
organic crisis, the ‘stagflation-crisis’ of the 1970s, was discursively framed and 
politically resolved. The turbulences and dislocations of these years resulted 
in the rise of neo-liberalism as a particular reaction that became a dominant 
hegemonic force by successfully repressing alternative projects and hereby 
representing its contingent origins as necessary.  
 
Despite, or perhaps better, because of its internal contradictions and 
ambiguities, the neo-liberalist project exercised a strong ideological allure in 
its formative years – perhaps best summed up by Thatcher’s infamous phrase 
‘there is no alternative [to her monetarist policies]’.119 Neoliberalism, thus, 
initially delivered this fantasmatic ‘”enigma plus promise” that accounts for a 
common identification without (yet) a common identity’ (Glynos and Howarth, 
                                                 
119
 According to Laclau and particularly also Chantal Mouffe, this is, of course, an ideological 
statement par excellence as their theoretical edifice presupposes that there are ‘always 
alternatives’ (see Contu, 2002, p. 160).   
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2007, p. 130; see also section four in chapter one of this thesis). The 
neoliberalist project emerged as a populist political discourse,120 which linked 
together various heterogeneous demands in a chain of equivalence and 
produced an empty signifier with which a large number of different sectors of 
society, including especially the aspiring lower classes could identify 
(Interview 10). This empty signifier – ‘freedom’ – succeeded in promising,  as 
Laclau and Zac put it in the second opening quote, ‘an order’ (in the face of a 
perceived ‘non-order’)121 during the major dislocation of the 1970s, while the 
counter-discourses of the left failed to provide an ‘ideological grip’ (Glynos, 
2001) for mass support.  
 
Neoliberalism, on the contrary, successfully established a ‘common sense’. 
Hereby, think tanks were of vital importance by diffusing neoliberalist ideology 
and discrediting as well as marginalising opposition (Desai, 1994).122  
 
Andrew Gamble (2009a, p. 68) recalls the rise and subsequent ‘becoming 
common sense’ and subsequent sedimentation of neoliberalism as follows: 
 
‘It already seems a while since the glad, confident morning of neo-liberalism, 
and the emergence of neo-liberal as the new common sense. It had a hard 
fight against the ‘embedded liberalism’ of the Keynesian era, the combination 
of international institutions, such as fixed exchange rates and domestic 
policies, such as full employment, high welfare spending and management of 
demand which underpinned the great post–war boom of the 150s and 1960s. 
But once neo-liberalism got into its stride it became a formidable discourse, 
                                                 
120
 It is worth recapitulating here that the Laclauian understanding of populism is connected to 
the expansion of equivalential chains that divide the social into two camps  (see Laclau, 
2005). In contrast, Stuart Hall and Colleagues have used the term ‘authoritarian populism’ in a 
more ‘conventional’ sense here (see for example: Hall, 1988b). 
121
 See  also section 2.5 of chapter one of this thesis   
122
 As Desai (1994, p. 59) puts it in relation to Thatcherism:  
‘The think tanks and their theories were central to the Thatcherite project. They 
provided it with a critique of the welfare state consensus which seemed coherent and 
intellectually respectable … Their philosophy also contained a vision of future Britain 
which, despite its philistine simplicities, did inspire a critical, if small, group of key 
people. Moreover, the think tanks did crucial spade-work in preparing numerous well 
worked-out proposals for reform which the more committed among the Thatcherite 
ministers could implement.’  
See also section 2.3 of this chapter for the role of the Institute for Economic Affairs in the 
context of the building society price cartel.  
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and dominated debate, forcing most other discourses to the margins, 
particularly in the Anglosphere but also more broadly. Its success owed much 
to its reinvention of economic liberalism both as a form of political economy and 
as a political ideology. Like any discourse, it was never monolithic and 
developed many strands, but by the end of the century it was not just a 
hegemonic ideology but a largely unchallenged one.’  
 
It is argued here that neoliberalism was not simply superimposed on Western 
societies in a ‘top-down’ fashion (by the administrations of Thatcher and 
Ronald Reagan, for example, even though they played an important role)123 
but the result of a plethora of metonymical hegemonic operations which 
unified a multitude of different struggles to ‘become state’ in a Gramscian 
sense.  
 
A detailed analysis of the changes of the mortgage market in the UK in the 
late 1970s and early 1980s124 sheds light on the type of struggles that 
preceded the institutionalisation of neoliberalist hegemony. What is striking 
about the case of the UK mortgage market is its transformation from a heavily 
politically protected market dominated by a price cartel to one of the most 
deregulated markets in Britain in less than a decade.  
 
Hereby, mortgages became highly symptomatic of more general processes of 
neoliberalisation and financialization. The breakdown of the building society 
price cartel and the deregulation of mortgages also exemplify how subjects 
were successfully mobilised politically in the name of the neoliberalist signifier 
‘freedom’. The transformation of mortgage lending and funding therefore 
provides a particularly illuminating example of how the demand ‘freedom’ 
became taken up, by a variety of different sectors of the economy and society 
in the course of the ascendancy of neoliberalism).  
 
                                                 
123
 Political parties and ‘strategically placed agents’ are, of course, important for the diffusion 
and legimtimation of hegemony. Contrary to Gramsci (1971), however, those components are 
curiously neglected in Laclau’s body of work (see also Griggs and Howarth, 2009).   
124
 The 1980s and 1990s are examined in the next chapter 
 168
In line with the central aim of this thesis of providing a genealogy of the 
political in the context of the UK mortgage market, this chapter takes the 
organic crisis of the 1970s as a starting point of the political institutionalisation 
of the neoliberalist regime in accordance with Laclau and Mouffe’s (2001) 
claim that hegemony is always a contingent and particular reaction to a crisis 
(rather than being intrinsically or teleologically necessary or rational).        
 
This chapter is particularly concerned with providing an empirical grounding of 
Laclau’s concept of the political, or what Glynos and Howarth (2007) term the 
‘foregrounding of the political dimension’ (see section 2.4 and 2.5 and section 
three of chapter one of this thesis). The argument of the chapter proceeds in 
two stages: The first part investigates the rise of neoliberalist hegemony on a 
national scale by using central theoretical concepts of Laclau and PDT. The 
second part is concerned with the particular political struggles that eventually 
transformed the mortgage market in the name of neoliberalist ideology.   
 
The first part of section one investigates how the neoliberalist particular 
became elevated into the status of the universal as a reaction to the ‘disorder’ 
that was the organic crisis of the 1970s. The latter hereby culminated in a 
political moment of public contestation where the political dimension of the 
neoliberalist regime became foregrounded and visible. The crisis therefore 
marked a ‘moment of antagonism’ (Laclau, 1990, p. 35) in which the 
sedimented status quo of embedded liberalism, Keynesian economics, 
welfarism, as well as the political post-war consensus were publicly 
challenged and, ultimately, profoundly transformed. Also, this section explores 
how the signifier freedom became hegemonised by the neoliberalist particular 
resulting in a widespread acceptance of the importance of a free and 
unregulated economy as necessary precondition of a non-totalitarian society 
consisting of ‘free’ property owning individuals (see the opening quote by 
Hayek; section one of chapter three of this thesis and section 1.4 of this 
chapter for the concept of freedom in neoliberalism).   
 
The second section, then, looks at how the institutionalisation of neoliberalism 
created a terrain for political struggles that eventually resulted in the 
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fundamental transformation of mortgage lending and funding in accordance 
with neoliberalist ideology. It hereby ivestigates, at the meso-level of the 
mortgage market, how struggles precede and constitute the institutionalisation 
of a hegemonic regime and therefore render it contingent (see LCE, p. 106).  
 
The price cartel that had previously dominated the mortgage lending market 
and had also been a big player in the personal savings market became a 
nodal point of condensation for a range of unfulfilled demands that were 
articulated  alongside the demand of ‘freedom to compete’ which acted as a 
stand-in for all of them (see Laclau, 2005a and chapter one for the concept of 
empty signifier). The cartel’s abolishment, in conjunction with the regulatory 
liberalisation of the market, created the condition of possibility for the 
marginalisation of the mutual logic and the financialization of mortgages.    
 
 
1. The Demise of Embedded Liberalism and the Rise of 
Neoliberalism 
 
1.1 Capitalism Contained: Embedded Liberalism and the Post-War Years 
Like neo-liberalism, its preceding international regime, ‘embedded liberalism’, 
also was a political (and antagonistic) response to the particular conditions of 
its time. It surfaced as the outcome of political struggles responding to the 
dislocations of the Great Depression of the 1930s and World War II (Blyth, 
2002).125  
 
                                                 
125
 According to Andrew Gamble (2009b, p.452), the way in which the Great Depression was 
perceived and framed as crisis also marked an epistemological shift in terms of how the 
signifier ‘crisis’ was approached more generally, in the sense of what actually constitutes a 
crisis. From that point on, as Gamble argues, a crisis not only designated the breaking point 
of the boom within an economic cycle leading to a downturn, but also progressively included 
the structural (e.g. financial, organisational, political and ideological) obstacles to recovery. In 
that broader sense, crisis came to be discursively constructed as a predominantly political 
and social event. This was characterised by the struggles of different groups for the right to 
define the nature and resolution of the crisis at the end of which stands a more or less 
profound institutional transformation. He remarks that the crisis of 2007-, without its future 
consequences being clear, in all likelihood accounts for such a structural crisis (see also the 
introduction of this thesis).    
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The term embedded liberalism designates the dominant international financial 
system among Western countries in operation from World War II until the 
1970s. Its ideological underpinning postulated the ‘embedding’ of capitalist 
expansion within a multitude of social and political constraints (as noted on in 
section 1.2 of chapter two of this thesis, embedded liberalism therefore 
favored a ‘mixed system’ rather than a purely capitalistic one). Nevertheless 
this system or regime was still profoundly committed to capitalist values. It 
operated under the Breton Woods agreement of pegged exchange rates that 
used the US Dollar as a reserve currency. The regime was managed by a 
number of newly founded institutions such as the World Bank, the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD). (In the neo-liberalist age, these 
institutions subsequently became central to the global diffusion of neo-
liberalist ideology by imposing disciplinary measures on financially distressed 
countries such as Britain in 1976 ; see e.g. Peet, 2003 and below.)  
 
On the one hand, embedded liberalism was based on the belief in free trade 
and economic liberalism as a facilitator of peace. On the other hand, the 
aftermath of the Great Depression, the latter being chiefly attributed to 
monopolistic practices of large corporations and trusts, irresponsible banks 
and those dubbed by Keynes as ‘coupon clippers’ (the rich rentier class), saw 
the rising legitimation of government interventionism which became prevalent 
alongside, or even instead of, market mechanisms in line with the ‘demand 
side’ monetary and fiscal policies of Keynes. Interventionism was seen to be 
appropriate to ensure economic growth, the welfare state and full employment 
in order to stimulate consumption as well as cushioning the effects of the 
economic cycle.  
 
Within this overall framework, risk was seen to be best contained by 
syndicates (such as the building society price cartel) and nationalised 
industries. In a number of countries central industries such as coal, steel, and 
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automobiles were owned by the state126 and state-led corporate planning was 
widely in use (see: Harvey, 2005 p. 10-11; Blyth, 2002; Krasner, 1983). This 
system privileged a ‘productionist’ or ‘Fordist’ system of capital accumulation 
within which finance capital was placed under major constraints and remained 
a ‘facilitator of other firms’ economic growth’ rather than, as in a more 
financialized economy, ‘a growth industry in its own right (Engelen, 2003, 
p.1367; see also chapter three of this thesis). For example, one legislatory 
response to the 1929 stock market crash was the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 
which separated investment and commercial banking activities in an attempt 
to curb the speculative activity of commercial banks in the stock market. (A 
renewed separation of retail and wholesale banking is often postulated in the 
wake of the current financial crisis as Glass Steagall was repealed in 1999; 
see e.g. McSweeney, (2009).127 However, no country has implemented 
anything like this so far – in Britain, the Vickers Report stopped short of 
recommending a Glass-Steagall-type legislation, opting instead for the less 
drastic future ‘ring-fencing’ of retail deposits from investment banking; see 
also chapter seven of this thesis)   
 
The Fordist system of accumulation delivered a period of unprecedented 
economic growth and stability via wage compromise which was based on 
productivity gains of the Fordist assembly line under Taylorist principles of 
organisation128 (Aglietta, 2001; Gramsci, 1971, p. 277-316; see also chapter 
three of this thesis for the concepts of Fordism and productionism). Politically, 
the system rested on a temporary hegemonic consensus of various conflicting 
ideological positions. In Britain, the Right suppressed their most extreme 
reactionary and market-liberalist fractions and the Left agreed to cooperate 
within the re-negotiated framework of Western capitalism (see Hall, 1988a 
p.36). In the most developed capitalist countries of the West, embedded 
liberalism delivered high economic growth coupled with rising living standards, 
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 Prior to 1979, the UK had one of the largest publically owned industrial sectors in Europe 
(Cook, 1998). 
127
 Before Glass Steagall was repealed, it had been heavily lobbied against (and was also 
circumvented) by the banking industry, with the Clinton Administration of the 1990s 
increasingly turning a blind eye to infringements (see MacDonald, 2009). 
128
 In Fordism workers are paid relatively high wages in order to enable them to afford its 
mass produced goods. 
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low inflation and low unemployment during the boom years of 1950s and 
1960s. However, it came increasingly under strain during the late 1960s and 
1970s which eventually led to a major ‘organic crisis’ that paved the way for 
the rise of the neo-liberalist revolution.  
 
The ensuing brief analysis in section 1.2 discusses the dislocations of 
postwar-embedded liberalism129 that culminated in the stagflation crisis of the 
1970s. In following Glyn (2006) and others, it predominantly emphasises the 
latter’s economic and political aspects at the expenses of the cultural 
dimension due to space constraints.130 
 
1.2 ‘Stagflation’: The Dislocations of Embedded Liberalism 
The high employment brought about by the boom years of the 1950s and 
1960s strengthened union membership and the bargaining power of unions. 
Collective bargaining had become well-protected by labour laws in Europe 
and unions were now in the position to increasingly challenge capitalist 
demands. These developments resulted in growing wages and a squeeze on 
profitability as well as rising industrial conflict.131  
 
Additionally, increased global demand in raw materials, food and energy, 
particularly the sharp rise in the price for oil, contributed to growing inflationary 
pressures while productivity growth started to slow down from the mid-1970s 
onwards as the Fordist assembly line exhausted its productivity gains. 
Differences in inflation rates between countries together with different impacts 
of the rise in commodity prices and diverging growth in productivity led to 
payment imbalances which increasingly undermined the pegged exchange 
                                                 
129
 See also Laclau and Mouffe’s analysis of the so-called new social movements who situate 
their emergence within the dislocations created by the embedded liberalism of the 1950s and 
1960s.   
130
 The factors listed here are not exhaustive, of course, as, according to the view followed 
here, crises (as well as social formations more generally) are always overdetermined and 
relational and not the result of clearly isolatable causal mechanisms; see the theoretical 
discussions in chapter one and two of this thesis).  
131
 Strikes, as a particular manifestation of the strengthened positions of unions, became 
especially common in France, Italy and the UK. In the UK, the average number of annual 
working days lost was 7 million during the late 1970s and early 1980s. That compares to 0.5 
million in the early 21st century (workinglives.org, 2010). However, working days lost due to 
strike have been generally on the rise since 2007.  
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rate system of the Bretton Woods agreement (see Glyn, 2006). Further, 
increased international competition also threatened pegged exchange rates. 
Finance capital became more powerful and mobile with the rise of institutional 
funds and other financial innovations. Where speculation was previously 
something that was carried out largely by individuals, these funds started to 
pool savings and investments on a far larger scale (Authers, 2010). Hereby, 
increased capital mobility undermined more and more the pegged exchange 
rate system which was eventually brought down by a series of speculative 
attacks carried out during the early 1970s (Obstfeld and Rogoff 1995).  
 
The United States pulled out of the Bretton Woods Accord under Nixon in 
1971 and Britain and other industrial nations soon followed. This resulted in 
chaotically floating exchange rates and monetary disorder. The steep rise of 
oil prices determined by the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC), the primary supplier of oil for the global market, in addition to its 
politically motivated embargo of oil against certain countries, suppressed 
economic growth and increased inflation. Furthermore, the American 
government’s involvement in the Vietnam War and social uprisings in France 
and Italy during the late 1960s - the latter triggered by the decline of major 
industries under Fordist principles - threatened the social stability of the 
hegemonic post-war consensus and further contributed to inflationary 
pressures (Aglietta, 2008). 
 
Britain, in line with the global conditions of the times, underwent a period of 
severe ‘stagflation’ during the 1970s, a situation within which both 
unemployment and inflation were very high. This situation was often used by 
free market advocates to directly discredit Keynesian economics that seemed 
unable to account for the simultaneous rise of inflation and unemployment. 
Inflation averaged 13% a year during the 1970s and peaked at 25% in 1975 
(Bank of England, accessed 2010). Unemployment increased in the mid- 
1970s, before levelling off at around 1.5 (5 per cent) in the late 1970s. In the 
recession of the 1980s, it peaked at over 3 million (just under 12%) before 
eventually declining (Leaker, 2009). The low productivity growth in Britain 
commencing in the late 1960s coupled with frequent labour unrest was often 
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seen as something endemic to Britain and came to be known under the name 
of ‘British disease’. Rolls Royce, the pinnacle of British manufacturing, went 
bankrupt in 1971 and was nationalised by the then Labour government. 
Britain experienced a secondary banking crisis at the beginning of the 1970s 
after a brief period of relaxed credit conditions. In 1976, a sustained run on 
Sterling, a loss of confidence in the British economy by the international 
markets and external pressure by the IMF and the United States led the 
British government to seek an emergency loan from the IMF in 1976 and 
harsh conditions were placed on Britain for obtaining the loan (Harmon, 
1997). While the bailout by the IMF was against the domestic policies and 
ideology of the then Labour government of Callaghan, Gamble (1988) argues 
that much of the replacement of Keynesian economics by monetarist 
doctrines was actually carried out by the Labour government between 1974 
and 1976 in responding to the crisis and the conditions placed upon Britain by 
the IMF.  
 
By the end of the 1970s, which culminated in the infamous ‘winter of 
discontent’, Britain had entered a period of not only economic but organic 
crisis (in a Gramscian sense) where the ruling political economic and cultural 
alliances disintegrated and the search for new alliances began (see e.g. Hall, 
1988b; Simon, 1982).132 The winter of discontent marked a tipping point – a 
political moment of public contestation (see section 1.5 of chapter one of this 
thesis) - which eventually resulted in the ‘re-composition of the dislocated 
structure’ around new signs and nodal points (see Laclau, 1990, p. 40). The 
winter of discontent refers to the events of January/February 1979 when the 
Labour government’s agreement with unions to control pay increases 
collapsed into a series of harsh industrial disputes involving many lower paid 
service sector workers. These events were cunningly exploited by the right-
wing discourse in the press which framed the strikes as a complete state of 
anarchy stemming from the economic mismanagement of the Labour 
government (Thomas, 2004). The horrific dimension of the emerging fantasy 
that subsequently propelled the neoliberalist revolution is aptly captured in a 
                                                 
132
 A situation where subjects are literally compelled to engage in acts of identification (LCE, 
p. 129; see also section 1.4 of this thesis for Laclau’s concept of subjectivity).   
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book of one of Thatcher’s economic advisers, Patrick Minford, who sums up 
the winter of discontents as the time when ‘…graves went undug and rubbish 
piled up in the streets’ (Minford 1998, p. 85).  
 
1.3 Antagonism and Chains of Equivalence: Neoliberalism on the Rise 
As pointed out earlier, the crisis of the 1970s was successfully attributed to 
the inadequacy of Keynesian demand-side economics to account for a period 
of stalled growth coupled with very high inflation and the perceived economic 
and political ineptitude of the Labour government. Together with a lack of 
political support for alternatives of the left (see Hall, 1988b; Gamble, 1985; 
1988; 2009a), neoliberalism under Thatcher (and Reagan) drew support from 
large sectors of society resulting in the elevation of the neoliberalist particular 
into the status of the universal: 
 
‘Volcker133 and Thatcher, as Harvey (2005, p. 2) comments, ‘both plucked 
from the shadows of relative obscurity a particular doctrine that went under 
the name of “neoliberalism” and transformed it into the central guiding 
principle of economic thought and management‘. 
 
An important factor for the success of neoliberalist discourse during its 
formative years was its articulation alongside neo-conservative values both in 
Britain and the US.134 As Gamble (1985) observes, Thatcher fused 
neoliberalism with more traditional demands of the Conservative party such 
as a strengthening of family values, law and order, national defence etc.  
 
In the terminology of Laclau, such an operation can be regarded as the 
expansion of a chain of equivalence (or populism) which aims at dividing the 
social space into two opposing camps. As discussed in chapter one of this 
thesis, the combination of the underlying demands of this chain are 
heterogeneous and contingent. (For example, there is no apriori ‘necessity’ to 
articulate the signifier of ‘law and order’ alongside that of ‘free markets’; in the 
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 Reagan re-appointed the [monestarist] Paul Volcker as Chairman of the Federal Reserve 
Bank in 1983. 
134
 For neo-conservativism in the neoliberalist context see also: Steger and Roy (2010, p. 22) 
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case of the transformation of the building society price cartel (see below), 
even traditional demands from the left were articulated alongside neoliberalist 
demands)Hence, these discourses are solely united by the common 
opposition to an external enemy. Indeed, it has been frequently observed that 
particularly Thatcher’s first term was characterised mostly by an 
antagonistic135 and ideological reaction to the alleged failures of embedded 
liberalism. Bringing down inflation at any cost (through monetarist rather than 
fiscal measures, such as the control of the money supply and the reduction of 
the national deficit) aside, Thatcher’s overall political, economic and social 
programme lacked internal unity and coherence and was thus, to a large 
extent, defined and constructed by its ‘obstacles’ (Hall, 1988b; Gamble, 1985; 
1988; Minford, 1998, chapters three and four; for the constitutiveness of such 
obstacles that prevent the presence of a full and reconciled identity but are 
nevertheless constitutive of it see particularly section 1.4 and four of chapter 
one of this thesis). As Torfing (1999, p. 35) puts it:  
 
‘The national mood was certainly an important precondition for Thatcher’s entry 
onto the political stage; nevertheless the Thatcher government initially lacked a 
coherent programme of economic reform to show that it could tackle the 
economy more successfully than the former Labour administration. Thus, 
Thatcher’s electoral victory was first and foremost a result of the fact that she 
had won the ideological battle for the hearts and minds of the British people…’ 
 
The emergence and rise of Thatcherism and neoliberalist hegemony is 
therefore a particularly illuminating example for how ‘the institution of a 
particular regime … is always defined in opposition to a contested regime … 
and this oppositional contrast colours the regimes practices’ (LCE, p. 106).        
 
1.4 Freedom: What’s in a Name? 
The empty signifier which partially unified (and still unifies) the neoliberalist 
regime via pointing to a constitutive outside (see section 2.5 of chapter one of 
                                                 
135
 This antagonistic response points to the political (and thus contingent) character at the 
heart of the rise of neoliberalism: ‘’it is only in … antagonistic relation to other projects that the 
contingency of particular acts of institution is shown, and it is this contingency that gives them 
their political character’ (Laclau and Zac, 1994, p. 4).   
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this thesis) can be called ‘freedom’. The noun ‘freedom’ or the adjective ‘free’ 
appear inflationary in some of the major works of neoliberalist thinkers (see 
e.g. Hayek 1962; Friedman 1962; for an overview of the early main strands of 
neoliberalist thought and their relation to freedom see Foucault, 2010).  
Indeed, Michel Foucault suggests that neoliberalism should be analysed and 
problematised as a ‘technology of freedom’ (see Gertenbach, 2010, p. 14).  
 
In the most well-known work of the most important organic intellectual of 
neoliberalism, Friedrich von Hayek’s The Road to Serfdom 1962, ‘freedom’ 
functions purely as an antidote to its antagonised negative inversal which is 
‘serfdom’.  Freedom hereby becomes the name for the ‘universal cure’ against 
any form of organisation or regime that is conceived to be ‘unfree’ and 
oppressive.  
 
These forms stretch from the horrors of Fascism and Stalinism as well as the 
perceived omnipresent ‘socialist threat’ to any form of collectivist organisation 
of the economy, more than minimalist interventionism on the part of the 
state136 and the exercise of democratic control of the population. Freedom, as 
Hayek points out, becomes the ‘ultimate value and not democracy’ (ibid, 
chapter four). As the first of the two opening quotations of this chapter (which 
is taken from Hayek’s book) illustrates, this type of freedom, as he 
understands it, presupposes, ‘in the first instance’, economic freedom.  
Unrestricted market exchange, thus, becomes the necessary ontological 
precondition of the free and autonomous individuals that all of humanity 
should aspire to:  
 
‘The gradual transformation of a rigidly organised hierarchic system into one 
where men gained the opportunity of knowing and choosing between different  
forms of life, is closely associated with the growth of [free] commerce’ (ibid p. 
11).        
 
                                                 
136
 While Hayek does not advocate a return to the laissez faire capitalism of the 19th century, 
the role of the state should be reduced to the enforcement of a free economy. 
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Freedom, however, also became a highly contested signifier in the context of 
the rise of neoliberalism. Its emptiness is exposed by the competing 
hegemonic projects and associated ‘market logics’ that aim to fill it with 
meaning: ‘Freedom’, as Patrick Minford (1998, p. 2) asserts, ‘is a “pro” word 
with good connotations. So it has been appropriated to advocate its opposite: 
The regulation of people’s lives for their own good.’ Contrarily, Karl Polanyi in 
The Great Transformation coming from a perspective of the left, lamented the 
hegemonisation of freedom by the neoliberalist particular, often referring 
directly to Hayek. According to Polanyi (who wrote the book as early as 1944), 
it had become increasingly difficult to articulate an alternative version to the 
notion freedom as conceived of in neoliberalism which ‘degenerates into a 
mere advocacy of free enterprise’:  
 
‘Planning and control are being attacked as a denial of freedom. Free 
enterprise and private ownership are declared to be essentials of freedom. No 
society built on other foundations is said to deserve to be called free. The 
freedom that regulation creates is denounced as unfreedom; the justice, liberty 
and welfare it offers are decried as a camouflage of slavery’ (cited in Harvey, 
2005, p. 37; this is insightful statement is also the opening quote of the thesis).  
  
The following analysis illustrates how this particular version of freedom 
created a terrain for political struggles in the UK mortgage market of the late 
1970s to early 1980s. At the end of this period neoliberalism emerged 
victorious leading to the deregulation of the market and the breakdown of the 
building society price cartel, paving the way, in turn, for the financialization of 
mortgages.    
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2. Transforming the Mortgage Market: Struggles, Deregulation and 
Neoliberalisation in the British Context 
 
2.1 Building Societies: A Brief History  
Until the 1980s, the mortgage market was a heavily regulated ‘sheltered 
circuit’ (Revell, 1979) dominated by building societies which are governed by 
separate legislation and, at the time, were also separately regulated.  
 
Building Societies sprang from the Friendly Society Movement of the late 17th 
century which spread rapidly after 1750.  Friendly societies were mutual 
associations that offered a form of protection for the working classes in the 
increasingly industrialised environment of the time. These associations pooled 
the savings of its members to provide for the event of sickness, infirmary, or 
for immediate necessities arising on the death of a member or his [sic] wife. 
At the end of the 18th century it was estimated that there were about 7.000 of 
these societies which acquitted a certain form of legal protection and 
encouragement by the Friendly Societies Act of 1793. Other mutual 
institutions with similar purposes were also formed. The idea of forming 
building societies or clubs for the provision of houses followed from these 
efforts at mutual protection and improvement.137 The first known building 
society was established in (or about) 1775 in Birmingham. It was called the 
Ketley’s Building Society because its meetings were at the Golden Cross Inn 
of which Richard Ketley was Landlord (see Ashworth, 1980, p. 1-2).  
 
Originally, building societies were ‘terminating societies’ which were wound up 
after the last home was built. The fundamental concept behind a building 
society was that each member would contribute a regular subscription to a 
fund, which would then be used to finance the purchase or building of a house 
to be allocated to a specific member. All members would continue to pay their 
subscription until houses had been acquired for them all, at which point the 
society would terminate (Drake, 1989). Terminating societies were organised 
as fundamentally democratic institutions, all its members were on equal 
footing and each member had one vote. The funds which building societies 
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 Credit unions also have their roots in this movement (Dayson, 2002).  
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could lend to its members were taken from a pool of the same funds that 
those members had invested in (Talbot, 2009).  
 
It was from this basis as terminating societies that permanent societies would 
later evolve. In order to accelerate the provision of housing, societies started 
to offer interest payments to people who were pledging their savings with 
them and simultaneously charged interest from their borrowers in order to 
cover the cost of funds. The movement rapidly spread across Britain but their 
operations remained predominantly local (a feature that more or less persists 
until today).  
 
The first society with a permanent constitution was established in 1845. The 
1874 Act established a recognisable and prudential regime, restricting 
sources of funding and monitoring borrowing. Building societies now became 
financial intermediaries between borrower members and investing members. 
It remained, however, an organisational model that was underpinned by 
member relations and based on members’ funds and loans. As Talbot (2007, 
p. 7) points out, at a fundamental level this legal approach did not change until 
the Societies Act 1986. At the level of governance, a lot was determined by 
the size, membership and wealth of individual societies.  
 
In 1890, there were 2795 building societies operating in the UK. In 1895 the 
number of building societies had reached its peak at 3642, and after this time 
the number decreased continually. In 1935 there were fewer than 1000 
societies in existence and by then end of 1987 their number had decreased to 
187 (Drake, 1989). (Today, the number of building societies has further 
shrunk to a mere 47 at the time of writing). 
 
Building societies predominantly provided housing for the wealthier strata of 
the working class and owner occupation became an important status symbol 
within the latter. One can therefore say that the origins of the ‘homeownership 
ideology’ in Britain lay indeed with the mutual movement (Saunders, 1990). 
However, building societies were different to banks in that they were guided 
by the Victorian virtues of thrift and self-help in order to promote and facilitate 
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homeownership, as opposed to banks who sought to make profits from 
lending (see Wainwright, 2009, p. 115). Building societies are therefore not 
traditionally ‘capitalist’ institutions in the sense of being institutions geared 
towards the maximisation of surplus value (cf. Gibson-Graham, 1995).  To 
what extent ‘mutual values’, if they indeed have ever existed in a ‘pure 
form’,138 have, however, progressively been eroded in an increasingly 
competitive and financialized market is, of course, debatable; see particularly 
chapter six of this thesis in this context).   
 
Until World War I, housing was still mostly a privilege of the rich. However, 
building societies were a decisive factor in the expansion of homeownership 
and the institutionalisation of the mortgage market.  
 
2.2 The Evolution of the UK Mortgage Market and the Building Society Price 
Cartel 
Before World War I, less than ten per cent of the population were estimated to 
be owner occupiers. Up until the 19th century the overwhelming majority of 
mortgage contracts were mostly arranged locally by solicitors between 
landowners and rich landlords (Merret, 1979). After World War II, 
homeownership as well as council houses rose drastically and by the 1960s 
44 per cent of households were owner occupiers and 25 per cent were council 
tenants. These two trends reflected the two major, and often politically 
conflictual, ideological positions towards housing provision by the two major 
British parties. Labour traditionally favoured the extension of council housing 
and the Conservatives promoted homeownership in line with a commitment 
towards individual property ownership. These contrary ideological positions on 
housing were often marginalised by the opposed administrations during the 
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 Interestingly, an erosion of ‘traditional’ mutual values is already observable within the 
establishment of permanent societies, as these facilitated the emergence of a large 
membership base. This resulted in the development of managerial control at the expenses of 
member control. By the 1930s, virtually all societies were management controlled (see Talbot, 
2009, p. 7 ff). It makes sense, therefore, to conceive of mutual values antagonistically in this 
context, i.e. in the sense of what they are not in a given historical period of time (see chapter 
one of this thesis). This is because extensive studies of the building society sector show that 
there is no real agreement as to what these values ‘really are’ on the side of their members 
and directors (see e.g. Dayson, 2002). This insight has been confirmed by my own interviews 
(particularly Interview four and five). As the director of one society put it: ‘People know that 
building societies are different but they don’t really know what it is…’ (Interview four). 
 182
post-war years depending whether Labour or Conservatives were in power. In 
sum, this period witnessed a relative expansion of council tenancies as 
opposed to private homeownership. During the later post-war years, however, 
the position of Labour against mass homeownership was slowly eroded to the 
point that in the 1980s, after Thatcher’s victory in the general elections, for the 
first time, Labour agreed on a policy aimed at the reduction of council tenants 
(ibid). 
 
The mortgage market itself was up until the 1980s almost synonymous with 
building societies. Societies were the main source of mortgage lending as 
they were the only specialist mortgage providers. They were also a dominant 
player in the savings market in the United Kingdom. 
 
At that time the societies operated under the 1962 Building Societies Act 
which restricted their activities to mostly mortgage lending and retail saving. 
The big societies were effectively able to run a cartel, exempted from 
investigation under the Restrictive Practices Act. This cartel became an 
important tool of macro-economic policy in the inflationary environment of the 
1970s. As homeownership grew, societies became also increasingly politically 
important as governments tended to profit from low interest rates on 
mortgages (which were ‘recommended’ by the cartel (see below)). Low 
interest rates were frequently seen to be a powerful instrument to gain votes 
at election times. It has been reported that on a number of occasions, the 
building society cartel was given a donation by a party (both Labour and 
Tories) in order to keep the interest rate below the politically sensitive number 
of ten per cent (Boléat and Coles, 1987). 
 
The cartel, as the favoured model of mortgage provision of the time, benefited 
from a sympathetic tax regime and legal restrictions on the interest bearing 
liabilities of banks and finance houses under the Supplementary Special 
Deposit Scheme, also known as the ‘corset’. The latter was introduced in 
1973 to control bank lending after a period of accelerating credit growth in the 
private sector (and early free market experiment under the conservative 
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government of the early 1970s). The corset required banks and finance 
houses to place special deposits with the Bank of England if their growth in 
interest bearing liabilities exceeded certain limits. This made the banks 
reluctant to expand as they were effectively penalised for doing so.  
 
The only other noteworthy providers of mortgage finance were thus insurance 
companies and local authorities. Banks only provided a limited amount of 
finance often through bridging loans when households temporarily needed to 
fund two homes. Insurance companies gradually withdrew from the market as 
they favoured other portfolio options and public expenditure constraints 
introduced during the 1970s effectively terminated local authority lending. The 
dominance of the building societies in the mortgage market, however, was not 
due to their mutual values per se (see footnote 130 above), but reflected 
issues of macro-economic policy and their particular characteristic relation to 
other potential lenders such as banks. The societies were seen to be the most 
stable, and hence the best, way to engage in mortgage lending in line with the 
cautious approach towards risk of the time (Boléat and Coles, 1987). 
 
The two other favourable tax schemes were a tax deduction on savings 
accounts, an arrangement with the Inland Revenue dating from the 1890s, 
and a corporation tax which all mutuals paid at a lower rate than commercial 
organisations. These measures were justified on the grounds that the latter 
could set shareholder dividends against tax (Stephens, 2007). Furthermore, 
the shares139 and deposits of building societies were excluded from the 
government’s control of the money supply, and their mortgage lending from 
credit control (Boddy, 1980, p. 85). Within the climate of the volatile interest 
rates of the 1970s, the cartel was seen by the government as a way to sell its 
anti-inflationary fiscal (as opposed to monetarist) policies particularly as 
mortgage interest payments at the time contributed to the Retail Price Index 
(Stephens, 2007).  
 
                                                 
139
 Shares are here to be understood literally in the sense of owning a part of the organisation 
in the form of certain types of savings accounts. Before the rise of what know is known as 
‘shareholder value’, some investors (savers) in building societies were often referred to as 
‘shareholders’ (see e.g.  Boléat, 1986).  
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This privileged political, economic and cultural position allowed for the 
extraordinary dominance of building societies in the mortgage lending market. 
During 1973-79 the building societies’ annual share of mortgage lending was 
on average 83 per cent and peaked at a near monopoly status of 96 per cent 
in 1977 and 1978. It only fell below 70 per cent once during that time 
(Stephens, 1993). The societies formed a government sanctioned interest rate 
cartel which allowed the council of the Building Society Association (BSA) - its 
trade body - to recommend both the interest for borrowing (mortgages) and 
lending (shares and deposits). This practice was developed in the 1930s as a 
reaction to the imminent financial collapse of some societies due to extremely 
intensified competition and low demand in the wake of the economic climate 
of the Great Depression. The council of the association began to recommend 
interest rates in 1939 which remained relatively stable during the 1950s and 
1960s. The economic climate of volatile general interest rates of the 1970s 
saw frequent changes of interest rates of mortgages recommended by the 
council. Some of them were not followed by larger societies. This volatile 
climate resulted in a ‘Memorandum of Agreement’ between the building 
societies and the government in 1973, enforced by the Joint Advisory 
Committee (JAC). This memorandum tied the cartel more closely to the 
supervision of the government and included a commitment by the twenty 
largest societies to support recommendations made by the council. Thus, the 
power of the recommended rate system grew even further during the 1970s 
as the cartel was actively encouraged by government policy during this time, 
given a preoccupation of the government of keeping mortgage rates down (for 
the reasons mentioned above) (Boléat, 1986).  
 
The cartel operated in two different ways on interest rates: It allowed the BSA 
to recommend the general level of interest rates (mortgages and shares) 
compared to the rates offered by competing institutions, but also the margins 
between lending and borrowing rates. This means that the BSA council 
estimated the appropriate level of mortgage lending against which it set the 
share rate to attract the necessary investors by adding the cost for 
management, taxation, and reserves. Interest rates were usually kept as low 
as possible and operated below a ‘market clearing rate’ at which supply 
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equals demand and the market for loans is ‘cleared’. Societies generally used 
variable mortgage rates to balance fluctuations in general interest rates 
(Boddy, 1980).  
 
At the end of the 1970s, the Building society cartel effectively operated as an 
oligopoly within which more than 50 per cent of the total assets were 
concentrated in the hands of the 5 largest societies: the Halifax, Abbey 
National, Nationwide, Leeds Permanent and the Woolwich. The sector had 
undergone considerable consolidation and over the past decade mainly in the 
form of merger the number of societies had declined from 504 in 1969 to 326 
building societies in 1978, 228 of which were members of the BSA (Gough 
and Taylor, 1978).  
 
As already indicated, the traditional view on the cartel was that a cartel 
protects a stable lending and savings environment in attempting to minimise 
the impact of general interest rates on lending and saving. Furthermore, the 
cartel was deemed to be superior to the mechanisms of the market to 
reconcile the interests of borrowers and lender, and also allowed a certain 
convenience and predictability in not having to adjust mortgage rates on a 
frequent basis. However, the cartel suffered from its own dislocations which 
rendered it particularly vulnerable to the neoliberalist counter-revolution.  
 
The societies did not generally compete against each other on price but on 
advertising and branch networks. The lack of competition among the societies 
and with other lenders had allowed the societies to be particularly selective in 
granting loans and allocating funds below the market clearing rate. These 
were deemed to be beneficial for lower income households as it kept the 
interest of mortgage rates as low as possible. It also enabled societies to set 
conditions on loans and carefully select borrowers and property (Boddy, 
1980). As a result, however, savings rates were at uncompetitive levels and 
reduced the inflow of savings. Thus, the societies were running down their 
liquidity provisions or rationed their mortgages which could lead to queues, 
sometimes for several months. This was known by the expression of 
‘mortgage feast and famine’ (Buckle and Thompson, 1992). It has been 
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pointed out that mortgage demand had exceeded supply by the early 1950s 
and there had probably been a shortage of mortgages for most of the 1970s 
following the brief house price surge of the 1972-73 (The Times, 1983a). 
 
The considerable amount of resistance that manifested itself against the 
building society price cartel was supported by the ‘upwardly mobile’ social 
strata which pushed for a boost in housing supply and the provision of 
consumer credit. Furthermore, banks and other institutions increasingly 
lobbied for their entry into the mortgage market and developments in 
international financial markets exerted more and more pressure on the 
protected circuit of mortgage lending in the UK. Additionally, council tenants 
pushed for the sale of their council homes. These struggles will be looked at 
in more detail in the next section. It will be shown how the transformation of 
the UK mortgage market was a crucial element of the neoliberal counter-
revolution. 
 
2.3 In the Name of Freedom: Contesting the Cartel 
As indicated in the last sub-section, the cartelised structure of mortgage 
lending in the UK created its own dislocations. By the 1970s virtually all 
discussion of mortgage lending and its institutions were a formulated as a 
critique of the cartel (Ball, 1990).140 Hereby, traditional leftist demands to more 
equality, transparency, social justice, as well as commercial pressure from 
domestic and foreign banks eager to enter the profitable home loans market 
and popular support for an increase in homeownership volumes, all gradually 
‘articulated their grievances publicly as demands’ (LCE, 122). It becomes 
apparent in this context, how the transformation of the sedimented status quo 
proceeds through ‘radical political demands’ that ‘publicly contest the norms of 
                                                 
140
 Building Societies have always been contested on various grounds. For example, in his 
predecessor to ‘1984’, ‘Coming Up For Air’ (2000 [1939]), George Orwell, as early as 1939, 
depicts building societies as quasi-totalitarian institutions, a ‘swindle’, that lures people into 
buying something they do not need. This resonates with the broader assertion of some 
Marxist writers that the extension of homeownership in the 20th century was deliberately 
fostered by the capitalist class to align the interest of the working class with the interests of 
the bourgeoisie (e.g. Cockburn, 1977). 
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a particular practice or system of practises in the name of a principle or ideal’ 
(LCE, p. 115 ff; see also section 1.5 of chapter one of this thesis).141  
 
The breakdown of the cartel and the deregulation of the mortgage market, of 
course, resonated perfectly with Thatcher’s neo-liberalist agenda of ‘the 
restoration of competition and personal responsibility for effort and reward, the 
image of the overtaxed individual, enervated by welfare coddling, his initiative 
sapped by handouts by the state’ (Hall, 1979, p. 17). 
 
From a more general vantage point, the cartel came increasingly under 
pressure during the late 1970s and early 1980s after the emergence of a 
number of corporate scandals in relation to fraud and the corruption of 
managers in some of the smaller societies. Barnes (1984), a left-wing critique, 
describes the existence of mutual values itself as a ‘myth’. He points 
discriminatory practices against women, blacks, the elderly, homosexuals and 
certain geographical areas (predominantly the inner cities). Additionally, 
Barnes showes that the practices of mortgage feast and famine systematically 
disadvantage the poor in terms of access to mortgage finance. Coupled with a 
discretionary management style and a self-perpetuating board of directors, he 
concludes, the cartel leads to nothing other than ‘posh offices and poor 
housing’ (p. 6). As the Times (1983b) reports, the building societies finally 
showed their ‘true colours’ in the 1970s by only wanting to lend for the 
purchase of “respectable homes” in “respectable locations”’. 
 
Market participants and free market advocates had long complained about the 
favourable tax regime for building societies and its monopolistic practices in 
the 1970s and independent investigations had, on occasion, challenged the 
practices of the cartel before but without recommending its abolition. The 
National Board for Prices and Incomes investigated the setting of interest 
rates by the cartel in as early as 1966. It reasoned that the cartel ‘tends to 
lead to the determination of margins between the investment and mortgage 
                                                 
141
 ‘Freedom to compete’ also develops into a hegemonic demand according to LCE (p. 16) 
as it successfully generalises its relevance to other sectors and institutions (see e.g. chapter 
six of this thesis).  
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rates that are sufficient to allow the least efficient societies to survive and, at 
the same time, to give generous margins to the more efficient societies’ 
(National Board for Prices and Incomes, 1966). 
 
The Right thus saw the building societies as (Labour) government controlled 
‘self-perpetuating oligarchies without direct control from lenders or borrowers’ 
(Seldon, 1979, p. 8). Drawing inspiration and legitimacy from the neoliberalist 
intellectuals such as Friedrich von Hayek, Milton Friedman, Keith Joseph, and 
other free market advocates, it was argued that market mechanisms and 
competition would per se provide for a more efficient and fairer way of 
allocating mortgages and, on these grounds, free markets are, by their very 
nature, generally better equipped to produce superior forms of market 
organisation (see also the first introductory quote by Hayek and the 
discussion in section 1.3 of this chapter). As Talbot (2009, p. 14 ff) points out, 
inspired by the general sentiment of neoliberalism, scholars gradually 
produced a judicial-economic theoretical framework that would justify a ‘free 
market remedy’ against everything that appeared to be controlled by 
management (as opposed to shareholders) such as building societies. 
 
Arthur Seldon (1979), himself a major intellectual of the Thatcherite era and 
co-founder of the right-wing think tank ‘Institute for Economic Affairs’, stressed 
the general superiority of the private enterprise from schools to health 
provision as opposed to the false ideology of non-for profit organisations 
(which was the general status of building societies at the time). According to 
Seldon, building societies should be put, not least for their own sake, under 
more direct ‘market control’. The supply of mortgages would then 
automatically be stabilized by market forces’ (ibid p. 9). His recommendations 
for a reform of the mutual sector are worth quoting in full (not least because 
they identify a change of rhetoric and language as a key strategy for reform):  
 
  ‘1.   replace the image of ‘social service’ or a ‘movement’ by that of efficiency; 
2. replace the emphasis on “non-profit making” by readiness to meet   
competition; 
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3.  emphasise personal service-and in particular abandon the 25 per cent rule 
or other limits on mortgages; 
4.  arouse the interest of millions of tenants in house ownership; 
5.  root out all forms of high-handedness 
6.  employ more of their reserves to finance homes; 
7.  campaign for more freedom of manoeuvre under the law; 
8.  exchange trustee status for more effective means of attracting savings’ 
(Seldon, 1979, p. 10) 
 
The ‘Committee to Review the Functioning of Financial Institutions’  
commenced under Labour PM Harold Wilson also judged building societies 
on the grounds of a lack of competitiveness and efficiency, albeit in less 
overly ideological terms (Committee to Review the Functioning of Financial 
Institutions, 1980). It argued that pressure to set competitive rates would 
encourage better administrative efficiency and the cutting of costs. The rise of 
the mortgage rate to market clearing rate levels induced by competition would 
also benefit the inflow of savings going into the mortgage circuit. It further 
argued that the ‘building society interest rate cartel provided doubtful benefits 
and, by encouraging non-price competition, is wasteful of resources’ (p. 112).  
 
2.4  A Piece of the Action: The Arrival of the Banks 
Major pressure on the cartel also increasingly came from the banks at the end 
of the 1970s which had traditionally felt disadvantaged by the favourable tax 
status of the cartel, as well as the restrictions placed upon them by the corset. 
At this time some of them were ‘experimenting’ more and more with home 
loans with the clear intention of moving into mortgages once the restrictions of 
the corset were removed (The Financial Times, 1979). At the same time, 
competition within the consumer finance market intensified and American 
banks pushed aggressively into the British consumer finance market, 
particularly into an earlier version of what is now infamously known as the 
‘subprime’ mortgage market. Citigroup, for instance, which owned a large 
portfolio of first and second mortgages in the United States, announced in 
1979 that it would take over the mortgage business which building societies 
frowned upon such as second homes, shorter leases or older properties, as 
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well as to ‘top up’ loans by building societies that were lower than desired. 
Other banks and household finance corporations had already started to invest 
significantly in the lucrative British home loans market (The Economist, 
1979a). Lloyds was the first British clearing bank to have made a clear move 
into mortgages, concentrating, at first, on lending over £25.000 to 
homeowners which building societies rarely ever did. The appetite for 
mortgages from the banks, which had been overtaken by the building 
societies in size, was clearly growing. While the banks had concentrated on 
lobbying against tax advantages and the corset in the past, they now became 
more confident in moving into the home loans sector even without equal tax 
treatment by planning to use non-interest bearing accounts for the funding of 
mortgages (The Economist, 1979b). This confidence reflected the sentiment 
that a demand for an increase in the supply of mortgages was strong among 
the general population. This demand was, in part, pushed by the government 
and the inflationary environment of the 1970s and in part created by the 
expansion of the building society movement itself, which now became 
increasingly unable to service this surge in demand - given its rigid legal 
framework and lending standards. As the Times (1983b) puts it: 
 
‘A combination of soaring inflation and government legislation pushed more 
and more young people into the homeowning market. Gone were the days 
when a young couple would save for years to buy a new house when they 
married. Today’s young wanted a home now - and they were not prepared to 
wait for it‘. 
 
2.5 ‘Home Loan Battles’: The Advent of Thatcher and the End of the Cartel 
The Thatcher government came to power in May 1979, replacing the previous 
Labour government of James Callaghan that had left the housing market in a 
crippled state, mainly caused by the stagflation crisis and global turbulences 
of that time (Short, 1982). Thatcher mobilised support within civil society not 
least by putting a strong emphasis on increasing homeownership and housing 
credit in line with the neo-liberalist core values of strong property rights and 
economic freedom. The Conservative Party Manifesto of (1979) promised to 
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create a ‘property owning democracy’ chiefly by increasing home ownership. 
It stated that:   
 
‘To most people ownership means first and foremost a home of their own (...) 
mortgage rates have risen steeply because of the Government’s financial 
mismanagement. Our plans for cutting government spending and borrowing will 
lower them’.  
 
The manifesto also promised what came to be known as the ‘right-to-buy 
initiative’ which forced councils to sell council homes to their tenants at a 
significant discount of up to 50 per cent in some cases. This dramatically 
increased homeownership over the 1980s. This policy had begun as a 
grassroots movement of a few Tory-controlled councils that started sales 
drives to their own tenants in the 1970s. This then fed through to the national 
party and became a central strategy for the general election. After 1979, the 
pressure from council home tenants became so strong that Labour had to 
abandon its traditional policy of a strong commitment to state housing 
(Saunders, 1990; see also above). 
 
According to Short (1982), owner-occupation was central to the neo-liberalist 
ideological stance of the Thatcher administration. A home of your own 
encouraged independence while the attack on council housing with its 
allegedly huge subsidies freed both a waste of resources and reduced 
unacceptable state control. As he puts it (ibid p. 64):  
 
‘The concept of liberating the council house tenancy almost took on a religious 
fervour within the Tory rank and file. There was a belief that housing market 
forces left to themselves could find the right solution. The basic housing tenets 
of Conservative policies were: owner-occupation is good; the housing crisis is 
over; the public housing sector is over–subsidized and the private rented sector 
can be revived. These became the main goals of the new Conservative party 
and they were mediated by previous policy proposals and the available 
legislative measures.’  
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Owner-occupation was therefore one of the central mechanisms of the 
creation of consent within the hegemonic neo-liberalist formation. 
Homeownership became rooted and sediment within civil society, perceived 
to be an intrinsic ‘natural desire’ of humans (Saunders, 1990, Chapter 2).  
 
Following the coming to power of the Conservatives, the days of the building 
society cartel were numbered. While technically in operation until 1983, it lost 
much of its significance through a variety of measures taken soon after the 
Conservatives took over the rule of government. The abolishment of foreign 
exchange controls and the abandonment of the ‘corset’ in 1980 caused the 
banks to aggressively expand into the mortgage market.  The struggles at the 
heart of this expansion were entitled ‘home loan battles’ by the Times 
(1983a). Banks, with huge funds available for mortgage finance, were willing 
to lend up to 100 per cent of the house price. In 1980s, the increase in the 
market share of banks was 6 per cent and at one point banks originated every 
third new mortgage in 1980 (The Times 1983a). However, the ‘home loan 
battle’ was far from decided at that point with banks retreating from mortgages 
in 1982 due to falling interest rates. While fundamental changes had taken 
place from 1979 onwards in the building society sector and the societies 
diversified into new areas such as cheque books and consumer credit, they 
were still regarded as the primary mortgage market authority (The Times, 
1983b). This perception, however, had dramatically changed by the end of the 
1980s. 
 
The deregulation of the UK mortgage market was not a conscious policy like 
the ‘right-to-buy initiative’ but a contingent, if welcomed, outcome of the 
government’s neo-liberalist ideological stance (Stephens, 2007). One of the 
first actions of the newly elected government was the abandonment of the 
setting of guidelines for mortgage lending by the Joint Advisory Committee 
which was eventually disbanded in 1984. In his memoirs, Nigel Lawson 
(1992), Financial Secretary to the Treasury under Thatcher at the time and 
soon to become Chancellor of the Exchequer, recalls that he himself chose to 
abandon these practices as he was not convinced that they would work. This 
became the first step of a series of, often almost accidental (and primarily 
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ideology-driven), measures to deregulate the mortgage market. The eventual 
abandonment of the corset came about because the abolishment of exchange 
controls allowed banks to circumvent its restrictions on domestic interest 
bearing liabilities mainly by entering the UK markets through foreign branches 
and subsidiaries. The cartel remained in place until its collapse in 1983 
because, as Lawson recalled, its temporary existence was convenient for 
purposes of macro-economic stability even though he favoured the eventual 
‘liberalization’ of the building society sector: ‘What we decided to do with 
building societies was to allow the crumbling to take place at a natural pace 
as competition developed from the banks’ (ibid p. 87). 
 
The cartel lost its significance during these first years of the 1980s and 
widespread breaches of its setting of interest rates were recorded in 1982. 
This process also included an interesting change of rhetoric from 
‘recommending’ interest rates to ‘advising’ the latter (Barnes, 1984). Its 
eventual demise in 1983 became a mere footnote (Stephens, 2007).  
 
Their restrictive legal framework within this newly emerging competitive 
market was problematic for the building societies as it limited the expansion of 
their activities and did not allow them to anything other than retail funds for 
mortgage lending. In 1983 the banks re-entered the mortgage market and 
competition became fiercer. The deregulated market also allowed for the entry 
of so-called centralised lenders that solely relied on capital market funding for 
its mortgage lending. As a result, the share of mortgage lending from building 
societies diminished rapidly.  
 
As one interviewee (Interview 8) summarises these developments:  
 
‘The incoming conservative government felt that it was wrong for mortgages to 
be allocated in the same way that bread was allocated in standard rations, you 
queued up and waited until you got to the front of the queue even if you were 
credit worthy and worthy of having a loan. That was not the right way to do 
things, so they removed the restrictions on banks and made the case that 
banks would be welcome in the mortgage market … In 1980, banks had 5 per 
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cent of net mortgage lending and by 1982, they had 35 per cent of net 
mortgage lending. The building societies had implemented a pricing policy that 
created queues i.e. created an expectation of poor customer service and a 
ready and willing group of people wanted to go somewhere else which could 
serve them more quickly, which the banks could … And the banks did exactly 
that … It was completely alien to them to be constrained by a BSA cartel …The 
cartel fell in 1983. It wasn’t made illegal until 1987 but it disappeared in 1983 in 
effect.’ 
 
The building societies had lobbied for greater access to wholesale funds since 
1979. Eventually, a working party set was up by the BSA, the Stow 
Committee investigating potential access to the wholesale market (Boléat, 
1986). In 1983, the BSA sponsored Spalding Report (1983) recommended the 
relaxation of legislation and the possibility for societies to demutualise. At the 
time, the need for regulatory change for building societies was increasingly 
being recognised, but the proposed restructuring of the sector also provoked 
resistance: Commenting on the proposals of the Spalding Report, Labour 
politician Douglas Houghton stated in the House of Lords that:  
 
‘I am a little irritated by the way in which the present tycoonery of the building 
societies talk about the building society industry. It is a movement. I hope it will 
remain a movement. If they call it an industry, they know where they are going. 
They are walking straight into company law, straight into the City, straight into 
financial institutions instead of great social movements’ (HL Deb 19 April 1983, 
Paragraph 539).  
 
However, most parties, even those within the building society sector, agreed 
that a need for regulatory change and a liberalisation was ‘necessary’ to make 
them more ‘competitive’. By the 1980s the traditional building society model 
was already outmoded, a dinosaur on the verge of extinction:  
 
‘It [The 1962 Building Society Act] is, in essence akin to a preservation order 
like those imposed on National Trust Parks and ancient buildings. However, in 
the present, increasingly competitive environment and with the lines of 
demarcation among financial services fast becoming blurred, an imposed 
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preservation order on the nature of business undertaken by societies could, in 
fact, have the opposite effect to what is intended: it could threaten their future 
survival’ (Llewellyn and Wrigglesworth, 1990 p. 29). 
 
This regulatory change that created a level regulatory convergence and a 
level playing field between banks and building societies came about in the 
form of the 1986 Building Society Act and was part of the Big Bang 
deregulation of financial services in the UK. It also allowed for the 
demutualisation of societies paving the way for the demutualisation frenzy of 
the 1990s.  
 
The following table sums up the main deregulatory measures in the UK 
mortgage market from 1971-1991: 
 
 
 
Figure 4 
A Summary of themain deregulatory measures in the UK mortgage market from 
1971-1991 
Source: Nellis and Lockhart (1995) 
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Conclusion 
 
This chapter analyses the breakdown of the building society price cartel and 
the deregulation of the UK mortgage market in the light of the rise of 
neoliberalist hegemony during the stagflation crisis of the 1970s. It does so 
with a particular focus on Laclau’s concept of the political as instituting 
dimension of the social and related concepts developed by Glynos and 
Howarth (2007) such as political dimension and political moment (see 
particularly section 2.4 – 2.5 and section three of chapter one of this thesis for 
a thorough theoretical discussion of the concept of the political). The chapter 
problematises the notion that the advent of neoliberalism was a rational 
development (in the sense that there was ‘no alternative’ to neoliberalist 
restructuring). It also challenges a narrow focus on state-political modes of 
coercion. Instead, this chapter situates neoliberalism in the context of 
hegemony which requires the ‘consent of the governed’ and is constituted in 
and through hegemonic struggles. Hereby, it investigates the struggles that 
were constitutive upon the establishment and flourishing of neoliberalist 
hegemony and the resistance it generated under particular consideration of 
the transformation in the UK mortgage market between the late 1970s and 
early 1980s.  
 
The first part of section one discusses the preceding regime of embedded 
liberalism and its internal dislocations that erupted during the crisis of the 
1970s. The emergence of the neoliberalist project is then analysed as a 
particular antagonistic reaction to these dislocations which, as opposed to 
alternative projects of the left, succeeded in presenting a credible empty 
signifier – freedom – alongside which a range of different unfulfilled demands 
were articulated that were able to mobilise sufficient political and popular 
support. The transformation of the UK mortgage market is further investigated 
as a specific example of the political struggles that preceded the 
institutionalisation of neoliberalism and paved the way for the financialization 
of mortgage finance. Hereby, the mortgage market was transformed from a 
‘protected circuit’ dominated by a cartel that determined (‘recommended’) 
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interest rates into a highly competitive market where the allocation of 
mortgages and interest rates became increasingly determined by market 
mechanisms.      
 
This new market environment also favoured a new ‘money culture’ that would 
crystallise into the increasing financialization of mortgages. The 1986 Building 
Society Act, then, alongside the ‘Big Bang’ Financial Services Act of 1986, 
fundamentally altered the economic, cultural and political parameters of 
mortgage lending and funding in accordance with neoliberalst principles. 
These developments are discussed in the following chapter under particular 
consideration of the demutualisation frenzy of the 1990s and the struggles 
that preceded and surrounded it. 
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‘I doubt whether any business has had to contend with so many and such 
violent changes, over such a short period of time, as the financial services 
industry. Economists tell us that one factor can transform markets in quite 
radical ways. Fundamental changes in Technology; New Social and Economic 
Orders; New Kinds of Competition; New Channels of Distribution. We have 
experienced the lot’ (Scott Durward, Chief Executive of Alliance and Leicester 
cited in: Campaign, 1988, 21 October). 
 
‘It is only at the conclusion of a hegemonic struggle that a particular meaning 
may be “naturalized”…’ (LCE p. 131).  
 
 
Chapter Six: Big Bang and Demutualisation: The 
Transformation of the British Mortgage Market in the 
1980s and 1990s 
 
 
Introduction 
 
As the first opening quote indicates, the 1980s and 1990s witnessed a 
fundamental restructuring of the financial services sector and the mortgage 
market in the UK. The volatile climate of the 1970s combined with 
technological innovations and the rapid growth of international capital flows 
further undermined established financial and economic arrangements which 
were increasingly deemed ‘uncompetitive’ by the government. These 
processes resulted in a series of deregulatory legislation such as the Big 
Bang Financial Services Act of 1986, the Building Societies Act of 1986 and 
the 1997 Banking Act which, by liberalising financial services and markets on 
an unprecedented scale, marked a decisive shift away from the protectionist 
arrangement and cautious approach to risk which had characterised 
embedded liberalism. This chapter charts the rise of what has been called a 
new ‘money culture’ (see Marshall et al., 2010) – or, in the terminology of 
LCE, the rise of the social logic of financialization. The chapter hereby 
 199
investigates the continued marginalisation of the mutual model in the context 
of the ongoing political institutionalisation of neoliberalist hegemony that 
began in the late 1970s (see chapter five of this thesis). The first section of 
the chapter investigates some of the major changes that occurred during the 
1980s (legal, political, technological and cultural) which led to an increasingly 
unfavourable climate for institutions, such as mutual building societies. The 
chapter then investigates the responses to these changes in relation to the 
societies (such as the increasing adoption of a ‘profit motive’ by some of the 
societies, made possible by new legislation such as the 1986 and 1997 
Building Societies Acts). It further investigates how these responses 
themselves have contributed to undermine the traditional mutual approach 
which, in turn, paved the way for the demutualisation wave of the 1990s 
where over two thirds of mortgage assets were transferred to the stock market 
(see Heffernan, 2005). Those developments consequently created the 
conditions of possibility for the fiancialization of mortgage on a large scale in 
the UK.   
 
It is argued in this chapter that the conversion of ten societies into listed 
companies, starting with the Abbey National in 1989 and continuing until the 
late 1990s, was the result of contingent struggles rather than the outcome of a 
process of ‘natural selection’ that, as was frequently asserted by pro-
demutualisation campaigners, would inevitably weed out ‘inefficient’ business 
models such as societies (see Dayson, 2002).  
 
Hereby, the chapter makes use of the concept of ‘antagonism’ and ‘war of 
position’ (see section 1.6 and section 2.1 of chapter one of this thesis) to 
illustrate the contingent nature of the conflicts that surrounded the 
demutualisation processes. It is argued here that the conversions were often 
successful because different agents such as management, members, 
financial advisors and even government agencies formed powerful coalitions, 
incentivised partly by individual profit motives and partly by an identification 
with the neoliberalist rhetoric of ‘freedom to compete’. The concept of 
antagonism helps to analyse the constitutiveness of struggles and the division 
of the mortgage market ‘into two opposing camps’ at the height of the 
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conversion debate where, on both sides, a lot of effort went into the derision 
of the ‘enemy’ that was presented as an obstacle to be removed. The 
considerable resistance to the demutalisation frenzy, then, shows the 
contingency of these processes and the inability of a hegemonic discourse to 
suture the social space completely which, in turn, helps to ‘reactivate’ counter-
hegemonic possibilities that had become largely sedimented.    
 
 
1. Setting the Scene: The Big Regulatory Shake-Up and its 
Implications 
 
1.1 The ‘Free Economy and the Strong State’142 
Thatcher’s political fate was in severe doubt amidst the recession of the early 
1980s (that particularly affected the manufacturing sector) and the rather slow 
process of her anti-inflationary policies. Therefore, her monetarist stance was 
highly controversial in her own party and almost cost her the re-election. 
Eventually, inflation went down to 5 per cent by the end of 1982 which 
restored her good fortunes and that of her backers (Minford, 1998; Gamble, 
1988). As a result and against a background of domestic and global 
neoliberalist ideology, the UK experienced a sharp reversal of the 
interventionist and protectionist policies that had defined the era of embedded 
liberalism. The 1980s saw an economic restructuring on an unprecedented 
scale that established financial markets and services as the growth industry of 
Britain (Glyn, 2006). The privatisation of state-owned companies as well as 
council housing was hereby a crucial part of Conservative policy to create a 
‘property owning democracy’ of shareholder and homeowners through the 
market.  The policy of wide shareholding was pursued with the aim to give 
voters an extra source of income which they could use in the event of 
unemployment and retirement and to make them ‘complicit’ in the 
reproduction of corporatist capitalism. Additionally, it was believed that shared 
ownership would make management more responsive to public opinion given 
                                                 
142
 This is the title of Andrew Gamble’s book on Thatcherism (1988) 
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the vast increase in small shareholders143 (Johnson, 1991, see also chapter 
four of this thesis).  
 
By the 1983 manifesto, the government was able to point to the privatisation 
(in whole or in part) of Cable and Wireless, Associated Ports, British 
Aerospace, Britoil, British Rail Hotels, Amersham International and the 
National Freight Corporation. The next privatisation round included 51 per 
cent of British Telecom, Rolls Royce, British Steel, British Shipbuilders, British 
Leyland, a large number of airports, the National Bus Company as well as 
British Gas’ oil division (later named Enterprise Oil). Housing was an 
important part of this policy in the form of the right to buy initiative (outlined in 
the preceding chapter) and a commitment to keep the mortgage rate down 
(This was not always possible but was successfully reinforced for a few 
months before both, the 1983 and 1987 election and played a part in the 
reestablishment of the Conservatives’ popularity). The 1984 Housing and 
Building Control Act extended the right to buy to leasehold property and 
increased the discount to 60 per cent (it had previously started at 33 per cent 
and increased to 50 per cent after 20 years’ tenancy). The 1986 Act increased 
the discount to 43-70 per cent for flats, according to length of tenure. The 
original target of one million homes was reached in 1986 and a total of 1.5 
billion homes was sold in 1989 which, together with similar  sales in Scotland 
and Wales and other property sales by the government,  totalled £30.6 billion 
(less than the £39 billion cost of mortgage interest relief offered by the 
government) (ibid).    
 
These privatisation initiatives were paralleled by a progressive liberalisation of 
the financial services industry during the 1980s as money became more 
international and less easy to control by governments. This opened up a 
range of new possibilities for financial institutions. By the 1970s, for example, 
currencies were trading continuously in markets and their value fluctuation 
was based on those trades (see Morgan and Sturdy [2000] for a general 
                                                 
143
 This belief, akin to the more general recent notion of a ‘democratisation of finance’ is, of 
course, controversial (cf.  Langley, 2008a; DeGoede, 2003; 2005; Froud et al,, 2010; Engelen 
et al., 2011; Crouch, 2011) 
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overview over the transformations in Financial Services in the UK during this 
time). Britain abolished its foreign exchange controls in 1979. In addition to 
the gradual breakdown of the building society monopoly in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s, as well as the abolition of restriction on domestic bank lending 
(the removal of the corset was discussed in the preceding chapter), the Bank 
of England eased its interventionist stance in relation to the control of interest 
rates. It did this by ending the formal announcement of the minimum lending 
rate and the abolition of reserve requirements on banks’ balance sheets in 
1981 (Nellis and Lockhart, 1995). Additional deregulatory measures followed 
with the Finance Acts in 1983 and 1984 which abolished the remaining hire 
purchase controls and provided a first step for building societies to tap 
wholesale markets which made funding cheaper and more readily available. 
As a result, the wholesale funding of the societies increased rapidly during the 
1980s. An unprecedented shake-up of the financial services sector 
subsequently followed in the wake of the  Building Society Act of 1986  and 
the ‘Big Bang’ Financial Services Act of the same year, as well as a new 
Banking Act in 1987 (ibid; Boddy, 1988). Domestic deregulation was 
accompanied by legislation at the level of the European Community (soon to 
become the European Union) that gradually established common European 
markets for the free movement of goods, services and workers.  
These deregulatory measures sparked a seismic shift in the financial services 
industry and reinforced competition in the mortgage market between banks, 
building societies and other mortgage lenders or savings institutions but also 
between building societies themselves. What emerged out of these 
developments and the various struggles that accompanied and constituted 
them was the new neoliberalist consensus that mortgages are best provided 
through the market (Green and Wachter, 2010; Kleinmann, 1995). This notion 
culminated in the demutualisation frenzy of the 1990s which paved the way, in 
turn, for the progressive financialization of mortgage finance. The ‘Big Bang’ 
Financial Services Act and the 1986 Building Societies Act were crucial for the 
liberalisation of financial services and increasing financialization of mortgages.  
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1.2 Reforming the Square Mile: The ‘Big Bang’ Financial Services Act of 1986 
In the fall of 1986, two legal events occurred which together became known 
as the Big Bang on the London Stock Exchange which referred to the 
restructuring in the operation of exchange in the form of a settlement between 
the exchange and the government responding to claims that the London 
Stock Exchange had become anticompetitive. As Clemens and Weber (1989) 
point out, the Big Bang has been the most rapid and complete regulatory 
reform of financial markets so far, as well as the most striking example of a 
regulatory move engineered to benefit the financial industry.  
Most importantly, the Act was concerned with the abolishment of monopolistic 
fixed commissions on securities transactions and severed the traditional 
separation of ‘brokers’ (who could not trade and act on their own account) and 
‘jobbers’ (the ‘market makers’ who were not allowed to act for customers) 
which had been a particular cause of complaint (Hablutzel, 1992). Also, 
barriers to foreign entry into the exchange were abolished which had been 
essentially constructed and operated as a private club. This involved of a new 
regulatory agency, the Securities and Investment Board (SIB) and provided 
for the delegation of duties and powers to some self-regulating organisations 
(SROs) (ibid, Plender, 1986-87). These legislator measures resulted in major 
changes in the structure of financial markets and the structure and ownership 
of trading firms, a significant increase in the number of market participants 
and an increase in the movement of stock trading off the floor of the 
Exchange (Clemens and Weber, 1989).  
Particularly (but not exclusively) from a neoliberalist perspective, the 
regulatory shake-up of the City had been long overdue. The longstanding 
domination of the ‘Square Mile’144 by an elite-club of old-established financiers 
was seen to be merely perpetuating ‘Victorian and Edwardian’145 values at the 
expenses of the benefits that a competitive exchange could reap. As a 
commentary in the Times on the Big Bang reports shortly before the latter’s 
coming into effect on 27 October, 1986: 
 
                                                 
144
 The’ Square Mile’ refers to the financial district situated in the City of London that is about 
a square mile in size. It is used as a shorthand for institutional investors.   
145
 In contrast, building societies are often associated with the Victorian values of self-help 
and cooperatism. 
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‘Until the 1980s, it was the Victorian and Edwardian era that ruled the area … 
The City believed in free trade, in open markets, in unfettered capitalism – for 
everybody except itself … Restrictive practices that have made even the most 
regressive Union Baron flinch were tolerated, as they seemed quite good  for 
the country and, besides, the City held the purse strings …The system was 
antiquated, outrageously unfair and, for its members, a licence to print money 
…The Big Bang proper is the moment when all this is thrown out of the 
window. Market makers and agents no longer have to be separated. 
Membership of the Stock Exchange is thrown open both to foreigners and 
outsiders and commission rates are flexible – brokers will have to compete on 
the price they charge to investors.’  
  
The Financial Services Act brought about a significant growth of economic 
and financial activity and profits in the financial and business services industry 
(the sector increased from a share of 11.6 per cent of GDP in 1979 to 19.8 
per cent of GDP in 1989 while, during the same period, manufacturing 
declined from 28.4 per cent of GDP to 22.2 per cent of GDP). The Act also 
increased the complexity of the financial regulatory structure and exposed the 
financial system to a wide range of new risks arising from the explosion of 
private credit in the bull years of the mid- to late 1980s that households were 
unable to service during recession times (Johnson, 1991, p. 198 ff; p. 268). 
(See below, for example, for an account of the housing recession in the early 
1990 and section three of chapter four for the role of credit in the lead-up to 
the financial meltdown.)  
The Big Bang re-established London as a major global financial centre. 
Together with technological change and the increased internationalisation of, 
and volumes in, global capital flows, the Financial Services Act became one 
of the main drivers of the unprecedented transformation of the financial 
services industry in the 1980s and paved the way for the ‘de-regulatory race 
to the bottom’ between London and New York that defined the pre-crisis 
conjuncture (see French et al., 2009).  
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1.3 Lenders Unleashed: The Transformation of UK Financial Services and the 
Mortgage Market 
During the turbulent years of the early 1980s banks began a process of 
‘restructuring for profits’ (Leyshon and Thrift, 1993). This resulted in a more 
‘flexible’ approach to labour markets and an unprecedented round of voluntary 
and compulsory redundancies. Additionally, this also resulted in the closure of 
a significant number of both bank and building society branches. In the face of 
a more competitive market for retail financial services, banks had been 
particularly eager to drive down costs by closing branches (Leyshon et al., 
2006; Marshall et al., 2000). 
Financial instruments such as bonds equities and securitization146 became 
more and more important and were bought in increasing volumes by 
investors. The traditional model where banks acted as simple intermediaries 
between borrowers and savers was herby progressively displaced by a 
process called ‘disintermediation’. Hereby, the relationships between 
investors and borrowers became increasingly mediated by the financial 
markets themselves (see also chapter three of this thesis and section one and 
two of chapter four for the processes of disintermediation caused by 
securitization).147  
 
These developments had a number of crucial consequences: 
Disintermediation increased competition as new institutions such as 
investment banks, centralised lenders (see below) and even non-financial 
companies entered financial services. Under a logic of traditional 
intermediation, competition in financial markets revolved mainly around the 
ability to match assets with liabilities and around matters of interest rates 
offered to borrowers. In disintermediated markets, however, financial 
                                                 
146
 The first British RMBS was structured in 1987 (Pryke and Freeman, 1994). By the end of 
the 1980s, the market for mortgage backed securitization in the UK was still small by 
American standards (Green and Wachter 2010).  
147
 Disintermediation denotes the process by which buyers and sellers of a financial product 
are increasingly brought together without the presence of a financial intermediary through 
processes of outsourcing and off-balance sheet transactions such as securitization. As 
Heilpern (2008) notes, these processes were taken to the extreme in the years preceding the 
current financial crisis.  One of the knock-on effects of disintermediation, however, has been 
the introduction of new and increasingly opaque forms of ‘re-mediation’ leading to highly 
convoluted financial  transaction chains.  
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institutions become increasingly required to assess and price risk, to distribute 
securities on behalf of their clients and to trade in secondary markets on their 
own account. (The latter point being the now well-known ‘proprietary trading’ 
that has become highly controversial in the wake of the current financial crisis 
proprietary trading; see e.g. McSweeney, 2008.) Far from having occurred 
naturally, disintermediation required acts of political institution. (see e.g. 
Wainwright (2009a) for an illustrative account of how the successful 
implementation of securitization in the UK hinged on networks of bankers and 
lawyers who lobbied for and creatively adapted an originally alien idea.)148 
 
Further, the rise of disintermediated finance and securitisation spawned an 
explosion of financial innovation and the growth of credit and debt resulting in 
easier access to credit which began to gradually take over as the engine of 
capitalist growth (Glyn, 2006). After allowing for inflation, the amount 
outstanding in consumer credit had more than doubled over the eighties. Not 
only did more people use credit than a decade before, but those people also 
tended to have a larger number of credit commitments. During the same time, 
mortgage debt had almost trebled as a consequence of the Right-to-Buy 
legislation and also because of a steep appreciation of house prices (see 
Kempson, 2002, p. 2). The housing recession at the beginning of the 1990s 
can at least partly be attributed to increased consumer indebtedness and the 
government’s policy to increase homeownership (Watson, 2009a). During the 
recession, consumers paid off debts and borrowing levelled off before picking 
up again and doubling once more in the period from 1994 to 2001 (Kempson, 
2002, p. 2; see section three of chapter four of this thesis for the pre-‘credit  
crunch’ situation of consumer indebtedness). As one interviewee (Interview 
15) sums up these new developments in relation to credit expansion: 
 
‘The government controlled the money supply and what happened was that it 
was then free competition for available money … anybody could get a loan, 
provided that they could pay the interest rate … so all the previous regimes, 
see, had huge controls on who could get credit. You’d only get credit if you 
                                                 
148
 The politics of disintermediation were even more overtly visible in the United States where 
the secondary mortgage market has been essentially the product of state-political acts of 
institutionalisation (see Gotham, 2006 and chapter four of this thesis).  
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were the right sort of person; if you satisfied the controls. Credit was controlled 
and given to worthy people and firms … Anybody could get credit who had 
creditworthiness and was willing to pay the price … So you could argue that in 
many ways this was the most revolutionary thing that Mrs Thatcher did 
because she enabled the working classes to get credit.’ 
 
He continues by saying: 
‘Effectively, it became a deregulated system in which people’s demands at the 
interest rate drove the balance sheets. There was no control at the balance 
sheets … whereas if you have credit controls, the government says that the 
balance sheets shall be no bigger than this … The world changed completely, if 
you could pay the price, you could get the credit.’ 
 
New sophisticated risk management techniques and a steep rise in 
competition also contributed to the move of financial institutions into 
increasingly riskier loans such as leveraged buyouts and commercial 
property. The fundamental fragility of this new financial logic and the 
emergence of a ‘shadow banking system’ (on which the current meltdown is 
often blamed) were already visible at the time149:  
 
‘In effect, money has been mutating into new forms which exist outside existing 
structures of regulation. Indeed, this is precisely why many of them are 
developed, although the majority of instruments have been introduced with the 
overt aim of helping to manage risk in increasingly volatile financial markets’ 
(Leyshon and Thrift, 1993, p. 226).     
 
These processes combined allowed banks and other financial services 
providers to increasingly diversify their product range as they moved into new 
areas and were able to tap new markets for funding.  Ertürk et al. (2008) point 
out that the revolution in retail banking, which also paralleled the capital 
market revolution, included important changes in everyday life (see also 
chapter four of this thesis). These manifested themselves, they argue, 
particularly in the altered layout of bank branches in advanced countries. 
                                                 
149
 One of its effected was the housing market recession at the beginning of the 1990s that 
temporarily dampened the expansion of financialization.  
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Bank branches of the 1970s were dominated by the long counter across 
which money was paid in and out by bank clerks. The decisions to lend 
money to companies and households were made on an individual basis by 
the branch manager in a side office. (For example, in the case of mortgages 
the managers made decisions individually and exercised their discretion at all 
times as to who would be granted a mortgage; see Wainwright, 2009b, p. 
118.) This system had been part of a governmentally administered credit 
rationing that promoted restraint and low competition on price in order to 
contain risk through syndicalisation. This system, however, had become 
progressively undermined by the growing volumes of financial transactions as 
well as technological and political change (French et al., 2009; see also 
chapter five of this thesis). In the new system which gradually developed, 
bank branches became dominated by cubicles and workstations. Decisions 
about loans became increasingly made by junior call-centre staff based upon 
impersonal criteria and the allocation of credit became driven by marketing-
led corporate policies and the cross-selling of financial products (Ertürk et al. 
2008, p. 9). 
Against this background, the traditional evaluation of the risk of a loan, based 
on face-to-face interaction, embodied knowledge and individual judgement 
(for example in relation to the evaluation of the credit risk of a mortgage 
borrower) became downgraded in favour of more standardised and 
impersonal procedures made possible by technological progress.150 The most 
significant development in this respect was the adoption of credit scoring 
systems which were designed to overcome information asymmetries and to 
distinguished “good” from “bad” customers “at-a-distance”. The advancement 
of credit to households and corporations does no longer necessarily 
presuppose a personal interview. Firms collect information from customers 
from standardised forms that are completed and submitted to a bank (or 
another lender) as part of an application for a savings account or for credit. 
This information is then often supplemented by information from other 
databases (such as credit card checks for example) and evaluated by a 
                                                 
150
 This emergent epistemological stance towards risk assessments and management has 
become firmly embedded in processes of mortgage lending and funding to the point that 
MacKenzie (2011) approaches the ‘credit crisis as a problem in the sociology of knowledge’.   
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computerised credit-scoring software (Leyshon and Thrift, 1999). This 
software literally constitutes borrowers or savers as ‘good’ or ‘bad’ (with ‘bad’ 
customers gradually becoming ‘the new good’ in the lead-up to the financial 
crisis). Over the course of the 1980s and 1990s, credit scoring and risk based 
pricing became an integral component of the financialzation of the economy 
particularly the financialization of mortgages (see Aalbers, 2008). Thus, it 
becomes apparent that technology played a big part in the in the hailing of the 
new financial subjects and the financialization of everyday life that is 
discussed in chapter.151 
 
It is worth pointing out here that most building societies have retained 
elements of the traditional ‘face-to-face’ approach towards risk management 
until this day (a feature which served them well within the financial crisis – see 
section two of  chapter seven of this thesis).  
 
The restrictive regulation of building societies at the time, however, made 
them increasingly unable to compete within the new deregulated environment 
of the 1980s as banks and other lenders rapidly expanded their market share 
and the mortgage market became radically transformed. As one interviewee 
has commented (Interview eight): 
 
‘The banks effectively were given the green light by the Thatcher government 
to come into the mortgage market even at the time of recession, as it was in 
the early 80s, and the banks were able to cream off the best business … that 
was the demand which the building societies weren’t able to meet.’ 
 
Building societies are a classical example of the traditional form of financial 
intermediation in the sense that they provided (and still provide) an effective 
channel for saver’s surpluses to meet borrowers’ deficits. Under this model, 
building societies performed all three basic housing finance functions 
themselves: the origination, servicing (such as collecting, accounting and 
enforcement of the mortgage instrument) and funding of the loan. This 
                                                 
151
 Technology is, thus, not ‘neutral’ but integral part of a hegemonic formation (cf. Bridgman 
and Willmott, 2006). 
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particular circuit managed to exclude many of the potential risks as they were 
handled by the simplicity and narrow range of both savings and mortgage 
products and well as the protected environment of the price cartel (Pryke and 
Freeman, 1994; see also chapter five of this thesis). The deregulation of the 
market increasingly integrated the latter within the broader macroeconomic 
environment. It also linked mortgage interest rates to costs in wholesale 
borrowing, such as LIBOR and mortgage borrowers, and originators indirectly 
with capital market investors. A gradual specialization within the different 
functions of housing finance was developed as a ‘market clearing rate’ for 
mortgages was established. In the wake of the rise of securitization, new roles 
for financial agents emerged, offering a range of new services such as 
administrators, credit enhancers, pool insurers and issuers alongside 
increasingly disintermediated and fragmented ‘value chains’152 (Pryke and 
Freeman, 1994).  
 
Constraints on bank lending such as the corset were gradually abolished in 
the early 1980s (see chapter six of this thesis) and banks started to compete 
more aggressively for mortgage business, but also for the savings market. 
This competition took a number of non-price forms such as new technology 
(including the increased use of ATMs), increased product diversity and 
advertising. Price competition took the form of the bidding up retail interest 
rates for savings, the diversification of investments and the introduction of 
premium interest rate accounts.153 The mounting competition led the societies 
to increasingly turn to wholesale markets for the funding of mortgage loans 
which was facilitated by the Finance Acts 1983 and 1984. These Acts eased 
prior restrictions on interest rate payments. As a result, the proportion of new 
funds raised in the wholesale markets increased to 48 per cent in 1986 and 
wholesale funds stood at 12 per cent of total funds by 1988 (Boddy, 1988).  
 
                                                 
152
 Heilpern (2008, p. 8) defines a ‘value chain’ as the ‘overall space that encompasses the 
physical business communications, logistical, financial, and administrative process, which 
resides between the buyer and sellers as part of a commercial legal transaction’. 
153
 These problems that were already underway in the late 1970s prompted the BSA to 
establish the Stow Committee which reported in 1979 that it would examine future sources of 
funds for building societies (ibid). 
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As mortgages became gradually more attractive to institutional investors, 
building societies were no longer in the position to pick and choose the people 
and institutions they did business with (apart from borrowers and savers those 
included also estate agents and homebuilders), but they had to actively seek 
mortgage business. (As a result, estate agents quickly became important 
actors in the housing finance market rather than in the narrow market that 
they had previously operated in. House buyers now became likely to 
approach agents first and agents were more and more elevated into a position 
from where they could channel customers to particular mortgage lenders) 
(Boléat and Coles, 1987). Resulting from these developments, some of the 
building societies were among the institutions exploring the possibilities of 
wholesale funding and, by doing so, became more integrated into financial 
markets themselves:  
 
‘Put very simply, the rationale for secondary market activity in Britain is that the 
mortgage instrument is now an attractive instrument for institutional investors 
and, for this reason alone, an industry is developing to meet the demands of 
institutional investors through supplying and servicing loans to those investors. 
The estate agents are at the forefront of this new activity as are building 
societies’ (ibid, p. 125).  
 
The Big Bang also allowed for the entrance of a new type of mortgage lender 
into the market – the so-called ‘centralised lender’. These lenders were not 
funded through local branch networks anymore but wholly by the wholesale 
markets. Centralised lenders sell mortgages through mortgage brokers, 
including independent financial advisers and estate agents, as well as call 
centres and websites. Centralised lenders were able to offer competitive rates 
on their mortgage products as they could minimise costs by not needing to 
maintain a local branch network and being able to sell their products widely 
through intermediaries (Wainwright, 2009b). (Most of the descendants of 
these early centralised lenders perished, unsurprisingly, in the wake of the 
global financial meltdown given their reliance on capital markets for the 
funding of their on-going mortgage business, see CML, 2010a.) These new 
lenders had a fundamental impact on the restructuring of the mortgage 
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market, both in terms of contributing to the institutionalisation of securitization 
and the secondary mortgage market in Britain and by introducing the 
formalised credit scoring techniques outlined above. This new structure is 
known as the ‘centralised’ mortgage lending structure and subsequently 
became widely established in Britain.  
 
By the early 1980s, the competition for mortgages and savings had become 
so fierce that it had been described as open warfare: ‘Britain’s retail market’, 
as the then chairman of Barclay’s, Timothy Bevan, put it, ‘is a vast battlefield 
where the smoke of competition is so thick … as banks, building societies and 
other institutions slog it out for the saver’s pound’ (The Financial Times, 1983, 
20 October).  
 
While at first building societies seemed to be getting the upper hand in the 
market (ibid), they increasingly found themselves ill-equipped for these 
struggles. The heavily regulated societies experienced it to be ever more 
difficult to cope in a post-cartel world of aggressive competition and 
deregulated markets. In this new world, the traditional mutual model of 
mortgage lending and funding came increasingly under strain from within and 
from outside of the sector. As Marshall et al. (2011) point out, the progressive 
marginalisation of the building society movement stemmed from the 
emergence of a new ‘money culture’154 prompted by the Big Bang and the 
Building Societies Acts 1986 and 1987 (see below). This new culture (or 
‘market logic’ in our terminology) aimed at overriding opposition to 
neoliberalist market reform and at strengthening London’s role as an 
international financial centre. This new ‘money culture’ is ‘“made up of people 
who position themselves in relation to the circulation of money and are also 
positioned by it”’ (Pryke and Allen cited in Marshall et al. 2011, p. 8). This 
resulted in the gradual undermining of the established ‘”accounting and legal 
mentality”’155 which had previously defined the societies as ‘”creatures of 
                                                 
154
 Marshall et al. (2011) draw on Allen and Pryke’s (1999) interpretation of Georg Simmel’s 
sociology of money here.  
155
 Marshall et al. (2011, p. 8) retell an old joke in this context that, until the late 1970s, the 
sector was so predictable that managers adhered to the ‘the rule of three’: they borrowed 
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statute”’ who could only operate in the manner specified by legislation 
(Marshall et al., 2010, p. 8; see also section 1.4 of the chapter below). Indeed, 
as the calls of those who identified with, and used the language of, the new 
‘money culture’ became more and more widespread, building societies also 
increasingly became advised  to convert to plc status in the name of 
‘efficiency’ and ‘profitability’:  
 
‘While societies have recognised the need for their operations to be profitable 
in order to generate reserves to fund new activities, the competitive 
environment in both the borrowing and the lending mainstream activities has 
not enabled them to widen operating margins … An organisation in company 
form rather than in mutual form is also more likely to be able to attract 
managers from competing institutions156 and offer comparable rewards’ 
(Burnett, 1986, p. 51).  
 
The growing influence of the neoliberalist discourse also forced existing 
building societies to adjust internally to the new conditions, and some 
societies (but not all of them – Marshall et al. [2000] distinguish between 
‘commercial’ and ‘social’ mutuals here) increasingly identified and pursued 
commercial strategies which included the rationalisation of their branch 
networks that previously had been kept artificially afloat even if some 
branches were loss-making. (However, branch closures of building societies 
were not as drastic as those of the banks and generally more sensitive to the 
needs of their communities; Leyshon et al., 2006; Marshall et al., 2000; Nellis 
and Lockhart 1995.) 
The increasing commercialisation of parts of the movement was also 
frequently commented on with concern. Dayson (2002, p. 184), for example, 
complains that the ‘capitalist fixation’ with profits and technology 
fundamentally unsettled their ‘mutual raison d’être’. In pursuing ‘the dominant 
culture’, as he points out, societies risk their relationship with members, as 
failure to correspond to this new culture could be interpreted as managerial 
                                                                                                                                            
funds at one per cent, they lent them at two per cent and they were on the golf course by 
three o’clock.  
156
 It has been argued that the introduction of managers with a plc background was a crucial 
factor for the orientation of some society towards generating profits (Llewellyn, 1997).  
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incompetence. Building societies also became forced to use accounting 
standards which are ‘designed from the perspective of shareholder investors 
on issues of profit and income maximization’. Thus, as he (ibid) emphasises, 
the societies hereby became ‘hampered by the language of business’ (see 
also the above quote by Burnett): 
 
‘This process results in building societies becoming marginalised and being 
described as inefficient or labelled as community services, while the banks are 
unfettered to close branches in deprived areas, to pay management 
extraordinary salaries, and to  target the most profitable accounts with no 
responsibility to improve access. All of this occurs because capitalism 
dominates and shapes everyday discourse forcing mutuals to use this 
language if they are to be understood, while the images of building societies 
and credit unions are carefully controlled and monitored by the state and 
media’ (Dayson, 2002, p. 185).  
 
The particular legislative framework that gave societies greater powers to 
compete in the deregulated market and, thus, allowed for this ‘erosion from 
within’ of the mutual model, was the 1986 Building Societies Act (amended by 
the 1997 Building Societies Act). These Acts aimed at the creation of a level 
playing field between the societies and other financial institutions and gave 
societies the possibility to convert to plc (or bank) status, paving the way for 
the demutualisation wave of the 1990s.   
 
1.4 Towards a ‘Level Playing Field’: The 1986 Building Societies Act 
As noted earlier, the Big Bang was paralleled by another piece of legislation 
that would have the effect of fundamentally transforming the UK mortgage 
market and enabling the widespread financialization of mortgage assets: the 
1986 Building Societies Act that came into force on 1 January 1987.        
 
The Act significantly expanded the societies’ powers and introduced a new 
regulatory framework. Societies remained primarily concerned with lending for 
house purchase but the Act significantly removed the differences between the 
societies and other financial services institutions. It represented the first piece 
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of coherent legislation in relation to the building societies’ powers and 
regulation since the Building Society Act of 1874 and implemented proposals 
of the Treasury Green Paper Building Societies: A New Framework published 
in 1984. The new legislation eased restrictions in terms of the uses of funds 
and by allowing for unsecured loans and property development. It also 
allowed for the diversification of societies into activities related to house 
purchase and financial services including estate agency, insurance broking, 
surveys, money transmission and foreign exchange services (which 
subsequently made societies far more distinct from each other than previously 
had been the case). The Act also established a Building Society Commission 
that carried out and extended the regulatory functions previously operated by 
the Chief Registrar of Friendly Societies.157 Crucially, the Act formalised and 
set limits on the use of wholesale funding. It also allowed building societies to 
convert into public limited (Boddy, 1988). The Act can be seen, as Perks 
(1991, p. 396) puts it, ‘in part as a reaction to … criticisms [against the 
disadvantages that the societies were facing] and in part as a symptom of a 
political climate that favoured “privatization” and “corporate status” for a wide 
range of organizations and activities.’ 
 
One of the notable features of the Act were the numerous powers given to the 
Commission (which had been established by the Act) and/or the Treasury to 
make statutory instruments (regulation, orders etc) which, providing approval 
by the parliament could amend and supplement the Act. Since its coming into 
force (largely on 1 January 1987) it has been amended and extended 
considerably, particularly in relation to building societies’ powers. The 1997 
Building Societies Act made a large number of essential amendments to (but 
did not replace) the Act of 1986. Crucially, it replaced the previous 
‘prescriptive’ regime with a ‘permissive’ regime that increased the commercial 
freedom of societies and enhanced further the scope for competition and 
widened the choice for consumers. It also introduced measures to enhance 
the accountability of building societies’ boards to their members and made 
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 The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 which came into force on 1 December 2001, 
provided for a single legislative framework for the regulation of financial services in the UK 
under the supervision of the Financial Services Authority (FSA) (BSA, 2010, 20 April).   
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changes to the provisions in relation to the transfer of a building society’s 
business to a company (see also section three of this chapter). Under the 
1986 and 1997 Act, building societies must fully secure at least 75 per cent of 
their assets on residential property.158 The Treasury can reduce this limit by 
order to no less than 60 per cent. Also, and importantly, the societies can only 
raise a maximum of 50 per cent of funding from the wholesale markets.159 
(BSA, 2009, 29 July).   
 
Until the 1997 Act, the regulatory regime was ‘prescriptive’ which means that 
activities of societies were deemed to be illegitimate unless specifically 
permitted. Since 1997, the legislation has become ‘permissive’ in that 
activities are thought to be legitimate unless stated otherwise (Stephens, 
2001). The 1997 Act gave building societies the freedom to pursue any 
activities set out in their memorandum, subject only to compliance with the 
revised principle purpose introduced by that Act, the lending and funding 
limits, the restrictions on powers and prudential requirements (BSA, 2009, p. 
4). In the pragmatic view of the BSA (ibid), this is the ‘essence’ or ‘nature’ of 
the mutual model, which together with the fact that most of a building society’s 
customers are its members, outlines what distinguishes societies from other 
financial institutions. 
 
The 1986 Act (amended by the 1997 Act) also established rules for the 
demutualisation of societies into plcs. Conversions require a two thirds 
majority by ‘shareholding’ members (members with share accounts). An initial 
minimum turnout of 20 per cent was required which was later raised to 50 per 
cent. Furthermore, the conversion requires a simple majority of borrowing 
members. Mergers can precede demutualisation which requires the same 
majority. Unlike plcs, hostile takeovers of societies are prohibited and 
conversions can only be forced upon societies under particular 
                                                 
158
 Section 6B of the 1986 Act defines ‘loans fully secured on land’ as a loan that is secured 
on residential property, if the principal of, and interest accrued on, the loan does not exceed 
the value of the security and there is no more than one prior mortgage on the land (BSA, 
2009, 29 July, p. 5).   
159
 The Building Societies (Funding) and Mutual Societies (Transfers) Act of 2007 or the 
‘Butterfill Act’ gives scope for the Treasury to amend the Building Societies Act 1986 (1997) to 
allow societies to borrow up to 75 per cent of their funding from the wholesale market.   
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circumstances. After conversion, the new banks are protected from takeover 
for a period of five years (unless they themselves have taken over another 
company) – a legislative feature that led to the conversion of a number of 
societies for strategic reasons (see section 2 of this chapter) (Stephens, 
2001).  
 
Starting with the Abbey National in 1989, nine building societies have so far 
demutualised (preceded by the mergers of some of the societies) with 
Bradford & Bingley being the last one to float on the stock market in 2000. 
Additionally, the late 1990s saw the floatation of Cheltenham & Gloucester, 
Alliance & Leicester, Bristol & West, The Halifax, Northern Rock, Birmingham 
Midshires, and Woolwich Building Societies. In the dying days of the 
Conservatives, many new first time shareholders were created at the height of 
the crisis in 1997 (the Major administration did not leave without further 
liberalising sector with the 1997 Act).  At the time, the mortgage market was 
fiercely in the grip of a populist discourse whose political logic divided those in 
favour of demutualisation and those against it into two ‘antagonistic camps’ 
with outright ‘battles’ between certain societies and groups of carpetbaggers 
raging back and forth (see Dayson, 2002). ‘The spate of conversion’, as The 
Banker (1997, 1 June) notes at height of the demutualisation mania in 1997, 
‘is leading to a polarisation into two camps: the converters and the remaining 
mutuals spearheaded by the Nationwide and Bradford & Bingley [who would 
later convert as well] which will be the only mutuals left with a high street 
presence.’   
 
While the conversions were far from inevitable and societies demutualised for 
different reasons (see Stephens, 2001), the ‘pro-demutualisation camp’, more 
often than not, was able to win the struggles surrounding the conversions by 
being able to build successful alliances between different the factions involved 
in these struggles against a favourable background of neoliberalist hegemony. 
Conversions to bank status were often preferred because banks, unlike 
building societies, could borrow from the wholesale markets without 
restrictions and could use securitization freely. Thus, the demutualisation of a 
society would enable potentially unlimited access to cheaper and widely 
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available wholesale funding in an increasingly competitive mortgage market. 
This was frequently thought to outweigh the disadvantages such as being be 
accountable to, and having to pay, shareholders. Under the deregulated 
market conditions of the 1980s discussed above, improved access to funding 
was difficult to resist for societies. In 1997, Peter Birch, the chief executive of 
the (already converted) Abbey National, stated that societies face severe 
difficulties ‘because they do not have access to capital and capital eventually 
is king’ (The Times, 27 September, 1997).  
 
There were, however, also less strategic (and more opportunistic) incentives 
to convert.  As Langley (2008a, p. 56) points out, support for the mutual model 
quickly waned as members of the societies were given substantial windfalls in 
the case of a conversion – stakes in the new companies in the form of shares 
that often went into the thousands of pounds – which were typically evenly 
distributed among members irrespective of the amount of savings held in a 
deposit. This, in turn, gave rise to the so-called ‘carpetbagger’ phenomenon – 
people who joined societies merely to speculate on a potential conversion and 
an associated windfall (there were also certain notorious carpetbaggers who 
joined societies on primarily ideological grounds). Furthermore, there were 
commercially oriented (but often ill-informed) ‘carpetbagger guides’ available 
that advised on which society would convert next (see e.g. The Financial 
Times, 1997, 13 August).  Financial advisers, investment bankers and City 
lawyers would also be generously rewarded by conversion and, of course, the 
managers of building societies could boost their status, salaries and bonuses 
through floatation. (In fact, The Bradford & Bingley was the only society to 
convert against managerial advice and the conversion was blamed on 
carpetbaggers by management [Heffernan, 2005].) Indeed, managers were 
often seen to be the primary driving force behind the conversions, as Phillip 
Ireland, then chief executive of the still mutual Yorkshire Building Society 
asserts: 
 
‘…the biggest threat [to mutual building societies] appear to be from within the 
building societies industry, in particular from other converting societies and 
internal Boards [of directors] and management … mutuality benefits are 
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irrelevant if its management does not want it. The intention behind some of 
these changes in legislation for which we are lobbying [Government] is 
therefore to use the ability of management to influence unreasonably the 
decisions of members’ (quoted in Tayler, 2003, p. 397). 
 
However, resistance to demutualisation was often passionately fought and 
sometimes successful. The ‘reactivation’ of these struggles, therefore, can 
serve as   local example of how neolibeliberalism and financialization have 
been contingently and politically instituted.      
 
 
2. The Fight to Stay Mutual  
 
Abbey National, then the second largest building society, was the first society 
to float and remained the only one to do so until 1997 (The Woolwich decided 
against it at the time). Abbey National had been a particularly rebellious and 
innovative society which, previously, had attempted to break the cartel 
arrangement of the BSA. Upon presenting plans for conversion, the directors 
announced a number of ‘roadshows’ to be held in city centre hotels organised 
by public relations consultants. The directors pointed to the restrictions under 
the 1986 for building societies, the improvement for customers given greater 
access to capital markets and a number of other reasons in order to mobilise 
support for the conversion campaign. Their main pitch to win over members 
was the ‘recognition of ownership’ i.e. the free shares worth about £150 per 
member. The Abbey Members Against Floatation (AMAF) formed an  
antagonistic reaction to these proposals emphasising instead particularly the 
traditional values associated with societies such as simplicity, an ‘identity of 
interest’ between savers and borrowers and so forth, but also commercial 
benefits and the increased ‘efficiency’ of mutuals in recent years. The ‘fight to 
stay mutual’ mostly took place at general meeting and through the circulation 
of leaflets but also other measures, such as car stickers saying ‘Abbey Bank 
(No Thanks)’, for example. Eventually, AMAF was defeated by the more 
powerful directors (who denied them a board meeting) and their own rather 
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amateurish campaign and lack of resources even though support for the 
project had been growing throughout their campaign. As Perks (1991, p. 425) 
summarises 
 
‘The arguments for conversion were powerful and effective because of 
the directors’ position, and the resources that they could command, not 
because of any intrinsic merit or demonstrable truth … The arguments 
were inadequate and misleading, and they were severely criticised by 
the Building Society Commission. If the directors had relied on the power 
of argument alone they might well have lost …’  
 
Despite Abbey having been the only society to convert for almost a decade, 
its demutualisation set the precedent that a society could gain the members’ 
support for floatation even in the face of resistance.  
 
By the early 1990s, senior management in most of the larger building 
societies had reached the conclusion that the legislation of the 1986 Act, while 
appropriate at the time, was too restrictive for the societies and demanded a 
more permissive way of regulation. By the time the government had rushed 
through the legislation shortly before the general election in 1997, the 
demutualisation wave was already under way. An important trigger hereby 
was the takeover of the sixth biggest society, Cheltenham and Gloucester, by 
Lloyds bank which was not a hostile takeover but made clear that their mutual 
status would not protect them from acquisition. The attraction of seeking a 
takeover by a bank lay also in Cheltenham and Glouster’s ability to retain its 
own brand name and operational independence while being able to access 
Lloyds distributional network (Marshall et al., 1997; Stephens, 2001). The 
subsequent demutualisation frenzy, however, even took market insiders by 
surprise as Adrian Coles, Director of the BSA admits: 
 
‘It has been utterly, unbelievably, astonishing. Seeing the swift disappearance 
of the former societies in the firestorm, which I don’t claim to have predicted, 
has also been astonishing’ (Adrian Coles, Director General, Building Societies 
Association, quoted in Pollock, 2008). 
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Halifax merged with the Leeds Permanent, then the fifth largest society. 
Immediately, the closure of 40 branches was announced with another ten per 
cent planned for 1996. Halifax was launched on the stock market in June 
1997 and was the then biggest ever stock market launch in history, its 
windfalls averaging £2300 (The Guardian, 1997, 3 June).  
 
The next ones to go were National and Provincial, the Woolwich, Alliance and 
Leicester, Bristol & West and Northern Rock and, one year later, Birmingham 
Midshires. Some of them demutualised to avoid a hostile takeover (Stephens, 
2001). In 1997 alone, the windfall gain was £ 37 billion as a result from the 
flotation of these societies which amounted to six per cent of overall 
consumers’ expenditure (The Independent, 1997, 14 July). This round of 
demutualisations was immediately successful because neither the 
Conservatives nor the Labour Party 160 created a framework that prevented 
them. Notably, when the courts found a way to circumvent an anti-
carpetbagger provision in the 1986 Act that specified a qualifying period of 
two years to participate in a residual claim, the Thatcher government declined 
to introduce amending legislation. Instead, they remained committed to their 
policy of ‘deregulation by default’ that had already led to the breakdown of the 
building society cartel (Tayler, 2003; see also chapter five of this thesis). The 
pro-demutualisation discourse became so pervasive that opponents of 
conversion were often publicly mocked, hereby becoming constructed into 
what Laclau and Mouffe refer to as the ‘common enemy’ (see section 1.6 of 
chapter one of this thesis). Such an antagonisation of the ‘anti-conversion 
camp’ becomes visible in the following quote, for instance:  
 
‘Opponents of conversion were treated with derision in the popular media. 
Resistance by directors was interpreted as backward-looking, over-cautious 
and inattentive to their policy-holders who would benefit from access to more 
diversified services, competitive loans and so on.’ As the Times further put it, 
                                                 
160
 Indeed, New Labour was not necessarily committed to preserving traditional mutual 
values. As the Guardian points out: ‘In power, business-friendly New Labour is not sure about 
“Mutualism”. Here’s a bastard child of capitalism that which the party has occasionally 
chucked under the chin but never warmly embraced’ (The Guardian, 1998, 22 July).  
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‘opponents were compared to “steam train enthusiasts”, hopeless romantics 
trying to save a business model that had no place in electrified modern 
capitalism.’ (The Times, 2008, 16 June) 
 
The conversions were mostly justified with reference to greater access to 
wholesale funding for the benefit of the consumer or by alluding to the 
perceived inefficiency and restrictions of the mutual model which often took on 
the form of a social Darwinist rhetoric of the ‘survival of the fittest’ (Dayson, 
2002). Behind these claims to rationality and efficiency, however, was an 
arguably deeply fantasmatic investment in the excitements and enigma of the 
stock market (cf. Stäheli, 2007):  ‘They used words like “freedom to compete” 
and “access to capital,”’ a building society analyst for UBS commented on the 
conversion frenzy, ‘but the main reasons were excessive pay, share options 
and testosterone’ (Pollock, 2008).  
 
As mentioned earlier, resistance to these processes was often very 
determined and, on occasions, successful. This was the case, for example, 
for the Nationwide whose pro-mutual CEO, Brian Davies, and committed 
board of directors fought a lengthy campaign in the name of mutuality and 
(very narrowly) succeeded in fighting off carpetbaggers on several occasions 
(Griffiths, 2001). Nationwide had been the target of a particularly notorious 
group of carpetbaggers around Michael Hardern, a former Royal Butler, who 
ran an aggressive campaign to force several societies to convert. Despite a 
number of societies managing to successfully shake off carpetbaggers and 
the Britannia, for example, alongside the Nationwide, following management 
advice to vote against conversion (Heffernan, 2005, p. 781), the fate of the 
sector was perceived to be sealed at the time unless societies were better 
protected by the government. According to a statement by the Save Our 
Building Societies pressure group in 1998: ‘It is now only direct action by the 
government that can save the building society movement’ (The Financial 
Times, 1998, 24 July).  
 
The Labour government eventually (and reluctantly) intervened by raising the 
requirements for demutualisation proposals albeit not without waiting for the 
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Nationwide ballot to be decided according to the old regulations (The 
Guardian, 1998, 22 July). The amended legislation was widely felt to be the 
end of the demtualisation frenzy as carpetbaggers retreated. However, one 
important conversion was yet to come: Bradford & Bingley, a building society 
which had previously underlined its commitment to mutuality on several 
occasions (see The Financial Times, 1998, 26 Feburary). The society 
eventually gave in to carpetbaggers and demutualised in 2001 against the 
board’s advice. The result was unexpected since the “death of the 
carpetbagger” had already been proclaimed a few weeks earlier by one 
newspaper. Thus, Bradford & Bingley’s conversion sparked renewed fear of 
another round of demutualisations and the now seemingly inevitable ‘demise 
of a 19th century ideal’ (The Economist, 1999, 29 April). However, the 
remaining societies fought back successfully this time, making Bradford & 
Bingley the last UK building society to convert to bank status (so far) and 
bringing the mutuality vs. conversion struggle to a provisional end. As the 
Economist (1999, 29 April) resumes at the end of the 20th century: 
 
‘As queues of carpetbaggers formed around the block, building societies felt 
justified in taking steps to raise their defences. Many raised the minimum-
deposit rules - to as much as £ 3000 - or restricted membership to local 
residents. Nationwide, the biggest society still remaining mutually owned, 
required new members to sign way any windfall to a charitable foundation. It 
recognised that the minimum deposit rule was deterring the very people it was 
set up to serve. Last year, it narrowly defeated a motion to demutualise. Fifteen 
societies have changed their rules, to require more than a simple majority vote 
to force conversion. Yet, despite the vigorous defence that some societies have 
mounted, the Bradford & Bingley conversion is an important landmark in their 
long and steady decline as a force in British banking.’ 
 
The now heavily diminished building society sector was still able to offer 
competitive products and carve out a more or less comfortable niche for itself 
following the conversion frenzy. Also, the frequently cited ‘efficiency’ of the 
demutualised societies, particularly the benefits for customers, was highly 
questionable, as an independent parliamentary group pointed out (the All-
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Parliamentary Group for Building Societies & Financial Mutuals, 2006, March). 
It was the rapidly growing and ‘exciting’ new banks, however, that defined the 
subsequent conjuncture. As the demutualised societies swaggered into the 
seemingly limitless possibilities on offer to them in what came to be known as 
the period of the ‘Great Moderation’ (see section two of chapter seven and 
chapter five of this thesis), the ‘death of the building society’, notwithstanding 
evidence to the contrary (i.e. competitive savings and mortgages products, 
better customer services etc), had frequently been declared (see e.g. 
Manchester Evening News, 2005, 11 July).  Yet, it was the building societies 
which came back with a vengeance less than a decade later.  
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Conclusion 
 
This chapter continues to investigate the marginalisation of the mutual logic in 
the UK mortgage market during the 1980s and 1990s and the rise of the logic 
of financialization. It shows how different factors such as technological 
change, the internationalisation of capital and neoliberalist ideology 
contributed to the progressive deregulation of financial services and markets 
in the UK. These changes are inherently political in nature. The first section 
investigates the liberalisation of financial services under the 1986 Financial 
Services Act and the changing environment of the 1980s which were defined 
by an increase in competition which made it increasingly difficult for building 
societies to compete with banks and other lenders which were aggressively 
entering the market. These transformations, it is argued, led to a liberalisation 
of the building society movement which, in turn, contributed to a further 
erosion of the mutual model (of some societies) in favour of the identification 
with the neoliberalist discourse that emphasises profits and freedom to 
compete. The struggles surrounding the demutualisation wave are analysed 
in the light of the political terrain that was created by the hegemony of 
neoliberalism which, however, also provoked resistance – sometimes 
successfully. In drawing on concepts such as Laclau’s social antagonism and 
Gramsci’s war of position, these struggles can be conceptualised as 
contingent and potentially reversible, providing, in turn, a vantage for the 
contestation of the hegemony of neoliberalism and financialization.  
 
The next chapter discusses the financial crisis and the ‘return of the building 
society’ in its wake. It concludes that the logic of mutuality which has briefly 
re-surfaced during the financial crisis has, so far, failed to generate enough 
wider political support in order to provide a viable alternative to the fiancialized 
model that dominates the market. 
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‘From 1992 to 2007 the world economies all grew pretty much without 
interruption … [during this period] credit was fairly cheap the real rate of 
interest was quite low … because there were huge savings, there was a great 
savings glut from the far east … These savings were coming out on to the 
world market … driving down rates of interest everywhere … It was a big 
period of easy money’ (Interview 15).  
 
‘The fundamental problem of political philosophy is still precisely the one that 
Spinoza says so clearly, and that Willhelm Reich rediscovered: “Why do men 
fight for their servitude as stubbornly as though it were their salvation?”’ 
(Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus quoted in Gammon and Palan (2006, p. 
97).  
 
 
Chapter Seven: Ideology and Politics in the Financial 
Crisis 
 
 
Introduction 
 
As discussed in the previous chapters (particularly chapter four of this thesis), 
the economic bull years that culminated in the financial crisis of 2007- were 
driven by a benign macro-economic climate of low global interest rates and 
high volumes of liquidity. Growth was powered by the expansion of 
neoliberalist deregulating and financialization which had its political roots in 
the resolution of the stagflation-crisis of the 1970s and the marginalization of 
alternative ways of organising the economy, such as the mutual model of 
mortgage lending and funding. The boom was arguably also deeply 
interwoven with fantasy. Everyday leveraged investors increasingly identified 
with the notion of ever increasing house prices. Politicians, bankers, 
regulators and auditors all colluded to some degree or another in this 
ideological utopia of an endless boom without a bust. This fantasmatic logic 
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exerted such a strong influence over its subjects that the crisis that followed 
took many by surprise.  
 
This chapter outlines how this fantasy emerged as a particular manifestation 
of the market and how this fantasy was succeeded by a restoritative attempt 
of the utopian return to prudent capitalism. The opportunity for a counter- 
hegemonic move in the wake of a brief resurgence of mutual building 
societies at the beginning of the global financial crisis was squandered given 
a lack of political and popular support. Instead, a restoritative fantasmatic 
logic has propelled a political logic of difference that has so far succeeded in 
defending the status quo of neoliberalism and financialization in the UK 
mortgage market.  
 
 
1. Ideologies of a Near Past161: The Fantasmatic Rise of the 
‘Perfect Market’ 
 
1.1 The Fantasy of the Market 
The idea of ‘free markets’, legitimated by a general trust in the ‘scientificity’ of 
neoliberalist economics (see chapter two of this thesis), became the central 
nodal point of economic activity which was arguably also deeply interwoven 
with ideological fantasy. The latter’s ‘grip’, rested, to a large part, on the 
neoliberal notion that markets are something neutral, apolitical and even 
‘natural’. This view was (and still is) widely disseminated by what Nigel Thrift 
calls the ‘the cultural circuit of capitalism’. (For attempts of the Financial Times 
to ‘sediment’ or ‘naturalise’ financial markets in the years of the new economy, 
as well as during the current global financial crisis, see DeCock et al., 2008; 
2009; 2011). As  DeCock et al. (2011) point out, the decisive characteristic of 
‘the market’ as ideological  fantasy is to be found in the projection of a certain 
‘image of the market’, an image that first and foremost aims at naturalising 
markets as such rather than a particular market policy or even specific 
                                                 
161
 This title is inspired by DeCock, C., Fitchett, J. and Volkmann, C. (2009) ‘Myths off a Near 
Past: Envisioning Finance Capitalism anno 2007’, ephemera 9 (1), pp. 8-25.  
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economic intervention. Thus, markets effectively became a blank canvas, or a 
‘horizon’ in phenomenological terms, for the elaboration of any concrete form 
of economic organisation.   
 
Following Žižek (1997), such a reference to mere ‘utility’ and ‘neutrality’ 
designates ideological fantasy at its purest. This notion, in turn, has made the 
articulation of alternatives to the market economy from within the neoliberalist 
universe very difficult indeed, since ‘it is the fantasy of the law of the markets 
as “impassable horizon of our time” in its purest form [that defines 
contemporary capitalism] … a direct expression of human nature’ as DeCock 
et al. (2010, p. 15) put it (see also chapter two of this thesis).   
 
From about the mid-1990s onwards the market ideology found its particular 
expression in the belief that even the destructive effects of business cycles – 
the ‘bust’ in a market that usually follows a ‘boom’ or the ‘bear’ that follows a 
‘bull’  – had finally been conquered for good. Politicians, traders, regulators, 
rating agencies, auditors and the wider public (in the form of the new 
everyday financial subjectivities discussed in chapter four of this thesis) 
colluded in the fantasy of unlimited bull markets and debt-fuelled consumption 
which underpinned the inflation of the bubble (see chapter four of this thesis). 
The conjuncture that preceded the meltdown of 2007-8 can therefore be 
classified as one that was defined by a widely shared beatific fantasy of a 
never-ending economic prosperity: an eternal boom without a bust.  
 
1.2 ‘Beating the Bear’: The Ideology of Boom without Bust 
Due to advancements in computer technologies (see Aglietta and Breton, p. 
436) and the ‘risk-dispersing’ qualities of financial derivatives and 
securitization (see chapter four of this thesis), the belief emerged that the 
destructive effects of business cycles as such had finally been conquered 
and, relating to this point, house prices would essentially rise ad infinitum and 
credit-financed consumption would also always be available. This set of 
ideological beliefs became a particularly pronounced expression of the 
general fantasy that the market usually ‘gets it right’ (see chapter two of this 
thesis). This fantasy was deeply embedded within the materialities and 
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symbolics of the social logic of financialization which is characterised in 
chapter three and five of this thesis.   
 
As a result of the benign macro-economic climate during the past conjuncture, 
the UK economy (and indeed the world economy to varying degrees) had 
experienced a continued period of economic growth. Ben Bernake in the 
United States, then a member of the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve Bank (the central bank of the USA) and now its chairman, alluded to 
the then widely used notion of the ‘Great Moderation’ (which has mockingly 
been substituted by the term ‘The Great Complacence’ in a recent book by 
Engelen et al., 2011).  
 
A lot of the praise for this development was attributed to the expansion of 
financial derivatives and securitization markets from Alan Greenspan to the 
IMF and a large number of leading academics, unsurprisingly most notably 
neo-classical economists (see Krugman, 2009). For example, Greenspan, 
then Bernake’s predecessor as Chairman of the Federal Reserve Bank and 
firm believer in the market mechanism, commented in a speech in the same 
year that: 
 
‘by far the most significant event in finance during the past decades has been 
the extraordinary development and expansion of financial derivatives … the 
reason that growth has continued despite adversity, or perhaps because of it, is 
that these new financial instruments are an increasingly important vehicle for 
unbundling risk … in short, the value added of derivatives themselves are an 
increasingly important vehicle for unbundling risk’ (USAGold.com, 1999, 24 
March).162 
 
Greenspan also more than once (and controversially) claimed that derivatives 
had increased the standard of living globally (ibid) hereby unintentionally 
                                                 
162
 In the wake of the crisis, Greenspan somewhat revised his position stating that his 
‘ideology’ (sic) had been ‘partially wrong’ and that he ‘found a flaw’. He claimed that he had 
believed too much in the willingness and capacity of financial institutions to monitor 
themselves prudently (PBS NewsHour (2008, 23 October).   
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providing an interesting example for the infusion of morality with a particular 
hegemonic content as pointed out by Gramsci (see chapter one of this thesis).   
In the UK, where New Labour fully embraced neoliberalist hegemony and 
financialized growth (itself legitimised by their own organic intellectuals),163 
Gordon Brown, then Chancellor of the Exchequer, confidently asserted that: 
 
‘For 40 years our economy has an unenviable history, under governments of 
both parties, of boom and bust. So, against a background of mounting 
uncertainty and instability in the global economy, we set about establishing a 
new economic framework to secure long-term economic stability and put an 
end to the damaging cycle of boom and bust’. In his last budget report the 
Chancellor confirmed that: ‘we will never return to the old boom and bust’ 
(Channel 4 News, 2008)164. 
 
This fantasy also provided an effective incentive for the large-scale 
identification of everyday financial subjects with the neoliberal consensus 
based on leveraged consumption in exchange for political participation and 
contestation. The fantasy of a perpetual boom, therefore, provided the 
‘ideological glue’ that held together the neoliberalist historical bloc in the first 
decade of the century, tying the ‘interest’ of the broader population to those of 
the financial and political elite. As a result of the financialization of all sorts of 
credit, particularly mortgages, consumption became one of the motors of 
capitalist expansion and consumer credit, for example through leveraging 
one’s home. Its becoming more readily available and widespread was aided 
by the persistent diffusion of neoliberalist ideology throughout civil society 
(see chapter five of this thesis for more details). (Perhaps one of the most 
striking examples that signifies that marriage of the world of financial markets 
and consumption is the weekly magazine of The Financial Times entitled How 
To Spend It which promotes a decisively upmarket version of consumerism 
unattainable for, but still presented as an ideal to, the vast majority of the 
population who, however, still can still derive a certain private jouissance from 
                                                 
163
 See Jessop (2003). 
164
 Brown also retrospectively qualified his statement in an interview with Daily Mail in 
September 2008:  'I actually said, No more Tory boom and bust (...) Fifteen per cent interest 
rates under the Tories! We've got interest rates of five per cent, that's a bit different, isn't it?’ 
(The Daily Mail, 2008, 11 September). 
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it. Such a fantasmatic attachment to consumerism, as noted in chapter two of 
this thesis, has arguably found its horrific expression in the lootings that took 
place across the UK in August 2011.)   
 
With credit increasingly drying up as a result of the financial meltdown, its 
central role for neoliberalism becomes more and more apparent. One 
interviewee pointed this out by commenting on the crisis that: ‘We all 
participated in this [the meltdown], I certainly did … We all have our credit 
cards, our cars, our mortgages …’ (Interview three).  
 
Housing and mortgages featured particularly prominently within this scenario 
since the notion of ‘liquid homes’ centring on the notion of continuously rising 
house prices was actively politically promoted. Everyday leveraged investors 
enthusiastically identified with the ideology of housing as a perpetual ATM 
machine protected by the state, as those who did not get on the property 
ladder ‘scolded themselves for missing such as “sure thing”’ (see the first 
opening quote by Hamilton in chapter four of this thesis). Governments 
became eager to collude in, and exploit, this fantasy in order to further the 
neoliberalist agenda of free markets and private property, as well as to 
compensate for the crumbling of the remnants of the Keynesian welfare state 
and to finance state expenditures such as the public sector expansion under 
New Labour. 
 
The fantasy of ‘no more bust, only boom’ arguably also exerted a strong 
ideological grip on economic and political cadres because it reinforced 
feelings of omnipotence and invincibility contributing, in turn, to large-scale 
excessive risk taking and denial of the consequences (see particularly the 
above quote by Gordon Brown). Stein (2011) argues that the crisis was 
preceded by a collective ‘manic culture’ that had evolved in the past two or 
three decades in Western capitalism. This was characterised by sentiments of 
omnipotence, triumphalism, denial and over-activity implicating different 
parties such as regulators, auditors, governments and financial market 
institutions more or less simultaneously. It is also argued that the ‘phallic 
masculinity’ that arguably dominates the collective thinking in financial 
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markets contributed to, and legitimised, a sense of certainty and risk-taking 
(Figlio, 2010).   
 
The presence of this ideological fantasy also helps to explain (among others) 
things such as incompetence, the opacity of the banking system and, of 
course, also ‘sheer greed’165. This greed is exemplified by the refusal of a 
large number of market participants and experts to accept anything but a ‘soft 
landing’, despite warning signs since early 2006, as property markets, 
particularly commercial property, were booming well into the first half of 2007. 
For example, Bernake, testifying to the Congress’ Joint Economic Committee 
in March 2007, stated that: ‘... at this juncture ... the impact on the broader 
economy and financial markets of the problems in the subprime markets 
seems likely to be contained.’ (M2 Presswire, 2007, 29 March).166 
 
It becomes clear that the meltdown itself (and the boom beforehand) is, thus, 
indeed inextricably linked to a certain emotionally charged ‘belief’: 
 
‘Far from representing a failure of knowledge’, Roberts (2009, p. 335) points 
out, ‘it seems to me that the crisis has its roots in too much certainty – a belief 
by market participants that they knew what they were doing ... The 
extraordinary thing about the credit crisis is that the hurt and damage was 
similarly inevitable and yet we had all somehow come to believe in the magic 
whereby markets can transform aggressive self interest into a public good.’ 167  
 
Accounting for the presence of the fantasmatic ideology of ‘no more bust – 
only boom’ therefore helps to explain that, despite the crisis having actually 
been relatively well predicted (Chick, 2008), its subjects often appeared 
‘trapped’ in their belief systems as the crisis already began to unravel. This is 
                                                 
165
 For an illustrative account of some of these themes see Lewis (2009).  
166
 The presence of denial also becomes apparent in Greenspan’s statement (ibid) that: ‘I 
knew -- the housing bubble became clear to me sometime in early 2006, in retrospect. I did 
not forecast a significant decline because we had never had a significant decline in prices’. 
167
 It is perhaps useful to clarify again here (see also section four of chapter one here) that the 
notion of ‘no more boom and bust’ as ideological fantasy (as well as the post-crisis fantasy to 
be analysed below) is not intended to be used in a ‘false consciousness sense’ as one might 
read into this citation but to illustrate how a particular ideology had underpinned, and given 
consistency, or, ‘an underlying guarantee’ Chang and Glynos (2011, p.11) to the organization 
of the economy prior to the dislocations experienced as a result of the financial crisis.  
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illustrated by the infamous quote of Chuck Prince, then Chairman and CEO of 
Citigroup, in 24 June, 2007: ‘When the music stops, in terms of liquidity, 
things will become complicated. But as long as the music is playing, you’ve 
got to get up and dance. We’re still dancing’ (quoted in Langley, 2009, p. 71).  
 
It is argued in the following that the crisis, despite a brief resurgence of the 
mutual model and a credible alternative to fiancialized growth, has been 
accompanied by a restorative fantasy which postulates a return to an 
imaginary age of ‘prudent capitalism’ that aims to compensate for the loss of 
‘no more bust – only boom’. 
 
The figure below gives an outline of the timeline of the crisis: 
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Figure 5: Chronology of the crisis, July 2007 – February 2009 
Source: Gamble 2009 
 
1.3 The Revenge of the Repressed: The Downfall of the Converted and the 
Return of the Mutual  
Cracks in the American subprime market were increasingly showing during 
the first half of 2007. By the second half events began to unravel at a 
quickening pace. In April, an American Bank that specialised in the subprime 
market, New Century Financial, filed for bankruptcy and slashed its workforce 
by half. Its collapse sent ripples throughout the financial system and other 
institutions had to increasingly write-off subprime loans. In Britain, 20 per cent 
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of mortgage products disappeared in just 10 days and 100 per cent 
mortgages vanished as Abbey withdrew the last home loan available without 
a deposit. The investment bank Bear Stearns announced the loss of two of its 
hedge funds in July, 2007. Banks became aware of their own exposure to 
subprime loans and their willingness to lend to each other increasingly 
diminished with the signifier ‘credit crunch’ increasingly being used as an 
reason. In August, investment bank BNP Paribas announced to put money 
out of two of its fund due to a ‘complete evaporation in liquidity’. The central 
banks of Europe, the US, Canada and Japan now began to intervene. On 4 
September the rate at which banks lent to each other- the LIBOR – had 
reached its highest level since 1998. The BBC revealed on 13 September that 
Northern Rock had asked for, and been granted, emergency financial support 
from the Bank of England as lender of last resort. A day later, anxious savers 
queued in front of Northern Rock’ branches to withdraw £1 billion until the 
government guaranteed their savings (BBC, 2009, 11 June; Gamble, 2009a, 
p. 22 ff).  
Although Northern Rock, the former building society, had virtually no subprime 
lending, it became heavily dependent on wholesale funding to the extent that 
when the latter dried up in the global markets, it became quickly illiquid. Prior 
to its collapse the Rock had grown very aggressively becoming the fifth 
largest lender in the UK with about 50 per cent of its funding coming from 
securitization through its SPV Granite. Its retail deposits had fallen from 
62.7% at the end of 1997 to 22.4% at the end of 2006 (House of Commons 
Treasury Select Committee, 2008). As one market participant sums up 
Northern Rocks Business model in relation to securitization (see also chapter 
four of this thesis): 
 
‘Northern Rock didn’t fail because it wasn’t profitable, Northern Rock failed 
because of a crisis of confidence. Essentially, they were leveraging up very, 
very aggressively … they were overtrading against the asset base that they 
had through securitization … so that enabled them to constantly lend more and 
more and more’ (Interview four). 
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Northern Rock was nationalised in March 2008 and eventually sold to Virgin 
Money in November 2011 at a loss of £ 400 million to the British taxpayer. 
Halifax, another one of the demutualised societies and the largest mortgage 
lender had merged with Bank of Scotland to form HBOS leaving it in severe 
difficulties. On 18 September, 2008 Lloyds TSB announced the acquisition of 
HBOS ending weeks of speculation about its fate. Commenting on HBOS’s 
downfall, CEO, Andy Hornby stated that ‘it was the combination of being 
property based on one side of the balance sheet with a significant reliance on 
wholesale funding on the other’ (HM Treasury Select Committee, 2009, p. 22). 
Bradford & Bingley, the next ex-mutual to perish was said to have attempted 
to ‘replicate Northern Rock’s disastrous funding model’ (The Telegraph, 2008, 
26 September). It too had grown rapidly. Bradford & Bingley combined a high 
exposure to the wholesale markets by venturing into the more profitable buy-
to-let market of which it became the leader, advancing a fifth of all home loans 
(ibid).  Bradford & Bingley also became big players in the self-cert market and 
acquired mortgage loan books through a series of deals with the General 
Motors subsidiary General Motors Acceptance Corporation (GMAC), leaving it 
particularly exposed to bad quality home loans. The problems of Bradford & 
Bingley were identified as being that ‘it was very exposed to the buy-to-let 
market [and that] it also had a problem with the self-cert market’ (HM Treasury 
Select Committee Report, 2009, p. 16). Bradford & Bingley was nationalised 
in September 2009. Its savings operations and branches were sold to 
Santander. None of the 10 converted societies exist anymore today. National 
& Provincial, Cheltenham & Gloucester, Bristol and West, Abbey National, the 
Woolwich and Birmingham Midshires were all taken over in the 1990s or 
2000s and Alliance and Leicester was acquired in July 2008 by Santander. 
Unsurprisingly, the entirely centralised securitization funded lenders all 
vanished.  
 
In September 2009 the entire banking system bordered on the verge of 
collapse in the wake of the downfall of Lehman Brothers and AIG. In Britain, 
the government injected a total of £37 billion into three banks effectively 
(part)nationalising them as the country slid into a recession: Royal Bank of 
Scotland (RBS), Lloyds TSB and HBOS. 
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Amidst these turbulences encompassing the downfall of all of the 
demutualised societies whose ‘exciting’ business models were hailed only a 
year earlier,168 the mutual sector lived through a spectacular resurgence 
powered by a shift in public discourse towards ‘safety and stability’. Often 
declared dead in the wake of the demutualisation frenzy (see the previous 
chapter) building societies increasingly managed to capitalise on their image 
as being boring at the beginning of the crisis.  In the first half of 2008 almost 
£6.3 billion were deposited in the sector as opposed to £3.8 billion during the 
first half of the previous year. In line with the global economic problems, 
lending had slowed from £8.4 billion in the first half of 2007 to £3.4 billion 
between January and June 2008 (The Independent, August 3, 2008).  
 
During the early phase of the crisis one could detect a ‘reactivation’ (see 
section 2.4 of chapter one of this thesis) of the mutual model that led to an 
increased questioning of the merits of the demutualisation frenzy. As the 
Times puts it on 16 June 2008 (cited in BSA, 2008, 31 July): ‘What is doubly 
sad is that some of the most battered banks are former building societies – 
those once prudent institutions woven into the fabric of British life’.  
Following this, on 7 June the Independent reports:  
 
‘today the demutualisation dream lies in tatters. All of the building societies that 
did it have either gone or are shadows of their former selves … a perfectly 
viable industry which performed a vital public service in a reasonably well 
managed responsible fashion, has been completely destroyed’ (The 
Independent, August 3, 2008).  
 
Building Societies, restricted by law as to their capital markets funding activity 
(see the previous chapter) and having no shareholders to serve, did therefore 
not experience the same problems as the banking sector or even the 
centralised lenders did. This lead to the Independent (ibid) remarking that: ‘the 
governance arrangements of building societies have proved rather sounder 
                                                 
168
 Northern Rock, for example, was given a ‘buy’ or ‘hold’ recommendation by most analysts 
including Goldman Sachs (Fletcher, 2007).  
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than those of the heavily “incentivised” bankers’. Indeed, a number of 
societies pulled back from the market in the early phase of the tightening of 
credit conditions despite losing market share.  For example, the retail director 
of the Nationwide pointed out that: ‘we took the view at the beginning of this 
year [2007] that our rivals were driving down pricing, loosing affordability 
constraints and sacrificing quality for market share’. He goes on by 
emphasising the importance of sticking to a ‘very basic principle’ despite 
losing market share, in the light of these developments (The Independent, 
November 23, 2007).  
 
One interviewee (Head of Group Risk of a building society – Interview five) 
regards the absence of a financialized business model as central for the 
identity of a society:  
 
‘We don’t treat mortgage customers as commodities. There is a personal 
approach there and that does mean that, particularly in the branch based 
business, we would interview every customer and we would look at the 
individual circumstances and we would base our decision on the interview. We 
would always say “it’s not just a scorecard “yes or no” decision but we will see 
whether we could help somebody depending on the circumstances. So I think 
it’s fair to say that is a mutual feature. Is it an exclusively mutual feature? I don’t 
think that it is but I have worked for HSBC for 18 years and increasingly driving 
cost and overhead out of the business model means moving towards a 
scorecard-based, commoditised approach with call-centres and everything that 
goes with that. I think you then lose that personal touch … I think a mutual 
would try to retain an element of that. I think it’s something about the mutual 
ethos that is about building relationships rather than viewing mortgages as 
commodities. Hence, we have never securitized. When we have grown our 
mortgage book, we have done it through direct acquisition so I guess who 
could say that’s reflecting that approach.’  
 
However, mutuality appears not to be a bulletproof guarantee for stability. The 
Derbyshire, Chesire and Dumferline building societies all collapsed during the 
financial crisis because of involvements in the Icelandic Banking Crisis or, in 
the case of the Dumferline Building Society, the ill-advised purchase of self-
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certified mortgages by GMAC and Lehman which resulted in heavy losses. 
Those societies have, as Michie and Llewellyn put it: ‘developed a risk 
appetite inappropriate for a mutual’ (cited in Elgin, 2011, p. 4). 
 
More generally, then, the mortgage market is still in distress and the societies 
are facing strong competition from the state owned banks in a depressed 
market. In 2010, there were only 8 or 10 active lenders out of 100 and return 
to pre-‘crunch’ lending and securitization volumes seemed neither realistic or 
desirable. The mutual sector, however, proves to be remarkably resilient and 
cautiously optimistic (BSA, 2011b, 1 June). However, given the coalition 
government’s commitment to ‘foster diversity and promote mutuals’ (BSA, 
2011c, 4 May), remarkably little has been done to change how the mortgage 
market and its institutions operate, as one can see by the rushed sale of 
Northern Rock to Virgin at a knock-down price. Mutuo, a think tank dedicated 
to promoting mutual values pointed out that the government failed to produce 
evidence showing that a mutual solution is not feasible. As Ed Mayo, the 
secretary general of Cooperatives, UK stated: ‘Deciding not to mutualise 
Northern Rock despite calls from a range of stakeholders, does not sit well 
with the government’s frequently stated support for cooperatives and mutuals.  
It is argued here that one of the reasons for the reluctance to implement more 
radical reform is the emergence of a fantasmatic narrative of the crisis that 
aims at the a re-affirmation of neoliberalism and financialized growth which 
has been translated into a political logic of difference in order to preserve the 
institutional complex as a whole.  
 
 
1.4 A Return to Prudent Capitalism 
The post-crisis ideological fantasy has morphed from its ‘no more boom and 
bust’ incarnation into a desire to return to an imaginary situation of prudent 
capitalism which is translated into a transformist political logic of difference. 
This political logic preserves key features of financialization and neoliberalist 
hegemony based on the fantasmatic object of the market. This new fantasy 
contains beatific and horrific elements. At its beatific end, according to Bloom 
(2010), this fantasy is centred upon an idealised future of recovering the 
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stability of an imagined past. Its promise contains a restoration of prudent 
borrowing and lending that has somehow gotten out of hand. According to 
DeGoede (2009), the crisis is discursively framed in terms of ‘excess’. 
Through the attribution of excess to borrowing lending, trading and so on, it is 
possible to retro-actively define causes for the dilemma and, thus, project 
control on to the situation.  
 
Alistair Darling, for instance, demands a ‘return to good old fashioned 
banking’ (BBC News 2009, 11 June). As such endeavours are continuously 
frustrated, they become translated into their horrific reverse: the crisis as a 
threatening contamination of, or intrusion into, an otherwise pure economy. 
The widespread use of toxicological metaphors in the wake of the crisis to 
describe financial instruments is a good indicator of this process. Hereby pure 
AAA assets become ‘contaminated’ by ‘bad debt’ etc, or, as Watson (2009a) 
points out, responsible mortgage borrowers are discursively opposed to 
reckless lenders, a move that legitimises a bank bail-out because it promises 
to return banking back to ‘normal’ via state interventionism. At the height of 
the crisis, the latter is depicted in highly apocalyptical terms using a language 
that resembles an end-of-days scenario. And indeed, what MacKenzie calls 
‘the-end-of-the-world trade’ – the cost of taking out an insurance against the 
collapse of half of America’s top corporations has, despite its very 
hypothetical nature, increased tenfold in 2009. Shortly after the collapse of 
Lehman, one trader fuelled the collective imagination with a story that the its 
collapse had been: ‘a financial Armageddon, doomsday and nuclear war 
rolled into one’ (The Daily Star, 2008, 16 September).  
 
What emerges out of these scenarios are ‘greedy bankers’ as the archetypical 
scapegoats of the financial crisis. Greedy bankers have stolen our collective 
lost/impossible enjoyment in the sense that they are not just enjoying 
themselves but enjoying themselves at our expenses. As the Scottish Sun 
excitedly reports (2008, 18 October): 
 
‘FATCAT Lloyds TSB bankers gorged themselves on a sumptuous five-course 
feast at Scotland’s most exclusive hotel – just days after getting a share of a 
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£17 billion bailout paid for by YOU. As Scots families struggled to beat the 
credit crunch, the money men scoffed salmon terrine and beef fillet while 
quaffing expensive fine wines at Gleneagles in Perthshire. Afterwards they 
retired to the swanky hotel bar and roared with laughter while ordain whisky’s 
costing up to £1,000 A NIP’ (original emphasis).  
 
Even in the fall of 2011, the Daily Mirror is still running a feature series called 
FatCat bankers with its own logo – a fat cat with a big cigar in its mouth. What 
this scapegoating process arguably has achieved, apart from snatching back 
a little bit of that lost jouissance, is to narrow that fundamental and systemic 
critique and transformation which becomes very difficult to articulate. As  
DeGoede (2009, p. 306) comments: 
 
‘the present focus on the bonus culture, entails a very problematic and populist 
narrowing of the debate. It allows ordinary citizens an easy target to voice their 
critiques of the financial sector and it allows [Ministers] to make a seemingly 
firm stand against the financial industries. In the meantime, the complex 
product innovations and more fundamental risk cultures of the markets are in 
the process of being placed beyond public debate.’ 
 
Scapegoating bankers presents us therefore with what Žižek (1997, p. 29) 
calls a ‘false opening’ or an ‘offer to be refused’ as it simultaneously maintains 
a false opening of choice, while at the same time narrowing the possibilities 
for choice. This ideological commitment to a false opening is arguably what 
has prevented a more fundamental reform of the financial system so far.  
 
In the context of the mortgage market this means, for example that the 
government does not intervene into how mortgages of the failed banks are 
priced (i.e. through the market) (see Watson, 2009b). Indeed, the separation 
of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ bankers only serves to reinforce the market as a 
depoliticized sphere beyond public scrutiny and intervention (Froud et al., 
2010) and hereby preserving key rhetorical tropes of the neoliberalist project 
such as the generation of ‘shareholder value’ for the taxpayer. The 
government was quick to respond to the crisis of the housing market and has 
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quickly propped up the latter with a whole series of different legislatory 
measures (Williams, 2011). Yet, what seems to be prevalent is a return to the 
market and bubble mentality. Recently, the Coalition government has 
introduced a new taxpayer-backed 95 per cent mortgage to help ‘“unstick” the 
housing market and make the “dream of homownership” a reality for more 
people’. A year earlier the housing minister Grant Schapps asserted in June 
2010 that ‘the age of aspiration [regarding the increase of homeownership 
levels] is back’. Simultaneously, and in emphasising the private sector as a 
future solution for housing provision, he stated that ‘the cash for affordable 
housing has run out’ (Guardian, 2010, 8 June). In this sense, one perhaps has 
to refine the post-crisis fantasmatic logic not as an imaginary return to a 
golden age of capitalism but essentially a return to the bubble: ‘Please can we 
have our bubble back, clamours just about everyone‘ (The Guardian (2009, 
24 February). Neoliberalism might be crumbling, but it still seems to be very 
much alive in the realm of belief.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter is concerned with the concept of ideological fantasy in the pre-
crisis and post-crisis world. It characterises the pre-‘credit crunch’ conjuncture 
of asset inflation and frantic trading of securitization and derivatives driven by 
a favourable macroeconomic and embedded in the fantasmatic notion of ‘no 
more bust – only boom’. This fantsmatic logic is a particular manifestation of 
the fantasy of the market which came to an end amidst the dislocations of the 
financial crisis.   
 
The chapter describes the events of roughly the first year of the global 
financial crisis. It shows how every single building society that was still an 
independent entity collapsed in the wake of the meltdown. As the remaining 
building societies lived through a period of ‘reactivation’, new fantasmatic logic 
centring on the market was already underway. The latter drew on the notion of 
a return to prudence and on the scapegoating of a number of individuals, 
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most notably ‘greedy bankers’, who were deemed responsible for ‘the mess 
we’re in’. It is argued that this fantasy propels a political logic of difference that 
re-affirms neoliberalism and financialized growth. Thus, the contestation of the 
status quo in the mortgage market seems unlinkely (for the forseable future at 
least) as Northern Rock has been returned to the stock market.  
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Chapter Eight: Concluding Discussion 
 
Introduction 
The thesis provides a genealogical reading of the political construction of the 
UK mortgage market in the light of the financial crisis of 2007-. Its main aim, 
reflected in the overall structure of the thesis, is two-fold: Firstly, to develop 
and engage a poststructuralist account on the financial crisis and, secondly, to 
investigate empirically the financialization of the British mortgage market in 
the build-up to, and the aftermath of, the financial meltdown of 2007-09. The 
UK mortgage market has been chosen as the object of analysis given the 
importance of mortgages for the conjuncture of capitalist expansion that 
preceded the crisis and given the relative neglect of scholarly research on the 
UK context as opposed to the US. My theoretical framework is outlined in the 
chapters 1-3 and the empirical analysis of the mortgage market has been 
carried out in the chapters 4-7.  
The poststructuralist/post-Marxist approach to political economy that is 
developed in the chapters one and two draws on the theoretical framework of 
Ernesto Laclau and PDT. It is used as an ‘ontological frame’ for the 
articulation of more middle-range theories of neoliberalism and financialization 
that are discussed in chapter three. Taken together, these various theoretical 
approaches construct an ‘investigatory lens’ which allows for a fresh 
perspective on the financial crisis and its preceding phase of capitalist 
expansion. (I have outlined the need for such a combination of theoretical 
approaches in section two of chapter two of this thesis as well as in the 
introduction; for the ’method of articulation’ see LCE, chapter six; Howarth, 
2005; and section three of the introduction to this thesis.)  
By making use of the theoretical edifice thus constructed (and the empirical 
material listed in section three of the introduction), the thesis gives an in-depth 
account of several ‘critical moments’ in the financialization of the UK mortgage 
market during neoliberalist hegemony under particular consideration of the 
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marginalisation of the building society model that had dominated the market 
until the 1980s.  
In the following, I will outline and synthesise my main theoretical arguments 
and empirical findings, with a particular focus on the empirical analysis 
chapters, and situate them in a broader context. Section one of this 
concluding discussion presents the main theoretical insights of the thesis and 
section two contains an overview over the most important points of the 
empirical analysis carried out in the chapter 4-7 in the light of these insights.  
1. Main theoretical insights 
The thesis develops and engages a poststructuralist/post-Marxist approach to 
the political economy as a critical alternative to mainstream interpretations of 
the economy and the financial crisis.  
In particular, I have distinguished a poststructuralist/post-Marxist take on the 
political economy from an orthodox Marxist one on the one hand and a 
neoclassical one on the other hand. While Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe 
locate themselves within the Marxist (more precisely, Gramscian) tradition, 
one of their main contributions is the deconstruction of Marxist economism 
and historical stagism as discussed extensively in the chapters 1-2. Following 
this approach, the thesis affirms the critical angle and focus on social struggle 
of the Marxist tradition but rejects its economic determinism. Thus, a major 
theoretical concern of the thesis is the constitutive nature of struggles and the 
primacy of the political in the construction of economic space. Also, and 
following Gramsci as well as Laclau, the economy is not an isolated sphere 
but part of a hegemonic project which always consists of cultural, political and 
economic factors alike. Social logics such as mutuality or financialization are 
therefore not confined to one topography of the social (the economy, for 
example) but are articulated within the wider historical bloc of neoliberalism. 
An analysis of the political economy according to the approach advocated 
here must therefore always take into account how its logics are made and re-
made within a wider hegemonic terrain (I have particularly illustrated this point 
in chapter four of this thesis that consists of a discussion of the cultural, 
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political and economic forces that have contributed to the financialization of 
the UK mortgage market). Furthermore, as indicated above, a Laclauian 
approach to the economy is diametrically opposed to the doctrine of 
neoclassical economics which has been instrumental in legitimising and 
promoting neoliberalist hegemony and the financialized growth model at the 
heart of the financial crisis. In particular, neoclassical economic’s 
conceptualisation of the economy as an isolated terrain populated by rational 
actors who operate in an ahistorical social and political vacuum can be 
challenged by a poststructuralist/post-Marxist framework which emphasises 
relationality, historicity, power, affect and the primacy of the political. (See 
particularly chapter two of this thesis for a brief synopsis and critique of the 
methodological underpinnings of neoclassical economics and an overview of 
a poststructuralist political economy according to Laclau.)  
In drawing on these insights, the thesis aims to contribute to the small and 
diverse but growing literature on poststructuralism and political 
economy/finance (see e.g. Langley, 2006; 2007; 2008a; DeGoede, 2003; 
2004; 2005; 20006; 2009; Daly; 1991; 1999; 2004; 2006; Scherrer, 1995; 
Bertramsen et. al, 1990; Griggs and Howarth, 2009; Howarth, 2010; Gibson-
Graham, 1996; 2006). Inspired by various traditions of the ‘poststructuralist 
variety‘, these approaches are broadly concerned with highlighting power and 
politics, anti-economism, contingency, economic difference and the 
precariousness and discursivity inherent in the construction of economic 
space.  
Most importantly, as the majority of these approaches point out, the economy 
has long been constructed as a depoliticised sphere beyond public debate 
and political inquiry within mainstream representations (see in this context 
also Froud et al., 2010; Harvie and Milburn, 2011, 4 August). Thus, a major 
theoretical concern of these accounts often involves a ‘re-politicisation’ of 
economic and financial practices (see particularly DeGoede, 2004; 2005).  
A Laclauian framework, then, is able to contribute to this agenda of the re-
politicisation’ of sedimented and contingent economic and financial practices 
by providing a theoretical framework that formulates, as Contu (2002) puts it, 
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a ‘political answer to questions of struggle’. Thus, Laclau supplies the 
theoretical resources to account for the contingency, historicity and political 
construction of the economy (cf. Laclau, 1990, p. 31-36) by situating power-
struggles at the heart of the social. This allows for a ‘re-politicisation’ of the 
economy in the truest sense of the word (see particularly Daly, 2004) as 
power is conceived of as a set of exclusionary and inclusionary practices that 
are linked to the instituting dimension of the political which takes primacy over 
the social (including the economy which, consequently, can no longer function 
as the determining ‘base’ of society). The economy, as mentioned on a 
number of occasions in the thesis, can therefore be understood as the 
contingent result of conflicting hegemonic power struggles that strive to 
institutionalise their particular interests as universal and to 
marginalise/suppress alternatives.  
The task of the researcher, then, becomes to expose the ‘original acts of 
violence’ (Laclau, 1990, p. 33-5) that have led to the establishment of the 
current taken for granted social order and have involved the repression of 
equally valid alternatives. This means that every social order (including the 
economy) can be challenged as contingently instituted or, to invert Margaret 
Thatcher’s infamous phrase, ‘there is always an alternative’.  
Here, Glynos and Howarth’s ‘logics approach’ (see LCE), a particular version 
of Political Discourse Theory (PDT), has helped to translate Laclau’s rather 
abstract theoretical premises into a more ‘institutionalist’ framework that 
deploys a nexus of political, social and fantasmatic logic to account for how 
social regimes are instituted, contested, maintained or transformed. Also, the 
component of ideological fantasy in Glynos and Howarth’s theoretical edifice 
brings to the fore a useful psychoanalytical dimension which remains latent in 
Laclau’s own work. (See particularly section four of chapter one for a 
discussion of the concept of ideological fantasy.) In accordance with Laclau, 
the logics approach affirms the radical contingency and political institution and 
general contestability of every social order.  
As stated above, these theoretical insights which are discussed at length in 
the first two chapters of the thesis form the basis of a genealogical study 
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whose aim it is to illuminate the political acts of institution and power struggles 
as well as the affective dimension that have shaped the mortgage market in 
the UK during the last four decades.  
The different theories analysed in chapter three highlight different aspects and 
processes of financialization such as the growth of derivatives and 
securitization (British Social Accountants), institutional transformations 
(Regulation School) and culture and everyday life. Those approaches are 
then ‘articulated together’ in the chapters 4-7 on the basis of the overall 
framework of Laclau and PDT.  
In doing so, the thesis aims to avoid an overtly structuralist explanation of the 
financial crisis as well as narratives of individual greed, incompetence and 
fraud that occupy the mainstream press and a range of practitioner account. 
Instead, it stresses how struggles have constituted the current economic and 
financial order and how this very order is always vulnerable to the forces that 
it has excluded in the process of its constitution.  
2. The Political Construction of the UK Mortgage Market 1979-
2011 
In order to illuminate how the mortgage market in the UK has been 
constructed politically with respect to its exclusionary practices and 
constitutive power struggles, the analysis section of the thesis consists of four 
chapters that highlight, on the one hand, different historical phases of market 
construction in the neoliberalist era and, on the other hand, different aspects 
of the theory of Laclau and PDT. The overriding concern of these four 
chapters is to investigate how the progressive financialization of mortgages in 
the UK has rested on hegemonic power struggles and, particularly, the 
exclusion of the mutual model that had previously dominated the market. The 
thesis hereby provides an in-depth localised example as to how the 
hegemonic regime of financialization and neoliberalism has been politically 
instituted and the struggles and modes of resistance that this process has 
encountered. Financialization is conceptualised as a ‘market logic’ of the 
neoliberalist regime that has constituted itself to a large part in opposition to 
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the logic of mutuality. The ‘naming’ of those two logics serves the purpose of 
challenging the dominant logic of financialization in the name of an arguably 
more sustainable and fairer but marginalised counter-logic (see section three 
and LCE for the process of naming logics and counter-logics).  
In doing so, the thesis traces several different ‘critical moments’ from 1979 
until the aftermath of the meltdown and has investigated how struggles at the 
organizational level of the mortgage market are related to the molar level of 
neoliberalist hegemony. To this end, the thesis deploys Glynos and Howarth’s 
framework of social (chapter four), political (chapter five and six) and 
fantasmatic (chapter seven) logics and dimensions as a ‘guiding thread’ 
throughout the analysis chapters. 
The thesis concludes that the rise of financialization in the mortgage market 
has been inherently political and unstable in nature (as revealed in the 
financial meltdown) but that the potential opportunity for reform associated 
with the brief resurgence of the mutual model in the wake of the financial 
crisis has not (yet) gathered sufficient political support to challenge (and 
potentially transform) the financialized monoculture of mortgage lending and 
funding in the UK. The main points of the chapters 4-7 will be summarised in 
the following in the light of these elaborations. 
Chapter Four is concerned with giving an overview over the state of 
financialization of the UK mortgage market prior to the financial crisis - the 
‘sedimented’ content of financialization in the words of Laclau - whose political 
origins had been largely forgotten prior to the meltdown and whose 
reactivation has been the aim of chapters 5-7. Theoretically, the chapter 
particularly draws on Glynos and Howarth’s concept of social logics and 
Laclau’s notion of discourse as well as Gramsci‘s relational conception of 
hegemony. It is also the chapter that makes the most use of the theories of 
financialization as discussed in chapter three in order to account for different 
aspects of the financialization of the mortgage market.  
The chapter aims to provide a broad overview over the social logic of 
financialization in the context of homes and mortgages. It is primarily 
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concerned with the description of how the financialization of mortgages 
‘ticks’169. Hereby, Laclau’s conceptualisation of discourse is an important 
thread throughout the chapter.  
 
Firstly, as discussed at length in chapter one, a discourse comprise ‘material 
and ideal’ elements and (partially) constitutes subjects as well as objects. In 
following this approach, the chapter investigates a range of material as well as 
symbolic practices of mortgage borrowing and financing and shows how, 
through the emergence of new financial instruments such as securitization 
and derivatives, new forms of subject positions are produced and identified 
with (see particularly also Langley, 2006; 2008a on this point). The identity of 
the financialization of mortgages (how the financialization of mortgage ‘ticks’) 
is therefore understood to be an assemblage of practices, speech-acts, 
material things and subjects, a bricolage that forms an unstable totality, rather 
than a ‘rational’, ahistorical and asocial phenomenon.   
 
Secondly, and following Gramsci’s notion of a historical bloc in addition to 
Laclau’s concepts of discourse and relationality, the economy cannot be 
viewed in isolation but must be situated within a wider relational terrain of 
hegemony that includes cultural, political and hegemonic forces in equal 
measure (see particularly also Bertramsen et al., 1991 for a thorough 
discussion of this point). The chapter comprises a broad analysis of the 
cultural, political and economic factors that have contributed to the hegemony 
of financialization in the context of mortgage lending and funding in the UK. 
Given the importance of securitization for financialization, the chapter contains 
a lengthy discussion of this financial market innovation as well an account of 
forms of mortgage borrowing that are associated with financialization and are 
characteristic of the neoliberalist ideology of consumption promoted on the 
basis of freedom and choice (equity release schemes, buy-to-let, 125 % etc). 
Additionally, the chapter discusses important cultural and political factors that 
contributed to the financialization of housing and mortgages to account for the 
‘bigger picture’ that has been neglected in the often (but by no means always) 
                                                 
169
 To recapitulate, the analysis of  a social logic is primarily (but not exclusively)  concerned 
with description. (see LCE and section three of chapter one of this thesis).  
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technical and depoliticised literature on the financial crisis and processes of 
financialization.  
 
Having provided a (more or less) descriptive account of the social logics of 
mortgage market financialization in chapter four, the thesis then asks how this 
regime has been politically instituted and contested with particular reference 
to the progressive marginalisation of the building society model (the political 
dimension and logic) in the chapters 5-6 before it investigates the curious 
absence of fundamental reform in chapter seven (fantasmatic logic and 
dimension). To this end, the thesis takes the transformations of the British 
mortgage market in the UK in the late 1970s as the starting point of its 
genealogical investigations. 
 
As already indicated, chapter Five is concerned with the instituting dimension 
of neoliberalist hegemony and the related hegemonic struggles that have 
shaped the mortgage market in the UK in the late 1970s and early 1980s 
which, in turn sowed the seeds of the demutualisation frenzy of the 1990s and 
the rapid financialization of mortgage finance in its wake. 
 
The aim of the chapter is to return to, or ‘reactivate’, the terrain of the original 
violence’ of the hegemony of neoliberalism in order to account for the 
contingent struggles that preceded its institution and the forces it excluded or 
marginalised in its constitution. The various manifestations of the concept of 
‘the political’ in the work of PDT (e.g. political moment, political dimension and 
political logic) hereby form the backbone of the chapter). In addition, it uses a 
range of associated Laclauian concepts such as dislocation, antagonism, 
empty signifier and logic of equivalence in order to chart the contingent rise of 
neoliberalism and the associated transformations of the UK mortgage market.  
In the first part of the chapter, it is shown that the rise of the neoliberalist 
project is linked to the ideological appeal of the signifier ‘freedom’ which 
successfully mobilised political support from various sections of society in the 
wake of the dislocations created by the stagflation crisis of the 1970s while 
simultaneously managing to repress alternative projects of the left (see 
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Gamble, 2009a for a number of alternatives that had been attempted but 
ultimately failed).  
 
The second part of the chapter investigates the fundamental transformations 
of the UK mortgages market from a ‘protected circuit’ dominated by a near-
monopoly cartel of building societies into one of the most deregulated 
financial markets in the UK. By using Glynos and Howarth’s theoretical 
approach, the chapter discusses how various economic, political and 
ideological struggles ‘in the name of a principle or ideal’170 - the signifier 
‘freedom’ - led to the successive deregulation of the market and the 
abolishment of the building society price cartel. It is thus possible to connect 
struggles at the level of the market to the broader molar level of national and 
global neoliberalist hegemony (cf. Howarth, 2010). On the basis of the 
transformations in the mortgage market, it is also shown how neoliberalism 
largely constituted itself as an antagonistic response to the preceding regime 
of embedded liberalism171.  
 
These developments and struggles contributed to a broader restructuring of 
financial services in the UK and the progressive undermining of the building 
society model culminating in the demutualisation wave of the late 1990s which 
is the topic of chapter eight. Theoretically, the chapter aims to further 
substantiate the central claim of this thesis that hegemonic struggles 
constitute economic space.    
 
If every book or thesis indeed has a ‘core’ as argued, for example, by 
Agamben (2011), for this thesis, the latter is to be found in chapter six. This 
is the case because the chapter contains the essence and synthesis of the 
main theoretical and empirical arguments of the thesis. To reiterate, the first 
one is, the constitutive (and not derivative) nature of hegemony power-
struggles and the presence of an economy that is ‘criss-crossed with 
                                                 
170
 LCE, p. 115 
171
 It is worth recalling here that, according to Glynos and Howarth (LCE, p. 106), ‘the 
institution of a particular regime...is always defined in opposition to a contested regime...and 
this oppositional contrast colours the regimes practices’. 
 
‘  
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antagonisms’ (HSS, p. 151). The second one is the empirical claim that the 
building society demutualisations of the 1990s were the focal point for the 
financialization of the UK mortgage market both ideologically and materially.  
The chapter primarily makes use of Laclau’s notion of power and antagonistic 
struggles as well as Gramsci’s concept of ‘war of position’ to investigate the 
continuous erosion of the ‘market logic’ or mutuality from the early 1980s 
onwards that culminated in the conversion of 10 of the largest society into plc, 
hereby transferring two thirds of mortgage assets to the stock market. The 
first part of the chapter investigates the ‘Big Bang’ Financial Services Act and 
Building Society Act both of 1986 that significantly accelerated the logic of 
financialization and further eroded the logic of mutuality, making instead most 
building societies more market oriented.  
 
The second part of the chapter provides an in-depth account of the struggles 
which surrounded the demutualisation phase starting with the conversion of 
the Abbey National in 1989. In addition to Laclau’s notion of antagonistic 
struggles, this section particular deploys Gramsci’s idea of a ‘war of position’ 
that emphasises the importance of persuasion and the building of alliances in 
order to ‘seize power’.  
 
The chapter argues that neither were those demutualisations ‘pre-determined’ 
nor were they exclusively driven by supposedly rational factors such as ‘the 
freedom to compete’ or ‘access to capital’ even if those were indeed important 
factors. The fierce hegemonic struggles (that often transcended the 
immediate sphere of the market, via an active media interest for example) as 
well as the successful resistance to demutualisation of some of the societies, 
highlight the contingency at the heart of the demutualisation, a contingency 
that later became partly reactivated in the wake of the financial crisis.    
The chapter therefore illustrates how Laclau’s notions of power, antagonism 
and contingency can be put to work to illuminate constitutive processes in the 
political economy.    
 
Chapter Seven, then, investigates the ideological and political response to 
the dislocations of the financial crisis in the context of the UK mortgage 
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market. Hereby, the chapter deploys the concept of ideological fantasy that is 
discussed in section four of chapter one. This Lacanian concept finds 
expression in PDT as the ‘fantasmatic logic’ that accounts for the ideological 
‘grip’ (Glynos, 2001) of a practice or regime. The concept of ideological 
fantasy stresses the categories of subjectivity and enjoyment – jouissance in 
Lacanian terms – by providing an analytical frame for how subjects identify 
with certain practices and not others. However, these practices often affirm 
rather than contest structures of domination and oppression. The chapter 
uses the notion of fantasmatic and political logics to illustrate how the 
alternatives to financialization that have presented themselves in the wake of 
the financial crisis have been dismissed (so far) in favour of an affirmation of 
the status quo and the legitimation of existing power relations.  
Empirically, the chapter argues that there has been a partial ‘reactivation’ in 
the wake of the crisis – a heightened sense of contingency which was 
particularly visible when building societies, traditionally associated with safety 
and stability, lived through a period of resurgence in the wake of the failure of 
the demutualised societies such as Northern Rock and Bradford & Bingley. 
However, this has not translated into broader political support and 
opportunities for a structural reform of the sector, and indeed, the financial 
markets more broadly, have arguably been squandered in an attempt to 
recuperate the neoliberal project and financialized growth.  
 
The first part of the chapter investigates the ideological fantasy of ‘no more 
bust, just boom’ that underpinned the conjuncture of financialized expansion 
which preceded the crisis and drove to debt bubble most notably in housing. It 
conceptualises this fantasy as a particular version of the more general quasi-
religious ideology of ‘the market’ that has been integral to the neoliberalist 
project from its inception. The ‘crunch’, then, led to a short-lived disruption of 
this ideology as savers and borrowers returned to mutuals amidst the failure 
of the demutualised society which entailed a partial reactivation of the merits 
of the demutualisation period (or, rather the lack thereof) in the wider public 
discourse. 
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Soon, however, the fading fantasy of ‘no more bust, just boom’ became 
transformed into a newer one that can be titled ‘a return to prudence in 
capitalism’ which affirmed key features of the neoliberalist model and 
promised and imaginary return to ‘responsible capitalism’, albeit (and only 
seemingly paradoxically) largely within the established order (see also Bloom, 
2010). Reinforced by the public scapegoating of a few individual bankers and 
horrific depictions of doom and decay at the height of the crisis, the thesis 
argues that this fantasy has (so far) resulted in a significant narrowing of the 
public debate by providing jouissance for the public and by mobilising a 
political logic of difference that has been mostly successful in keeping 
contestation (and concessions to the population) to a minimum and 
preserving the existing institutional complex as a whole by preventing 
fundamental structural reform.  
 
Given a lack of political (and ideological) support, the impact of the 
resurgence of the building society model in the wake of the financial crisis has 
therefore been limited. Despite a convincing case for demutualisation, 
Northern Rock has now been returned to the public market (not least because 
of a lack of interest from other building societies in its acquisition). The thesis 
concludes that a formidable opportunity for sustainable reform has therefore 
indeed been ‘wasted’, at least for the time being (cf. Froud et al., 2010).  
 
To briefly recapitulate, the thesis provides and approach to the political 
economy that affirms contingency, discursivity and the primacy of the political 
over the social. It thus locates power-struggles at the constitutive centre of 
economic activity. This allows for conceptualising the economy a contingent 
sphere of institution and economic activity and agency, contrary to the 
dominant paradigm of neoclassical economics, as something that is 
constantly made and re-made via struggles and acts of identification. The 
concept of fantasmatic logic, as used particularly in chapter seven, provides 
further theoretical resources to illuminate as to why subjects identify with 
certain hegemonic projects and submit themselves to conditions of 
subordination.  
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The critical, and indeed emancipatory, merit of this approach lies in the fact 
that, from this point of view, contingency is something to be affirmed. Hence, 
another social and economic order that differs from the current status quo is 
not only thinkable but, given enough political support, also achievable. The 
extension of the concept of radical democracy onto the economy, then, 
means an openness other potential forms of organization of the economy 
from the vantage point of which the existing power configuration can be 
potentially be challenged (see also Gibson-Graham, 1996; 2006). The thesis 
analyses financialization precisely from such a vantage point by providing an 
in-depth genealogical investigation into one of its counter-logics: the logic of 
mutuality.  
 
The following chapter concludes the research project. It revisits the research 
questions posited at the beginning of the study, points out the limitations of 
the thesis and discusses potential areas of further research and engagement.   
 
Overall Conclusion 
 
1. Research Questions 
This thesis provides a detailed genealogical analysis of the transformations in 
the UK mortgage market in the neoliberalist era by using the theoretical 
framework of Ernesto Laclau and Political Discourse Theory.  In the course of 
this thesis, I have addressed the following research questions: 
 
1. Research Question One: How can the theory of Laclau and PDT be 
fruitfully mobilised for an analysis of the economy and finance? 
 
I discuss Laclau’s theory and PDT in detail in chapter one. Chapter discusses 
and engages a Laclauian framework for an analysis of the political economy. 
Hereby, it a useful strategy has been to juxtapose a poststructuralist political 
economy following Laclau with the philosophical underpinnings of 
neoclassical economics and, through this oppositional contrast, distill different 
conceptual categories for empirical analysis. I conclude this observation by 
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arguing that Laclau and PDT furnish concepts that are able to challenge 
convincingly the central paradigms in neoclassical economics such as the 
figure of the homo economicus, the social atomism of economic agents as 
well as the relegation of politics and power from the sphere of the economy.  
 
A Laclauian poststructuralist political economy, as understood here, therefore 
emphasises the categories of relation, irrationality, primacy of the political and 
power as well as affect in economic analysis. I put these guidelines to use in 
my analysis chapters 4-7, emphasising hereby the category of discursive 
relation in chapter four both at the molar level of state, economy and civil 
society and at the molecular level of how subjects and and material objects 
are constituted.  
 
Further, the thesis highlights the political dimension of institution and 
contestation and the constitutiveness of antagonistic struggles upon the 
economic sphere in chapter five and six and investigate the category of affect 
and ideological fantasy in chapter seven. In the light of Laclau’s (1991) 
emphasis on how the empirical always interacts with the theoretical in the 
course of which both become transformed, what has emerged as a central 
argument during the course of my research both theoretically and empirically, 
has been the notion that struggles are constitutive upon the economic sphere 
and not derivative of an underlying transcendental principle such as ‘the 
market’ or the ‘economic base’ (see also the concluding discussion in the 
preceding chapter of this thesis).  
 
This insight has emerged by carefully observing the processes of struggle and 
resistance between different hegemonic forces and market logics in the light 
of the ascendancy of neoliberalism and the demutualisations of the 1990s.  
Hereby, Laclau’s theoretical edifice has helped to conceive of those struggles 
as contingent and involving counter-logics that can be reactivated to contest 
the status quo.  
 
Theoretically, the struggles that took place surrounding the rise of 
neoliberalism are situated within an explanatory framework that shows how 
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subjects are politically mobilised in relation to certain demands/signifiers – the 
signifier ‘freedom’ for example. This framework therefore adds to other, more 
Foucaultian, poststructuralist accounts of the political economy (see e.g. 
Langley, 2006; 2008; DeGoede 2003; 2005; 2006) by providing a theoretical 
framework for struggle that integrates the molar and the molecular level of the 
economy.  
 
2. How and why has the UK mortgage market been transformed from a 
protected circuit in the 1970s to a highly financialized and competitive market 
in 2007 where the mutual model has been increasingly antagonised? What 
have been the implications of these transformations for the global financial 
crisis?  
 
The thesis provides an empirical analysis of the transformations in the UK 
mortgage market since the late 1970s. Chapter five investigates the rise of 
neoliberalism and the struggles surrounding the breakdown of the building 
society price cartel. Chapter six discusses how the rise of a new money 
culture, or market logic, progressively undermined and marginalised the 
mutual logic, culminating in the demutualisation frenzy. Chapter seven shows 
the ideological attempts to reanimate and preserve key features of 
neoliberalism and financialization.  
 
As already stated, the thesis shows that the contemporary mortgage market 
has been the result of struggles. Thus, the transformations in the UK 
mortgage market are understood to be contingent and always contestable. 
Neoliberalism has succeeded in marginalising the mutual model by mobilising 
enough (often tacit) political support from various sections of society but, as 
the occasional successful resistance to the demutualisation wave and the 
resurgence of mutuals during the financial crisis exemplifies, this has not been 
a necessary process. Thus, as frequently pointed out in the thesis, ‘the 
excluded’ can always serve as a counter-logic to challenge and potentially 
transform the existing taken-for-granted power configuration. Whether it 
succeeds, however, is arguably a matter of successfully generalising its 
particular demand.  
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The thesis argues that the demutualisation wave exemplifies crucial features 
of the neoliberalist project and sheds light on the current problems in the 
mortgage market. It is thus unsurprising that these processes have been 
reactivativated to some degree in the wake of the crisis.  
 
In particular, demutualised societies made aggressive use of the wholesale 
funds that became freely available upon demutualisation. The frozen money 
markets of 2007-8 that resulted in the collapse of, inter alia, all remaining 
demutualised societies can, and have, therefore been directly related to the 
hegemonic struggles and politics that shaped the market in the 1980s and 
1990s.  
 
In making explicit this connection both ideologically and materially, the thesis 
contributes to existing research on mortgage finance that highlights 
institutional factors but often fails to adaeqautely conceptualise processes of 
power and resistance (see e.g. Aalbers, 2008; 2009a; 2009b; Gotham, 2006; 
Sassen, 2009; Wainwright, 2009a; 2009b).  
 
3. How has neoliberalist hegemony and financialization been reproduced or 
contested culturally, politically and economically in the context of the UK 
mortgage market? 
 
The reproductive mechanisms of neoliberalism, its social logics, are 
particularly investigated in chapter four with regard to their political, economic 
and cultural dimension in the context of the mortgage market. This chapter 
accounts for the social logic of financialization from the perspective of the 
broader historical bloc of neoliberalism. It shows that neoliberalist hegemony 
in the mortgage market relies on a hegemonic consensus which centres on 
the transformation of housing into an object of finance and speculation. As the 
chapter emphasises, this is enabled economically by new financial 
instruments. Further, the chapter discusses the cultural and political 
component of mortage market financialization, the latter with regard to how a 
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cross-party agreement emerged in the neoliberal age that is based on 
homeownership above all other forms of accommodation.  
 
The contestation that neoliberalism has encountered is discussed on a 
number of occasions throughout the analysis chapters 4-7 with particular 
emphasis on the demutualisation frenzy which supports Laclau’s claim that 
struggles are constitutive upon the social. Together with the other main insight 
of the thesis that neoliberalism, as a hegemonic regime, always encompasses 
cultural, political and economic aspects, the thesis contributes to existing 
accounts on neoliberalism that conceives of the latter more narrowly 
particularly at the expenses of cultural forces and struggles (see e.g. Gamble, 
2009a; Gamble, 2009b; Gamble, 2002 Crouch, 2011; Harvey, 2005). 
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2. Limitations 
 
The thesis is not a representative ‘case’ nor is it concerned with the ‘testing’ 
and application of theoretical variables. As pointed out in section two and 
three of the introduction, rigid definitions of validy and reliability therefore do 
not apply to the study and they are not intended to172. Rather, the focus is on 
discovery (both theoretically and empirically) and political intervention.  
 
Therefore, the study is not, ‘generaliseable’ in the more narrow sense as 
deployed in the mainstream social sciences particularly as it factors a certain 
contingency into the process of carrying out empirical research itself by 
acknowledging the overdetermined nature of every social identity (see the 
discussions in sections two and three of the introduction). The thesis is thus 
not concerned with ‘causality’ but with ‘critical explanation’ (Glynos and 
Howarth, 2007).  
 
Also, the focus of the thesis is theoretical and not methodological or method-
led. However, it is acknowledged that future work is needed to elaborate a 
more concise methodological position particularly in relation to data gathering 
and analysis in order to defend this approach against accusations of 
‘methodological arbitrariness’. Given Laclau’s focus on ontology and neglect 
of (one could even say, open hostility towards) ‘methods’, the thesis gives 
primacy to the ontological at the expenses of methods which, admittedly, 
assume more of an ad-hoc character in the study173. While this is presumably 
in accord with Laclau himself, if I was to conduct the study again, however, I 
would (early on) focus more on considerations of methodology and methods 
particularly in relation to data collection and empirical research designs in 
order to obtain a more cohesive dataset (not least for future follow-up 
research).   
 
                                                 
172
 As stated in the introduction, this does not mean, of course, that the methods employed in 
this study cannot be justified.  
173
 However, this approach also has had the advantage of responding flexibly to the difficulty 
of gaining research access to financial institutions during the financial crisis.  
 262
A second (and related) limitation of the study is that is concerned with the 
application of one particular approach (Laclauian theory and PDT) to a 
context where it has not (or not sufficiently) been used in the past (the 
economy). While, as I believe, this has yielded a number of interesting 
insights, a more theoretically flexible account could have been, perhaps, a bit 
more elegant at times. On the other hand, this would have compromised the 
theory-led approach that has been an important part of the thesis.  
 
Also, my analysis is confined to a particular site of the economy, the mortgage 
market (and within this market, to very particular forms of struggles), but also 
aims to make a more general statement concerning the trajectory of 
neoliberalist hegemony. However, it does not claim to do this exhaustively 
and in an ‘unbiased’ manner (in the sense that mainstream social science 
would use the term). While the thesis certainly points to crucial symptoms of 
neoliberalism as a whole, the latter is a very complex and overdetermined 
process and has developed many strands and contradictions and, arguably, 
currently undergoes significant transformations (see also section one of the 
introduction).  
 
Within this complex terrain, the study is to be understood as a ‘particular’ 
intervention that is political rather than ‘scientific’ in nature (‘scientific’, again, 
according to a more mainstream connotation of the term). Since this course of 
action, in all likelihood, accounts for a weakness for a good portion of social 
scientists, it needs to be reiterated here that, while its methodological side 
could have indeed been strengthened (see above), the thesis does not 
attempt to be ‘a primer’ on the neoliberalisation and financialization of 
mortgages but, rather, as also indicated above, is to be understood as being 
part of a hegemonic struggle that itself is based on contingency and the 
(unavoidable) exclusion of other, equally valid, alternatives.  
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3. Glimpsing the Future 
 
The contribution of Laclau and PDT to a critical poststructuralist economy is 
still in its infancy but has a lot to offer to the field of political economy (as well 
as business and management studies). As pointed out in chapter two, there is 
a small but growing amount of work on Laclau and political economy already 
(see for example Howarth, 2010; Griggs and Howarth, 2009; Bertramsen et 
al., 1991; Scherrer, 1995). However, these accounts have remained either 
very abstract or, as in the (very interesting) work of Griggs and Howarth’s 
work on aviation, arguably, not been too much concerned with a theoretical 
engagement with the sphere of the political economy per se.  
 
In my eyes, therefore, more studies are needed that merge theory 
development and empirical analysis and hereby address traditional concerns 
of political economy (or economics) in a novel way. The logics approach, and 
PDT more broadly, seems to be a promising way forward in this respect (see 
e.g. Glynos et al., 2011) but they are certainly not the only one.  
 
In my eyes, Laclauian theory can provide a novel approach to power and 
economic struggles which contests established accounts on the basis of the 
contingency, historicity, power and primacy of the political of all social 
relations. Researcher dissatisfied with the monolithic, universalist and 
totalising representation of capitalism in orthodox Marxism (see Gibson-
Graham, 1996; 2006 in this context) but nevertheless in search of a critical 
angle, can find a vast theoretical reservoir in Laclau for a more nuanced and 
differentiated approach to economic life including, of course, its contestation. 
Central concepts such as antagonism, dislocation, identity and identification, 
empty signifier and so forth can thus potentially form the basis of a myriad of 
different critical studies on the economy that actively affirm contingency and 
radical democracy.   
 
The extension of the concept of radical democracy itself onto the economy, as 
briefly indicated in section two of chapter one and chapter two, could hereby 
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become the conceptual backbone of a critical approach towards the poltical 
economy that is firmly committed to social justice and critique. A new 
emancipatory research spirit could therefore potentially emerge that takes 
seriously the contingency and ‘openess’ of the economy as opposed to relying 
on an arguably outdated and futile notion of ‘revolution’. Indeed, research 
based on Laclau can escape such totalising accounts by starting to engage 
with concrete demands (Laclau, 2005) or logics (Glynos and Howarth, 2007) 
that have the potential of becoming (counter-) hegemonic.174 
 
Of course, this requires a lot more theoretical and empirical work as to the 
suitability and limitations of this research strategy. Hereby, Chantal Mouffe’s 
body of work could also be of additional help as she has, arguably even more 
than Laclau (see Wenman, 2002), contributed to the concept of radical 
democracy. Additionally, the cross-fertilisation with other approaches such as 
Regulation School appears promising but could be developed more 
systematically and with more considerations for empirical research. Similarly, 
other approaches to political economy and finance, particularly those 
concerning culture and everyday life (see chapter three), could be mobilised 
together with Laclauian theory and PDT for further fruitful empirical research 
and theory development.  
 
The almost complete absence of the economy in the theory of Laclau as 
discussed in chapter two, can hereby be turned into a major advantage, I 
believe, which is the development of a fresh and critical theoretical 
perspective on the political economy that is receptive to the demands 
imposed by the current times and unburdened by past dogmas or failures.   
 
Empirically, further research is needed on the current performance of building 
societies and the role they can play in the mortgage market of the future. For 
example, the merger of the Britannia building society with the Co-operative to 
                                                 
174
 This has been the approach favoured in this thesis which has idenfied mutuality as a 
counter-hegemonic discourse from which to contest financialization and neoliberalism.  It 
must also be noted in this context, that precisely such a totalising pre-occupation of the left 
with the then dominant discourse on the state in capitalism has led to an almost complete 
silence on its part as well as a strategy of non-interventionism during the demutualisation 
period of the late 1990s (see Taylor, 2003).   
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form a so-called ‘supermutual’ is an interesting case and certainly worthwile 
researching.  
 
More generally, the current and future trajectory of the mortgage market 
needs to be further researched given its past importance for growth and 
neoliberalist expansion as well its cultural and political significance in terms of 
homeownership ideology. It will be important, hereby, to challenge the 
‘monoculture’ that still conceives of the market as the best provider of homes 
and mortgages.  
 
The main empirical insight of this thesis is that mutuals provide a viable (and 
arguably much ‘healthier’) alternative to neoliberalist forms of organisation 
and financialized business models but are in need of political support given 
neoliberalism’s tendential hostility towards all forms of collective organisation.   
Nobody of the mutual specialists that I have interviewed during my research 
would advocate a return to the price cartel discussed in chapater five (or 
indeed anything that comes close to it) even if this was possible. However, an 
attentiveness to the ‘reactivation’ of collectivist forms of organisation that 
typically (but not always) have been marginalised by neoliberalism in favour of 
‘freedom to compete’ and individual property, is certainly another important 
topic for future research.  
 
This is particularly the case in the light of current debates about the future of 
the economy and capitalism more broadly. Not all ‘collective’ forms of 
organisations are the same, of course, and while some have thrived during 
the financial crisis such as the Cooperative and John Lewis, others have 
suffered for example in agriculture, particularly in the global South. It is 
perhaps therefore not far-fetched to argue that, whatever the sector that 
delivers the growth that is needed to revive the economy, it is also likely to 
encounter the destruction of its more traditional forms of organisation if 
neoliberalism is to survive in its current form (if indeed those forms still exist).    
 
The research that is proposed here should thus move beyond the current 
infatuation of the political elite with the ‘John Lewis Model’, of course, to 
 266
encompass broader and more profound considerations about the nature and 
desirability of certain economic and organisational forms and practices (and 
their potential alternatives) and, ultimately, the society that we want to inhabit. 
Hereby, Laclau’s theoretical perspective can make a valuable contribution.  
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Appendix 
 
List of Interviews 
 
1. Market Analyst 
Interview in November 2007 and September 2008. The interviewee was 
employed by two large investment banks respectively at the time of the 
interviews. The person has over ten years experience in the analysis of a 
range of different commercial sectors.    
 
2. Leadership Consultant in the Private Equity Sector 
Interviews in February 2008, and October 2008. At the time of the interviews, 
the person was founding member of a leadership consultancy. The 
consultancy specialised in consulting private equity funds, including the 
private equity section of a large commercial bank.  
 
3. Vice President; Relationships and Sales Officer of Investment Bank 
Interview in November 2008. The interviewee was employed by the British 
dependence of an American investment bank at the time of the interview. This 
person has had a longstanding career in investment banking and has also 
authored scholarly papers on financial markets and the crisis. 
 
4. Director of Building Society 
Interview in March 2009. The interviewee was the director of one of the ten 
largest building societies in Britain at the time of the interview. Prior to that, 
the individual also had an extensive career in the commercial banking sector.  
 
5. Head of Group Risk – Building Society  
Interview in June 2009. At the time of the interview, this individual was Head 
of Group Risk of a medium-sized building society. The person has oversight 
over the risk management system and frameworks that the society and its 
subsidiaries use to assess and manage exposure to risk. Prior to this, the 
person had worked for a commercial bank for almost twenty years.   
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6. PhD candidate economics 
Interview in May, 2011. This individual specialised in financial economics at 
the time of the interview. The person also kindly provided material for the first 
section of chapter two.  
 
7. Professor in Economics: Head of Academic Section 
Interview in January 2009. This professor has published widely on the 
banking sector and global macroeconomics both in academic journals and in 
newspapers.  
 
6. Software Engineer, Hedge Fund 
Interviews in August, 2008 and February, 2009. This person designed and 
maintained trading software for a hedge fund that specialised in futures 
trading at the time of the interview. This individual holds a PhD in financial 
economics and has in-depth knowledge about financial derivatives.  
 
7. Mortgage Market Expert 
Interviews conducted via e-mail between March and August, 2009. This 
person had worked in the mortgage market for over 25 years at the time of the 
interview. The person has published widely on the UK mortgage market.   
 
8. Director General of BSA (title given with consent of the interviewee) 
This person was the director of the Building Society Association at the time of 
the interview. He has an exceptional expertise of the building society sector 
and the mortgage market and has published widely on these subjects.   
 
9. BSA Employee 
Interviews in September, 2009 and March, 2010. This person was a 
longstanding employee of the BSA at the time of the interview.  
 
10.  BSA Employee  
Interview in December, 2008. This person was employed by the BSA at the 
time of the interview.  
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11. Head of Group Finance 
Interview in June, 2009. This person was in charge of the finance division of a 
medium sized building society at the time of the interview. The person has a 
personal background in commercial banking and is an expert on mortgage 
funding 
 
12. Head of Public Relations 
Interview in June, 2009. This individual was the head of public relations of a 
medium sized building society. The person has more than twenty years 
experience in the sector.  
 
13. Political Activist: Derivatives Specialist 
Interview in November, 2009. This person was a political activist at the time of 
the interview. The individual is an expert on financial derivatives. 
 
14. Professor Accounting 
Interview in January 2008. This person has published widely about the 
auditing, banking and the shadow banking system. The person is also 
involved in political consultation  
 
15. Professor of Economics – Adviser to Thatcher (title given with the consent 
of the interviewee).  
Interview in October, 2009. This person was an economics professor at the 
time of the interview. He had previously been an adviser to Thatcher and has 
published widely on the crisis of the 1970s and Thatcher’s economic policies. 
 
16. Business Analyst 
Interview in July, 2008. This individual was a business analyst for a large 
investment bank at the time of the interview. It the time of the interview, he 
was an analyst in the pharmaceutical sector.  
 
 
 270
References 
 
Aalbers, M.B. (2008) ‘The Fiancialization of Home and the Mortgage Market Crisis’, 
Competition and Change 12 (2), pp. 148-166. 
Aalbers, M.B. (2009a) ‘The Sociology and Geography of Mortgage Markets: 
Reflections on the Financial Crisis’, International Journal of Urban and Regional 
Research 33 (2), pp. 281-90. 
Aalbers, M.B. (2009b) ‘The Globalisation and Europeanization of Mortgage 
Markets’, International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 33 (2), 389-410. 
Agamben, G. (2011) ‘The Kingdom and the Glory’: For a Theological Genealogy of 
Economy and Government’, Stanford: Stanford University Press.  
Aglietta, M. (1979) ‘A Theory of Capitalist Regulation: The US Experience’, London: 
Verso. 
Aglietta, M. (1998) ‘Capitalism at the Turn of the Century: Regulation Theory and 
the Challenge of Social Change’, New Left Review I/232, November-December, pp. 
41-90. 
Aglietta, M. (2000) ‘Shareholder Value and Corporate Governance: Some Tricky 
Questions’, Economy and Society 29 (1), pp. 146-159. 
Aglietta, M. (2001) ‘A Theory of Capitalist Regulation: The US Experience’, London: 
Verso. 
Aglietta, M. (2008) ‘Into a New Growth Regime’, New Left Review 54 (Nov-Dec), pp. 
61-74. 
Aglietta, M. and Breton, R. (2001) ‘Financial Systems, Corporate Control and 
Capital Accumulation’, Economy and Society 30 (4), pp. 433-466. 
Aglietta, M. and Reberioux, A. (2005) ‘Corporate Governance Adrift: A Critique of 
Shareholder Value’, Cheltenham: Edward. Elgar. 
Akerlof, G.A. and Shiller, R.J. (2009) ‘Animal Spirits: How Psychology Drives the 
Economy and Why It Matters for Global Capitalism’, Princeton: Princeton University 
Press. 
Allen, J. and Pryke, M. (1999) ‘Money Cultures After Georg Simmel: Mobility, 
Movement and Identity’, Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 17 (1), 
pp. 51-68.  
All-Party Pariamentary Group for Building Societies & Financial Mutuals’ (2006, 
March) ‘ Windfalls Or Shortfalls: The’  
Althusser, L. (1967) ‘Contradiction and Overdetermination’, New Left Review I/41, 
January-February, pp. 15-35. 
 271
Althusser, L. (1971) ‘Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses’. In: Althusser, L. 
(ed) ‘Lenin and Philosophy’, New York: Monthly Review Press, 158-83. 
Amin, A. and Thrift, N. (2004) ‘The Cultural Economy Reader’, Oxford: Blackwell. 
Anderson, P. (1976) ‘The Antinomies of Antonio Gramsci’, New Left Review I/100, 
November-December, pp. 5-78. 
Arrighi, G. (2009) ‘The Long Twentieth Century: Money, Power and the Origins of 
Our Time, London: Verso. 
Ashworth, H. (1980) ‘The Building Society Story’, Inverness: Bookmag.  
Authers, J. (2010) ‘The Fearful Rise of Markets’, London: Financial Times Prentice 
Hall. 
Ball, M. (1990) ‘Under One Roof: Retail Banking and the International Mortgage 
Finance Revolution’, London: Harvester Wheatsheaf. 
Bank of England (2007) ‘Mortgage Equity Withdrawal Q4 2006’, available at: http:// 
www.bankofengland.co.uk/statistics/mew/current/index.htm, accessed 20 August, 
2010. 
Bank of England (2010) ‘Housing Equity Withdrawal Q2, 2010’, available at:, 
accessed 30 November, 2010. 
Bank of England (2010) ‘UK Inflation 1790-2005’, available at: 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/education/inflation/timeline/chart.htm, (accessed 1 
August, 2010) 
Banker, The (1997 1, June) ‘UK: Faith of the Converted – These are Interesting 
Times for the UK Banking Industry’ 147 (856).  
Barnes, P. (1984) ‘Building Societies: The Myth of Mutuality’, London: Pluto Press.  
Barrell, R. and Davis, E. (2008) ‘The Evolution of the Financial Market Crisis in 
2008’, National Institute Economic Review 206, pp. 5-14. 
Bauer, M.W. and Aarts, B. (2000) ‘Corpus Construction: A Principle for Qualitative 
Data Collection’, in: Bauer, M. and Gaskell, G. (eds) ‘Qualitative Researching with 
Text, Image, Sound: A Practical Handbook, pp. 19-37. 
Bbalibor.com (accessed 2008, 20 April), available at: bbalibor.com.   
BBC News (2007, 13 September) ‘Chancellor Warns on Consumer Debt’, available 
at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/6992450.stm, accessed on 5 December 
2011. 
BBC News (2009, 11 June) ‘Timeline: Credit Crunch to Downturn’, available at: 
http://news. bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/7521250.stm, accessed 3 June, 2010.  
Bertramsen, R.B., Thomsen, J.P.F. and Torfing, J. (1991) ‘State, Economy and 
 272
Society’, London: Unwin Hyman. 
Best (2009) ‘How to Make a Bubble: Toward a Cultural Political Economy of the 
Financial’, International Political Sociology 33 (4), pp. 461-465. 
Bevir, M. (1999) ‘Foucault, Power and Institutions, Political Studies 47 (2), pp. 345-
359. 
Blackburn, R. (2008) ‘The Subprime Crisis’, New Left Review March/April, pp. 63-
106. 
Bloom, P. (2010) ‘Back to the Future: The Paradox and Fantasy of Capitalist 
Ideology Under Crisis’, Swansea University working paper (working paper page 
numbers) 
Blyth, M. (2002) ‘Great Transformations: Economic Ideas and Institutional Change 
in the Twentieth Century’, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Boddy, M. (1980) ‘The Building Societies’, London and Basingstoke: McMillan. 
Boddy, M. (1988) ‘Financial Deregulation and UK Housing Finance: Government 
Building Society Relations and the Building Societies Act, 1986’, Housing Studies 4 
(2), pp. 92-104.  
Boléat, M. (1986) ‘The Building Society Industry’, London: Allen & Unwin, 2nd 
Edition. 
Boléat, M. and Coles, A. (1987) ‘The Mortgage Market: Theory and Practice of 
Housing Finance’, London: Allen & Unwin. 
Boléat, M. and Coles, A. (1987) ‘The Mortgage Market: Theory and Practice of 
Housing Finance’, London: Allen & Unwin. 
Bourdieu, P.  (2003) ‘Firing Back: Against the Tyranny of the Market 2’, London: 
Verso.  
Bourdieu, P. (2005) ‘The Social Structures of the Economy’, Cambridge: Polity 
Press. 
Boyer, R. (1990) ‘The Regulation School: A Critical Introduction’, New York: 
Columbia University Press. 
Boyer, R. (2000) ‘Is a Finance-Led Growth Regime a Viable Alternative to Fordism’, 
Economy and Society 29 (1), pp. 111-145. 
Boyer, R. (2008) ‘A Finance-Led Growth Regime?’ in: Ertürk, I. Froud, J., Sukhdev, 
J., Leaver, A. and Williams, K., ‘Financialization at Work: Key Texts and 
Commentary’, London and New York: London.  
Bresser-Pereira, L.C. (2010) ‘The Global Financial Crisis, Neoclassical Economics, 
and the Neoliberal Years of Capitalism’ Revue de la Regulation 7 (1), available at: 
 273
http://regulation.revues.org/index7729.html, accessed 14 March, 2011. 
Bridgman, T. and Willmott, H. (2006) ‘Institutions and Technology: Frameworks for 
Understanding Organizational Change – The Case of a Major ICT Outsourcing 
Contract’, Journal of Applied Behavioural Science 42 (1), pp. 110-126.  
Bryman, A. (2008) ‘Social Research Methods’, Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Buckle, M. and Thompson, J.L. (1992) ‘The United Kingdom Financial System in 
Transition: Theory and Practice’, Manchester: Manchester University Press. 
Building Society Association (2009, 28 July) ‘The Building Societies Act 1986 – A 
BSA Summary Fifth Edition’, available at: http://www.bsa.org.uk/ 
consumer/factsheets/100003.htm, accessed 20 September, 2010.  
Building Society Association (2010, 20 April) ‘The History of Building Societies: 
Factsheet’, available at: http://www.bsa.org.uk/consumer/factsheets/100009.htm 
accessed 30 January, 2011. 
Building Society Association (2011a) ‘Mortgage Market Share’ available at: 
http://www.bsa.org.uk/docs/statisticspdfs/mortgages/mortgage_market_share_sum
mary.pdf, accessed 1 June, 2011. 
Building Society Association (2011b, 1 June) ‘Strong April for Mutuals’ Deposits’, 
available at: http://www.bsa.org.uk/mediacentre/press/monthly_stats_ april11.htm, 
accessed 3 June, 2011. 
Building Society Association (2011c, 4 May) ‘Mutuals Have an Opportunity that 
Should Be Seized’, available at: http://www.bsa.org.uk/mediacentre/press/ 
chairman_speech11.htm, accessed 27 May, 2011. 
Burawoy, M. (2008), ‘Durable Domination: Gramsci Meets Bourdieu’, unpublished 
seminar paper, April 3, 2008, University of Wisconsin, pp. 1-34 (working paper page 
numbers). 
Burnett, B. (1986) ‘Changing Into A Company: A Capital Idea’, Building Society 
Gazette, March, p. 51.  
Burton, D., Knights, D., Leyshon, A., Alferoff, C. and Signoretta, P. (2004) ‘Making a 
Market: The UK Retail Financial Services Industry and the Rise of the Complex Sub-
prime Credit Market’, Competition and Change 8 (1), pp. 3-25. 
Butler, J., Laclau, E. and Žižek, S. (2000) ‘Contingency, Hegemony, Universality: 
Contemporary Dialogues of the Left’, London: Verso.  
Callon, M. (ed) (1998) ‘The Laws of the Market’, Oxford: Blackwell. 
Campaign (1988) ‘Special Report on Financial Advertising’ (3) ‘Waging War for 
Plastic Power - The Building Societies, Liberated by Changes in the Law, Are 
Taking on the Banks in All-Out Struggle For Control in the Financial Services 
Market.  
 274
Cederström, C. (2007) ‘The Lacanian Left Does Not Exist’, ephemera 7 (4), pp. 609-
614. 
Cederström, C. and Spicer A. (forthcoming) ‘Discourse of the Real Kind: A Post-
Foundational Approach to Organizational Discourse Analysis’, pp. 1-48 (working 
paper page numbers).  
Chang, W. and Glynos, J. (2011) ‘Ideology and Politics in the Popular Press: The 
Case of the 2009 UK Mps’ Expenses Scandal’, forthcoming in: Dahlberg, L. and 
Phelan, S. (eds) ‘Discourse Theory and Critical Media Politics’, London: Palgrave 
Macmillan, pp. 1-23 (working paper page numbers). 
Channel 4 News (2008). ‘FactCheck: No More Boom and Bust?’, available at: 
http://www.channel4.com/news/articles/politics/domestic_politics/factcheck+no+mor
e+boom+and+bust/2564157, accessed 3 May, 2010. 
Chick, V. (2008) ‘Could the Crisis at Northern Rock Have Been Predicted?: An 
Evolutionary Approach’, Contributions to Political Economy  27 (1), pp. 115-127. 
Christie, H., Smith, S.J. and Munro, M. (2008) ‘The Emotional Economy of Housing’, 
Environment and Planning A 40 (10), pp. 2296-2312. 
Christophers, B. (2010) ‘On Voodoo Economics: Theorising Relations of Property, 
Value and Contemporary Capitalism’, Transactions of the Institute of British 
Geographers 35 (1), pp. 94-108.  
Clark, B. (1998) ‘Political Economy: A Comparative Approach’, Westport, CT: 
Praeger. 
Clemons, E.K. and Weber, B. (1989) ‘London’s Big Bang: A Case Study of 
Information Technology, Competitive Impact, and Organizational Change’, System 
Sciences 4 (1), pp. 233-242.  
CML (2009) 5th Annual Mortgage Funding Conference, 14 October, London.  
CML (2010a) ‘The Outlook for Mortgage Funding Markets in the UK in 2010-2015’, 
Report by the Council of Mortgage Lenders, available at: 
http://www.google.co.uk/search?hl=en&source=hp&q=The+Outlook+for+Mortgage+
Funding+Markets+in+the+UK+in+2010+-+2015&btnG=Google 
+Search&aq=f&aqi=&aql=&oq=&gs_rfai=, accessed 20 September, 2010. 
CML (2010b) ‘Mortgage Market Review: Response by the Council of Mortgage 
Lenders to the Financial Services Authority’s Discussion Paper 09/3’, Council of 
Mortgage Lenders.  
CML (2010c) ‘The Decline in Lending: A Question of Demand or Supply?’, News 
and Views 23 30 November 2010, available at: http://www.cml. 
org.uk/cml/publications/newsandviews/79/286 accessed: 30 November 2011. 
CML and CIH (2005) ‘UK Housing Review 2004/2005’, report produced jointly by the 
Council of Mortgage Lenders and the Chartered Institute for Housing, London and 
 275
Coventry: CML and CIH. 
Cockburn, C. (1977) ‘The Local State’, London: Pluto Press. 
Coles, A. (2008, 27 June) ‘Cracking the Crunch, By Adrian Coles, Director General 
of the BSA’, available at: http://www.moneymarketing.co.uk/blogs/ cracking-the-
crunch-by-adrian-coles-director-general-of-the-bsa/167971.article, accessed 10 
September 2010. 
Committee to Review the Functioning of Financial Institutions (1980) ‘Appendices’, 
London: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office.  
Contu, A. (2002) ‘A Political Answer to Questions of Struggle’, ephemera 2(2), pp. 
160-174.  
Cook, P. (1998) ‘Privatization in the UK: Policy and Performance’ in: Parker, D. (ed) 
‘Privatization in the European Union: Theory and Policy Perspectives’, London: 
Routledge. 
Criado, S. and van Rixel, A. (2008) ‘Structured Finance and the Financial Turmoil of 
2007-08: An Introductory Overview’, Documentos Ocasionales N. 0808, Banco De 
España, available at: http://ideas.repec.org/p/bde /opaper/0808.html, accessed 30 
June, 2009. 
Critchley, S. (2004) ‘Is There A Normative Deficit In the Theory of Hegemony?’ in: 
Critchley, S. and Marchart, O. (eds) ‘Laclau: A Critical Reader’, London: Routledge, 
pp. 113-122.   
Critchley, S. and Marchart, O. (2004) ‘Introduction’, in: Critchley, S. and Marchart, O. 
(ed) ‘Laclau: A Critical Reader’, London: Routledge, pp. 1-13. 
Crouch, C. (2009) ‘Privatised Keynesianism: An Unacknowledged Policy Regime’, 
The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 11 (3), pp. 382-99.  
Crouch, C. (2011) ‘The Strange Non-Death of Neoliberalism’, Cambridge: Polity 
Press.  
Daily Mail, The (2008, 11 September) ‘Yes, He’s Human After All. Allison Pearson 
Gains Exclusive Access to the Prime Minister’, available at: 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1076412/Yes-hes-human-Allison-Pearson-
gains-exclusive-access-Prime-Minister.html, accessed 8 May, 2010. 
Daily Star, The (2008, 16 September) ‘Greedy Bankers Have Lost Us 500,000 Jobs 
and Our Pensions.’ 
Daly G, (1991) ‘The Discursive Construction of Economic Space: Logics of 
Organization and Disorganization’, Economy and Space 20 pp. 79-102. 
Daly, G. (1999) ‘Ideology and its Paradoxes: Dimensions of Fantasy and 
Enjoyment’, Journal of Political Ideologies 4(2): pp. 219-38. 
Daly, G. (2004) ‘Radical(ly) Political Economy: Luhmann, Postmarxism and 
 276
Globalization’, Review of International Political Economy 11 (1), pp. 1-32. 
Daly, G. (2006) ‘The Political Economy of (Im)possibility’, in: DeGoede, M. (ed) 
‘International Political Economy and Postsructural Politics’, Houndsmills, 
Basingstoke:  Palgrave McMillan, pp. 177-194. 
Davis, A.G. (2006) ‘The Limits of Metrological Performativity: Valuing Equities in the 
London Stock Exchange’, Competition and Change 10 (1), pp. 3-21. 
Dayson, K. T. (2002) ‘Carpetbaggers and Credit Unions: A Sociological Study into 
the Paradox of Mutuality in the Late Twentieth Century’, thesis submitted to the 
University of Salford, Manchester, for degree of Doctor of Philosophy, Institute of 
Social Research. 
DeCock, C., Cutcher, L. and Grant, D. (2010) ‘Call for Papers: Crisis, Critique and 
the Construction of Normality: Exploring Finance Capitalism’s Discursive Shifts,’ 
Culture and Organization 16 (2), pp. 181-183. 
DeCock, C., Fitchett, J. and Farr, M. (2008) ‘Myths of a Near Future: Advertising the 
New Economy’, ephemera 1 (3), pp. 201-228. 
DeCock, C., Fitchett, J. and Volkmann, C. (2009) ‘Myths of a Near Past: Envisioning 
Finance Capitalism Anno 2007’, ephemera 9 (1), pp. 8-25.  
DeCock, C., Murray, J., Vachhani, S. and Volkmann, C. (2011) ‘A Dialectical 
Reading of the Global Financial Crisis: Four Constructive Theses’, Swansea 
University, UK: Working Paper. 
DeGoede (2003) ‘Beyond Economism in International Political Economy’, Review of 
International Studies 29, pp. 79-97. 
DeGoede, M. (2004) ‘Repoliticizing Financial Risk’, Economy and Society 33 (2), pp. 
197- 217. 
DeGoede, M. (2005) ‘Virtue Fortune and Faith: A Genealogy of Finance’, 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota. 
DeGoede, M. (2009) ‘Finance and the Excess: The Politics of Visibility in the Crisis’, 
Zeitschrift für Interantionale Beziehungen, 16. JG, Heft 2, pp. 299-310. 
DeGoede, M. (ed) (2006) ‘International Political Economy and Poststructural 
Politics’, Houndsmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave, McMillan. 
Delatte, A.-L., Gex, M. and López-Villavicencio, A. ‘Has the CDS Market Amplified 
the European Sovereign Crisis? A Non-Linear Approach’, available at: 
http://www.southwesternfinance.org/conf2011/swfa2011_ submission_137.pdf, 
accessed, 20 August, 2011. 
Derrida, J. (2006) ‘Spectres of Marx: the State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning 
and the New International’, Abingdon Oxon: Routledge Classics.  
Desai, R. (1994) ‘Second-Hand Dealers in Ideas: Think-Tanks and Thatcherite 
 277
Hegemony’, New Left Wing Review I/203, pp. 27-64. 
DETR (2000) ‘Quality and Choice: A Decent Home for All: The Housing Green 
Paper’, Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions: London, 
available at: http://www.communities.gov.uk /documents/housing/pdf/138019.pdf, 
accessed 20 September 2008. 
Deutsche Bank (2008) ‘The Sub-prime Mortgage Crisis: A Synopsis’, available at: 
http://www.globalsecuritisation.com/08_GBP/GBP_GSSF08_022_031_DB_US 
_SubPrm.pdf, accessed 30 June, 2009.  
Drake, L. (1989) ‘The Building Society Industry in Transaction’, London: MacMillan.  
Dreyer Hansen, A. D. (2008a) ‘Laclauian Discourse Theory and the Problems of 
Institutions’, paper presented at WISC Second Global International Studies 
Conference, Ljubljana, 23-26 July, p. 1-17 (working paper page numbers).  
Dreyer Hansen, A. D. (2008b) ‘The Ontological Primacy of the Political? Some 
Critical Remarks’, paper presented at the Inaugural World IDA Conference 
‘Rethinking Political Frontiers and Democracy in a New World Order’, Roskilde, 8-10 
September 2008.   
DuGay, P. and Pryke, M. (2002) ‘Cultural Economy: Cultural Analysis and 
Commercial Life’, London: Sage. 
Duménil, G and Lévy, D. (2004) ‘Neoliberalist Income Trends: Wealth, Class and 
Ownership in the USA’, New Left Review 30 (November-December), pp. 105-33. 
Duménil and Lévy (2009) ‘The Crisis of Neoliberalism’, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press. 
Dyrberg, T.B. (2004) ‘The Political and Politics in Discourse Analysis’, in: Critichley, 
S. and Marchart, O. (ed) ‘Laclau: A Critical Reader’, London: Routledge, pp. 241-
255. 
Economist, The (1979a, 10 February) ‘American Banks Show the Way’, p. 118. 
Economist, The (1979b, 10 February) ‘Follow Lloyds’, p. 118. 
Economist, The (1999, 29 April) ‘Mutually Assured Destruction?’, available at: 
http://www.economist.com/node/321470, accessed on 12 April 2010. 
Elgin (2011) ‘The Implications of the Financial Crisis for UK Building Societies’, 
RIBM Doctoral Symposium, 30-31 March, Manchester Metropolitan Business 
School.  
Engelen, E. (2003) ‘The Logic of Funding European Pension Restructuring and the 
Dangers of Fiancialization’, Environment and Planning A 35 (8), pp. 1357-1372. 
Engelen, E., Ertürk, I., Froud, J., Johal, S., Leaver, A., Moran, M., Nilsson, A. and 
Williams, K. (2011) ‘After the Global Complacence: Financial Crisis and the Politics 
 278
of Reform’, Oxford University Press. 
Engelen, E., Ertürk, I., Froud, J., Leaver, A. and Williams, K. (2010) 
‘Reconceptualizing Financial Innovation: Frame, Conjuncture and Bricolage’, 
Economy and Society 39 (1), pp. 33 - 63. 
Epstein, G. A. (2005) ‘Financialization and the World Economy: Introduction’, in: 
Epstein, G. A. (ed) ‘Financialization and the World Economy’, Bodmin, Cornwall: 
MPG. 
Epstein, G. A. (2005) ‘Introduction’, in: Epstein, G.A. (ed) ‘Financialization and the 
World Economy’, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
Ertürk, I., Froud, J., Johal, S., Leaver, A. and Williams, K. (2008a) ‘General 
Introduction: Financialization, Coupon Pool and Conjuncture’ in: Erturk, I., Froud, J., 
Johal, S., Leaver, A. and Williams, K. (eds) ‘Financialization at Work: Key Texts and 
Commentary’, London; New York, Routledge. 
Ertürk, I., Froud, J., Johal, S., Leaver, A. and Williams, K. (2008b) ‘The Historical 
Critique of the Rentier and Financier’ in: Erturk, I., Froud, J., Johal, S., Leaver, A. 
and Williams, K. (eds) ‘Financialization at Work: Key Texts and Commentary’, 
London; New York, Routledge. 
ESRC National Centre For Research Methods Review Paper (2009) ‘Discourse 
Analysis: Varieties and Methods’, National Centre For Research Methods, 
NCRM/014.  
Euromoney (2007) ‘Liquid Real Estate’, March 6, available at: 
http://www.euromoney.com/Article/1243943/Title.html, accessed 5 October, 2010. 
Fama, E. (1970) ‘Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work’, 
Journal of Finance 25 (2), pp. 383-417. 
Federal Reserve Board (2010) ‘What You Should Know About Home Equity Lines 
Of Credit’, available at: http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/equity/equity_ 
english.htm, accessed 10 May, 2010. 
Figlio, K. (2010) ‘Masculine Phantasy and the Economy’, paper presented at 
Fantasy in Economic and Organizational Life: Problem, Theory, Method Workshop, 
26 February 2010, University of Essex.   
Financial Times, The (1979, 3 September) ‘UK Banking’, Special Report, p. 1. 
Financial Times, The (1983, 20 October) ‘The Smoke of Battle Thickens: Britain’s 
Banks and Building Societies’.  
Financial Times, The (1998, 24 July) ‘Companies & Finance, UK: Building Society 
Relief as Butler Almost Pulls It Off: The Nationwide Vote On Conversion Was 
Uncomfortably Close For the Mutual, Says Christopher Brown-Humes’.  
Financial Times, The (1998, 26 February) ‘Companies and Finance: UK: B&B 
 279
Underlines Its Pro-Mutual Stance’.  
Financial Times, The (2011, 8 September) ‘The Future of Banking: Hunt For a 
Common Front’, p. 11. 
Forrester, J.P. (1994) ‘Mortgaging the American Dream: A Critical Evaluation of the 
Federal Government’s Promotion of Home Equity Financing’, Tulane Law Review 
96, December, pp. 373-394. 
Foucault, M. (2010) ‘The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France, 
1978-79’, Houndsmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan.  
French, S., Leyshon, A. and Thrift, N. (2009) ‘A Very Geographical Crisis: The 
Making and Breaking of the 2007-2008 Financial Crisis’, Cambridge Journal of 
Regions, Economy and Society 2009 (2), pp. 287-302.  
French, S., Lleyshon, A. and Wainwright, T. (2008) ‘Finanicalizing Space, Spacing 
Finanicalization’, paper presented at ESRC Financialization  and Competitiveness 
Seminar, School of Arts and Social Sciences, Northumbria University, Newcastle 
Upon Tyne, April.  
Freud, S. (1999) ‘The Interpretations of Dreams’, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Friedman, M. (1962) ‘Capitalism and Freedom’, Chicago: Chicago University Press. 
Friedman, M. (1966) ‘The Methodology of Positive Economics’, in: Friedman M. 
‘Essays in Positive Economics’, Chicago: Chicago University Press, pp. 3-16; 30-43. 
Froud, J., Haslam, C., Hohal, S. and Williams, K. (2000) ‘Financialization and 
Shareholder Value: Consultancy Moves, Management Promises’, Economy and 
Society 29 (1), pp. 80-120. 
Froud, J., Haslam, C., Hohal, S. and Williams, K. (2002) ‘Financialization and the 
Coupon Pool’, Capital and Class 78 (Autumn), pp. 119-151. 
Froud, J., Johal, S., Leaver, A. and Williams, K. (2006) ‘Financialization and 
Strategy: Narrative and Numbers’, London: Routledge. 
Froud, J., Moran, M., Nilsson, A. and Williams, K. (2010) ‘Wasting a Crisis? 
Democracy and Markets in Britain after 2007’, The Political Quarterly 81 (1), pp. 25-
38. 
Fukuyama, F. (1992) ‘The End of History and the Last Man’, London: Penguin. 
Fullbrook, E. (2005) ‘Economics and Neoliberalism’ essay for ‘Hassan, G. (ed) ‘After 
Blair: Politics after the New Labour Debate’, London: Lawrence and Wishart, 
available at: http://www.paecon.net/Fullbrook/Economicsand Neoliberalism.pdf, 
accessed 15 March, 2011. 
Fumagalli, A. and Mazzadra, S. (eds) (2010) ‘Crisis in the Global Economy’, 
Cambridge Mass: MIT Press. 
 280
Gamble, A. (1985) ‘Britain in Decline: Economic Policy, Political Strategy and the 
British State’, Houndsmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan.  
Gamble, A. (1988) ‘The Free Economy and the Strong State: The Politics of 
Thatcherism’, Houndsmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan. 
Gamble, A. (2001) ‘Neo-Liberalism’, Capital & Class 25 (3), pp. 127-134.  
Gamble, A. (2009a) ‘The Spectre at the Feast: Capitalist Crisis and the Politics of 
Recession’, Houndsmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Gamble, A. (2009b) ‘British Politics and the Financial Crisis’, British Politics 4, pp. 
450-462.  
Gammon, E. and Palan, R. (2006) ‘Libidinal International Political Economy’, in: 
DeGoede, M. (ed) ‘International Political Economy and Poststructural Politics’, 
Houndsmills, Basingstoke, Palgrave, McMillan. 
Garcia-Papet, M. F. (2007) ‘The Social Construction of a Perfect Market: The 
Strawberry Auction at Fontaines-en-Sologne’, in: MacKenzie, D., Muniesa F. and 
Siu, L. (eds) ‘Do Economists Make Markets?’, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
pp. 20–53. 
Geras, N. (1987) ‘Post-Marxism’, New Left Review 163, May-June, pp. 40-82.  
Gertenbach, L. (2010) ‘Die Kultivierung des Marktes: Foucault und die 
Gouvernmentalität des Neoliberalismus’, Berlin: Parodos.   
Gibson-Graham, J. K. (1996) ‘The End of Capitalism (as we knew it): A Feminist 
Critique of Political Economy’, Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell.  
Gibson-Graham, J. K. (2006) ‘A Postcapitalist Politics’, Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press. 
Glasze, G. (2007) ‘Vorschläge zur Operationalisierung der Diskurstheorie von 
Laclau und Mouffe’, Forum Qualitative Sozialforschung 8 (2), pp. 1-33. 
Glyn, A. (2006) ‘Capitalism Unleashed’, Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Glynos, J. (2001) ‘The Grip of Ideology: A Lacanian Approach to the Theory of 
Ideology’, Journal of Political Ideologies, 6 (2), pp. 191-214.  
Glynos, J. (2008) ‘Ideological Fantasy at Work’, Journal of Political Ideologies 13 
(3), pp. 275-296. 
Glynos, J. and Howarth, D. (2007) ‘Logics of Critical Explanation in Social and 
Political Theory’, Abingdon: Routledge.  
Glynos, J. and Howarth, D. (2008) ‘Interpretations, Mechanisms, and Logics’, paper 
presented at the 1st IDA World Conference, 8-10 September, Roskilde University, 
Denmark.  
 281
Glynos, J. and Stavrakakis, Y. (2004) ‘Encounters of the Real Kind: Sussing Out the 
Limits of Laclau’s Embrace of Lacan’, in: Critchley, S. and Marchart, O. (eds) 
‘Laclau: A Critical Reader’, London: Routledge. 
Glynos, J. and Stavrakakis, Y. (2008) ‘Lacan and Political Subjectivity: Fantasy and 
Enjoyment in Psychoanalysis and Political Theory’, Subjectivity 24, pp.256-274.  
Glynos, J. and Stavrakakis, Y. (2010) ‘Politics and the Unconscious – An Interview 
with Ernesto Laclau’, Subjectivity 3 (3), pp. 231-244. 
Glynos, J., Klimecki, R. and Willmott, H. (2011) ‘Cooling Out the Marks: An Analysis 
of the Ideology and the Politics of the Financial Crisis’, Working Paper, Cardiff 
University and Essex University, Working Paper Page Numbers.  
Gotham, K.F. (2006) ‘The Secondary Circuit of Capital Reconsidered: Globalization 
and the U.S. Real Estate Sector’ American Journal of Sociology 112 (1), pp. 231-
275. 
Gough, T. J. and Taylor, T. W. (1979) ‘The Building Society Price Cartel’, Hobart 
Papers 83, London: The Institute of Economic Affairs. 
Grahl, J. and Teague (2000) ‘The Regulation School, the Employment Relation and 
Financialization’, Economy and Society 29 (1), pp. 160-178. 
Gramsci, A. (1971) ‘Selections from the Prison Notebooks’, Lawrence & Wishart: 
London. 
Grant Thornton (2007, 23 August) ‘Amount of UK consumer debt exceeds UK GDP 
as country struggles to pay off personal debt – says Grant Thornton’, available at: 
http://www.grant-thornton.co.uk/press_room/amount_of_uk_consumer_debt_exc. 
aspx, acessed 16 December 2010. 
Green, R. K. and Wachter, S. M. (2010) ‘The Housing Finance Revolution’ in: Smith, 
S. J. and Searle, B. A. (eds) ‘The Blackwell Companion to the Economics of 
Housing: The Housing Wealth of Nations’, Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell. 
Griggs, S. and Howarth, D. (2009) ‘Regulation Theory, Governmentality, and Post-
Marxist Discourse Theory: Towards a Critical Explanation of the Politics of 
“Sustainable Aviation”’, paper presented at to the Political Economy, Financialization 
and Discourse Theory Workshop, Cardiff University, UK, 28-29 May. 
Grossberg, L. (1996) ‘Identity and Cultural Studies: It That All There Is?’ in: Hall, S. 
and du Gay, P. (eds) ‘Questions of Cultural Identity’, London: Sage, pp. 84-107. 
Guardian, The (1997, 3 June) ‘Halifax Handout Averages £2300’.  
Guardian, The (1998, 22 July) ‘Mutual Societies: Board With Victorian Values: Big 
Capital Rides High. Nationwide Might Decide This Week To Cash In As Well. But 
the Financial Future For Some People, Argues David Walker, May Still Lie With the 
Friendly Societies’. 
Guardian, The (2007, 14 February) ‘Buy-To-Let Mortgages increase by 48%’, 14 
 282
February, available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/money/2007 /feb 
/14/buyingtolet.business, accessed 13 January, 2008. 
Guardian, The (2009, 24 February) ‘Owners Must Be Weaned Off The House-Price 
Drug’, available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/feb/24/ house-
prices-taxes, accessed 8 January, 2011. 
Guardian, The (2010, 1 October) ‘Mortgage equity increases by £6.2bn, says Bank 
of England’, available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/money/ 2010/ oct/01/mortgage-
equity-bank-of-england, accessed 30 November, 2010. 
Guardian, The (2010, 8 June) ‘Homeownership – Not Renting – At Heart of 
Government Housing Strategy’, available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk 
/money/2010/ jun/08/homeownership-government-housing-strategy, accessed 14 
August, 2010. 
Guardian, The (2011, 18 November) ‘Taxpayer to Lose Out By At Least £400m As 
Virgin Buys Banks’, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2011 
/nov/17/northern-rock-virgin-money-taxpayer, accessed 18 November 2011.  
Guardian, The (2011, 2 September) ‘US To Sue Banks Over Sub-Prime Mortgages’, 
available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2011 /sep/02/us-authorities-sue-
banks-subprime accessed 3 September, 2011.  
Guardian, The (2011, 20 August, a) ,’Zombie Banks Stalk a Fearful World’, available 
at: http://www.morningstar.co.uk/IntroPage.aspx?site=uk&backurl=http%3A 
%2F%2Fwww.morningstar.co.uk%2Fuk%2Fmarkets%2Fnewsfeeditem.aspx%3Fid 
%3D145653080768540,  accessed 20 August, 2011. 
Guardian, The (2011, 20 August, b) ‘Good News on Mortgages (If You Already 
Have One)’, no web-source available.  
Guardian, The Fletcher, N. (2007), ‘Shining Knight of Wall Street Lifts the Gloom’, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2007/jun/30/marketforces, accessed 31 October 
2008 
Gurney, C. (1999) ‘Pride and Prejudice: Discourses of Normalisation in Public and 
Private Accounts of Home Ownership’, Housing Studies 14 (2), 163-183. 
Habermas, J. (1984, 1987) ‘The Theory of Communicative Action’, Vols. 1 and 2, 
Boston: Beacon. 
Hablutzel, P. (1992), ‘British Banks’ Role in the UK Market Since the Big Bang’ 
Chicago-Kent Law Review 68, pp. 365-376.  
Hall, P.A. and Soskice, D. (2001) ‘Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional 
Foundations of Comparative Advantage, Edited Collection, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Hall, S. (1979) ‘The Great Moving Right Show’, Marxism Today, 23 (January), pp. 
14-20. 
 283
Hall, S. (1988a) ‘The Toad in the Garden: Thatcherism Among the Theorists’, in: 
Nelson, C. and Grosberg, L. (ed.) ‘Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture’, 
Urbana: University of Illinois Press. 
Hall, S. (1988b) ‘The Hard Road to Renewal: Thatcherism and the Crisis of the Left’, 
London: Verso. 
Hamilton, A. (2005) ‘Asset Price Bubbles and Manias. How Much Was The Property 
Boom Driven By Collective Psychology and Herding Behaviour?’ dissertation for the 
award of the MA Property Valuation and Law degree 2004-05, London: Cass 
Business School, available at: http://www.housepricecrash.co.uk/pdf/alexander-
hamilton-dissertation.pdf, accessed 20 November, 2010. 
Harmon, M. (1997) ‘The 1976 UK-IM Crisis: The Markets, the Americans, and the 
IMF’, Contemporary British History, 11 (3), pp. 1-17. 
Harvey, D. (2005) ‘A Brief History of Neo-Liberalism’, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Harvie, D. and Milburn, K. (2011, 4 August) ‘The Zombie of Capitalism Can Be 
Beaten: Through Mass Direct Action’, available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk 
/commentisfree/2011/aug/04/neoliberalism-zombie-action-phone-hacking, accessed 
4 August, 2011.  
Hayek, F.A. (1962) ‘The Road to Serfdorm’, London: Routledge. 
Heffernan, S. (2005) ‘The Effect of UK Building Society Conversion On Pricing 
Behaviour’, Journal of Banking & Finance 29 (3), pp. 779-797.  
Heilpern, E. (2008) ‘The Impact of Disintermediation, Outsourcing and Institutional 
Risk on Today’s Global Banking Value Chain’, lecture delivered to the University of 
Hertfordshire Business School, 16 June.  
Heilpern, E., Haslam, C. and Andersson, T. (2009) ‘When It Comes To the Crunch: 
What Are the Drivers of the US Banking Crisis’, Accounting Forum 33, pp. 99-113. 
Heires, M. and Noelke, A. (2009) ‘Finanzkriese und Finanzialisierung’, in: Kessler, 
O. (ed) ‘Die Politische Ökonomie der Subprime-Krise’, Wiesbaden: VS Verlag. 
Hildyard, N. (2009) ‘A (Crumbling) Wall of Money: Financial Bricolage, Derivatives 
and Power’, The Corner House, available at: 
http://www.thecornerhouse.org.uk/pdf/briefing/39wallmoney.pdf, accessed 26 
September, 2009. 
Hilferding (1981 [1910]) ‘Finance Capital’, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.  
HM Treasury Report (2008a) ‘Housing Finance Review: Analysis and Proposals’, 
March 2008.  
HM Treasury Report (2008b) ‘Mortgage Finance: Final Report and 
Recommendations’, November 2008. 
 284
HM Treasury Select Committee (2009) ‘Banking Crisis: Dealing with the Failure of 
the Failed Banks’, May 2009.  
Houghton, J. (2008) ‘The Ideological Importance of Housing, Renewal 16 (3/4), pp. 
44-51. 
House of Lords Debate 19 April 1983 Paragraph 539 
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/lords/1983/apr/19/building-societies-reform 
Howarth, D. (2000) ‘Discourse’, Buckingham: Open University Press. 
Howarth, D. (2004) ‘Hegemony, Political Subjectivity, and Radical Democracy’, in: 
Critchley, S. and Marchart, O. (ed) ‘Laclau: A Critical Reader’, London: Routledge, 
pp. 256-276. 
Howarth, D. (2005) ‘Applying Discourse Theory: The Method of Articulation’, in: 
Howarth, D. and Torfing, J. (eds) ‘Discourse Theory in European Politics: Identity, 
Policy and Governance’, London: Palgrave MacMillan, pp. 316-349.  
Howarth, D. (2010) ‘Welcome to Hard Times UK Style: Articulating a Critical and 
Explanatory Political Economy’, paper prepared for APSA Annual Meeting, 2-5 
September, Washington D.C., USA (working paper pages numbers).  
Howarth, D. and Torfing, J. (eds) (2005) ‘Discourse Theory in European Politics: 
Identity, Policy and Governance’, London: Palgrave MacMillan.   
Howarth, D., Norval, A. J. and Stavrakakis, Y. (eds) (2000) ‘Discourse Theory and 
Political Analysis: Identities, Hegemonies and Social Change’, Manchester: 
Manchester University Press.  
Independent on Sunday, The (2008, 3 August) ‘Savings Customers Flock to 
Security of Building Societies’, p.18.  
Independent, The (1997, 14 July) ‘This Windfall Disaster Could Have Been 
Prevented; It Was Within the Power of Government to Have Slowed the Stampede 
to A Manageable Pace By Raising the Electoral Hurdle Required For the Societies 
to God Public’, p. 19. 
Ingram, K. (2009) ‘If Securitisation is Dead, Why Do So Many Government Schemes 
Use It?’ Capital Markets Law Journal 4 (4), pp. 462-476. 
International Financial Services London (2010) ‘Securitisation 2010’, available at: 
https://www.thecityuk.com/assets/Uploads/Securitisation-2010.pdf, accessed 3 July, 
2010.  
International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2009) ‘Restarting Securitization Markets: Policy 
Proposals and Pitfalls’, available at: http://www.imf.org 
/external/pubs/ft/gfsr/2009/02/pdf/chap2.pdf, accessed 20 January, 2010. 
Ishikawa, T. (2009) ‘How I Caused the Credit Crunch’, London: Icon Books. 
Jessop, B. (1990) ‘Regulation Theory in Retrospect and Prospect’, Economy and 
 285
Society 19 (2), pp. 153-216. 
Jessop, B. (2003) ‘From Thatcherism to New Labour: Neo-Liberalism, Workfarism, 
and Labour Market Regulation’, Department of Sociology, Lancaster University 
available at: http://www.comp.lancs.ac.uk/sociology/ soc131rj.pdf, accessed 30 
November, 2011.  
Johnson, C. (1991) ‘The Economy Under Mrs Thatcher: 1979-1990’, London: 
Penguin Books.  
Kaletsky, A. (2010) ‘Capitalism 4.0: The Birth Of A New Economy’, London: 
Bloomsbury Publishing. 
Kempson, E. (2002)’ Over-Indebtedness in Britain: A Report to the Department of 
Trade and Industry’, Personal Finance Research Centre, London, available at: 
http://www. ggy.bris.ac.uk/pfrc/Reports/Overindebtedness_Britain.pdf, accessed 18 
August 2010. 
Keynes, J.M. (1936) ‘The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money’, 
London: Macmillan, St. Martin’s Press. 
Kindleberger, C.P. and Aliber, R. (2005) ‘Manias, Panics and Crashes: A History of 
Fiancial Crises’, 5th edition, New York: John Wiley and Sons.  
Kleinmann, M. (1995) ‘Meeting Housing Needs Through the Market: An Assessment 
of Housing Policies and the Supply/Demand Balance in France and Great Britain’, 
Housing Studies 10 (1), pp. 17-38.  
Klimecki, R. and Willmott, H. (2009) ‘From Demutualisation to Meltdown: A Tale of 
Two Wannabe Banks’ Critical Perspectives on International Business 5 (1/2), pp. 
120-140. 
Klimecki, R. and Willmott, H. (2010) ‘Hegemony’, in: Tadajewski, M., MacLaran, P., 
Parsons, E. and Parker, M. (2010) ‘Handbook of Critical Management Studies’, 
London: Sage.  
Knights, D. (1997) ‘Governmentality and Financial Services: Welfare Crises and the 
Financially Selfdisciplined Subject’, in: Morgan, G. and Knights, D. (eds) ‘Regulation 
and Deregulation in European Financial Services’, Basingstoke: Macmillan, pp. 216-
236.  
Knorr-Cetina, K. (2009) ‘Maverick Markets’, paper given at the SOSCI Seminar 
Series Autumn 2009, 15th December, University of Cardiff.   
Knorr-Cetina, K. and Preda, A. (2005) ‘The Sociology of Financial Markets’, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Kotz, D. (2008) ‘Financialization and Neoliberalism’, Paper written for Teeple, G. 
and McBride, S. (eds) ‘Relations of Global Power: Neoliberal Order and Disorder’, 
Toronto: University of Toronto Press, forthcoming 2010.  
Krasner, S. (1983) ‘International Regimes’, Ithaca, New York: Cornell University 
 286
Press. 
Krippner, G. (2005) ‘The Finanicalization of the American Economy’, Socio-
Economic Review 3 (2), pp. 173-208. 
Krugman, P. (2009, 6 September) ‘How Did Economists Get It So Wrong’, New York 
Times, available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/06/ magazine/06Economic-
t.html, accessed 5 January, 2011. 
Kvale, S. and Brinkmann, S. (2009) ‘Interviews: Learning the Craft of Qualitative 
Research Interviewing’ (2nd ed), London: Sage Publications. 
Laclau, E. (1977) ‘Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory: Capitalism, Fascism, 
Populism’, London: New Left Books. 
Laclau, E. (1990) ‘New Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time’, London: Verso.  
Laclau, E. (1991) ‘Intellectual Strategies’, Memorandum to PhD Students in the IDA 
Programme, Essex University, available at http://thatsnotit.wordpress.com/ 
library/ernesto-laclau-phd-thesis-recommendations/, accessed 30 September, 2009. 
Laclau, E. (1996) ‘Emancipation(s)’, London: Verso. 
Laclau, E. (1998) ‘Paul de Man and the Politics of Rhetoric’, Pretexts 7 (2), pp. 153-
170. 
Laclau, E. (2000) ‘Identity and Hegemony: The Role of Universality in the 
Constitution of Political Logics’, in: Butler, J., Laclau, E. and Zizek, S. (eds) 
‘Contingency, Hegemony and Universality: Contemporary Dialogues of the Left’, 
London: Verso. 
Laclau, E. (2002) ‘Critical Realism and Discourse Theory: Debate with Ernesto 
Laclau, in: Bhaskar, R. (ed) ‘From Science to Emancipation: Alienation and the 
Actual Enlightenment’. London: Sage. 
Laclau, E. (2003) ‘Discourse and Jouissance: A Reply to Glynos and Stavrakakis’, 
Journal for Lacanian Studies 1 (2), pp. 278–85. 
Laclau, E. (2004) ‘Glimpsing the Future’, in: Critchley, S. and Marchart, O. (ed) 
‘Laclau: A Critical Reader’, Abingdon: Routledge. 
Laclau, E. (2005a) ‘On Populist Reason’, London: Verso.  
Laclau, E. (2005b) ‘Philosophical Roots of Discourse Theory’, Paper for Centre for 
Theoretical Studies in the Humanities and Social Sciences, available at: 
http://www.essex.ac.uk/centres/TheoStud/onlinepapers.asp, accessed 20 July, 
2009. 
Laclau, E. (2006) ‘Ideology and Post-Marxism’, Journal of Political Ideologies 11 (2), 
pp. 103-114. 
Laclau, E. (2007) ‘Discourse’, in: Gooding, R. E., Pettit, P. and Pogge, T. (ed) ‘A 
 287
Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy’, pp. 431-437. 
Laclau, E. and Mouffe, C. (1985) ‘Hegemony and Socialist Strategy’, London: Verso. 
Laclau, E. and Mouffe, C. (1990) ‘Postmarxism Without Apologies’, in: Laclau, E. 
‘New Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time’, London: Verso. 
Laclau, E. And Mouffe, C. (2001) ‘Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a 
Radical Democratic Politics’, 2nd Edition, London: Verso. 
Laclau, E. and Zac, L. (1994) ‘Minding the Gap: The Subjects of Politics’, in: Laclau, 
E. (ed) ‘The Making of Political Identities’, London: Verso. 
Lanchester, J. (2010) ‘Whoops! Why Everyone Owes Everyone and No One Can 
Pay’, London: Allen Lane. 
Langley, P. (2004) ‘In the Eye of the “Perfect Storm”: The Final Salary Pension 
Crisis and the Financialization of Anglo-American Capitalism’, New Political 
Economy 9 (4), pp. 539-58. 
Langley, P. (2006) ‘Securitizing Suburbia: The Transformation of Anglo-American 
Mortgage Finance’, Competition and Change 10 (3), pp. 283-99. 
Langley, P. (2007) ‘The Uncertain Subjects of Anglo-American Financialization’ 
Cultural Critique 65 (Fall), pp. 66-91.  
Langley, P. (2008a) ‘The Everyday Life of Global Finance: Saving and Borrowing in 
Anglo-America’, Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Langley, P. (2008b) ‘Financialization and the Consumer Credit Boom’, Competition 
& Change 12(2): 133-147. 
Langley, P. (2010) ‘The Performance of Liquidity in the Sub-Prime Mortgage Crisis’, 
New Political Economy 15 (1), pp. 71-90. 
Latour, B. (2005) 'Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network 
Theory’, Oxford: Oxford UP. 
Lawson, N. (1992) ‘The View from No.11: Memoirs of a Tory Radical’, London: Corgi 
Books. 
Leaker, D. (2009) ‘Office for National Statistics: Unemployment: Trends Since the 
1970s’, Economic & Labour Market Review 3 (2), pp. 37-41. 
Lévi-Strauss, C. (1966) ‘The Savage Mind’, Chicago: Chicago Univesity Press.  
Levy, D.L. and Egan, D. (2003) ‘A Neo-Gramscian Approach to Corporate Strategy: 
Conflict and Accommodation in the Climate Change Negotiations’, Journal of 
Management Studies 40 (4), pp. 803-829.  
Lewis, M. (1989) ‘Liar’s Poker’, New York: Norton. 
 288
Lewis, M. (2010) ‘The Big Short: Inside the Doomsday Machine’, London: Allen 
Lane. 
Leyshon, A. and French, S. (2009) ‘“We All Live In a Robbie Fowler House”: The 
Geographies of the Buy-To-Let Market in the UK’, The British Journal of Politics & 
International Relations 11 (3), pp. 438-460. 
Leyshon, A. and Thrift, N. (1993) ‘The Restructuring of the UK Financial Services 
Industry in the 1990s: a Reversal of Fortune?’, Journal of Rural Studies 9 (3), pp. 
223-241.  
Leyshon, A. and Thrift, N. (1999) ‘Lists Come Alive: Electronic Systems of 
Knowledge and the Rise of Credit Scoring in Retail Banking’, Economy and Society 
28 (3), pp. 434-466.  
Leyshon, A., Signoretta, P. and French, S. (2006) ‘The Changing Geography of 
British Bank and Building Society Branch Networks, 1995-2003, working paper, 
University of Nottingham, UK (working paper page numbers).  
Lindlof, Th. R. and Taylor, B.C. (2002) ‘Qualitative Communication Research 
Methods’, London: Sage (2nd edition).  
Lipietz, A. (1987) ‘Rebel Sons: The Regulation Approach’, French Politics and 
Society 5, pp. 3-17. 
Llewellyn, D and Wigglesworth, J. (1990) ‘Labouring under the Law’, Mortgage 
Finance Gazette November, pp. 28-36. 
Llewellyn, D.T. (1997) ‘Reflections on the Mutuality vs. Conversion Debate’, BSA 
Project Paper No.1, London: BSA.   
Lleyshon, A. and French, S. (2009) ‘“We All Live In a Robbie Fowler House”: The 
Geographies of the Buy-To-Let Market in the UK’, The British Journal of Politics & 
International Relations 11 (3), pp. 438-460. 
Lleyshon, A. and Thrift N. (2007) ‘The Capitalization of Almost Everything: The 
Future of Finance and Capitalism’, Theory, Culture & Society 24 (7-8), pp. 97-115.  
Location, Location, Location (2010, 15 September) ‘Episode Information – Location 
South Bank’, available at: http://www.channel4.com/4homes/on-tv/location-location-
location/episode-information/location-location-location-south-bank-10-09-15p1.html, 
accessed 20 December 2010. 
London Councils (2007) ‘Our Vision for Homes in London’, London: London 
Councils 
M2 Presswire (2007, 29 March) ‘Blue Chip News: Morning Alert for Centex Corp’. 
MacDonald, L. (2009) ‘A Colossal Failure of Common Sense’, London: Ebury Press.  
MacKenzie, D. (2008) ‘End of the World Trade’, Real World Economics Review, 46 
 289
May 2008, pp. 102-109. 
MacKenzie, D. (2004) ‘The Big, Bad Wolf and the Rational Market: Portfolio 
Insurance, the 1987 Crash and the Performativity of Economics’, Economy and 
Society 33 (3), pp. 303-34. 
MacKenzie, D. (2005) ‘Mathematizing Risk: Models, Arbitrage and Crises’, in: 
Hutter, B. and Power, M. (eds) ‘Organizational Encounters with Risk’, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, pp. 167-189. 
MacKenzie, D. (2006) ‘An Engine, Not a Camera: How Financial Models Shape 
Markets’, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
MacKenzie, D. (2011) ‘The Credit Crunch as a Problem in the Sociology of 
Knowledge’, American Journal of Sociology 116 (6), pp.  1778-1841. 
MacKenzie, D. and Millo, Y. (2003) ‘Constructing a Market, Performing Theory: The 
Historical Sociology of a Financial Derivatives Exchange’, American Journal of 
Sociology 109, pp. 107-45. 
MacKenzie, D., Muniesa, F. and Siu, L. (2007) ‘Do Economists Make Markets? On 
the Performativity of Economics’, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press.  
Manchester Evening News (2005, 11 July) ‘Building Societies Are Tops For Best 
Deals’.  
Marazzi, C. (2010) ‘The Violence of Financial Capitalism’, Cambridge Mass.: MIT 
Press. 
Marshall, J. N., Pike, A., Pollard, J. S., Tomaney, J. Dawley, S. and Gray, J. (2011) 
‘Placing the Run on Northern Rock’, Journal of Economic Geography Advance 
Access published January 20, pp. 1-25.  
Marshall, J. N., Willis, R., Coombes, M., Raybould, S., Richardson, R. (2000) 
‘Mutuality, De-Mutualization and Communities: The Implications of Branch Network 
Rationalization in the British Building Society Industry’, Transactions of the Institute 
of British Geographers 25 (3), pp. 355-378. 
 
Martin, R. (2002) ‘The Financialization of Daily Life’, Philadelphia: Temple University 
Press.  
Marx, K. (1976) ‘Capital Volume I: A Critique of Political Economy’, London: Penguin 
Classics.  
Marx, K. and Engels, F. (1999) ‘Manifest der Kommunistischen Partei’, Stuttgart: 
Reclam.  
McSweeney, B. (2009) ‘High Noon in the Last Chance Banking Saloon’, Centre for 
Socio-Cultural Change (CRESC), available at: http://www.esrc.ac.uk/my-
esrc/grants/RES-577-28-0001/outputs/read/e34bc93e-93dc-426a-8823-1d4d2c28 
 290
7603, accessed 3 June, 2010. 
Merret, S. (1979) ‘State Housing in Britain’, London: RKP. 
Metro (2010) ‘Homeownership Dream Is “Over” for the Young’, 11 October 2010, 
available at: http://www.metro.co.uk/news/843686-home-ownership-dream-is-over-
for-the-young, accessed 13 November 2010.  
Michie, J. and Llewellyn, D. (2009) ‘Converting Failed Financial Institutions into 
Mutual Organisations’. London: Building Societies Association, available at:  
http://www.bsa.org.uk/docs/presspdfs/remutualisation.pdf. 
Milller, J. H. (2005) “Taking Up a Task”: Moments of Decision in Ernesto Laclau’s 
Thought’, in: Critchley, S. and Marchart, O. (ed) ‘Laclau: A Critical Reader’, London: 
Routledge, pp. 256-276.  
Minford, P (1998). ‘Markets Not Stakes: The Triumph of Capitalism and the 
Stakeholder Fallacy’, London: Orion Publishing. 
Montgomery, J. (2006) ‘The Financialization of the American Credit Card Industry’, 
Competition and Change 10 (3), 301-319. 
Montgomery, J. (2007) ‘The Logic of Neoliberalism and the Political Economy of 
Consumer Debt-Led Growth’, in: Lee, S. and McBride, S. (eds) ‘Neoliberalism, State 
Power and Global Governance’, Dordrecht, the Netherlands: Springer, pp. 157–72. 
Montgomery, J. (2009) ‘A Bailout for Working Families’, Renewal 17 (3), pp. 22-31. 
Montgomery, J. and Williams, K. (2009) ‘Financialized Capitalism: After the Crisis 
and Beyond Neo-Liberalism’, Competition & Change 13 (2), pp. 99-107. 
Morgan, G. (2010) ‘Legitimacy in Financial Markets: Credit Default Swaps in the 
Current Crisis’, Socio-Economic Review 8 (1), pp. 17-45. 
Morgan, G. and Sturdy, A. (2000) ‘Beyond Organizational Change: Structure 
Discourse and Power in UK Financial Services’, Houndsmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave 
MacMillan.  
Mortgage Guide UK (2010) ‘Homeownership Rates UK’, available at: 
http://www.mortgageguideuk.co.uk/blog/uk-housing-market/home-ownership-rates-
uk/, accessed 10 August, 2010. 
Mouffe, C. (1993) ‘Introduction: For an Agonistic Pluralism’, in: Mouffe, C. (ed) ‘The 
Return of the Political’, London: Verso, pp. 1-8.    
Munro, M., Ford, J., Leishman, C. and Kofi Karly, N. (2005) ‘Lending to Higher Risk 
Borrowers’ Sub-Prime Credit and Sustainable Home Ownership’, York: Joseph 
Rowntree Foundation 
Murphy, L. (1996) ‘Whose Interest Rates? Issues in the Development of Mortgage-
Backed Securitisation’, Housing Studies 11 (4), pp. 581-589. 
 291
National Board for Prices and Incomes, ‘Rate of Interest on Building Society 
Mortgages’, Report No. 22, Cmnd. 3136, HMSO (November). 
Nellis, J. and Lockhart, T. (1995) ‘The Impact of Deregulation on the UK Building 
Society Branch Network in the 1990s’, International Journal of Bank Marketing 13 
(4), pp. 5-11.  
Norval A. J. (1996) ‘Deconstructing Apartheid Discourse’, London: Verso. 
Obstfeld, M. and Rogoff, K. (1995) ‘The Mirage of Fixed Exchange Rates’, The 
Journal of Economic Perspectives 9 (4). 
Office Of the Deputy Prime Minister (2003) ‘The Mortgage Backed Securities Market 
in the UK: Overview and Prospects’, Housing Research Summary, Number 201.  
Orwell, George (2000 [1939]) ‘Coming Up for Air’, London: Penguin Books. 
Oxford Centre for Mutual and Employee-Owned Business Report, 25 September 
2009, available at: http://www.bsa.org.uk/mediacentre/press/nr_remutualisation. 
htm, accessed on 12 January 2010.  
Parnell, B. (2009) ‘The Changing Nature of Property Sales’ CML Housing Finance 2 
(2009), pp. 1-10. 
Patterson, B. and Plehn, R. (2009) ‘State of the Markets’, Presentation given at the 
5th Annual Mortgage Funding Conference of the Council of Mortgage Lenders, 
London. 
PBS NewsHour (2008, 23 October) ‘Greenspan Admits “Flaw” to Congress, Predicts 
More Economic Problems’, available at: http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/ 
business/july-dec08/crisishearing_10-23.html, accessed 20 September 2011.  
Peet, R. (2003) ‘Unholy Trinity: The IMF, World Bank and the WTO’, London: Zed 
Books. 
Perks, R.W. (1991) ‘The Fight to Stay Mutual: Abbey Members Against Flotation 
Versus Abbey National Building Society’, Annals of Public and Cooperative 
Economics 62 (3) pp. 393-429.  
Peterson, V. S. (2006) ‘Getting Real: The Necessity of Critical Poststructuralism in 
Global Political Economy’, in: DeGoede, M. (ed) ‘International Political Economy and 
Poststructural Politics’, Houndsmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, pp. 119-138. 
Phillips, L. and Jorgensen, M.W. (2006) ‘Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method’, 
London: Sage.  
Plender, J. (1986-1987) ‘London’s Big Bang in International Context’, International 
Affairs 63 (1), pp. 39-48.  
Polanyi, K. (1954) ‘The Economy as Instituted Process’, in: Polanyi, K., Arensberg, 
C. and Pearson, H. (eds) ‘Trade and Market in the Early Empires, New York: Free 
 292
Press, pp. 243-270. 
Pollock, I. (2008), ‘Not such a good idea after all?’, available at: http://news.bbc. 
co.uk/1/hi/business/7641925.stm, accessed 30 October 2008. 
Pryke, M. and DuGray, P. (2007) ‘Take an Issue: Cultural Economy and Finance’, 
Economy and Society 36 (3), pp. 339-354.  
Pryke, M. and Freeman (1994) ‘Mortgage Backed – Securitization in the UK: The 
Background’, Housing Policy Debate 5(3), pp. 307-342.   
Revell, J. (1979) ‘UK Building Societies’, Report 3, Annex 1 of OECD, Housing 
Finance: Present Problems (1974) 82. 
Roberts, J. (2009) ‘Faith in the Numbers’, ephemera 9 (4), pp. 335-343. 
Ruccio, D. F. (2008) ‘Economic Representations: Academic and Everyday’, 
Abindon, Oxon: Routledge. 
Sassen, S. (2009) ‘When Local Housing Becomes an Electronic Instrument: The 
Global Circulation of Mortgages – A Research Note’, International Journal of Urban 
and Regional Research 33 (2), pp, 411-426. 
Saunders, P. (1990) ‘A Nation of Homeowners’, London: Unwin Hyman. 
Saussure, F. de. (2006) ‘Writings in General Linguistics’, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Scherrer, C. (1995) ‘Eine diskursanalytische Kritik der Regulationstheorie’, Prokla,  
25 (3), 457-482. 
Schnell, R., Hill, P.B. and Esser, E. (2000) ‘Methoden der Empirischen 
Sozialforschung’, München: Oldenburg Verlag, 8th edition.  
St. Pierre (2002) ‘Circling the Text: Nomadic Writing Practices’, in: Denzin, N.K and 
Lincoln, Y.S. (eds) ‘The Qualitative Inquiry Reader’, London: Sage, pp. 51-72.  
 
Schwandt, T. A. (1997) ‘Qualitative Inquiry: A Dictionary of Terms’, London: Sage.  
Schwartz, H.M. and Seabrooke, L. (2009a) ‘Varieties of Residential Capitalism in 
the International Political Economy: Old Welfare States and the New Politics of 
Housing’, in: Schwartz, H. and Seabrooke, L. (eds) ‘The Politics of Housing Boom 
and Bust’, Houndsmill, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan. 
Schwartz, H.M. and Seabrooke, L. (2009b) ‘Conclusion: Residential Capitalism and 
the International Political Economy’, in: Schwartz, H. and Seabrooke, L. (eds) ‘The 
Politics of Housing Boom and Bust’, Houndsmill, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan. 
Scottish Sun, The (2008, 18 October) ‘What a Bunch of Greedy Bankers’. 
Seeking Alpha (2008, 25 September) ‘Leverage 101: The Real Cause of the 
 293
Financial Crisis’, available at: http://seekingalpha.com/article/97299-leverage-101-
the-real-cause-of-the-financial-crisis, accessed on 10 August 2010. 
 
Seldon, A. (1979) ‘Preface’ in: Gough, T.J. and Taylor, T.W. (1979) ‘The Building 
Society Price Cartel’, Hobart Papers 83, London: The Institute of Economic Affairs. 
Serfati, C. (2009) ‘The Current Financial Meltdown: A Crisis of Capital-Driven 
Globalization’, Paper prepared for the International Conference ‘Whither 
Financialized Capitalism?’, 7 November 2009, SOAS, University of London.  
Shin, H.S. (2009) ‘Reflections on Northern Rock: The Bank Run that Heralded the 
Global Financial Crisis’, Journal of Economic Perspectives 23 (1), 101-119.  
Short, J. R. (1982) ‘Housing in Britain: The Post-War Experience’, London: 
Methuen.  
Simon, R. (1982) ‘Gramsci’s Political Thought: An Introduction’, London: Lawrence 
and Wishart.  
Smith, S. J. (2008) ‘Owner Occupation: At Home With a Hybrid of Money and 
Materials’, Environment and Planning A 40 (3), pp. 520-535. 
Soros, G. (2009) ‘The New Paradigm for Financial Markets: The Credit Crisis of 
2008 and What It Means’, New York: Public Affairs.  
Spicer, A. and Böhm, S. (2007) ‘Moving Management: Theorizing Struggles Against 
the Hegemony of Management’, Organization Studies 28 (11), pp. 1667-1698. 
Stäheli, U. (2000) ‘Sinnzusammenbrüche: Eine dekonstruktive Lektüre von Niklas 
Luhmanns Systemtheorie’, Weilerswist: Velbrück. 
Stäheli, U. (2003) ‘Undecidability and the Political’, Working Paper 21/2003, 
November, available at: http://ep.lib.cbs.dk/paper/ISBN/8791181631, accessed 3 
August 2010. 
Stäheli, U. (2004) ‘Competing Figures of the Limit: Dispersion, Transgression, 
Antagonism, and Indifference’, in: Critchley, S. and Marchart, O. (eds) ‘Laclau: a 
Critical Reader’, London: Routledge, pp. 226-240.  
Stäheli, U. (2007) ‘Spektakuläre Spekulation: Das Populäre der Ökonomie’, 
Frankfurt, Suhrkamp. 
Stäheli, U. (2008a) ‘Oekonomie: Die Grenzen des Ökonomischen’, in: Moebius, S. 
and Reckwitz, A. (eds) ‘Poststrukturalistische Sozialwissenschaften’, Frankfurt: 
Suhrkamp. 
Stäheli, U. (2008b) ‘Decentering the Economy - Governmentality Studies and 
Beyond?’ Seminar given at the Centre for Theoretical Studies in the Humanities and 
Social Sciences – University of Essex, 6 February, available at:  
http://www.essex.ac.uk/centres/theostud/staeheli%20governmentality.doc 
 294
Stavrakakis, Y. (1999) ‘Lacan and the Political’, London: Routledge. 
Steger, M. and Roy, R. K. (2010) ‘Neoliberalism: A Very Short Introduction’, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.  
Stein, M. (2011) ‘A Culture of Mania: A Psychoanalytic View of the Incubation of the 
2008 Credit Crisis’, Organization 18 (2), pp. 173-86.  
Stephens, M. (1993) ‘Housing Finance Deregulation: Britain’s Experience’, 
Netherlands Journal of Housing and the Built Environment 8, pp. 159-175. 
Stephens, M. (2001) ‘Building Society Demutualisation in the UK’, Housing Studies 
16 (3), pp. 335-352.  
Stephens, M. (2007) ‘Mortgage Market Deregulation and its Consequences’, 
Housing Studies 22 (2), pp. 201-220. 
Stockhammer, E. (2004) ‘Financialisation and the Slowdown of Accumulation’, 
Cambridge Journal of Economics 28 (5), 719–741. 
Stockhammer, E. (2009) ‘The Finance Dominated Accumulation Regime, Income 
Distribution and the Present Crisis’, Vienna University of Economics & B.A., 
Department of Economics Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 127, April, 
available at http://epub.wu-wien.ac.at/dyn/virlib/wp/eng/mediate/epub-wu-01 _ 
ecb.pdf?ID=epub-wu-01_ecb, accessed 18 September, 2009. 
Sumerlin, M. and Katzovitz, L.M. (2007) ‘Collateralized Debt Obligations: Who’s to 
Blame When the Market Blows Up?’ The Magazine of International Economic 
Policy, Summer 2007, pp. 12-13; 63. 
Svetlova, E. (2008) ‘Sinnstiftung in der Ökonomik: Wirtschaftliches Handeln aus 
Sozialphilosophischer Sicht’, Bielefeld: Transcript Verlag. 
Talbot, L.E. (2009) ‘Of Insane Forms. From Collectives To Management Controlled 
Organisations to Shareholder Value Organisation: Building Societies, A Case 
Study’, University of Warwick School of Law: Legal Studies Research Paper No. 
2009-04. 
Tayler, G. (2003) ‘UK Building Society Demutualisation Motives’, Business Ethics: A 
European Review 12 (4), pp. 394-402.  
Telegraph, The (2008, 26 September) ‘Bradford & Bingley’s Problems Blamed on 
Funding Model’.  
Thefreedictionary.com (2011) ‘Credit Risk’, available at: http://financial-
dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/credit+risk, accessed, 20 January 2011. 
Thisismoney.co.uk ‘Offset mortgages: Clear a Mortgage Early’, available at: 
http://www.thisismoney.co.uk/mortgages-and-homes/tips-and-guides/ 
article.html?in_article_id=394267&in_page_id=53957&in_advicepage_id=115, 
accessed 20 June 2010. 
 295
Thomas, J. (2004) ‘“Bound in by History”: The Winter of Discontent in British Politics 
1979-2004’, Media, Culture & Society 29, (2), pp. 263-283. 
Thornton, P. and Ocasio, W. (1999) ‘Institutional Logics’, American Journal of 
Sociology 105 (3), pp.801-843.  
Thrift, N. (2001) ‘”It’s the Romance Not the Finance that makes the Business Worth 
Pursuing”: Disclosing a New Market Culture’, Economy and Society 30 (4), pp. 412-
32. 
Times, The (1983a, 14 April) ‘Banks withdraw from the Fray’, p. 23. 
Times, The (1983b, 14 April) ‘Breaking Down the Traditional Role’, p. 23. 
Times, The (1986, 13 October) ‘Spectrum: Goodbye to the Golden Days/Big Bang’. 
Times, The (1997, 27 September) ‘Building Societies Are Going To Find It 
Increasingly Difficult To Remain Mutual’.  
Times, The (2008, 16 June), “Home truths”, available at: www.timesonline.co.uk 
/tol/comment/leading_article/article4143964.ece, accessed 30 October 2008. 
Torfing, J. (1999) ‘New Theories of Discourse: Laclau, Mouffe and Žižek’, Oxford: 
Blackwell. 
Torfing, J. (2004) ‘Discourse Theory: Achievements, Arguments and Challenges’, in: 
Howarth, D. and Torfing, J. (eds) ‘Discourse Theory in European Politics: Identity, 
Policy and Government’, Houndsmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan.  
USAGold.com (1999, 24 March) ‘Mr. Greenspan: a Proponent for Derivatives’, 
available at: http://www.usagold.com/greenspanderivatives.html, accessed 23 
August, 2009.  
Voter, the, (2011) ‘Political Dictionary’, available at: http://www.thevoter.org 
/glossary.php?word=hegemony, accessed 3 August 2011.  
Wainwright, T. (2009a) ‘Laying the Foundations for a Crisis: Mapping the Historical 
Geographical Construction of Residential Mortgage Backed Securitization in the 
UK’, International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 33 (2), pp. 372-88. 
Wainwright, T. (2009b) ‘ The Geographies of Securitization and Credit Scoring’, 
thesis submitted to the University of Nottingham for the degree of Doctor of 
Philosophy, School of Geography.  
Watson, M. (2009a) ‘Boom and Crash: The Politics of Individual Subject Creation in 
the Most Recent British House Price Bubble’, in: Schwartz, H. and Seabrooke, L. 
(eds.) ‘The Politics of Housing Boom and Bust’, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan. 
Watson, M. (2009a) ‘Boom and Crash: The Politics of Individual Subject Creation in 
the Most Recent British House Price Bubble’, in: Schwartz, H. and Seabrooke, L. 
(eds.) ‘The Politics of Housing Boom and Bust’, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan. 
 296
Weber, M. (1980) ‘Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft: Grundriß der verstehenden 
Soziologie’, 1. Halbband, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck. 
Weber, M. (2001) ‘The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism’, London: 
Routledge.  
Weintraub, E. R. (2002) Neoclassical Economics‘, The Concise Encyclopedia of 
Economics, available at: http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc1/ Neoclassical 
Economics.html, accessed 7 February, 2007. 
Wenman, M. A. (2003) ‘Laclau or Mouffe? Splitting the Difference’, Philosophy and 
Social Criticism 29 (5), pp. 581-606. 
Wilk, R. (1996) ‘Economies and Cultures: Foundations of Economic Anthropology’, 
Boulder, Colerado: Westview Press. 
Williams, G. A. (1960) ‘The Concept of “Egemonia” in the Thought of Antonio 
Gramsci: Some Notes on Interpretation’ Journal of the History of Ideas 21 (4), pp. 
586-599.  
Williams, K. (2000) ‘From Shareholder Value to Present Day Capitalism’, Economy 
and Society 29 (1), pp. 1-12. 
Williams, P. (2007) ‘Homeownership at the Crossroads?’, CML Housing Finance 2 
(2007), available at: http://www.cml.org.uk/cml/publications/research? Keyword 
=&key_area=0&date=0&page=4, accessed 20 November 2009. 
Williams, P. (2011) ‘The Credit Crunch in the UK: Understanding the Impact on 
Housing Markets, Policies and Households’, in: Forrest, R. and Yip, N.-M. (eds) 
‘Housing Markets and the Global Financial Crisis: The Uneven Impact on 
Households’, Cheltenham, Northampton: Edward Elgar, pp. 41-56. 
Williamson, J. (1999) ‘What Should the World Bank Think About the Washington 
Consensus’, Institute for International Economics’, paper prepared as a background 
to the World Bank’s Development Report 2000, available at: 
http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/paper.cfm?ResearchID=351, accessed 17 
October 2010. 
Willmott, H. (2005) ‘Theorizing Contemporary Control: Some Post-Structuralist 
Responses to Some Critical Realist Questions’, Organization 12 (5), pp. 747-780. 
Willmott, H. (2010a) ‘Identities in Organisations: From Interpretivist to Critical 
Analysis, working paper, University of Cardiff (working paper page numbers).  
Willmott, H. (2010b) ‘Creating “Value” Beyond the Point of Production: Branding, 
Financialization and Market Capitalization’, Organization 17 (5), pp. 517-542. 
Willmott, H. (2011) ‘Making Sense of the Financial Meltdown - An Extended Review 
of Andrew Gamble: The Spectre at the Feast: Capitalist Crisis and the Politics of 
Recession’, Organization, pp. 18 (2) pp. 239–260. 
Workingslives.Org (2010) ‘Industrial Conflict and Conciliation’, available at: 
 297
http://www.workinglives.org/research-themes/wlri-project-websites/cams/ industrial-
conflict-and-conciliation.cfm, accessed 15 July, 2010. 
Zaloom, C. (2006) ‘Out of the Pits: Traders and Technology from Chicago to 
London’, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 
Žižek, S. (1989) ‘The Sublime Object of Ideology’, London: Verso. 
Žižek, S. (1990) ‘Beyond Discourse Analysis’, in: Laclau, E. (1990) ‘New Reflections 
on the Revolution of Our Times’, London: Verso, pp. 249-260. 
Žižek, S. (1992) ‘Looking Awry: An Introduction to Jacques Laclan Through Popular 
Culture’, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.  
Žižek, S. (1997) ‘The Plague of Fantasies’, London: Verso. 
Žižek, S. (2006a) ‘Against the Populist Temptation’, Critical Inquiry 32, pp. 551–74. 
Žižek, S. (2006b) ‘Schlagend aber nicht Treffend’, Critical Inquiry 33 (1), pp. 185-
211. 
Žižek, S. (2009) First as Tragedy then as Farce, London: Verso. 
Zupančič, A. (2000) ‘Ethics of the Real: Kant and Lacan’, London: Verso. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
